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# THOUGHTS

ON THE

# MORAL ORDER OF NATURE.

BY ANNA MARIA WINTER.

IN THREE VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

DUBLIN:
JOHN CHAMBERS, 4, ABBEY-STREET.
1831.

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## "TO THE AUTHOR OF 'THOUGHTS ON THE MORAL ORDER OF NATURE.'"

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*"MY DEAR SISTER,*

*"I have read over your manuscript with the interest which, you will believe, I must take in a production of your pen; though, from the limited time which I had to devote to it, much more hastily than would have been necessary to a careful examination of the great variety of subjects it embraces.*

*"I think, however, I may take upon me to assure you, that the publication of it can be, in no respect, discreditable to you. Your work appears to me to afford proof of an observant, penetrating, capacious intellect, as well as of a pure and benevolent heart.*

*"As to those peculiar views which it unfolds, and which occupy so considerable a portion of it, I cannot undertake to pronounce an opinion upon them, and I am not, perhaps, well fitted to do so. Accustomed always to the practical concerns of mankind, and to contemplate them, in their various relations, according to the recognized, established principles of moral and social order, it may well be supposed that, at my present time of life, my mind may not be sufficiently open to the reception of new ideas on matters of this high importance. I must, therefore, as to all these points, refer you to the judgment of those enlightened readers which, I trust, your work will meet with, without pretending to anticipate what it may be. However, in your most novel speculations, I think they will, at least, discern the workings of a strong mind; as, I have no doubt, they will duly appreciate the force of character, and steadiness of purpose, which determined you, possessing the means of enjoying the amusements and pleasures of the world, to devote your time and thoughts to these profound meditations, and to the developement of views which you hoped might tend to advance the moral worth, dignity, and happiness of your fellow-creatures.*

*"Your very affectionate brother,*

*"JOHN PRATT WINTER."*

# ERRATA.

In page 24, line 28—For *this* read *his.*
..... 28, .... 13—After the word *high,* read *an* instead of *as.*
..... 41, .... 27—For *to him adore* read *to adore him.*
..... 53, .... 16—For *one* read *our.*
..... 76, .... 6—Between *of* and *life,* insert *this.*
..... 79, .... 35—After *once* read *he* instead of *be.*
..... 86, .... 4—For *beyound* read *beyond.*
..... 93, .... 7—For *keen* read *been.*
.....153, last line—For *it* read *they.*
.....165, .... 17—For *their* read *his.*
.....178, .... 33—For *devotednees* read *devotedness.*
.....193, .... 10—For *enlighted* read *enlightened.*
.....272, .... 32—For *studies* read *duties.*
.....344, 19-20—For *sor-w* read *sorrow.*
.....353, 21-22—Between *the* and *time* insert *first.*
.....490, .... 18—For *sensibilies* read *sensibilities.*

# DEDICATION.

TO

## GEORGE AND SAMUEL BOMFORD.

My Dear Nephews,

In dedicating this work to you, I am actuated by the hope that a careful study of the opinions consigned to it, and mature reflections on them, may induce you to form to yourselves more steady principles to guide you firmly in the paths of wisdom, than youths of your age are commonly directed by, at their entrance on life's tumultuous scene. Anxious relatives, fully competent to the arduous task, have, indeed, watched over your early years with such enlightened solicitude, that, though deprived of both your valuable parents at an age at which your memory could not serve to fix their images in your minds, you have always enjoyed precisely the same advantages of education, and the same heartfelt satisfaction, that would have fallen to your lot had you been living under the eye of a careful, yet indulgent father, and of a tender mother; nor could I, during the continuance of your childhood, moved though I was by a fond, maternal anxiety, which your orphan state compelled me to feel, forbear recognising with joy, that in fact the particular interest which you excited in me, was no more awakened by any substantial motive

than it would have been had the beloved authors of your existence been spared to you. If, now that you are about stepping forth into the busy haunts of men, I tremble more from figuring to myself the many snares that will beset you, than I should were your parents still alive, it is not that I doubt the zeal and affection with which your guardians will continue to advise you, nor that I do not feel the fullest assurance that you correspond perfectly to the lessons which you have imbibed from their precepts and example, by a sincere desire to become useful and honourable members of society; but, I know that the idea of being at liberty merely to consult their choice in their manner of living, is flattering to the best-intentioned youths, who early in life are their own masters, and often the wish to enjoy their independence, pushes them rashly on in the fatal career into which wild passion may have hurried them. This consideration it is, which makes me desirous to lend my feeble aid to enable you to reign truly over yourselves, by keeping your hearts obedient to the laws of right reason. Should the meditations which may perhaps exercise your thoughts after the perusal of this work, by leading you to take clearer and more extensive views of the situation which you are called on to fill in the social order, tend to attach you more firmly to the duties which it imposes on you, then, though the ideas exposed in this treatise should produce no other effect, I shall be amply rewarded for the assiduity of my endeavours to unfold them, nor will the long and painful sacrifices which my determination to write it has cost me, have been made in vain.

Your truly affectionate Aunt,

ANNA MARIA WINTER.

# INTRODUCTION.

THE principles developed in this work, and the views of the system of institutions and morals by which their correspondence with the design of Nature* might be practically illustrated, were suggested to me many years ago, by my observations and reflections on the Irish character, which I then supposed to belong to all mankind, being unacquainted with any country but my native one, and never having paid attention, on account of my thoughts being engaged by other themes, to those distinctions of national character of which conversation or books gave me an opportunity to obtain some knowledge.

Since that period, my travels to a few countries distinguished from Ireland by the modifications of the mental organization of their inhabitants, opened to my thoughts quite a new field of contemplation, which induced me to consider the design of the creation of mankind under various bearings that had before escaped my notice, and in consequence, to give to the plan of my work a much greater extension. But it still continues to bear the impress of the train of conclusions which first led me to form it, and is therefore, in its practical part, more directly suited to the Irish character than to any other. I have, however, forborne announcing in the title page its particular reference to it, for, though I think it probable that, by so doing, I might have arrested the attention of the public on my work, and obtained for it many readers; yet, do I prefer seeing it remain unknown, except to a few, rather than to push it forward into general knowledge, by leading the numbers who may read

* By the term *Nature*, I mean throughout this work nothing more than that concatenation and combination of causes and effects, by which the Creator conducts most of his visible system of natural and moral government.

its title, into a mistake respecting its drift; such a mistake they might be liable to fall into, were there any mention made of Ireland in the title affixed to the notice given of its publication, for they would be naturally led to suppose that it pointed out some remedy for the fatal disorders which so long prey on the vitals of my unhappy country; they would perhaps have suspected the female of presumption, or mental blindness, who could imagine that it was reserved for her to discover the means of alleviating the ills under which Ireland groans, after that so many learned and intelligent men had searched for them in vain; still, however, the subject is one of such urgent importance, that, even as a drowning person catches at a straw, so many of them would probably have perused this work with curiosity, to ascertain whether the imaginations of a woman's mind had suggested to her ought that might, should her counsels be followed, tend to lessen the woes of her country; I wish then, while I make it known that the following pages have a particular relation to the Irish, to declare also, that they have not been written in the view of checking the progress of our present calamities; their intention is merely to offer a slight sketch of a plan of social order, adapted to carry the Irish national character to the highest pitch of relative perfection which nature has formed it fit to reach. This plan is not in unison with notions on the same subject generally, I believe, prevailing; and I do not pretend to say that it could or ought to be introduced quickly into practice; nor do I attempt to indicate the means by which the Irish could be induced to calm the discordant passions which unhappily agitate them, and in concert labour ardently, yet peaceably, as this system supposes them to do, at the task of rendering their country flourishing and happy. I shall further add, that I do not make the slighest allusion to the revolutionary spirit which has broken out in Europe, since this work was completed previous to its appearance. 'Tis only a speculation, which perhaps may offer some interesting suggestions to the few who have leisure and inclination attentively to peruse it; I judge that my acknowledgment of the aim proposed in it, will be alone sufficient to prevent its having many readers, more particularly as the various vision-

ary speculations concerning the perfectibility of man, which appeared in the course of the last century, have made the subject at the present day be exploded, as one which could only be productive of senseless theories.

I do not seek to reclaim for the system which I here unfold, any more favourable hearing than existing prejudices may be willing to accord it. Let the multitude who may chance to hear discussions on it, smile, considering it the dream of an elderly woman: let most of its readers pronounce it to be such; I shall be satisfied, should a few intelligent persons read it with attention, struck with the idea that however chimerical it may be, since it appears like truth to one cool, reflecting mind, it probably contains some principles, the examination of which, even with an intention to refute them, may give to their thoughts a new and useful direction, leading to the discovery of some important truths in the science of training a nation to be virtuous and happy. My opinions on this subject I have no intention further to support—they are here explained—and should even a small number of enlightened persons take the trouble of becoming acquainted with them, they will, I am convinced, finally stand, or fall, according to their own intrinsic value. Sorry should I be to propagate any notion, the falsehood of which, either in this world or the next, I might one day learn: but while I freely and sincerely abandon my opinions to the reader, to receive from him the confutation to which they may be liable, I still think that I do well in inviting him to turn his thoughts into the channel which has been pursued by mine, so perfectly am I convinced that important good would result from its being minutely explored.

I was first led to give my thoughts that direction that has finally conducted me to this publication, by the melancholy in which, owing to the disturbed state of Ireland, I wore out my youth. While the anxieties and regrets which darkened so many minds in the counties most given up to the horrors of a civil war, cast a lowering cloud over the retirement in which I lived—which was seated within the precincts of the scene where it fiercely raged—often did my imagination, wearied with the uninterrupted contemplation of terrible disorder,

seek relief in tracing the image of a country wherein peace, prosperity, and brotherly love, universally reigned. Continually did I demand to myself to assign the reason why Ireland could not be placed in such a happy state, and urged incessantly by this question to study the character of the Irish as closely as I had opportunity, I arrived at last at the persuasion that no natural cause subsisted to hinder them from fully enjoying the blessing of love, of peace, and of a prosperity founded on a persevering, honest industry, or from uniting universally together to form one concordant, flourishing nation. I thought, however, that I could perceive that, in order thus happily to mould their dispositions, there ought to be advantage taken of many social feelings which were working obscurely within them, but which, if invigorated and fully expanded, would allow of each individual being under the influence of the rest of the community, in such a manner that all the members of the nation might improve each other, and firmly unite together in one happy commonwealth. It seemed to me, that this disposition of mankind to acknowledge a mutual salutary control, had never attracted the attention which it deserved from their governors, nor from those writers who sought by their publications to uphold good morals. The power of general opinion to check licentious minds, by the awe with which it inspired them, was indeed commonly acknowledged; the art too of improving mankind, by a judicious developement of those sentiments which give to one individual an ascendancy over another, had, in that branch of it which relates to the education of children, been as much advanced as it could be, where that branch was only eyed as offering in itself a complete science, and not as a subordinate portion of the system of operations by which the mutual influence of individuals could be so directed, as uniformly to attach them all to the laws of good order, virtue, and happiness.

Now that experience has verified the principle, that children by judicious management can be made greatly to direct—agreeably to the end proposed by their preceptors—each other's education, if few intelligent persons seem to have the curiosity to examine whether the principle could not be ren-

dered of more universal application, should the legislator and the wiser portion of mankind establish and watch over institutions, formed in the view to enlighten opinion, to purify morals, and incite in general the members of the community to stimulate each other in an honorable, virtuous career—if this want of curiosity almost every where subsists, I attribute, I confess, the little attention paid to so interesting a problem, to the shackles which prevent the growth of women's mind, and hinder them from exercising as extensive an influence over that of men, as suits the design of nature. The possibility of making all the members of society coalesce in such a manner, that the sentiment of their union shall be accompanied in their bosoms by the love of a calm, peaceable life, and by a disposition to form benevolently one happy community, does not attract the attention of men, because in the company merely of each other, those moral qualities by which they might be led to engage in an union of this desirable tendency, but faintly appear. 'Tis in the society of women that the human heart, in general, best exhibits those noble and amiable dispositions, which might be unfolded so as to carry nations to the highest perfection of virtue and felicity which they are capable of attaining. Men, however, think that they have much better opportunities than women, to become acquainted with the human heart; and so they undoubtedly have, in a manner that answers the ends of temporary expediency. They are much better acquainted with the human species, as it actually exists, with all its imperfections, all its vices about it. They know much better how to steer their bark in safety, amidst the shoals with which the passions of mankind surround it, and to take care of themselves in the midst of persons intent on outwitting them; but women have far more opportunity of penetrating into those folds of the heart, in which are deposited the first germs of the feelings that fit it, when they are fully developed, to put forth all its dignity, and to enjoy its utmost measure of true happiness, under a just and benevolent system of social order. In a word, men excel women in that knowledge of human nature which self-love, eager to promote its own ends, would wish to acquire: women have more opportunity to obtain that insight

into it which suits the views of social love, desirous to undertake the work of its improvement.

The conviction that women are better circumstanced and organized than men, for discovering in mankind the buds of those qualities too much nipt at present, which, properly fostered, might serve to make a whole nation unite with one mind to support a glorious, and truly beneficial system of social order, conducted me long since to the opinion that, though enlightened men, once their thoughts were turned to the means of opening in mankind a course to those sentiments which fit every individual in a nation for taking, agreeably to nature's design, an orderly and happy influence over the rest of its members, might greatly advance the knowledge of that design, and hasten the time when national characters should be moulded to it, yet must the first step, tending to demonstrate its existence, be taken by a female: this opinion naturally strengthened my resolution to make known to the public, the views on the subject which had attracted my notice.

After having extended the compass of my thoughts so as to make them comprise within their range, opinions respecting what the Irish national character would be, did it exactly correspond to that ideal type of relative perfection that nature had rendered it capable of realising, my meditations on the moral plan which this world was intended to accomplish, did not stop there. The consideration that mankind were endued with faculties proper to lead them to a much higher pitch of national virtue and happiness than they had ever yet attained, involving the idea that in the arcana of nature there was traced a type of the most perfect system of national order which could preside over the organization of human societies, I was led to reflect, that the Creator, in forming our species, had in view to fit individuals for uniting together as portions of a flourishing community on this earth, on the principle that it held a place, though probably a very low one, among the worlds which he had furnished with inhabitants, to the end, surely, that they might attain that degree of happiness suited to the position assigned them; and that therefore, though it might, under some points of view, be looked on as a gloomy land of exile, destined solely to purify us by affliction, till we

should become fit subjects for happiness in another life, yet that this idea should not so far dominate within us, as to discourage us from labouring to assure to this world its due portion of happiness. It is true, that as temporal concerns are often managed, it appears that all the thoughts of men which turn to the improvement of their lot here below, only conduct them to vice and disorder; so that the godly seem justified who behave, while sojourning on earth, as though they inhabited a house on fire which they cannot deliver from destruction, and where, in consequence, what they have to do is to save themselves and as many as hearken to them, from being involved in its ruin. But notwithstanding these disheartening appearances, not only my own observations on the human species, but the many examples which different ages afforded, of nations deserving of a certain admiration by an unusual display of fine qualities, which a comparatively good system of government had unfolded in them, convinced me that every individual ought to be trained to fill his place in a social system, established for making this world the abode of good order and happiness. Though, for want of this principle being well directed and steadily followed, most of the nations of the world have, for some thousand years, exhibited little but a miserable spectacle of the wretchedness in which guilt and ignorance have plunged unhappy mortals, I inferred, from the consideration of how much the human intellect was occupied in acquiring and diffusing lights which might aid men to ameliorate their condition, that mankind were destined to derive from experience the knowledge of the kind of institutions suited to them, and that, as members of a social community, they were to learn to distinguish and attach themselves to what was good, by their acquaintance with every kind of evil, of which vices or errors that had crept into their social system could be the source. If some nations, in the immense tract of time presented by history to our regards, astonish us by displaying the majesty in which human nature can array itself, when it is impelled by a high spirit, favoured by a suitable government, while at the same time they afflict us, on our perceiving that there was something false in the principle of their greatness, so that it could not produce permanent

effects, nor make their example beneficial to surrounding nations, I judged that it was the will of the Sovereign Disposer of events, that the memory of those moral phenomena should be transmitted to us, in order that we might learn duly to appreciate the lofty qualities which nations are capable of displaying, and that, whenever we had an opportunity again to call them forth, we might establish them on surer, and more liberal grounds.

The belief that mankind, considered as forming national associations, ought to keep constantly in view the means of effecting the happiness of this world, did not seem to me contrary to the doctrines of our Saviour, and the first christian writers; for, in all their precepts and exhortations, they mark their only intention to be, to improve the individual character of their disciples, leaving to the governing part of mankind to erect the social fabricks of which their disciples should be portions, and prescribing to the latter quietly to take their place in them, since their mission was merely to propagate a religious belief, too obscure at that time to occupy the attention of persons so situated as to have opportunity to labour effectually, in reference to the good of this world, at improving the condition of human societies. The disciples are constantly told by their Master, to respect the governments of the world as being ordained of God, which certainly could not mean that they were conducted in a sense conformable to his law; the persecutions of the saints, enacted by them and the infamous manner in which many of the Roman emperors reigned, amply proving the contrary; I therefore considered exhortations to this effect covertly to imply, that it was the will of providence to leave the research of the modes of government best suited to work out the felicity of this world, entirely to men's reason, and that it allowed them to go astray in the practical cultivation of this branch of knowledge, until, by turning their thoughts assiduously to it, from a profound conviction of its importance, they should learn at last how to fructify it, so as to diffuse among mankind the blessings of a virtuous and happy social order.

Should it be thought too presumptuous in a woman thus to dare to interpret texts of scripture agreeably to her own un-

derstanding, let it be remembered that I began to contemplate the world at an epoch when individuals were generally encouraged, by the opinions in vogue, to exercise their own reason in determining the degree of assent due to dogmas, which were recommended to their belief by the most sacred authority; let it be also remembered, that I lived in a country which did not then, as unhappily it does not now, exhibit the christian religion in the light of a celestial messenger spreading peace and good will amongst men; and my audacity in seeking to form, for my own satisfaction, original opinions on matters of religion, will not probably be thought so reprehensible as perhaps it might justly be considered, had I lived in a country where the established religious belief reigned unquestioned in every breast, and where it universally disposed mankind to charity, and mutual good will.

I think it right, however, explicitly to declare, that my hardy speculations have not conducted me to reject the fundamental doctrine of our holy religion: so far from the order of nature, as I conceive of it, militating against the belief that a Heavenly Redeemer died to restore us to God, it appears to me perfectly to harmonize with this consoling doctrine.

The natural, moral order cannot certainly be considered in all its bearings, without embracing so wide an extent in the range of our thoughts, that sentiments of natural religion flow from it, which should perhaps sometimes serve to explain an obscure point in revelation; sometimes also it will be found, that reason does well to confess its own impotence to enlighten us on the whole of our destiny, and that it should therefore bend submissively before a supernatural revelation, instead of hearkening to its own suggestions.

I have established for myself the principle that natural sentiments of religion ought, when right reason will allow of it, to keep respectful silence wherever they do not agree with a clear revelation:—

Firt—Because the history of the world gives ample reason to think that pure, natural sentiments of religion, springing from a belief of the unity of the Godhead, would never have been developed in the multitude without the aid of revelation, so that I revere it as the kindly instructor who has taught us

to form consoling and improving conceptions in matters of religion.

Secondly—Because, even did the view of nature, and the knowledge of ourselves suggest to us without the aid of revelation, fine, salutary notions of religion, we should not, from dreading lest they were nothing more than splendid illusions, dare to place confidence in them. We find it so necessary to make experience and positive knowledge the data from which we part, in judging on natural grounds of the conditions of our existence, that, where they entirely fail us, as they do relatively to the matters about which religious sentiments are conversant, such as—the being of the Creator—the intent of creation—and a future life, we have not courage to put any trust in the reasonings on harmonies and analogies by which we endeavour to supply their place. In order, therefore, to engage us to pursue those reasonings, with the hope of their leading to satisfactory results, it is necessary that we stay the groundwork of our religious belief on a supernatural revelation.

But I consider mankind, once they are possessed of sufficient knowledge to perfect the happiness of human societies, as entitled to interpret the various dark dogmas of religion, in a manner tending to sanction the distinctions established by reason and experience, between good and evil. Such a mode of proceeding may, agreeably to my apprehension, be vindicated by the following argument.

It seems to me that, among the natural and moral phenomena whence strong presumptions may be derived in favor of the truth of natural religion, noble, established systems of national order occupy an important rank. When it is observed how favorable they are to the happiness, and the expansion in all their dignity of the virtuous sentiments of mankind; when it is known that they have been prepared by a long succession and immense combination of causes and effects, the heart naturally ascends to the Deity with a persuasion that such a vast machinery, productive of such glorious effects, must have been set in motion by him for some adequate final cause; nor can we find one sufficiently great to be proportionate to the means employed for arriving at it, otherwise than in the con-

jecture that the order of things promoting our happiness and developing our virtues here below, has an important bearing on the moral order of the universe, as well as on our own future condition. Unlike the proofs of a particular providence which, as I have reason to think, every religious person gleans from the events of his own life, the tokens of a general one, exhibited by a system of national order reducing into practice nature's ideal type of human perfection, are equally manifest to every intelligence, so that each individual, by hearkening to the opinion of others concerning them, has an opportunity to enlighten and rectify his own. On this account, the consideration of systems of national order, presents, I think, to human reason, a field peculiarly proper for the establishment of her proofs of natural religion. Weak as she is, and liable to be falsely biassed in each individual when she explores regions wherein the human heart has an immediate interest, the most decisive argument which she can make use of to induce mankind to acknowledge the truth of her opinions, is to shew that it is generally recognised by candid inquirers.

Natural religion thus imbibed from the survey of a happy and noble moral order, assuring the prosperity and virtue of nations, can only be slowly developed, for it must keep pace with the progress of the arts and sciences, by which mankind learn rightly to exercise their faculties and to perfectionate their governments. But though natural and revealed religion were destined, if I may be allowed the expression, to arrive at their maturity at very different periods, revealed religion having been most vigorous and offering the freshest proofs of her divine origin, in an age when natural religion, owing to the wretchedness of human governments, was only in embryo ; yet are they intimately united, tending so much to elucidate the same subject, that revelation could not in many respects afford us full satisfactory lights to guide us to the perfection of our nature, without either encroaching on the office of natural religion, by fully unfolding to mankind all the mysteries of their condition, and presenting to them a delineation of that happy social order that they were fitted to realize—thus withdrawing them by supernatural means from the state of ignorance from which it was fitting that they should emerge, solely by the

exercise of their own understanding—or else obliging them to establish on earth a virtuous and happy social system, in submission to its authority and without making use of their reason.

The christian revelation neither enlightens men in a supernatural manner on the system of social polity adapted to their nature, nor obliges them to establish it while yet ignorant of its value, for it publishes its doctrines in such a dark, mysterious manner, as to give its disciples no insight whatsoever into the advantages attendant on a good system of social polity formed to advance the prosperity of this world, nor any ray of knowledge relative to those arts and sciences, an acquaintance with which is requisite for perfectionating such a system. During the ages in which the lights of the human understanding were too feeble to point out to it a type of a fine, national moral order, capable of being reduced to practice, the christian revelation humanized the characters of its disciples, without however preventing their falling into numberless errors, concerning the mode of rendering nations virtuous and flourishing, and without its being found necessary to understand it in such a manner as it will be requisite to do, when the science of forming national characters shall be carried to perfection, and that it will be perceived that the dictates of revelation were intended to accord with those of the wisdom which mankind shall at last have gleaned, by exercising their reason to discover the natural means of establishing peace and happiness on earth.

After that the ideas on the subject with which—without my proposing any end in the indulgence of them—my thoughts had been long conversant, had, by continual observations on the scenes that human nature was exhibiting around me, and the train of meditations that I in consequence pursued, multiplied to such a degree, and become so linked together, that I could elicit from them a regular system of principles for the good government of my countrymen, then, and not till then, did it occur to me, that, though general opinion and established usage forbade my intermeddling in such weighty matters, I might still do well humbly to lay before the public the

opinions which I had formed on the important topic that had so long absorbed my attention.

Still, however, I could not determine to act agreeably to the persuasion that the ideas which my reflections on those topics had presented to me might, were they exposed to the public, suggest to learned and intelligent persons several hints calculated to open to them new and useful views on the nature of a good social system—I could not determine to act agreeably to this persuasion, without being alarmed myself at the boldness of my resolution. It seemed to me that should I thus claim a hearing from my countrymen, it would be impossible to convince them that I did not set up for knowing better than any of them how to treat affairs, to the management of which it was more or less their business to attend, while it was none of mine. I imagined that, however I might plead innocent to such a charge, I should still be universally accused of having raised an absurd pretension to the discovery of a panacea for the ills afflicting Ireland. To avoid being thus publicly made a subject of mockery, I thought it would be wise of me to repair to some city of Europe where my work could steal into print unheeded, except by a few inquiring minds, who might bestow on its contents that calm, impartial investigation, which was the only kind of notice that I wished them on their first publication to obtain. Reflections of this nature having induced me eagerly to profit of an opportunity to travel to different countries separated from us by the sea, with a view of determining which of them best suited my purpose, my observations on them decided me finally to choose Paris for the place where I should first lay before the public the thoughts contained in these volumes. In that great city, I judged that I could most reasonably hope, both that profound and judicious critics would carefully examine the principles advanced in my work, and also that its author would not be punished by the taunts of censorious scoffers, for her temerity in writing it. In a city, where such multitudes of *literati* abounded, it was to be presumed that my book might fall from the press as tranquilly as I wished, from having no other appearance than that of one of the many new publications presenting original ideas on the most serious matters, which,

like new writings of every description, were continually soliciting, in the French capital, the notice of the public: and I concluded that, should my opinions at last draw the attention of any of my countrymen, no mistake could arise as to my motive for giving them publicity, so evidently would it be seen that I could have had no other than the wish to offer to a few candid, thoughtful readers, food for their meditations.

Induced by these reflections, I settled in Paris, and I should be wanting in gratitude to the amiable, friendly persons whom I there met with, did I not avow that the utmost which my hopes had anticipated was done by them, to ensure the success of my project. Though my occupations obliged me to live in such retirement as might well give me reason to fear that I should at last be forgotten by all my acquaintance and abandoned to total solitude, most of the families whom I knew proved to me, from first to last, that they remembered me in the kindest manner, and that, even when a dread of intruding on my busy hours made them seldom seek my company, I might count upon the zeal with which, should I give them an opportunity, they would facilitate to me the execution of my literary project, or render me any other service, which, as a stranger in the country, I might wish to receive from them. Their good offices and encouragement smoothed every difficulty which a foreign land and foreign language offered to intimidate me from endeavouring to take a place among the female writers of their country. Every circumstance combined to flatter me with the hope that this my principal work, the only one indeed for whose sake I was ever induced to appear as an author—for it was merely the wish that my name might not be entirely unknown, whenever I should offer this publication to the literary world, that determined me previously to undertake a few others—every circumstance combined to make me believe that this work, as soon as it issued from the press, would be read by an ample number of enlightened persons, when my project of publishing it in France was rendered abortive by a fit of illness into which I fell, in consequence of my inability to control my own feelings. After a residence of some years in the country to which I intended my writings to belong, when I found that, in order to let this work ap-

pear as one of its literary productions, I must still remain in it some years longer, I became, in spite of my efforts courageously to uphold my resolution, such a prey to nostalgia, as totally incapacitated me from pursuing my studies, and finally convinced me that, to avoid sinking entirely under it, it was absolutely necessary, that I should speedily return to my natural friends and country.

In Ireland then I at last give a public existence, and a form that may render them sensible to another mind, to the ideas that have for many years been constantly contemplated by me with so much affection, that I long imagined that it was quite equal to me in what country I lived, provided I could fix myself in one propitious to my desire to introduce them into public and to obtain an impartial hearing for them. Ireland is indeed the country where they are most entitled to attract from the public some attention, but the very circumstance of their being drawn from the consideration of the Irish character, is the one which makes me peculiarly diffident in laying them before my countrymen, and which urges me to entreat them to preserve, in perusing them, liberal, indulgent views of the motives which determined me to commit them to the press.

I shall moreover put forward a hope, that whoever undertakes the perusal of this work will in every respect prepare himself to judge it with liberality and indulgence. My expressions, I am convinced, are often not the best chosen for conveying my meaning with clearness and precision. The want too of a logical method in the arrangement of my ideas, will frequently, I believe, be perceived, and will perhaps sometimes put to a severe proof the patience of the reader. The fact is that, previous to the time when my thoughts began to embrace the general scheme of this work, I had neither from education, nor from habitual studies, acquired the command of a style proper to unfold it with method in appropriate terms. Afterwards, when I had determined to commit my conceptions to writing, it was then too late to learn to clothe them in the language best adapted to the communication of them, for I had become so accustomed to attending to the substance of my thoughts, heedless of the forms by which a knowledge of them might be imparted to another, that I found it extremely difficult to acquire

the art of expressing them with ease and propriety. This difficulty was rendered insuperable by the feeble state of my health, which, during the whole time of my projecting this work, has been so infirm, as frequently to make me almost despair of its allowing me to finish it, even in the most imperfect form through which the nature of the spirit animating it could, by attentive observers, be recognised. To nothing more than rudely to make known my meaning, did my frail health permit me to aspire, for even attempting to do thus much was so fatiguing as to be injurious to it; and it was utterly impossible for me to sustain the additional labour of learning to write in a suitable style. I have even to lament that, during the years in which I have been maturing the system here exposed, my sickly state of health has disabled me from much enriching my mind, and opening to it new views, by the perusal of the works of good authors. Zeal to execute well such an undertaking as this, would have engaged me to study the writings of historians, travellers, natural and moral philosophers, and to get acquainted with the principles generally received of national œconomy, and social polity. On all these subjects, I have but a very slight, superficial knowledge. There is not perhaps any literary topic which, more than the one treated of in the following work, seems to demand that the person intent on the developement of its different branches, should be one of deep and extensive reading, and I doubt that any one ever engaged in the composition of a book, concerning matters of general importance, who was not better acquainted than I am with the works already in existence, the perusal of which might enable him to treat in a more masterly manner the subject that he proposed elucidating. To my ignorance of the writings of other authors ought perhaps to be imputed many of the defects of my work: owing to it, I shall sometimes support a principle that I endeavour to establish, by the mention of known facts, which I shall however only vaguely notice, from having no acquaintance with the authors who recount them, except what I acquired at an early period of life, when my reading was quite of a desultory kind, and only left in my memory confused reminiscences. If the little knowledge which I possess of books, be one cause of the many imperfections of the one which I here

present to the public, I hope at least that the defects observable in it, which may be traced to this source, will not prevent the thoughtful reader from gleaning from it nearly as many useful hints as though they did not subsist. They make the sketch which I here offer him of nature's plan of moral order more vague, perhaps more erroneous, than it otherwise would be; but, had my health allowed of my employing to the utmost all my native faculties, to render my work just and comprehensive, it would still have remained but an unfinished sketch, so that the principal advantage which the reader could have reaped from the study of it, would have been derived from the nature of the impulsion given to his own thoughts. In its present state it will, I hope, serve equally to incite him to make researches into the mysteries of our destiny, at a point at which nature, I believe, has not entirely refused to lay them in some degree open to man's investigation.

It will perhaps occur to the reader that, instead of going to the fatigue of endeavouring to render the scheme of moral order which appears to me that of nature, intelligible to many, I should have done better simply to disclose my thoughts respecting it to a friend better able to deck them in a guise satisfactory to judicious critics. Such a friend,* it is well known, I have the happiness of possessing, and his amiable disposition would perhaps have led him willingly to forego for a time attention to his own affairs, in order to employ the clear dialectic and the persuasive elegance of his style, in arranging in a lucid method, and setting forth to the highest advantage, the ideas which I lay before the public. The task of placing them in the light in which they would have been most easily comprehended, and appeared most pleasing, would certainly have been a light one to him, though I could not, after long and wearisome efforts, entirely accomplish it.

From having recourse to such a measure, I was deterred by the consideration, that, to explain my ideas clearly to one individual, I must just take as much trouble, as though I meant to offer them to the perusal of several. No doubt that after I had laid them down in the form in which I here submit them to the reader's attention, an affection well merited by its object

* See Letter to the Author following Title page.

and deeply rooted in my breast, combining with the reverence due from me to superior virtues and talents, urged me strongly to apply for having them cast in a better mould, by a pen that could easily have done so. But I did not dare to listen to such a suggestion of my heart; being dissuaded from complying with it by my jealous anxiety concerning this fruit of my mental labours. I have, with the most unremitting attention, for a long course of years, ripened it till it has become what it now is; and when I considered that Irishmen in general of my standing in life, particularly those of distinguished abilities, had been compelled by duty and necessity, from their early years, to occupy themselves with the deepest interest about the politics of the day, it seemed to me utterly impossible, that even the most powerful mind, which had been so long accustomed to be thus employed, could operate such a revulsion of its thoughts, as quickly to become so completely penetrated with my ideas, that it could not only express them in a better style than I could myself, but also render them as exactly. I therefore, though I would not publish such a momentous work without submitting it beforehand to the inspection of one who had a good right to expect that he should be first made acquainted with it, determined to let it preserve the form, which, however it might want grace, or symmetry, faithfully expressed my ideas, and exhibited them, bearing the stamp of the mind whence they drew their origin.

After all I have said respecting the trouble that the composition of this work has given me, the reader may be surprised at its appearance, which happily is not very voluminous. This surprise will lessen when he knows that the cause of my writing it with such toil and difficulty, was in a great measure the wish to comprise it within the smallest compass which it could bear and allow of my thoughts being perfectly intelligible. I do not consider that I have fully succeeded, as it is still, I am convinced, drawn out to a needless length. My meaning, however, is not, I hope, lost in a wild waste of words, as it would have been, had I published this book some years ago.

Now that I have exposed my motives for advancing a plea to have my work treated with indulgence by the reader, both as to its purport and its style, I shall briefly mention the dif-

ferent parts of which it is composed, and the order in which I have placed them.

I divide it into three parts. In the first I expose those views that I take of our nature and the conditions of our existence, the understanding of which, though they have not an immediate relation to the practical scheme of social order here laid down, is necessary towards conveying a notion of this entire system, and I proceed to the unfolding of those conjectures on our future destiny and the design of our creation, which appear to my reason, when it parts from the supposition that nature adapted mankind to a plan of national order beneath which they should at last range themselves, best to agree with what we perceive of the Creator's design in placing them in this present life. In this part, as well as in the remaining ones, I sometimes find it necessary to enter into such details on the nature of our mental qualities, as would make too long an interruption to the main subject in discussion. In those cases, I throw my remarks concerning them into notes affixed to each chapter, which are therefore, though presented in this detached form, to be considered as an essential part of the work.

The second part relates to the plan which nature pursues in modifying differently the mental faculties and dispositions of the natives of various parts of the globe. My notions on this subject I offer, as nothing but very hazarded conjectures, well aware, that they are grounded on *data* insufficient to warrant any positive conclusions. The distinctions of national character certainly kept my curiosity incessantly awake, to discover what they signified to be nature's design in establishing them, from the time when they first attracted my notice, to the epoch of my life at which I ceased to have an opportunity to observe them—that is, during the years which elapsed between my departure from my native land and my return to it. Throughout this whole period, I neglected no opportunity that offered itself to me to observe, and compare persons of different countries. However a woman of retired habits could not, as it may well be supposed, have great facilities for pursuing with profit this kind of study. To make such a multitude of observations as would be requisite to establish, on plausible grounds, a system concerning the plan which nature pursues

in forming the distinctions of national character, it would be necessary not only to visit a far greater number of foreign nations than I have done, and to go much more into society, but also to pass and repass several times between the country where you have spent the early part of your life—the peculiar features of whose inhabitants must ever appear to you, as I may say, like the original air, of which other national characters are varieties—and the one, the characteristic distinctions between whose inhabitants and your countrymen, you wish to be able accurately to trace; every time that you thus remove from one country to the other, you will make some remarks on the distinctive habits or appearance of the natives of them, which had before escaped you: in like manner you should enable yourself to seize all the points of comparison subsisting between various foreign nations, by paying them in succession frequent visits: it would further be necessary towards learning rapidly to distinguish various national physiognomies, to have a much more penetrating sight than mine, for discerning objects at a distance. 'Tis by having the ability to dart a clear, comprehensive glance amongst a number of persons whose local position gives to your eye a considerable range at the moment of surveying them, that you learn rapidly to distinguish amidst the endless varieties of individual physiognomy, those distinctions of countenance, that uniformly characterize the persons belonging by their origin to certain countries. Conscious then, that my opportunities to study the national characteristic appearance of the natives of various countries, have been extremely limited, I shall just try to render the reader acquainted with the nature of the impressions made on me, by the different national physiognomies which I had occasion to remark; and I hope, without entering into a tiresome developement of the train of reflections and reasonings which my observations on this matter incited me to pursue, to make him comprehend how I was ultimately conducted to form those notions respecting the scheme of nature in modifying national characters, which I offer to his consideration.

As to my description of the distinctive manner in which the vital element plays in the countenance of the natives of various countries, I know that it must appear vague and un-

satisfactory, if not quite unintelligible. In regard to it, I regret my inability to draw portraits; for had I a masterly talent of that kind, I could, with a few strokes of a pencil, render my meaning far more evident than it could be made by the most elaborate explanation in writing. It is I know, exceedingly difficult to apply my observations on the play of this element to the human countenance, so as to ascertain by them the country to which a stranger owes his origin, but yet *I* have so often done so with success, that I feel myself warranted to assure the reader that they are not chimerical. I am convinced, that did a good portrait painter know how to analyse the human physiognomy in the manner that I have been accustomed to do, he would, owing to the opportunities which he would have closely to examine it, and the quick discernment of the nature of its expression which he would gain from the habit of rendering it in a copy, acquire such an ability to trace the element animating it, through all its windings, that he could not only determine with certainty the country to which each individual's parents belonged—provided their ancestors had been settled in it for some generations—but also name with unerring assurance, in the case of a mixed origin, the different countries whence it was derived.

I shall here warn the reader, that what I say relatively to the flow of the element in question, relates entirely to the manner in which it is uniformly modified in different parts of the globe, and has no reference whatsoever to those peculiar casts of features which, in some countries lead to suppose that they were originally partly peopled by the colonies of one nation and partly by those of another. For instance, when I say that in the Spanish, and the Irish countenance, the element under consideration appears to me—allowance made for the different mode of action of a cold and warm climate—to have in a considerable degree the same flow, I am far from intending to allege this circumstance, as a proof of our Milesian origin. Whether the Spaniards or any other nation first peopled this isle, is, I own, a matter of indifference to me, nor have my studies ever been directed in the view of throwing light on it. It is certain that I have principally remarked the Irish aspect among the descendants of the English and Scotch; but the in-

habitants of all parts of the island, whatever diversity of features may be found among them, seem to me to have the same national physiognomy in respect to the point of view wherein I have considered them, that is, in relation to the manner in which the principle that gives life to their countenances spreads itself through them.

In the third part, I expose my reasons for believing, that the Creator has formed mankind agreeably to a type of national perfection existing in himself, and on which the governments and social institutions of the various countries of the earth shall at last be modelled. The leading position of this part is, that the rank actually assigned to women in the social system, is far from being as high as one as it will be whenever mankind shall have realized in their mode of government the type of the perfection to which nations are to arrive. The situation wherein women are placed, seems to me to call at this instant for the serious attention of philosophers and legislators, since various nations who have lately shaken off a foreign yoke are now endeavouring, with the aid of that mass of political knowledge which overflows the civilized world, to range themselves under a solid and happy system of government, calculated to render them respectable by an energetical developement of their intellectual faculties, and of their noblest moral qualities; and I own, that I do not believe that the most fortunate combination of circumstances, can crown such an enterprize with a durable happy success, as long as woman is not put in such a relation with the national government, as shall naturally add much to her importance, and accustom her thoughts to contemplate a far wider range of duties than her present situation impels them to become acquainted with. Till circumstances engage her much more than they do at present to prepare herself for being a firm and rational supporter of a virtuous system of government and national morals, the countries that seek to new model their political institutions, will, I am afraid, exhibit the deplorable spectacle of people who grasp at the freedom with which civilization might be accompanied, from having an intellect so enriched with knowledge as to appreciate its value, but who, from their intractable, selfish passions, are only fit for slavery. If the reader should be inclined to think, as I know

many do, that experience has amply proved that mankind are made of too barbarous stuff ever to be adapted by their moral character to such a government as would appear to reason consonant to their dignity, I must own that I protest against this assumption, for, I lay it down as a principle, that experience never will have proved the inability of nations to rise by their moral character to as lofty an eminence, as enlightened human reason wishes to see them occupy, till every possible effort has been made to strengthen, by exercise, the understanding of women; to raise their sentiments to the highest pitch of magnanimity; and to augment in proportion their influence over men.

I think it advisable here to give notice that, neither the circumstances of my life, nor the bent of my studies have disposed me to view my own sex with partiality. No *esprit de corps* attaches me to it. Like most women whose general affections have not received some peculiar bias from events which have made a deep impression on them, I interest myself equally in all human nature, being perfectly convinced, by my reason and feelings, that the sex to which womens' protectors, as well as the guides who principally form their character belong, which usually too furnishes them their nearest and dearest relatives, has as much claim as their own on their sympathetic tenderness. The present state of things often, it is said, leads to women being cruelly oppressed, and females who have witnessed enormities of that nature, may well be stimulated to plead the cause of their sex, by a deep fellow-feeling with the sufferings to which it may be liable. But no motive of that kind has determined me to endeavour to show, that women ought to fill a more advantageous situation. My reasonings to prove this proposition, have been all drawn from my own observations, and it never lay in my way to witness any hardships, attesting an ungenerous propensity in men to that abuse of power to which the weakness of their sex exposes women. The blessings of life have seemed to me always very fairly shared with them by the men on whom they depended, and my reason for complaining of their situation being too confined is, that I think that unspeakable good would accrue to the entire nation, from

their being placed in as lofty, and enlarged a one, as the fiat of nature allots to them.

The main object of this part being to prove that mankind, considered as divided into national communities, are capable of reducing themselves under such political and social systems, as could render manifest a glorious and consistent design running through the visible creation, while a division of the first part is chiefly founded on the supposition that the existence of such a design is already proved, a logical distribution of the matter of this work would seem to have required the last part to be put before that portion of the first, which offers some conjectures on our relations with unknown worlds. In fact a regular exposition of the theory here laid down would have demanded that the last part, exhibiting those principles of human nature which fit mankind for the blessings of a free and prosperous system of internal government, should have been placed the first, the second part, which gives my reasons for believing, that all nations were meant to unite together for the good of all, the different modifications of their characters being such as to enable them to take a happier influence over each other, should next have followed; and after having unfolded all the arguments from which I conclude that one harmonious, benevolent and nicely combined system reigns through the moral constitution of the world, I should, from the consideration of the noble moral plan which the principal parts of the earth might, and will, I trust, one day reduce to practice in their government, have proceeded, taking analogy for my guide, to expose my conjectures on those laws of order which govern the whole moral universe. I have adopted a contrary method, from the belief that it was necessary, first to fix the reader's attention on the relations which probably subsist between this world, viewed as a place susceptible of an arrangement under a fine system of national institutions, and the unknown parts of the universe, in order to prevent his regarding mankind in a vulgar, contemptuous light, at the moment of perusing the part of the work, which relates to the mode of establishing at home a system of morals and government, stamped with the approbation of nature. It will be necessary for him to be penetrated with that sentiment of the majesty of the human species, which

a religious doctrine calculated fully to display that majesty can alone teach him, before it will be possible to get him to hearken without prejudice to principles, by the practical application of which, as I endeavour to prove, mankind might be raised to a lofty pitch of perfection. Unmoved by a sublime sentiment of natural religion, not only would he read all the details into which I enter, to prove that the various individuals of a society, particularly those of different sexes, might take over each other an influence tending to keep the whole community obedient to the laws of a truly glorious system of order—not only would he read such details with an incredulous smile, as believing them to be at best but a description of a machinery, which may be perceived among the peaceable inclinations of the human heart, but which is not animated by a spirit of sufficient force to resist the shocks which it must constantly receive from turbulent passions; but, unless the members of the nation were vigorously impelled in a virtuous career, by the belief that the creator intended that this world should be ruled by laws in harmony with those presiding over the order of the universe, the mutual influence of different characters, however justly it might be made to bear on each individual, would certainly offer but a feeble check to the impetuous current of his passions. It therefore seemed to me indispensable, before I proceeded to the exposition of the practical part of this system, to prove that there could be drawn from the consideration of it such sentiments of natural religion as, supported certainly by revelation, could make the desire to fulfil the will of God, and to serve man, predominate in almost every heart over the propensity to gratify sinful inclinations.

I avoid entering into any disquisition about the principle and object of our moral sentiments, being desirous to decline treating of matters which have been amply handled by more able writers. I do not pretend either to give very exact definitions of what constitutes the distinction between virtue and vice, for it is nowise my intention to endeavour to refer to rigorous theorems the whole science of ethics. On the contrary, I take for granted, that whatever be the reader's speculative opinions on the subject, his practical views of right and wrong, sufficiently accord with mine, and I therefore, when I mention

virtue, vice, or any of our moral qualities, proceed on the supposition that we attach to my expressions much the same meaning. My intention is not to determine the nature of any of our moral propensities, considered in itself, but merely to point out how the good ones might be made to flourish almost universally in a nation, and triumph over the bad, by means of mutual influence, and a system of morals and politics consonant to the design of our Creator. In noting, however, those springs of the heart, of which advantage might be taken to lead it to the love of virtue and good order, and in marking the bearings which its virtuous and orderly affections may have on its destiny in a future life, I shall sometimes be obliged to resolve the faculties and qualities of the human mind into what seems to me their primary elements. Where it may appear to the reader that I conduct this process badly, so as to be induced by it into error, should he still think me right in the inference which I draw from it, relative to the method of guiding mankind to virtue, or the place which they fill in the system of the universe, though he believe that the lights which give us some insight into these subjects, do not shine from the quarter where I think I discern them, I request him to pay more attention to the truth of the proposition at which I arrive, than to the connexion which I falsely imagined that I perceived existing between it and erroneous premises. My object is to exhibit not only this world, but also other parts of the universe, as being created in conformity to one great plan of moral order, and also to show how the part of that plan which relates to this world might be carried to its consummation; and if the general sketch which I present of it, serve to convince the reader that the belief of its existence sheds grandeur and harmony over the whole creation, let him not cavil, as though they were the prime matters claiming his attention, at any erroneous positions by which I may endeavour to strengthen, though they really only weaken, some of its details. If once the consistency of the system here exposed, with what is known of the operations of either moral or physical nature, be generally acknowledged, any partial errors which I may commit in unfolding it, will be easily rectified; and doubtless much time will not elapse before they shall be made quite to disappear from the arguments serving to sustain it:

for pens far more skilful than mine will quickly, I presume, undertake to explain it in a better method and to diffuse around it all the evidence of which it may be susceptible.

My manner of unfolding my opinions will often, I fear, particularly in the third and practical part, be found tiresome and unsatisfactory. I expose, at great length, the errors which mankind commit, on account of deviating from the order of nature; and I say but little of the institutions, the establishment of which might perfect our social system. Yet this latter subject is probably the one, on which the reader will feel principally desirous to become acquainted in detail with my conceptions. He will perhaps grow impatient at finding his attention drawn to a long series of evils for which I do not point out any specific remedy.

The fact is, that I believe that the few hints that I give, relative to the first measures by which mankind might be drawn nearer to the path of social order, wherein nature intends them to tread, are sufficient to engage intelligent minds to look for that path in its right direction, and to enable them, when society has entered upon it, to enlighten it on the various bearings of the complicated windings which it ought to follow. It would be unwise of me I think, to undertake to trace precisely all the practical forms of the state in which mankind, on their arrival at their national perfection would be placed, for I believe it to be impossible, without the aid of close observation on the results of practical experiments, to adapt a social theory perfectly to the moral constitution of the human race. The detailed description that I draw of the errors which it is liable to commit, when it follows the propensity that the most turbulent spirits at times feel, to live in a peaceable, regular manner, will, I hope, help to enlighten those who may seek cautiously to lead it on step by step to the full accomplishment of nature's system of social order, on the various wrong conceptions of it, which would be most likely to tempt them to deviate from the right line.

I have been further induced to confine myself to a very brief sketch of those social institutions to which the nation in a state perfection would be submitted, because the views that I present respecting them, relate principally to the advantage that would

ensue from the establishment of them among the higher classes, with whom, I think, the work of national improvement ought to begin. I do not attempt to point out the mode in which they should be extended, so as that the conduct of the great body of the people might be assimilated by them to that of their superiors, because I do not pretend exactly to foresee, what would be the relative position of the different classes. My opinions are only drawn from a consideration of the moral propensities of mankind, and in order to trace with minute precision a plan of this nature, it would be requisite to be adequate to a scientifical investigation of the correspondence subsisting between their physical wants and the productions of the globe which they inhabit. Such an investigation it is beyond my ability, and foreign to the design of my work to undertake: I cannot discern the point to which, under the most perfect system of social order, property would be equalized; of this only I am convinced, that the more it shall be equally divided among all the individuals composing the nation, without giving rise to disorderly habits, or vulgar tastes, the more the nation will be distinguished by its energetic, industrious spirit, its virtue and happiness.

This system is chiefly moulded on the principle, that men are to be incited in their industrious or ambitious undertakings by a spirit of individual competition; yet I sincerely hope that, they could often be engaged to carry on their laborious enterprises by mutual co-operation, though I do not believe, that it could ever be made a principle of action so commensurate to the wants, physical and moral of mankind, as entirely to supersede the necessity of exciting in them a spirit of either individual, or party competition. The emulation to excel a rival, seems to me a passion so necessary towards the developement of the moral energies of mankind, that, though its sphere of operations may be narrowed, and social sympathies partly taught to supply its place, yet do I believe, that the great fundamental duty of the guides of the people will ever be, first—to impel them vigorously to action, by means of a spirit of rivality; secondly—to teach them to keep that spirit subordinate to just, and generous sentiments.

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# PREFATORY EXPOSITION

## OF SOME OPINIONS HELD BY THE AUTHOR ON THE SUBJECT OF REVEALED RELIGION.

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§ 1.—In the foregoing introduction I sincerely profess myself to be a steady believer in the authenticity of the divine revelation propounded to us in holy writ, and in the expiatory sacrifice of the Son of God. Yet, as the design of this work does not lead me to treat of revealed religion—which subject is amply elucidated by far more able pens—and, as it continually incites me to break forth into warm eulogies of natural virtues—as if they could flourish vigorously in the heart unacquainted with christian ones—I think it advisable, notwithstanding that I here declare that, when I expatiate on the height of virtuous perfection, which our native dispositions are susceptible of reaching, I always mean it to be understood that, in order to their attainment of it, they must be penetrated by a profound, efficient faith in the christian dispensation—notwithstanding this declaration I think it advisable to let my way of thinking on some of the leading doctrines of christianity be known to the reader; that he may be convinced of my having a firm reliance on the merits of our Redeemer, and of my belief, as a christian, being thoroughly reconcilable to my sentiments of natural religion.

I shall pass over, as briefly as I can, the peculiar views which I take of christian doctrines, as I do not disclose them with a design to recommend them to the attention of the reader,

but merely to convince him, that the opinions propounded in this work admit of my being, without inconsistency, a sincere christian.

While I believe that God imparts to us his grace, if we sincerely pray for it, to aid our endeavours to improve our moral dispositions, I do not believe that our most fervent prayers have any efficacy to induce him immediately to illuminate our understanding, and capacitate us to comprehend the mysterious or seemingly contradictory passages of Scripture. I make use of the word immediately, because, I believe that that purification of heart which God's holy spirit may enable us to operate within us, may contribute indirectly to chase away from our understanding the clouds of prejudice, which sometimes lead us to interpret falsely the words of the sacred record, that unfolds to us the christian revelation.

But, that our understanding when we study it, though we may do so in simplicity and truth, is not illuminated by a special influx of the spirit of God, I think that we may infer from the prodigious number of sects into which christianity is divided. Did his spirit enlighten the understanding of men, to make them clearly comprehend the sense of every passage in the bible, we should see all those who, in equal singleness of heart, study it as the record of divine revelation, profess unanimously the same religious faith.

Since such is not the case, since persons apparently equally sincere, zealous christians, differ frequently so widely in their attempts fully to explain some of the doctrines, concisely and mysteriously expressed by our Saviour and his apostles, that they tremble lest the heretical interpretations which, they attribute to their opponents, should involve them in everlasting ruin; since I find besides that no authority subsists for settling the dispute between them,—God no longer revealing himself to us by miracles and prophecies,—I conclude that we are no longer—as the Jews once were,—under the regimen of a divine legislation, embracing every part of our conduct in this life; that regimen, which bids us silence, when God thus makes known his will, those feelings of our breast that may appear to us the most worthy of being hearkened to, if they be in opposition to it.

I conclude that our heavenly father no longer requires us to stifle within us the voice of nature, but that on the contrary we do his pleasure, when in sincerity and truth we develope, to the utmost of our power, the natural moral sense implanted by him in our bosoms, and that we refuse to give any interpretation, which is revolting to it, to the words of scripture.

I conclude that the law promulgated by divine revelation is not intended to take place of that law of nature which, on an attentive examination of the workings of our own heart, we find to be written in it; and that its design is rather to make us more clearly understand its dictates, by purifying our bosom from the dross of unholy passions.

I am further persuaded that the law of a divine, supernatural revelation is designed as a complement to the law of nature and not as a substitute to it, because I observe that it is inadequate to our sole guidance.

It does not speak to us of the duty of cultivating the hardy, intrepid qualities,—such, for instance, as these exercised by the firm, devoted patriot,—which, experience of the world and a native sense of dignity, may suffice to teach us the necessity of displaying: yet, if we abjectly renounce the care of our own just rights, we renounce also that of maintaining the christian religion in a pure, flourishing state among us; since a people professing christianity, who allow themselves to be enslaved, gradually substitute in their minds grovelling, superstitious notions that connive at the most vicious indulgencies, to a genuine attachment to the holy doctrines of our Saviour.

The christian religion keeping, as it appears to me, a total silence on that obligation to assert the dignity of our species, by which nature and experience assure us that we are bound, attaches itself exclusively to inculcating on us virtues of a different description, whose worth we would not be taught to know by nature and experience, yet with which it is absolutely necessary that our minds should be stored, to prevent our sense of our own dignity from degenerating into pride, arrogance and ferocity.

The virtues which the christian religion warmly enforces on us are the meekness, humility and sense of our own unwor-

thiness which ought to fill our bosoms as we call to mind our relations with our Creator. When those lowly virtues infuse their spirit through that sense of inherent greatness, with which nature inspires every heart, it ceases to kindle in us proud, insolent notions: it only awakens in our breast a reverential consciousness of the high place which the master of the universe assigns in creation to mankind, and a conviction of its being our imperative duty energetically to maintain ourselves in it.

Taught by these observations that the design of christianity is to purify our natural dispositions and convert them into virtuous ones, my object in this work is to point out the kind of process by which our natural, orderly sentiments can best be unfolded, for I consider that the art of fully developing them must form the basis of any judicious plan that can be devised, for the improvement of human societies.

When such a full developement is given to them, then will they be prepared for being mellowed into holy christian sentiments, by the preaching of the ministers of the gospel.

## § 2.—REASONS FOR NOT BELIEVING IN ETERNAL PUNISHMENTS.

The principle, which regulates my religious faith, of never admitting any interpretation of the scriptures, that does violence to my natural sentiments of right and wrong, forces me—I must avow,—to reject the doctrine of eternal punishments.

I know that many sincere christians refuse like me their assent to it, but as I am ignorant of the arguments by which they defend their disbelief in it—all my reading on the subject having been confined to the works of the supporters of this doctrine,—I shall concisely expose the reasons, that have determined me not to receive it among the articles of faith to which I believing bow.

The doctrine of the eternity of hell torments would, did I embrace it, incapacitate me for the fulfilment of my duty towards God, according to the definition given me of it by scripture; and for that, of my duty towards my neighbour, as it is explained to me by the voice of nature.

*First—It would incapacitate me for the fulfilment of my duty towards God.*

Did God simply claim from me obedience to him, it would suffice me to believe, that I had received an authentic revelation of his will, and I should think myself bound to perform it, without stopping to inquire whether his commands were agreeable to my natural sense of the kind of government of his creatures worthy the Lord of the universe.

Did he give me to understand that it was his intention that I should think of him with terror, there would be no necessity for laying any command on me to do so. It would suffice to tell me, that this life, so full of misery for a great number of mortals, was to be succeeded, for the larger portion of them, by one of eternal, unutterable woe. I should certainly, in that case, think incessantly of my Creator, with the most appalling apprehension, nor should I presume to question the justice of his terrible decrees.

But God does not limit himself to a requisition to me to obey him, nor does he take pleasure in inspiring me with slavish terror. He demands from me love; a love so fervent, as to absorb in it my whole being; and, by doing so, he tacitly makes with me the convention, to condescend so much to the natural sentiments which he has given me, as to lay sufficiently open, to my inspection, the principles, agreeable to which he governs mankind, for me to be thoroughly convinced of his being an object of love; for I cannot dare to love a being infinitely powerful, who has the absolute disposal of me, unless he let himself down, in some degree, to the level of my understanding, by proving to me, that I may place a full confidence in his goodness and mercy, according to my apprehension of the qualities essential to these attributes.

He certainly does condescend to my limited capacity, in a a marvellous manner, when he lets me know, that he has sent his only son to be a propitiation for the guilt into which I have been plunged by my sinful nature. The sacrifice of our Saviour is a mystery which, though it is above my reason, is not contrary to it. I find that, even in regard to the moral order of things adapted to this world, I must often be governed by the feelings of my heart rather than by the speculative views of

my reason, and it seems to me, therefore, no way surprising, that that portion of the immutable, universal, moral order, which revelation makes known to us, should be adapted to satisfying the feelings of my heart, rather than to affording to my reason an opportunity to prove, by logical arguments, the eternal fitness of its existence.

My feelings tell me that there ought to be an atonement for sin, and that no being but the Son of God can, by his spotless purity and the commensurability of his being to the totality of sinners, be a competent atoning offering for them all.

The belief in mankind being washed from the pollution of sin, by the blood of a divine Saviour is, in itself, most thoroughly heart-warming to me, and proper to make me draw near to God, with all the love and gratitude of a dutiful child, certain of being the object of his paternal tenderness. But if, after being consoled by the display of this wonderful token of the goodness of God, I am tanght to believe, that it shall prove ineffectual to the salvation of the greater part of my species, I sink back again terribly overwhelmed by the thought of God's infinite power and my utter dependence on him.

If he have any attribute which opposes itself to his showing mercy in the end to all the creatures whom he has formed, I cannot understand the principles which guide him in his universal administration, sufficiently to love and confide in him. If, to maintain his own honour inviolate, he dooms those who quit this world in their sins to everlasting perdition; if, because he confers endless rewards on the righteous, his glory requires that he shall never cease to punish the wicked, I can only say that the goodness and justice which preside over his decrees are so very different from the notions of these attributes which he has stamped on my mind, that I must tremble before him as much as I should did he assure me that those attributes enter not at all into his nature.

'Tis the belief alone that none of the attributes of the Almighty oppose themselves to his making the good of his creatures,—considered both collectively and individually,—the primary aim of his government of creation, that can persuade me that I comprehend his purposes sufficiently to love and confide in him, as an all-wise, unalterably affectionate father.

I know that he clearly denounces against the obdurate sinner tremendous judgments, which shall overtake him in a future life; and he expressly declares, that very many are the short-sighted mortals who live so as to expose themselves to undergo them. I also recognise, simply from my observations on the course of his administration of this world,—where dreadful misfortunes often befal persons, who have not drawn them down upon themselves by any guilt of which they are the direct retribution,—that the scheme of his government is one that admits of his treating his creatures with a fearful sternness. As such is the idea of it that I conceive, the impression made on my timid mind by meditations on it, consists in an awful sense of its sublime majesty rather than in a delightful one of its transcendent loveliness.

But with whatever sensations of fear I think of the present state of mortals and of the conditions of my actual existence, my filial confidence in my heavenly father and my resignation to his divine will, are still more powerful than my fears, so long as I firmly believe that, notwithstanding the severity of his dispensations, it is a paternal resolution to work out in the end the good of all his creatures, which determines him to enforce them.

This belief is adapted to opening in my mind a calm fountain of holy peace, which can put it exquisitely in harmony with the aspect of nature, by causing my thoughts to rise to the Almighty ruler by a soft sunshine, with sweet emotions of filial gratitude; and by exciting them to him adore with a solemn, confiding reverence, in the midst of infuriate storms.

It gives me courage to apply to myself, the sacred promises of the gospel, and inspirits me to meditate, with holy ravishment, on the ineffable goodness of our blessed Redeemer.

*Secondly—It would incapacitate me for the fulfilment of my duty towards my neighbour.*

Did the preachers of the Christian religion, while they are expatiating on the social dispositions, which distinguish the spirits of just men made perfect, bound themselves to the assertion, that those blessed spirits have incomparably more firmness than weak mortals, unfalteringly to fulfil the Al-

mighty's orders, when he commands them to pour out, on some hapless fellow-creature's head, grievous vials of affliction, I should, without hesitation, yield a full belief to their words; for the more we are perfect, the more we must have strength to accomplish, with steady inflexibility, the will of our heavenly father, however painful the performance of it may be to us.

But these preachers go further, and assure us, that if we work out our own salvation, we shall be put into the enjoyment of consummate felicity, though we know that many of our fellow-creatures are plunged in everlasting, unutterable woe.

This is a position to which I could not assent, without suffering my moral dispositions to follow an exactly retrograde direction to the one, in which their improvement in social love, requires them to advance.

The most pious, amiable beings on earth, those whose conduct is the most exemplary, are particularly the persons to whom the thoughts of another's misery is painful. This disposition is meritorious on earth, and yet in heaven, if we are to believe the favourers of eternal punishments, it is to disappear. The righteous, are there to enjoy a fulness of bliss far beyond our conceptions; though a fellow-creature, a friend, a child, perhaps, is suffering torments that our imagination cannot equal, as fertile as it is in inventing pains. Ask any well-minded person, how it is possible he could be happy in such a case, and he will surely reply, that he could not be so as he is at present, but that in heaven he shall be changed, so that the love of God will absorb him entirely.

My moral sense does not permit me to look on our commiseration with the sufferings of even our guilty fellow-creatures, as one of those weaknesses which the just shall shake off with their mortal coil; it assures me, that the more our virtue is perfected, the more it will teach us to identify our happiness with that of the whole creation.

While we are in this state of trial, numerous causes tempt, and even in some measure force us, to prefer ourselves to our neighbour; but, I consider this selfishness as among the miseries of our lot: my feelings represent true happiness to me, as

a sacred flame which demands infinite expansion, and which cannot burn perfectly bright any where, while there is one spot in the universe where it cannot penetrate. Far more satisfactory is it to me to cherish this sentiment, and to suppose, that I cannot enjoy the plenitude of whatever felicity the bountiful Creator has in store for me, till the arrival of the moment when the whole creation shall be equally crowned with happiness, than it would be to hope, that immediately after death I should enter on the fulness of beatitude.

I am persuaded, that if there be any thing in my thinking that the happiness of the universe must be connected with mine, which can render me guilty in the eyes of the God whom I adore, it is, not my entertaining such a belief; but that, with so deep a conviction of all the creatures being destined to unite together in fraternal love, I do not strive more efficaciously, to render myself fit for real happiness, by fortifying social love in my bosom, against the encroachments of self love.

If we are to believe the favourers of eternal punishments, the righteous, after death, shall undergo a change that shall cause them to lose the goodness of heart which makes them now pity the deplorably wretched, however they may have earned their misery; yet the vicious propensities of the wicked shall remain unchanged. According to this doctrine, it is our evil dispositions—which are most of them derived from self love,—that are, by their nature, to last eternally; and it is our good dispositions—in as far as they proceed from social love—that are frail and perishing.

This is quite contrary to what my sentiments and observations tell me, of the constitution of the human heart. Though selfishness is often triumphant there; though sometimes it seems not to leave in it the least trace of brotherly kindness, as the black clouds which cover the sky, eclipse entirely, at times, the light of the sun; yet, do I feel and remark, that social love has a permanent place in our bosom, and that the selfish passions which surmount it, are like vapours, that the restless agitation of our minds collects continually before it; so that had we the satisfaction of contemplating it in a serene, undisturbed state, such as we think that it ought to be in, to

let the qualities appear which essentially belong it, we should find it reflecting gloriously, throughout all its parts, the rays of social love.

Most sects of christianity agree, no doubt, in inculcating the precept, that God commands us to love and help one another, leaving him to judge who is to be saved, and who rejected.

But this moderation does not essentially affect the truth of the dogmas, which invites us to detach the idea of our eternal happiness, from that of our fellow-creatures, by teaching us to enjoy the hope of attaining to consummate felicity, while many are plunged in everlasting torments.

I believe, that most of those who sincerely reject the consoling promises of the christian religion, are determined to do so by the persuasion, that the acceptance of them involves the necessity of believing, that our heavenly father inflicts on evil doers, unavailing and endless punishments.

*If I did consent to put faith in those ministers of the gospel who assert, that the torments of hell are to be everlasting, should I at least have the satisfaction of thinking that, by devoting myself, with my whole heart, to the service of my Redeemer, I might arrive at making my own salvation sure?*

No, never should I cease to be tormented by the most horrible apprehension, that I might myself be doomed to eternal damnation; for I should be totally at a loss to discover, among the great multiplicity of paths around me, which was the one leading to heaven. One sect would tell me it was here; another would tell me it was there. On a question of such agonising importance, I should not dare to trust the conclusions drawn by my own reason, from the study of scripture; more particularly, as numbers of persons, far more intelligent and learned, understand it differently; and, bereaved of all confidence in the goodness of my Creator, I should be far from feeling secure that he would not punish, as a grievous crime, an ignorant assent to erroneous articles of faith.

In my dismay, I should probably refuge myself in the bosom of the church that most exclusively reserves to its members, the hope of salvation; though an intolerant denial of it, to per-

sons imbued with other christian tenets, is, agreeably to my actual way of thinking, what would most positively determine me to hold myself for ever estranged from any church, which assumes to itself a title to damn all those without its pale.

Yet when I had thus, bewildered by the most dreadful personal alarms, fled to the church which most invited me to enter it, by a promise of security, my terrors would be but little abated: besides that, I know that many persons of profound understanding, sincere piety, and well versed in biblical lore, think that church herself has admitted into her creed, some damnable heresies, I should tremble lest the warning given by the voice of nature, telling me that in limiting to a few, the mercies of the Creator, I was not fitting myself for a reception into the abodes of the blest, should prove at last, miserably for me, to be well founded.

To save myself then, from being for ever agitated to and fro, by agonizing perplexities, I have no other resource but the one which I lay hold of, namely—that of interpreting all the moral dispositions of scripture, in a manner to harmonize with the sense of justice which I find written, in indelible characters, within me; and then, fervently imploring the grace of God, to enable me to ameliorate my heart, agreeably to the united laws of nature and of scripture, to give myself no uneasiness, though I should not rightly comprehend some mysterious dogmas, darkly shadowed forth in the latter.

*My belief is, that the torments of hell are directed towards the reformation of the sinner, that he may become at last a subject fit to be received into mansions of bliss.*

I therefore trust, that the plan pursued by our Saviour, for the redemption of his fallen creatures, does not rest inefficacious for the mortals who depart this life without having reaped the benefit of it.

But does scripture warrant me in the belief, that the merciful designs of our Saviour are so infinitely comprehensive as I trust that they are?

It seems to me that it does; and I shall now briefly explain my principal reasons for thinking so.

Scripture does not carry its express revelations, concerning

the future doom of the wicked, any further than to the announcement of their punishment. It plunges them—as I must say, from not knowing how otherwise to explain my meaning,—into the torments of hell, and there it leaves them, confining itself to a strong representation of their sufferings. Those it describes in words to which an infinite meaning, in respect to duration, is attached, but to which, I think, the whole tenour of scripture justifies me in ascribing only a vague, indefinite one.

It appears to me that my opinions, relatively to future punishments, are sanctioned;

First—By the general spirit characterising the christian revelation. Secondly—By incidental expressions which our Saviour uttered. Thirdly—By a description wherein he has opened to us some detailed view of hell. Fourthly—By a passage wherein St. Paul has expatiated on the universal plan of redemption.

*First—The general spirit characterizing the christian revelation.*

The spirit of christianity invites us to regard Almighty God as a father who loves us more tenderly than any earthly parent; yet, I cannot but look on him as a terrible master, rather than a benign, paternal ruler, if his affectionate care for his miserable creatures is to cease as soon as they quit this world, and give place to the most inexorable wrath, provided they do not, during their abode in it, accept his proffered mercy, and most of them, as his holy word declares, blindly cast it from them. Surely, a tender father would never uselessly persecute his child, where he had no hopes of his amendment; nor would a wise one ever cease punishing him with a view to his reformation, as long as the attainment thereby of that object appeared to him feasible. Now, I believe, that no one doubts that an all wise God might cause the punishments of hell to tend, at last, to the conversion of the sinners involved in them.

Further, the scheme of redemption is announced to us in terms, the magnificence of which seem to me perfectly to accord with its nature, if it be, as I think, a universally effective one; but, I avow, that it would fall very far short of realising

the expectations that would be awakened in me, by the glorious aspect under which it is presented to the admiration of mankind, were I to consider it very partial, and confined in its operations.

The better to succeed in giving a clear idea of my mode of surveying this awful subject, I shall imagine the kind of perplexity, which would be likely to cast a gloom over the mind of the benevolent philosopher, to whom the christian revelation was unknown, and who was endeavouring, by careful observation and deep meditation, to discover the destiny of mankind.

I think that the grand mystery, into which he would be anxious to dive—as considering it one, a clear understanding of which, could alone furnish him the requisite *data* for the establishment of any well-combined reasoning on the design of our creation—would regard the dispositions, relatively to us, of the invisible ruler on whom we absolutely depend. He would be anxious to solve the question, whether his moral nature is good or evil, whether he loves or hates us, or else views us with total indifference. On consulting his own heart, he would be inclined to conclude that the power who impressed deeply on it the conviction, that it is right and noble for each individual to feel for his fellow-creature as for himself, must be one of infinite goodness, desirous to promote the happiness of every living being; but when he would look abroad on the world, and observe the guilt and misery deforming it, he would tremble from the apprehension of our being absolutely at the disposal of a malignant power, who delights in tormenting us, and in rousing us to be the enemies of each other. He would think, at least, that the phenomena offered to his view, on surveying mankind, made it reasonable to infer, that a good and an evil principle are continually contending for the mastery over us, and that the latter is the more powerful of the two. This hypothesis would represent to him chaotic elements as jarring so confusedly throughout the divine government of the world, that it would be utterly impossible for him, by the most vigorous use of his reason, to discover in it any regular plan, or to derive, from the study of it, a clear conception of the duties imposed on himself.

Let us now suppose, while he stands sighing over the inevitable woes to which mankind are doomed, if they be partly or entirely in the power of a being who hates them, that he is hailed by a christian preacher, who assures him, that he comes the messenger of glad tidings which shall be to all people; that he is furnished with ample documents to prove our supreme ruler to be to us a merciful, tender father, who is too pure to encourage our iniquities, which must be expiated before he will receive us into favour, but who has devised such a wonderful plan of redemption, that when it is unfolded to him he will rapturously exclaim, with angels and with prophets: "Glory be to God on high, and on earth, good will towards men—mercy and truth are met together, righteousness and peace have kissed each other."

Let us next suppose the preacher to reveal to the philosopher the amazing proof which God has given us of his paternal affection, in sending his Son to die for our sins; the latter will then naturally cry out: "Prove to me that this wonderful fact is well authenticated, and I shall indeed resign myself, with fervent gratitude, to the consolation of believing that mankind are under the dominion of an all wise, all good father."

But when the preacher goes on to tell him, that by far the greater number of mortals, blinded by their evil passions, shall depart this life without having reaped the benefit of Christ's redeeming love, and that those who do so, shall be plunged, by the wrath of God, into a gulf of everlasting, unutterable misery; when he acquaints him with this dreadful article of his faith, may we not justly suppose the philosopher to start with horror, like one awakened from a delightful dream to the contemplation of a frightful reality. Surely he will have a good right to reply to him: "If you can prove the revelation, which you announce to me, to be of divine origin, I must adhere to it, to try to render my own salvation sure; but I do not conceive that you were entitled to usher in the exposition of it with such cheering promises, since it represents the condition of the totality of my species as infinitely more deplorable, than what my worst fears, while I was in a state of darkness, had suggested to me concerning it."

*Secondly—Incidental expressions uttered by our Saviour.*

When our Saviour's alarming language relatively to the rich induces his disciples to exclaim: "Who then can be saved?" He replies: "With men this is impossible, but with God all things are possible."

It is true, that he afterwards condescends satisfactorily to explain to them the precise subject of their alarms, but still I think that, by the unqualified assertion above mentioned, he gives us to understand that God has ways, which are not explicitly revealed to us, of finally reconciling his dreadful denunciations against the wicked, with the extension to them of pardon and mercy.

Our Saviour also declares that, he that knoweth his Lord's will, and doth it not, shall be beaten with *many* stripes, while the sinner, who is ignorant of it, shall be beaten with but *few*.

Those words of limited signification, *few* and *many* stripes, do not appear to me to be applicable to never ending torments.

*Thirdly—A description in which our Saviour has opened to us some detailed view of hell.*

There is but the one passage in scripture wherein the gates of hell are, as I may say, thrown open, and we are invited to direct our attention on a positive sufferer in these tremendous regions.

The passage to which I allude is the parable of the rich man and Lazarus. It is couched in such terms, as to confirm me in the belief, that the torments of hell are limited in duration, and that they are inflicted on the wicked, with a merciful design to make them tend to their conversion.

Christ declares, no doubt, in the person of Abraham, that between beatified spirits and those plunged in hell, there is a great gulf, impassable to both parties; but he does not say, that that gulf is to separate them eternally, nor pledge the word of God for condemning the sinner ever to remain on the dark side of it.

I draw a conclusion favourable to my opinions from this parable:

First—On account of the mode in which our Saviour repre-

sents Abraham addressing the sufferer. Secondly—In consideration of the disposition evinced by the latter.

First—That the miserable wretch, actually undergoing a sentence of eternal damnation, should address Abraham, from whom he hoped to obtain relief, by the tender appellation of FATHER, would be perfectly natural, so that no inference could be drawn from his doing so, to countenance the opinion that his sufferings, though dreadful, were only a chastisement limited in duration. But our Saviour makes Abraham address the wretched being, who implores him from hell, by the endearing appellation of *son*, and I cannot suppose that he would put such a sacredly affectionate term in the mouth of a pious saint, whose every thought was subordinate to the counsels of the Most High, had he been speaking to a reprobate, for ever cast out from the presence of God; though it was perfectly appropriate, if the hapless sinner on whom he conferred the title of *son*, was only suffering a chastisement, that was at last to prepare him for a reconciliation with his heavenly master.

Secondly—The great arch fiend is described to us, in scripture, as a blasphemer of the Most High, and as a malignant being, constantly going about on earth, seeking whom he may devour. Our Saviour also says, that the wicked resemble Satan. We are therefore taught by holy writ, to form a clear conception of the moral dispositions of the inhabitants of hell.

Such dispositions, however, as we are warranted to ascribe to Satan and his followers, are not in the slightest degree manifested by the sinner, who, from the infernal abyss, raises his voice to Abraham. Not a murmur against his Creator escapes him, even when he is told that his misery admits of no alleviation: and, far from wishing to have partners in affliction, he appears for a time to forget himself, in his anxiety to save his brethren from becoming his fellow-sufferers. In short, his whole demeanour, according to my apprehension of it, is sublime, affecting and resigned.

This sinner, we are told by the divine preacher, who has described him to us, fared, while on earth, sumptuously every day, and he does not represent him in a light to induce us to suppose that, in painting a luxurious man, he intended us to

conclude that he was drawing the portrait of a person more estimable than the commonalty of those who lead a similar kind of life. Now I believe that it is a known fact, that the generality of persons immersed in luxury, suffer with repining impatience the smallest incommodity which befals them, and that they are very indifferent to the afflictions of their neighbour, particularly when they are themselves grieved by any personal ailment.

I therefore infer, from the words of our Saviour, that this sinner, at the time that he introduces him to our notice, was infinitely more resigned to the will of God, and more compassionate to his brethren, than he was at his departure from this world; and I think myself justified in concluding, by obvious implication, that the torments of hell had already had considerable effect in reducing him to a heavenly frame of mind.

*Fourthly—A passage wherein St. Paul expatiates on the universal plan of redemption.*

The parable of our Saviour, already cited, warms me with the consoling belief that, the torments of hell are inflicted as a dreadful chastisement, which shall finally fit the most sinful mortals, for a reception among the blessed.

The following well known passage of Saint Paul—by what appears to me a very simple, obvious interpretation—encourages me further to hope that, the divine plan of redeeming love, comprises a much wider universality of objects, than even the whole of the human race.

"Then cometh the end, when he—Christ—shall have delivered up the kindom to God, even the Father: when he shall have put down all rule, all authority and power.

"For he must reign, till he hath put all enemies under his feet.

"The last enemy that shall be destroyed is death:

"For he hath put all things under his feet:

"But when he saith, all things are put under him, it is manifest that he is excepted, which did put all things under him.

"And when all things shall be subdued unto him, then shall

the Son also himself be subject unto him that put all things under him, that God may be all in all."

Death is constantly spoken of in scripture, as a punishment for sin, indissolubly connected with it; wherefore when death is destroyed, sin—we are, I think, authorised to conclude—shall have ceased to exist. Nor does it seem to me, that God will be all in all, while ever either sin or misery, shall be in the universe; for these are evils very contrary to his nature.

The expressions concerning God the Father, represent, as I believe, the first person of the divinity contemplating, to all eternity, a bliss, pure and universal.

Those that relate to God the Son, describe the second, or person militant, of the divinity, combating the evil which has been allowed to enter into creation. He emanates from the bosom of the Father, at the moment of its first introduction into the universe—which, as scripture declares, was prior to the formation of this world—and he continues to war with it, and to make it subservient to good, until the time when, the fermentation occasioned by evil being completely done away, and a happiness purified by trials subsisting every where, nothing remains in the universe but views agreeable to infinite goodness, so that the Father reigns alone, the Son having no longer any enemy to vanquish.

Then cometh the end, not, I believe, the end of the present system of the world, at which time, we are told, the dominion of sin shall still be powerful; but the end whereat that whole design of Providence shall be accomplished, during the progress of which sin and misery were permitted to deform the creation.

I have now given, on the subject of my religious opinions, all the explanations requisite, for convincing the reader of the following work, that every sentiment contained in it is perfectly reconcilable, in my mind, with a steadfast belief in christianity.

Whether or no, the religious faith which I have embraced, may appear to him heterodox, I hope that he will think that it is neither disparaging to the majesty of God our Saviour, nor revolting to our natural sentiments.

# PREFATORY NOTICE

TO

# THE FIRST PART.

In the first book of this part, I shall establish a comparison between our present state and one of innocense, with the intent of marking clearly the characteristic distinction of that type of moral perfection which we should endeavour to realize.

I shall consecrate the remaining books, excepting the last, to some fugitive remarks both on the nature of the end towards which mankind are bound to aspire—that is of virtue—and also on various propensities and faculties of the human mind. Into some of these cursory disquisitions I enter with no other intention, than to convey to the reader a general notion of the point of view in which I regard our moral and social system. In others I wish to indicate the march of the human mind, relatively to the form in which its good dispositions ought to be unfolded. Where such is my object, I seek to prepare the ground work of this system by the establishment of theoretical principles, derived from facts, in one moral constitution, and I take the opportunity of specifying certain desiderata which those facts denote, that our national institutions ought to try to realize, to render society virtuous and solidly combined, agreeably to the design of nature.

I believe, that the slight sketch which I trace in the third part of the first steps to be taken, for the rational reconstruction of society—whenever the present fabric of it shall fall into utter decay—would, if judiciously pursued in practice, lead at length to the attainment of the desiderata in question.

I do not, however, fill up sufficiently my theoretical sketch, to mark the method of securing them. It seems to me that all that an untried speculation, concerning a well organised system of society, ought to attempt is, to trace the apparent tendency of the general principles of order implanted in the constitution of human nature; and that then it ought to leave to practical experiments gradually to discover the most feasible method of evolving them in the formation of society.

In the last book I unfold an hypothesis concerning the relations of the inhabitants of the earth with other parts of the universe, which seems to me satisfactorily to explain, agreeably to what appears of the course of nature, the causes of our being placed in this agitated, sorrowful state of existence, and not to be contradictory to the revelations of scripture.

# THOUGHTS

ON THE

# MORAL ORDER OF NATURE.

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## BOOK I.

### PART I.—CHAPTER I.

CONTENTS.

CONSIDERATIONS ON THE ATTRIBUTES OF THE DIVINITY.

§ 1.—Attentive observations on the world, and an examination of the principles of morality written within me, have led me to conclude, that mankind are formed on an orderly plan, the accomplishment of which would render human societies deserving of admiration, as a glorious work of the Divinity. As such a conclusion involves the assumption, that I have, in some degree, the faculty to form a judgment of the Creator, and to determine what is, or is not worthy him, I think it proper to begin my work with a clear description of the notices which I derive from my meditations, respecting his attributes. By explaining the notions concerning them, which are most agreeable to my understanding and sentiments, I shall mark precisely, the moral principle to which I refer my opinions respecting the design of the creation. Though the Creator be infinite, filling eternity and boundless space, yet he allows me to think, that I can partly fathom his moral nature; for I find that, in some respects, a type of what he is exists within me, like a point where my inquiries concerning what is good and

right, centre and terminate, from finding in it the ultimate end of their researches.

The upright man is an imperfect image of the type of him which I find within me, with this difference indeed, that the struggles with which the former wrestles against his own sinful nature and adverse fortune, give him an opportunity to exercise many virtues, which, though they be the most sublime ones man can practice, denote an imperfection, either in his own mind, or in his means of enjoyment, that does not exist in the type of the Creator, present to my thoughts.

However, though the moral attributes which I ascribe to him, be only those good qualities which seem to me necessarily to belong to a being possessed of unlimited power, and exempt from frailty, and that therefore my apprehensions of what he is, are very confined, yet do some of the few conceptions I have of his nature appear to me, as fixed, immutable, universal truths, on which, as far as his will can be made known to me by the lights of reason, it is incumbent on me to regulate my belief as to the design of his works.

The conceptions concerning the moral attributes of the Deity, which I make it a point of duty to entertain with steadiness, though with humble deference to his will, from a belief that they offer me a first, sure key, for truly interpreting the design of the creation, are those which tell me that he is perfectly good, just, and wise: that his goodness and justice determine him to spread, without any distinction of persons, all the happiness the creatures can enjoy, as widely as possible in the universe; and that his wisdom makes him act in the manner best calculated to fulfil his bountiful intentions.* I believe him, also, to be perfectly free from all those selfish and vindictive passions, which so often render human beings unfeeling, or cruel towards each other.

§ 2.—The sentiments that declare to me, that I can appreciate as an abstraction, the moral principles which determine the Creator in the government of his creatures, do not inform

* It is not so absolutely necessary towards my understanding his law, that I believe him to be all wise as all good. However, I could have little confidence in an universal and eternal Being, if I did not trust to his having wisdom to discern the best mode of accomplishing his beneficent purposes.

me, equally, of the positive form in which he puts those principles in execution. The wonderful construction of the universe convinces me, certainly, that his power is very great, and encourages me to trust with confidence in his intention to make all things work together, for the good of all living beings. But, I cannot form a positive idea of his power to confer happiness, either as to the degree to which an all good Creator would raise it, or as to the universality of the creatures whom he could render susceptible of it. It would be necessary, in order to comprehend these subjects, to be able to measure infinity, both as to time and space. My faculties are unequal to such an undertaking. However, though it be impossible for me to dive into the mysteries of eternity, and an universe without limits, I have sufficient intelligence to perceive, that mysteries of this kind necesarily exist, and that they lie beyond the bounds of human capacity; I accordingly recognise, that I ought to intrench myself in the contemplation of the truths that Providence has submitted to my reason; I shall therefore, in the course of this work, shun all the discussions which might lead me to pronounce an opinion relative to the positive power of my Creator, since he marks to me that I ought to rest satisfied to be ignorant in this respect. Taking the world as I find it, I shall interpret the design of the creation, so as not to compromise the goodness and the justice of God, since he gives me a clear conception of the nature and scope of these attributes, and teaches me to believe, that he must possess them in the full perfection in which I ascribe them to him.

§ 3.—It is not, however, my intention to proceed on the supposition, that the power of God to effect the felicity of his creatures, may not be equal to his will. The most necessary principle for me to adhere to, in trying to explain the order of nature, is, that God is perfectly good and wise. Without this belief, it would be impossible for me to obtain any clue to guide me through the mysteries of the design which he put in execution, when he created the world. But, though it be not so necessary to believe that his power is equal to his goodness, my sentiments of order recoil, with repugnance, from the idea, of the Creator of the universe having been obliged to leave his work imperfect: it would be so if he,

or any of the creatures who are capable of comprehending his entire plan, could conceive another, which would be more conducive to the general happiness, if he had the means to fulfil it. I judge, then, that what appears to me imperfect in the plan of the creation, is owing entirely to my views being too short for me to seize the harmony of it.*

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## CHAPTER II.

### REASONS OFFERED TO SHOW THIS WORLD WORTHY TO BE CONSIDERED BY US THE WORK OF AN ALL GOOD CREATOR.

§ 1.—The vices and the misery which I see shock, I must allow, my speculative notions of right. Agreeably to those notions it would become the goodness of the Creator not only to admit no misery into the world, but also to endow mankind with the utmost measure of happiness possible. I shall examine whether in practice, my sentiments are as contrary to what really exists as they are in theory. For this purpose, I shall try to represent to myself a clear image of a state of unmixed

* The system of the universe, composed, as after a profound examination it is considered to be, of an infinity of parts mutually dependant, and of natural causes, producing regularly certain effects, appears to me much more glorious than it would be, if the Creator had determined, that whatever was to exist, should start instantaneously into being, without any other cause but a signification of his will. Yet unenlightened nations have supposed, that all the parts of the creation, and the most remarkable events, have been thus produced in a moment, by a word spoken by the Creator. They thought it the only origin of things worthy the Almighty; and it is to be presumed, that had mankind not had sufficient intelligence to discover, that nature proceeds regularly and gradually in all her operations, it would ever have been considered a blasphemy to suppose, that the Creator trusted to the powers which he had placed in nature, for the slow, orderly accomplishment, of his great designs. Since then, the progress that our reason can at present make, is sufficient to show us, that that regular succession of causes and effects, whence are derived all the phenomena of nature, is really nobler than it would be to look on the Creator as the immediate cause of all things, although the contrary opinion at first prevailed; it appears probable that, were our reason still more enlightened, we should learn to correct, still further, our ideas in respect to the order of things worthy of the grandeur of God; and we should find the types, representing to our minds the most noble system of creation imaginable, to agree perfectly with the one which the Creator has established.

happiness. 'Tis thus I may hope to arrive at a precise ascertainment of the difference between my sentiments, relative to a perfect state of things, and that in which the moral world is placed. An attentive consideration of this difference may suggest to me too the reasons of our happiness being so defective, and teach me better to discern the means of improving it.

For our happiness to be complete, there ought to be a perfect correspondence between our wishes and our means to satisfy them.

Would mankind be perfectly happy with the inclinations which they actually have, provided, they could always indulge them?

It is very evident that a privilege of this kind could not be very beneficial to them, since the principal inclinations of many individuals lead them to hate and to wish to persecute other individuals of their species.

It is not then by indulging the tyrannical and vindictive passions of mankind, but by retrenching them from their nature, that their Maker could succeed in rendering their species happy.

Let us suppose these passions effaced from their disposition, it remains to inquire if the complete indulgence of all the rest of their wishes, would render them as happy as it seems to us that they ought to be, to appear as the work of an all wise and all good Creator.

The principal propensity which strikes me in general in mankind, is a sort of restless desire to extend the limits of their existence.

Were every contentious passion expunged from our nature, the most remarkable one which the propensity in question would stir up in us, would be, I believe, the curiosity to dive into all the depths of nature and of science.

So insatiable is such a curiosity, that I do not suppose that it would ever be thoroughly content, as long as we could not fill all time, all space, unravel all mysteries; possess all knowledge, distinguish the thoughts and sensations of every other being as clearly as we know what passes within ourselves; and retain for ever our perceptions and judgments upon all subjects simultaneously present to our minds. When we should have

arrived thus at the term of our ambition, should we be very happy?

It is manifestly impossible for me to judge of the kind of happiness which such a state of existence might afford, since justly to appreciate this state it would be necessary to have faculties that could measure infinity; however, from any idea which I can form of it, it seems to me that the entire universe would appear to us a joyless and monotonous prison, if our knowledge were so complete that it would be impossible for us to see any thing new, and that the ideas of all things were so continually present to our minds, that we could not have any variety of them.

To make us perfectly happy then our ambition to aggrandize our existence, must vanish along with our angry and hostile passions.

After being deprived of all those inclinations, which it seems impossible to reduce to good order, what is the kind of happiness which those we might have remaining might procure for us?

It is easy for us to imagine it, for the happiness so often described as belonging to the golden age, seems to be just the kind that would suit us, if we had neither ambition nor disorderly passions.

It is foreign to my subject to inquire whether the diverse fictions that have been invented relative to a golden age, drew their first source from a tradition which a real age of that nature left behind it; all that I wish is, to remark that the pleasure which so many writers have had in inventing or recalling images of the golden age, is a proof that such pictures are agreeable to our feelings and imagination, so that I may say that if Providence had heaped on us the blessings of the golden age and rendered us capable of enjoying them, there would apparently be no discrepancy between our situation and our notions of the order of things by which the goodness of God would be manifested.

It is useless to explain what I mean by the golden age. Who is there that, upon hearing this expression, does not immediately represent to himself a race of men free from vain cares, and unassailed by real wants which they know not how

to satisfy? Who does not imagine that he sees love and innocence reigning universally; a brilliant, yet temperate sky; rich harvests of which every member of the peaceable community has an ample share; and who does not think that he hears the murmur of the streams and the warbling of the birds, mingled with the sounds of a rural music, by which the shepherds express, in an affecting, artless manner, their pure and lively joy?

This tranquil state of existence, have we really reason to regret, that we have not been placed in it? Should we like to exchange, against a species of happiness so indolent and unreflecting, the ambition that makes us sigh for a much nobler destiny than this world could procure us, and the self respect arising from the consciousness of being able to affront dangers and to execute arduous undertakings, for the sake of doing service to ourselves and mankind? Whatever others might think of such a proposition, I can answer for my part, that I should not hesitate to reject it; and I own, that I should regard those who would accept it, with that sort of compassion with which I should view the voyagers, who, if they were left upon the coast of an unknown land, would content themselves with a scanty subsistence on the sea shore, rather than take the trouble of climbing a ridge of sterile and frowning rocks which it would be necessary to pass, in order to penetrate into the country. We have been lately, as I may say, thrown on the shores of existence—we are seeking for rest, and the images which offer themselves to our mind of the golden age, seem to be such, that if we could realize them, we should at once find ourselves in the enjoyment of peace and security. However, if I had it at my option, I should not choose thus to stand still in the vestibule of life. Far better do I like to go steadily forwards, in order to know all the advantages which I may procure myself. Though my passage be crossed by formidable obstacles, I feel a great wish to surmount them, in hopes of being at last well rewarded for my pains.

I shall not examine if we can form the idea of any other state of unalloyed happiness, for it appears to me, that those who undertake to represent clear images of such a state, always entertain us with descriptions, that do not differ materially from those of the golden age. Of this nature are the fictions re-

specting the Elysian fields. As to the joys of heaven, I do not know that any author has ever sought to give an idea of them. Those who enter into some particulars on this subject, attempt only to show the visible signs with which the inward joy is accompanied, and which generally consist in rays of the purest light investing the forms of the blessed, but they do not undertake to warm us with the feelings that compose this celestial joy, so much superior to any which is known on earth. I think then that I may conclude, that we cannot conceive a constant universal happiness, unmixed with no pain, and bought by no effort, and yet superior to that which is supposed to have distinguished the golden age. Since, therefore, I give the state that we are in the preference to that age, it follows, that those who think like me cannot imagine a state of pure happiness, which, upon reflection, would appear to them to correspond as well with the views of an all good God, as would a world whose inhabitants were excited by a noble ambition to prefer making continual and painful efforts, in order to improve their condition, rather than to pass an indolent, inglorious life.

§ 2.—It is true, that the deplorable state of misery in which history proves, that the vices of mankind have so often thrown different nations, offers a picture of evils much more excessive than those which I might suppose necessary for putting into action the noble qualities of the human heart. However, once I acknowledge that my abstract notions of the order of things which a perfectly good Creator would establish, are not applicable to practice; once I recognise that he might, without derogating from his goodness, expose human nature to some degree of pain, in order to ensure it a nobler destiny, my speculative principles offer me no longer any fixed rule for judging of the proceedings of a good God in regard to his creatures, nor can I discern how far his wise designs may render it necessary to expose them to sufferings.

§ 3.—But though experience and my own reflections show me that, a maxim which presented itself at first to my mind as a just one, namely, that an all good God would, from the first moment of their creation, render all his creatures perfectly happy, is not one reducible to practice, I am far from supposing, on that account, that all the sentiments written in my heart,

respecting the nature of God, are erroneous. The wrong idea which I am naturally disposed to form of him, in judging that he ought to admit no evil into the world, affects only his manner of accomplishing his benevolent intentions. The correction of this idea does not in the least shake my conviction, that the only principle worthy him to act on is, to make existence a great blessing to every being; so that though I see that he admits a great deal of evil into his works, I conclude that it will, in the end, lead to such universal and unspeakable bliss, that all the creatures will have reason to rejoice in recollecting the sufferings which they shall have gone through.

## CHAPTER III.

### A COMPARISON INSTITUTED BETWEEN THE GOLDEN AGE AND THE ACTUAL STATE OF THE WORLD.

§ 1.—The idea of the golden age, offering me the picture the most distinct which I am capable of comprehending, of a state of unmixed happiness, I think I shall do well to examine a little, the difference subsisting between this state, so much in harmony with the first views of my mind, and the one in which we are actually placed, in order that by the comparison, I may be the better able to characterize each of them, and reduce to a fixed rule, our aberrations from that standard of human felicity which is in accord with my speculative notions, concerning the kind of creation that would obviously have manifested the goodness of the Creator.

The happiness of the golden age, is composed of sentiments of love and peace, uniting all hearts according to the different relations established between them; and also, of a remarkable sensibility to the pleasure inspired by beautiful rural scenes, as well as by rural occupations and recreations followed with moderation. The people of the golden age, though continually habituated to the view of a delightful country, contemplate it always with a pleasure as exquisite, as what it would among us occasion to a young, enthusiastic poet, who saw it for the first time. The slightest incident is full of charms for this

happy people. A simple repast, composed of milk and fruits, which is enjoyed, in the midst of a beloved family, in a shady grove, and under a clear, mild sky, fills them with unspeakable delight. All their faculties unite, to procure them pleasures in harmony with each other, and chained together in a just subordination. Love and benevolence, are the predominant sentiments of every heart, and the principal source of its joys. These sentiments shed a mild lustre on the scenes of nature, heighten the tones of the simple music, and give, in short, to every pure motive of pleasure, its principal attraction.

§ 2.—Let us suppose that this people, though they continue innocent, and though they be guided by sages endued with all necessary knowledge, as well as strength of mind, to teach them to make the best of their lot, are become less fortunate, not from any change in their situation, but simply, because their sensibility is deadened, and that life often appears to them, in consequence, tedious and monotonous. They will find it necessary to overcome this disagreeable sensation, by greater activity and employment, so that they will try to indemnify themselves, by an energetical use of their faculties, for the power which they have lost to be indolently happy. The efforts that they make for this purpose, cost them some pain, but they are recompensed by the satisfaction which they feel in the consciousness of their force and resolution. Their happiness is not so much lessened, as that it bears a different character from what it had at first. It was then grounded on an exquisite agreement between their inward dispositions, and outward circumstances; it is now more the result of an inward force, tending to render them independent of outward circumstances.

§ 3.—This character becomes much more stronly marked, if we suppose, that not only the sensibility of the people to the pure joys which the circumstances they are in might procure them, is blunted, but that a fearful change is also effected in those circumstances; so that the earth no longer produces rich harvests, unless they force it by severe and constant labour; that the air becomes subject to various inclemencies, from the excesses of heat and cold, from furious tempests, or oppressive calms; from too much, or too little moisture. In this case,

this wise people make continual and great exertions, from necessity, and not merely to prevent, by active employments, their life from being tiresome. They are still benevolently disposed to each other, and they do not find their happiness considerably diminished, for new sources of enjoyment are opened to them, by the pleasure of being mutually useful; of encouraging each other; and lightening the burdens which they are doomed to bear, by the kindness of their brotherly love.

§ 4.—Let us now suppose their character to be still further changed by the introduction into it of an ambition to prove themselves fit for a noble state of existence. This new passion* embarrasses them very much, so little do they discern the means of gratifying it. The sentiment of peaceable brotherly love universally reigning among them, prevents their feeling, either as individuals or social corps, a pride in distinguishing themselves from any of their fellow-creatures, by superior power or imagined excellence. Their ambition, debarred by the goodness of their heart such kinds of gratification, would fain vent itself in finding some means of doing a further good to mankind than that which had been commonly hitherto effected, but, considering the simple tastes and harmless manners that characterise human nature, it has little opportunity to succeed in such an undertaking.

Individuals do not seek by an unusually magnificent style of living, to persuade themselves and the multitude that peculiar honour is due to them, both because these charitably minded people have no wish to be envied by a neighbour or strike him with awe, and that no individual among them is desirous to engross so large a share of the productions of the earth, as his natural wants do not require, and as must leave others in penury.†

* They may be said to have had this passion from the beginning of the period wherein adverse changes, inducing them to seek their happiness partly in the consciousness of a virtuous force of character, that they had no occasion to display while in their primitive state, had been made in their constitution and situation; but the satisfaction which they felt in the idea of their own worth was then urged on them by circumstances, I now suppose the wish to prove their high deserts to be a passion to which their nature inclines them.

† In a nation so good and wise as that which I am now describing, we are to suppose that the land belonging to the community is always peopled by

The only issue, therefore, which seems in general open to the ambition of this amiable people, is that of scientific researches: those they sometimes pursue with great ardour, though they usually find, that they terminate in nothing but vexation and disappointment. Seldom do they acquire by them any new light into the mechanism of nature, and when they do, it is such as rarely to serve any purpose, but to make them wonder why beings bounded to so small a compass by their dependance on a corporeal frame, should have an intellect able to comprehend so much of the structure of the universe. At last, convinced of their understanding being too comprehensive to suit their condition, they determine to stifle their ambition altogether, fully aware that this passion, from continually stimulating them to acquire speculative knowledge, exposes them to feel a thirst which they never can satiate; and tempts them to look down, with distaste, on the cares that necessarily occupy them, as matters which minds capable of so high a flight would willingly think beneath them.

§ 5.—Let us suppose the balance between self-love and social, the equality of which, amidst all the changes which this people has undergone, has still been preserved, and has prevented any individual among them from seeking his own good, in preference of that of his neighbour—let us suppose this balance to give way in favour of self-love, so that each individual, though still entirely free from malevolent passions, is naturally inclined to take care of himself in the first place, and only to serve others in as far as their desires do not clash with his.

Their teachers now begin to consider their character and circumstances with serious alarm, and to deduce from their reflections on them the maxim, that the duty of self-control is strictly prescribed to them by nature. Any efforts which they before engaged them to make, to accommodate themselves to the alterations in their lot, were of such urgent necessity, and so lightened to them by their mutual affection, that they seemed rather dictated to them by a sense of interest than of duty. But now they prescribe to them not to trust the first suggestions of interest, since, become quite personal, it would lead

no greater number of inhabitants than it can maintain in comfort, without bestowing on them superfluities.

them to break the whole frame-work of society, leaving every one to shift for himself, or else forcing the weak to become the servants of the strong, whom it would convert into lawless plunderers. To obviate the evils of such a state of disorder and insecurity, these sages might indeed resolve to fix society on its former impartial footing, by conventional laws, that should make every transaction be terminated according to exact stipulations, whereby all parties might equally consult their interest. But laws of this kind, they would readily perceive, could only be binding on those who would find them a protection to them; the persons who, owing to their force or address, could ensure to themselves a greater abundance than they could obtain by an observance of the laws, would surely set them aside; urged too by a dislike of labour, they would profit of every means of compelling others to work for them. In order therefore to keep society in the same state in which it was before the last change took place in their character, they see the necessity of supporting social love at the same height in every bosom by a strong sense of duty, at which it was before sustained by instinctive affection; that is, though the members of society cannot have the satisfaction of identifying, by their feelings, their own happiness with that of mankind, their instructors determine them to do so by their reason, and to be governed by the principle that it is their duty so to order their thoughts and actions, as that they may ever respect equally with their own, their neighbour's just pretensions. This well taught people have sufficient insight into the nature of true happiness, to be convinced that were their minds rightly attuned to it, they would love their neighbour as themselves, and they are satisfied that the more they think and act up to this conviction, the more they will draw their minds towards that state in which they ought to be fully blest. They are even aware that the more they counteract their selfish propensities, by giving to brotherly love its due share in the formation of their intentions, the more that latter principle strikes a deep root both into their heart and understanding, so that when they thus uphold it, in spite of all the obstacles which their constitution opposes to their cherishing it, they are sensible that they work it more profoundly into their character, than it was woven

into it in the golden age, when it was endeared to them by the charms which they instinctively found in it.

They perceive, indeed, that their steady resolutions to cultivate social love, does not increase, as they would wish, their power of enjoyment; since the further they advance in age, and leave their youthful days behind them, the less lively do they find the pleasure to be, which, even though they should continually become more imbued with a pure sentiment of social love, they can extract from the blessings of life. They can even perceive, that the young, wherever they form an attachment, or yield to the dictates of a kind sentiment, savour much more deliciously than the old, the joys that spring from friendly ties, or from benevolent emotions; though the latter, owing to the constant culture of good dispositions, should have hearts far more impregnated with tender, fraternal affections, towards all mankind.

§ 6.—This observation leads them to conclude, either that their heart deceives them, in advising them steadily to regulate it on the principle that, in proportion to the nature of their relation with their neighbour, love for him should guide it equally with self love; for, that by so doing, they would at last secure to themselves true, unspeakable happiness; or else, that there must be a future world. From the time, indeed, of their being sensible to the ambition to rise by their knowledge, or laudable efforts, to a higher state of existence, they must have had some suspicion, that that which constituted them living beings, was not to perish along with its mortal tenement. But now, that belief is further recommended to them, by the perception that, that process, which the very nature of true happiness requires them to go through, namely—that of supporting social love on an equality in their bosoms, with self love, cannot be conducted in this world, to a satisfactory term; since, after it has been, with incessant vigilance, completed, it cannot crown, with promised bliss, their worn out faculties. The idea is too repugnant to their nature, that the fullness of felicity for a moral, intellectual creature, does not principally flow from an unchangeable disposition to love one's neighbour, as one's self. They yield, therefore, gladly to the persuasion, that they shall revive in another world, wherein they shall at

last find, that the pains which they had taken in this life, to prepare themselves for relishing true happiness, had not had inadequate results; since there they shall be restored to a youth, far more brilliant, durable, and joyous, than that which had once afforded them on earth, such frail, and fleeting advantages. There, they conclude, that far more perfect felicity than any they had in the happiest season of life tasted here below, shall be afforded them, both by a world incomparably finer than the one which they shall have quit, and by inward feelings exquisitely attuned to the enjoyment of all the sweets which can be lavished by self and social love, harmoniously combined together in equal strength, and both in full possession of every advantage craved by them.

§ 7.—This cheering belief in a future state determines the people, whose sages have taken care to penetrate them with it, steadily to fulfil the new duty which the alteration in their character prescribes to them, of guiding themselves from principle, with as much justice and humanity, as though social love still ruled their minds as powerfully as self-love. Without such a sense of religion, though they might have perceived that the universality of mankind would be far happier were each individual to make it a point of duty to respect, as much as his own, the happiness of his fellow-creatures, yet could they not have devised a sufficient inducement to excite the persons to pursue this upright conduct, who might have seen that their own pleasure would be better promoted by a deviation from it.

§ 8.—With their principles of right thus reinforced by religion the wise leaders among this people perceive that, though such an amazing prepounderance has been given in their minds to self-love above social, yet does it not necessarily follow that the former shall crush the latter, since on the contrary it becomes, when rightly understood, its anxious and zealous protector; from feeling it to be so essentially its companion, that when it does not dwell in intimate and tender union with it, the happiness which it can in a lonely state confer, is meagre and of little worth.

§ 9.—This truth becomes still more evident to these leaders when, by a last change in the constitution of the persons under their guidance, they are rendered liable to all the passions

which torment human nature. Their ambition now makes them sensible to the pleasure of surpassing a competitor, and their instructors quickly recognise, that it is better to allow it in some degree—at least in regard to the individuals still in the bloom of youth—to seek this species of satisfaction, since the pursuit impels them to unfold their talents and engage in labours profitable to mankind. Their ambition, rightly directed, gives them also an opportunity to exercise towards their rivals just and magnanimous virtues. Animating them to the practice of a lofty self-denial and a generous forbearance, it dictates to them laws perfectly coinciding with those of an unbounded and sincere social love.

It would be tedious to enumerate all the virtues which the imagiuary people in question are now called on to practice. I shall just observe that they find their life to be a continual struggle to vanquish themselves. They are active, laborious and temperate, though indolence and the love of pleasure render these duties painful to them; they live peaceably and amicably with each other, though furious, vindictive passions often rise in their hearts. Thus reigning over themselves they feel such internal satisfaction, that they look back, without regret, on the undisturbed happiness which they once enjoyed. They perceive that their existence is much nobler and more extended than it was when they tasted the sweets of the golden age, although it is less beautiful and less perfect; that, instead of being, as formerly, in possession of all the objects on which happiness depends, they are now required to develope, and to fortify the dispositions which prepare them for being happy: and they acknowledge that it is necessary to the formation of these dispositions, that not only their outward means of gratification should be scanty, but, that they should have to surmount in their internal constitution many sources of vice and misery; for they find the victories which they gain over the wrong passions springing up in their minds still more efficacious for strengthening them in their good resolutions, than the courage with which they support the rigours of fortune. They would not, if they could, root out of their hearts the passions that agitate them, because, after having corrected or vanquished them, they have far more energy and force to accomplish the

most difficult duties, than they would have, if they were not subject to them; they also find that, when they are roused by the necessity of combatting them, unnumbered grand views of their destiny, of which they would never have taken notice, had it not been for the vigorous impulsion which these combats gave to their thoughts, present themselves to their attention and elevate their sentiments.

Though I do not offer this description, of how wise men would act, who had been obliged to quit the peaceable joys of the golden age, to brave the inclemencies of an unfriendly sky, and be agitated by violent, contending passions—though I do not offer it, as containing a correct analytical review, of the qualities distinguishing human nature, as it actually is, from what it is supposed to have been, in that age, yet is it calculated, I hope, sufficiently to mark the difference in the line of conduct that each of those states demands.

§ 10.—It does not, however, represent the principal difficulties that our condition in this life offers to us, since, what torments us most, is imputable to our folly and blindness in not obliging our passions to yield to the eternal and universal laws of order. On that account, they render us the enemies and persecutors of each other; they make us form projects that are traversed by those of our neighbour; and they render his downfall, necessary to our triumph.

§ 11.—The ills which we suffer from one another, cause our task to be heavier, and more complicated, but they do not change the nature of it. Our duty is still, to struggle nobly against the evils of life, and to exert so much the more force to put our mind in the state in which it ought to be, in order to be prepared for true happiness, the more our passions, and the exterior objects, are opposed to its finding happiness in that state. The principal procedure, too, by which we can become fit subjects for happiness is, ever to acquire the habit of giving to social love, its due share of influence over our sentiments and actions. For this end, we must endeavour to enlighten and purify our self love, that, instead of being hostile to our social love it shall, by kindly cherishing, strengthen it, till it attain its full growth and vigour.

§ 12.—I shall further remark, that it is as active members of an organised community, that we have the most opportunity to unfold, in its fullest perfection, our social love; and to exalt our self love, till it becomes the source of heroic sacrifices of our own personal good, to that of our fellow creatures.

§ 13.—The golden age, presents an image of a state of innocence, in which men are completely, and spontaneously happy; because, all their feelings are in perfect harmony with each other, and attuned to happiness; and because, all exterior objects, correspond exactly to their feelings.

The spirit which unites, men in a national, or social community, is unknown to human beings in the golden age; for, as they always practice towards their fellow creatures, the laws of justice, and that these laws are uniform, in their dictates, to every heart, they have no occasion to combine together, in order to establish a system of justice, formed to repress disorderly passions.

The Creator governs the supposed creatures in this state, like a benign, despotic monarch, who does not require them to take thought for themselves, and who keeps in his own hands, the charge of making them good, and happy.

When men, as they actually are, arrive at perfection, they are in a state of virtue; that is, they exert a prodigious force of mind, to keep the sentiments which render them susceptible of true happiness, reigning in their breast, though their passions seek to stifle them, and though exterior objects be contrary to their satisfaction.

In order that the contests which they hold with themselves, may have satisfactory results, it is necessary that their understanding have a distinct conception of the principles of duty that they ought to follow. They require to receive from these principles, a light which may teach them to regulate both self, and social love, so that they may act within them, with energy and majesty; and that the former may strenuously support the latter, in the exercise of due empire over them.

To induce them fully to acknowledge the authority of such principles, they find that it is necessary to arrange themselves in national communities, subject to one system of laws, the wisdom of which, preventing unjustifiable excesses, shall leave

well disposed men at liberty to act up to their views of right, and in particular to cultivate social love, the care of preserving which, in a flourishing state in their minds, they would be forced to neglect, did lawless spirits, by their unjust aggressions, oblige them to occupy themselves principally, with the means of self defence.

Men in a state of virtue are governed by laws of their own framing, or, in other words, by their own collective wisdom. Their Creator has, in some degree, renounced the care of them; though he still requires, that they shall of free will labour to continue equally good, as those innocent, affectionate beings whose image appears to their imagination a faithful copy of what mankind would be, had the Creator preserved them in a state of innocence. Men also know their weakness, and though they must not repose, like helpless burdens, in their Creator's arms, yet do they wistfully look towards him as to the eternal fount of order, by whose compassionate succour, aiding their own efforts, they hope to be enabled to keep their laws and their minds in harmony with the immutable principles of right, by which it is his will, that the whole universe should be governed.

§ 14.—On recognising that men, whether considered as individuals or portions of a social corps, are required to conduct themselves to the same ends of general peace, happiness and good will, whither their dispositions would tend, had their Creator maintained them in a state of innocence and undisturbed enjoyment; and on further recognising that such a duty demands from them an admirable degree of vigilance, self-control and activity, I conclude that the design of this life is to infuse into our moral existence, a concentrated energy, and to unfold in our understanding as well as sentiments, principles of right, with which we should, in a state of innocence, be unacquainted.

§ 15.—It seems to me that persons in a state of virtue differ from those in a state of innocence, in a manner analogous to that in which the fixed stars differ from the planets. However beautiful and pure be the qualities which give lustre to persons in a state of innocence, they have no fountain in

themselves, whence those qualities shall abundantly emanate in all circumstances and in all situations. The noble qualities which illustrate persons in a state of virtue, though communicated to them by their Maker, are identified with their nature, and convert them into living founts of righteousness.

# BOOK II.

SUBJECT.

*VIRTUE—SELF-LOVE AND SOCIAL.*

## CHAPTER I.

CONTENTS.

VIRTUE.

§ 1.—THOUGH I have contrasted a state of virtue, with one of innocence, I do not consider the difference that exists between them, such as to place them quite in opposition to each other. If men, whose business it is to climb the heights of virtue, are able to represent to themselves clear images of a state of innocence, and look back on it with tender affection, I think that they have been taught by nature, thus fondly to gaze on it, that they may draw from it their first ideas relative to the good which they ought to seek: these ideas they should afterwards modify, and render susceptible of more extensive bearings, in order to adapt them to their own character and circumstances.

§ 2.—If the views of the lot of human nature, whence men, in a state of virtue, extract their principles of conduct, point in the same direction with those of persons in a state of innocence, it follows—that the former, as well as the latter, look to the happiness of this world, as an object worthy their pursuit. They appreciate it, however, differently. All, or nearly all the joys which persons in a state of innocence value, are directly resulting from the exterior world; while virtuous men find, that their principal happiness consists in the consciousness of the force, that they exert for the right regulation of their own mind; the more numerous are the points at which they watch over it, the more comprehensive are their views, and the more rightly they fulfil their destination.

§ 3.—But, though their virtue be an elevated fabric, which is raised far above the humble joys of this life, it has, nevertheless, its foundation in them; and real virtue could not be

established on any other. In most occasions, to be ignorant of what is conducive to happiness, or to despise it, is to be liable to false ideas of virtue, which consists in cherishing our neighbour's happiness as our own, or in preferring a great and lasting good, to a contemptible, or momentary pleasure; so that, if we have no clear idea of the joys of life, or do not know how to value them, we cannot distinguish what it is, that virtue requires of us; nor can we strengthen our minds by making sacrifices to it. Were we to seek to act in a very meritorious manner, by reigning firmly over ourselves, without taking for our guide, a wish to find happiness in contributing to that of this world, we should probably be so uncertain how we ought to act, that we should be tempted to listen to the fanatics, or ambitious hypocrites, who might undertake to govern us, persuading us to believe them competent to explain to us the duties, the accomplishment of which could make us agreeable to the Divinity. Guided by them, we might learn to torment ourselves, by a thousand useless privations, without being, perhaps, in the least advanced in the practice of virtue. If real virtue implies—as I think that it evidently does—a taste for happiness, kept within just bounds by a firm resolution, it must remain uncertain, whether those who believe it to be their duty to deny themselves all the good things of this life, would, were they taught that they might innocently enjoy them, know how to do so with moderation; for it is much easier to push the cup of pleasure far from one, than to taste it, and to refrain from drinking of it to excess. We continually see persons who, as long as their thoughts are fixed on the necessity of supporting pain and fatigue, display an incredible strength of resolution, and who cannot forbear abandoning themselves to their passions, as soon as they are at liberty to seek for ease and enjoyment. Though virtue be often forced in this world, to walk in difficult paths, far from the temple of happiness, she ought always to keep it in view; for it is there that the lights shine, which can prevent her losing her way in the obscurity. It is by occupying ourselves assiduously, to improve the happiness of this world, that we can employ, in a laudable manner, the ambition which excites us to raise ourselves continually to a nobler state of existence; and the more

abundant is the happiness enjoyed by mankind, the more is every delicate, refined, virtuous sentiment, developed in them. When the blameless joys of a society, are carried to a great perfection, it must be in consequence of the dispositions which virtue recommends, being cultivated in it with such finished care, that they become general and immediate sources of happiness. In fact, we feel such dispositions to be those, that under a perfect order would make us happy; and it is easy to imagine such perfection given to our mind, that they might become an inexhaustible fount of happiness to us, even though outward circumstances were not favourable to their full satisfaction. This, we must suppose, will be the case with us, when we arrive at the highest state of existence for which we are designed: though in that state we hope that, our trials over, a perfect harmony will reign between all our inclinations, as well as between them and exterior circumstances, yet, from the nature of the trials which we at present undergo, we may judge, that when we shall be so perfect as not to have need of any, our love of the real good will be such, that we should unalterably seek it alone, even though every outward circumstance opposed our finding satisfaction in it. Our true happiness, as far as it depends on the state of our minds, being then completely firm, and developed, we may, without danger, enjoy that increase of it, which will arise from an exact correspondence between our situation and our wishes.

§ 4.—Virtue requiring every one to labour to promote in his sphere the happiness of this world, each individual ought in consequence to try to assure his own, since the friendliness of his neighbour could do little for him if he did not act in a friendly manner towards himself. 'Tis, however, a dangerous system of philosophy, that which encourages men to make the art of securing to themselves or even to the world, the greatest possible portion of happiness, their principal study. Though the reign of perfect and universal virtue is to the utmost propitious to happiness, yet, where the authority of virtue in a community is but imperfectly established—and it will never have sufficient force in human societies entirely to submit them to its control—the most virtuous of its members may sometimes become the victims of their inflexible integrity, and,

while they thus injure themselves by it, their efforts to serve their fellow-creatures may be fruitless. The state of society might, for instance, be so deplorably corrupted, that a man of honour, who would determine to act with a scrupulous regard to truth and probity, could not escape falling a prey to the artifices of the wily and unprincipled. Yet is it certain that were the whole society to imitate him, such laudable conduct would contribute greatly to its strength and prosperity.

Though the finished plan of Providence, or that which shows an indissoluble union between virtue and happiness, is the one to which men, both in their individual capacity and as portions of a commonwealth, should endeavour to make themselves conformable, yet, as Providence did not mean to let them rove in wild anarchy, during the ages which were to elapse, before they should learn to model their characters and institutions agreeably to the scheme of their perfection, it has constituted them so that they readily attach themselves with reverence to any system of social order upheld by their government, particularly after it has long prevailed among them. This system may be so pernicious as often to countenance vice more than virtue, yet may it be impossible to introduce a better in its place, and any attempts made to that purpose might only push the rash mortal who engaged in them, to acts of perfidy and lead to horrible disorders. The upright man is therefore bound patiently to submit to a state of things to which he cannot apply a remedy, yet in so doing, he perhaps condemns himself either to let the wicked triumph and trample him and his family, like the most abject beings, in the dust, or else to make some compromise between his conscience and the circumstances wherein he is placed, in order to rise to power, and thereby be able to secure himself, as well as the most deserving portion of the community, from cruel oppression.

This is an extreme case, however, under far better systems of government than the one here supposed, the upright man may frequently see the necessity of abating somewhat of the rigidity of his principles to accommodate himself to the times, or else of losing the opportunity not only to advance his own interest, but also to do good to his fellow-citizens. How far

it becomes a wise man to quit the standard which appears to him the one of strict rectitude, for the sake of conforming himself to the spirit of the government and of obtaining an opportunity to serve his own interests and those of the community, is one of the nicest points of casuistry which spiritual directors can be called on to settle. I certainly shall not presume to decide on it. In taking notice of the opposite route from that of happiness, into which bad or very imperfect systems of government might force virtue, I merely have in view, by my observations on this subject, to introduce the remark, that he who makes happiness the immediate object of his pursuit, will be easily induced, in following where it leads, to lose sight altogether of the ordinances of virtue. He will make utility, that is the consideration of existing circumstances, the entire scope of his actions, and the idea of virtue that is measured solely upon them will be always cold, calculating, and inclined to yield to the selfish passions. It will be like a sand bank which the waves increase or diminish, according to the direction in which they flow. Solid virtue obeys the laws of conscience let the consequences be what they may. It is like a rock, the same at all times, whatever be the direction or the force of the wind. Such a virtue does not allow itself weakly to bend to circumstances, but under a wise government circumstances are such, that this unshaken virtue is in honour, and becomes generally equally useful to the individual who exerts it, and to the nation to which he belongs. Under such a government, if virtue fail sometimes to be crowned with honour and success, it is only what is necessary to remind mankind, that severe trials serve to strengthen and purify her.

§ 5.—Passions, habits and prejudices can easily cloud a man's understanding, and prevent his perceiving more than a very confused, faint glimmering of that moral plan to whch the rational creation, in a state of perfection, would be conformed. But once he does discern it so distinctly, as to be able clearly to appreciate the nature of the virtuous sacrifices which it would require him to make, he is as convinced of his general views being right, notwithstanding that false notions of the conditions of human existence might also, in the days of igno-

rance, have appeared to him just ones, as a person awake is assured that his senses and thoughts are exercised by existing objects and circumstances, though during his sleep he had taken for realities the unsubstantial visions which beset his slumbering faculties.

§ 6.—The persons capable of distinguishing the moral order of virtue, and resolved to attach themselves to it, may sometimes be embarrassed to find a rule for the regulation of the details of their conduct, from a wish to preserve integral the main substance of their principles, without rudely clashing with established, perhaps respectable opinions. But they are at no loss to perceive, that the fundamental law which they should follow is not one that promises to lead them to happiness, but that prescribes to them the fulfilment of duties. In whatever situation the world may be placed, the upright man, even when the law of duty points exactly for him in the same direction with that of interest, still carries his glance beyond the objects which ultimately arrest the attention of the latter, to fix them on the temple of virtue, whither duty commands him to direct his steps.

§ 7.—It is particularly incumbent on us to avoid being warped from a sense of duty, by our own individual concerns. We are not, it is true, bound to despise any of our inclinations whose object is innocent. However, if we attach ourselves much to the gratification of those which seek momentary pleasure, we shall become too enervate to make the sacrifices, or to suffer the pain and hardships, which are often necessary towards entitling us to enjoy the lofty satisfaction, reserved for the courageous minds, who know how to postpone personal ease and enjoyment to the consciousness of doing their duty. The wise should therefore observe great moderation in the use of temporal goods, in which any excess might abate the energy of their mind, thus disposing them, both to prefer personal gratification to the duty of serving their fellow-creatures, and to shrink cowardly from the evils to which Providence exposes us, such as pain, disease and the horrors of death.

§ 8.—I shall further add, that persons whose hearts were set aright, supposing—what could not happen—that they had no opportunity of doing good, and that they had every means

of heightening, in an exquisite manner, their own pleasures, could not bear, however innocent those pleasures might be in themselves, to confine their thoughts so much to them as would be necessary for learning how to give them all their relish. In vain would they have an opportunity of conducting, through a most delightful garden, their own path in life; when they would observe the thorny wilds through which many persons, as deserving as themselves, would have to pass, they would have no inclination to exhaust their invention in embellishing their own course. They would prefer walking along a simple, unadorned road, without bestowing on it any particular attention: identifying their feelings with those of their suffering fellow-creatures, they would like to consider that for them also this world is a place of trial rather than of enjoyment, and that it is only when they arrive at a much higher state of existence, that they can hope to be really happy, in seeing happiness spread every where around them.

§ 9.—Not only do persons, anxious to improve in virtue, impose on themselves the obligation to use with great moderation the goods of this life, but, from knowing what human nature can bear, or what is adapted to the circumstances of certain individuals, or of the country wherein they are placed, they also exert their influence and authority in support of a just temperance and sobriety. They seek to render the love of pleasure subordinate to the love of virtue, but not to stifle it. They encourage every individual to be content with a moderate consumption of the good things of the world, in order that the greatest number of persons possible may enjoy them, and to the end, that social love may have the pre-eminence, in every heart, over the personal inclinations.

§ 10.—We ought to form our notions of duty on the principle, that providence reserves chiefly to itself, the care to separate happiness from virtue, so far as may be necessary towards strengthening the latter. Our business is, to labour incessantly, to unite them together. If we disregard the temporal happiness of our fellow creatures, particularly of those who are well deserving, whatever may be our pretence for doing so, we become hard-hearted and unpitying; often, perhaps, arrogant and selfish. It is our duty, in some cases,

to treat our fellow creatures severely, in order to do them good; but the good that we propose, ought not merely to refer to the next world; it ought to be evidently adapted to promote the prosperity of this; otherwise we may be prone to substitute our own imaginary views, in place of positive and certain good.

§ 11.—I judge, that the general plan of the Creator, in regard to this world, is to make all events tend, at last, to the establishment of an universal system, as favourable to the happiness of virtuous persons, as is consistent with the design of this life.

But, I am far from supposing such a plan to be his only one; on the contrary, I think it probable, that he has many particular ones for different societies; and I am persuaded, that he has one for every individual, though I conclude, that they all combine, harmoniously, with the universal one.

Though the accomplishment of the universal one, is what would render nations most virtuous, the virtue of individuals may often be raised to a more sublime height, where that of nations is sunk very low. He who resolves firmly to act with integrity in the midst of a depraved society, has far greater need of a noble force of mind, than it is necessary to possess when the example and precepts of all who surround you, excite you to virtue. I may say then, that the path of virtue resembles the roads which cross a chain of formidable mountains. At first, all the native difficulties of the place being left subsisting, the path is so fatiguing and dangerous, that few persons dare attempt to pass along it, but the few who succeed in this enterprize, give proof of superior vigour and energy. Afterwards, as civilization and improvements advance, the government undertakes to render this path as little toilsome and perilous, as possible: it succeeds so far in levelling and smoothing it, that those who have not an extraordinary courage venturing to travel in it, it becomes, in consequence, much more generally frequented.

§ 12.—In making the world happy, at the same time that it is rendered virtuous, if one does not produce those astonishing instances of virtue, which may sometimes appear in a corrupted state of society, the good that is done has this advantage,

that it is effected in a manner agreeable to the eternal order of things which, we have reason to think, reigns in states of existence superior to ours. We must suppose, that the glorious beings in those states, have an attachment to virtue which remains firm in the midst of the greatest enjoyments. Those, then, who know how to taste all the blessings of life, and who yet have sufficient strength of mind to choose virtue as the supreme good, follow, in this world, the example of the superior beings among whom, after death, they hope to be admitted.

§ 13.—But when the rulers of the people shall have done their utmost to render agreeable and smooth, the path of virtue, so that the multitude shall have courage to tread in it, it will still present to individuals such formidable obstacles to surmount, as shall prove the immutable truth, relatively to this world, of the maxim of the poet who says, in speaking of virtue—

> "Dangers and toils stand firm before her throne,
> And guard, so heaven commands, the sacred place."

With regard to those blessed spirits among whom we hope that a faithful discharge of our duties, while we remain in this world, will cause us to be received after our departure from it, we believe that virtue does not prescribe to them such painful duties as those which she enjoins to man. I trust, indeed, that she does not, but yet, judging from the analogy which I presume to exist between the principle of moral order engraved in the minds of superior creatures, and that which ought to animate the hearts of men, I infer that the former, as well as the persons among the latter who rightly fulfil their task on earth, look to the performance of their duty as their ultimate object, and not to the enjoyment of happiness. They, like upright men, are virtuous, though in a much superior degree.

By the word virtue, used as at present in its most general sense, I mean an intense energy permanently infused through our intellectual and moral forces, in a manner agreeable to the eternal laws of order.

A desire of happiness cannot awaken in us this energy, as we may judge from our apprehension of what mankind would be in a state of innocence. In that state, as well as in one of virtue, all the inclinations are harmonious and orderly; the

only difference is, that they are indulged still as they rise, because mankind feel that they cannot go astray in the pursuit of happiness, while under the reign of virtue every inclination is reviewed, still as it appears, by a sense of duty, which shows itself indulgent or severe according to the injunctions laid on it by the eternal laws of right. This difference occasioning that all the moral and intellectual forces of mankind are powerfully developed in a state of virtue, while in a state of innocence they remain languid and inert, I cannot suppose that such an immense complication of springs has been introduced into the human mind and human affairs, to determine mankind to enter at last into a state of virtue, when it appears, that they might have been created at once in a state of innocence, if good men after their resurrection were to be placed in a condition whose joys were to be analogous to those of a state of innocence; and in such a condition, it appears to me, that blessed spirits would be, did their moral views regard any species of happiness, however pure, as their ultimate object. I conclude then, that though among the blest, a sense of duty may not be opposed to the enjoyment of unspeakable, uninterrupted felicity, it still predominates so triumphantly in their minds, that it causes all the moral and intellectual forces to be developed with incomparably more energy among them, than they are on earth in the persons most admirable for their lofty, inflexible virtue.

§ 15.—The truly virtuous mind deeply feels the insufficiency of our portion here on earth, and fondly clings to a belief in an all-ruling power who will, in a future state, recompense every one according to his works.

The philosophy which would bound all our views to this life, would check our virtuous sentiments in the course which they most tend to take: it could not, without freezing them, hinder them from flowing towards a future and happier state of existence. They are like water which cannot be prevented, otherwise than by an icy bond, from throwing itself into the channel prepared to receive it.

The sentiments with which virtue inspires the human breast, are entirely out of proportion with this state of existence, so limited and unsatisfactory. Were we intended for no other,

it would seem that we ought to have been made on a plan much more bounded. In that case, our best lot would have been to be created to live in innocence; ever to possess, by the bounty of nature, all the blessings demanded by our present wants, and to be thoughtless of tomorrow.

§ 16.—Though virtue cannot be its own reward in this life, it seems to me to be a dangerous and false assertion to say, that without the belief of a future state, there would be no reason for preferring virtue to vice. This is representing the former, as having no inherent worth, and as being of value only on account of the future rewards which it may assure to its followers. 'Tis giving a degraded idea of it; for those who acted well, merely to obtain future rewards, or escape future punishments, might have a great deal of prudence and good sense, but I do not think that they would be entitled to the appellation of virtuous; nor would they, as I believe, be capable of that noble elevation of mind, which distinguishes those who have a deep sense of the charms of virtue. It is so true, that the former is precious in respect to the good it does, and the satisfaction that accompanies it, that were we all convinced that we have nothing to hope for beyond this life, our surest method of filling it with as much joy as it would be capable of receiving, would be for every individual to determine to accomplish all the precepts of the most lofty virtue: I know well, that no one would, probably, have sufficient force of mind to do so; but the general defection from the laws of virtue, which would take place, ought to be attributed to human weakness, rather than to the total want of motives for following them.

The belief in an eternal existence reserved for mortals, of which we can form no idea otherwise than by supposing our destiny in it under the influence of the conduct which we hold in this world, is like as if, in arithmetic, you placed an infinite series of cyphers after one principal figure. Such a suite would increase the value of the head number so much that, in comparison to what it would be were it alone, it would be as the ocean to a drop of water. But notwithstanding this immense difference, it is still its intrinsical, isolated value which renders it susceptible to have its importance so much increased by the

cyphers which follow it: were it a cypher itself, it would receive no value whatever from them. Thus, though our conduct in this life is principally rendered of importance by its effects on our lot beyound the grave, it has some value detached from this consideration.

Since we believe virtue worthy to form the principal happiness of superior beings, it must contain in it a fund of true happiness for every state of existence in which it can be exercised.

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## CHAPTER II.

### SELF-LOVE AND SOCIAL.

§ 1.—I use the word self-love as a general term, signifying collectively, all those desires which prompt an individual to seek solely his own gratification, whether those desires remain in a merely instinctive state, or that he has modified and classed them, from having formed a digested scheme to work out his own happiness.

According to the meaning which I apply to the term social love, the individual who possesses this quality in full perfection, is he who identifies his happiness with that of every human being, and indeed of every living creature, as we suppose men to do who are in a state of innocence; for though they do not enjoy by reflection the idea of bliss being universally spread—since they consider it a thing of course and have no conception of the nature of sorrow, nor of the possibility of its existence—yet do we figure to ourselves, that their minds are so exquisitely accorded to social love, that, were they made acquainted with the nature of sorrow, and to learn that any person, though it were a stranger far removed from their sight, was a prey to it, they would be afflicted just as if the case were their own; nor would the good things enjoyed by themselves or families afford them any pleasure, as long as they believed a fellow-creature to be less fortunate than they: they would even fling these treasures from them in disgust,

did they understand that they had been obtained for their use, to the detriment of their rightful owners.

§ 2.—It is needless to inquire whether the social love of innocent mortals would long remain integral, were they placed in a world where it would often be forced to combat the most urgent claims of self-love. I certainly believe, that the steady principles of truly virtuous men give to social love such deep root in their bosoms, enabling it to baffle the assaults of violent storms, as it would never possess among mortals in a state of innocence.

§ 3.—Leaving this question aside, I shall remark that persons in the most perfect state of virtue, are not required to mourn with all those of their fellow-creatures who may be distressed; such a comprehensive, compassionate sympathy, it would be impossible to acquire, and the endeavour to acquire it would only convert the persons who sincerely made it into incessant mourners, incapable of helping mankind to push forward to a higher state of existence, by directing them to refined pursuits and enjoyments. Social love, instead of requiring that the persons at ease themselves shall ever mourn from sympathy with the unhappy, commands that each individual, still as his turn comes to feel the burden of sorrow, shall to a certain degree, bear his load with silent fortitude, that he may not disturb, by his dejection or complaints, the joys of persons free for the moment from depressing cares. All the efforts then, which virtue requires us to make to sustain in our hearts the authority of social love, is, to be mild and equal in our temper; to treat every one, agreeably to their relations with us, with the respect or consideration due to them; incessantly to avoid encroaching on our fellow-creatures' rights by learning frequently to make their case our own; to use towards them, when they are in fault or in dissention with us, all the forbearance of which the maintenance of good order admits; to be ready, where we can, to relieve the helpless and to assist the laudable efforts of those who wrestle against ill fortune; to be strictly fair and faithful in all our dealings; to be ready to devote ourselves to the good of our country, without, however, seeking to promote even its prosperity in a manner unjust or injurious to humanity at large.

Social love, besides producing one wide expanse of affection, in which all human nature is comprised, has many branches, wherein it is more or less mingled with self-love. In these, I shall hereafter consider it.

§ 4.—The great cause which has precipitated social love from the rank which it should occupy, relatively to self-love, seems to me to spring from the passions to which the human mind is left a prey, and which cannot usually find a vent otherwise, than at the expense of social love.

The order of nature, requiring from men strenuous efforts, that they would have no occasion to make in a state of innocence, they have been supplied, accordingly, with a proportionate quantity of active fire and forces, which are pervaded, in consequence of their fallen state, by an evil principle, and which stimulate them, not to let them lie idle, by occasioning them an uneasy restlessness.* How to employ them rightly, they only learn from long experience; and, where they do not make a better use of them, those springs of active life, refusing to lie dormant within them, excite, in their bosoms, violent passions, frequently contentious ones, which force them to rush headlong into enterprises that call forth all their power. The better to illustrate my meaning, I shall here specify some of the effects which this mental source of agitation produces, on the characters of men, whether it kindle in them angry passions, or ferment in their bosoms, in a more benevolent form.†

§ 5.—Sometimes, kindling in an individual an ardent desire to excel a rival, or to show himself superior to other men, it lights in his mind, a steady flame of ambition, which, by teaching him to concentrate all his thoughts in the attainment of one great end, generally abates his stormy, vindictive pas-

* Man, in a state of innocence, contained, it is to be presumed, in his mind, a quantity of vital fire, which could not be put fully in exercise, except in a state of virtue; but it remained sufficiently quiescent to suit his condition, owing to the holy calm that a principle of love and obedience to God, diffused through his bosom.

† The peculiar conformation and complexion of many individuals, contributes partly to infuse through their temper, gloom and malevolence. But, I believe, that the great universal cause of the hostile propensities of mortals, proceeds from the restless vivacity agitating them.

sions, even though it only engage him to form such projects, as prove him entirely under the domination of selfish pride.

§ 6.—This restless fire that agitates the breast, and that keeps the thoughts in incessant motion, is frequently nourished by subjects of discontent and hatred, real or imagined.

§ 7.—Sometimes, it exasperates the mind against a certain individual, or against a party, composed of its near neighbours. Such a kind of anger is liable to be very furious, and is usually a sign that he who is affected by it, is little moved by the ambition to distinguish himself by a laborious cultivation of his talents.

§ 8.—Some persons dwell at peace with their countrymen, but hate a rival, foreign nation. Such characters have commonly a great deal of ambition to attain to unrivalled excellence in some praiseworthy line; nor is it purely selfish either, for they more wish to do honour to their country, than to outshine a competitor among their countrymen. They are usually sufficiently conversant with magnanimous thoughts, to feel that it becomes them to have an elevated mode of proceeding even towards their enemies. While they are the bitter foes, in a public capacity, of the entire mass of them, they are often kind and affectionate towards individuals among them, who are not involved in the public cause.

§ 9.—Some persons again have a diffusive, social kindness which hinders them from being originally disposed to entertain an habitual ill will to any of their fellow-creatures, yet are they greatly moved by that restless ardour of mind, which is commonly fanned into action by a malevolent sentiment. Persons of this description are commonly vain glorious: though they are pleased with every one, yet do they like to entertain themselves with the idea of their own singular merit; they form the most brilliant projects for the sake of rendering it manifest, and they readily allow the flatterers who acknowledge the justice of their pretensions, to ingratiate themselves with them.

Nor are they by any means inaccessible to the attacks of heinous passions. Though the active flame which animates them does not seem originally to awaken such passions in them, yet are they continually excited in their bosom by wayward

circumstances. Wounded pride, disappointed hopes, and resentment at the injustice of rivals who hate them, often call them forth in them : often too the ambition to act a great part in the world cannot be gratified otherwise, than by harsh deeds which they find it necessary for them to commit, to pave the way to success. On all these occasions they are obnoxious to the temptation, from never having been accustomed to discipline in their minds the hostile passions, to conduct themselves with greater inhumanity than those whose habitual entertainment of such passions has led to their often coolly revolving, in their thoughts, the sentiments which they inspired to them, and to their feeling that they ought to submit them to certain regulations.

§ 10.—Some persons are so easily moved by sensible objects and by compassion for actual individuals, that, though their minds be overflowing with angry passions, they cannot bear to direct them on any precise human being. They therefore let all their wrath fall on a party or a principle supported by a near and perhaps a well-minded neighbour, whose implacable enemies they become, not from any motive of personal animosity to him, but in obedience to a law of right, which, in conjunction with many associates, they have formed for themselves.

This conventional rule of duty hardens their hearts against the claims of humanity far more than would any private cause of resentment.

It is persons who have something honourable and magnanimous in their dispositions, at the same time, that they are a prey to barbarous passions, who are most liable thus to become fierce and remorseless in support of a principle. Though they feel that it would be base cruelly to rage against the aggressor, from whom they have received a private injury ; they think that they only prove themselves faithful, and firm minded, by an unrelenting persecution of those, who may have made themselves obnoxious to the displeasure of the party whose cause they support.

§ 11.—Some persons are too benevolent, or too generous, to harbour vindictive passions against any of the human race : in consequence, they endeavour to give to the fire that agitates

them, all the scope which it demands, by encouraging their minds to roam in imagination, through fair scenes of love and felicity, relatively either to this world, or the next.

I shall not consider this disposition, in the various phases which it presents, when it prompts the mind, ardently to seek to win an immortal crown of glory; but shall observe, that where it is truly tender and affectionate in a youthful female, who hopes for happiness in this life, it commonly leads her to the conception of a pure, and truly interesting passion, in which her being seems as completely absorbed, as if she only lived to the end, that she might be sensible to it.

Her soft, susceptible disposition, renders her captivating, by teaching sentiments, lovely in themselves, to rise in her heart; but, it does not much incline her to make such wise observations on the world, as shall enable her to give judicious counsels, to the young and inexperienced. The persons with this disposition, are frequently romantic, from so overcharging the colours with which they paint to themselves, the felicity to which they pretend in this life, that they never can realise it. Their judgment, too, is so little formed, and they are dazzled by such a brilliant illusion, that they frequently see the lovely form of the felicity of which they hope to take possession, in a quarter where nothing of the kind exists, and become, in consequence, the hapless dupes of their credulity.

§ 12.—The endeavour—principally made by women—to keep the mind in a lively state of emotion, by teaching it to observe what is fine in the human character, instead of allowing it to nourish itself with censorious remarks, has the disadvantage, when it is not made with great discretion, of habituating you to take false views of what is estimable. For instance, when women, to avoid illnatured gossipping, attempt to animate themselves with a deep interest in their topic of conversation, by praising some individual, they frequently offend against the moral order of nature, which ordains, that whatever is meritorious in character, shall not usually receive a high relief from the praise bestowed on it:—

On account of the modest nature of real virtue;

Of its entering so much into the natural order of things, that it rarely appears remarkable;

And of its being at all times so defective, in comparison of that ultimate perfection to which we should still strive to attain, that it is our business fearfully to exhort each other to persevere, to the end, in an upright course, rather than to bestow such triumphant praise on a virtuous conduct, as would seem to imply that the task of moral improvement was, by the object of our eulogiums, already completed.

But the women who thus seek to keep their mind in a commotion gratifying to the vital spark that agitates it, by lively transports of admiration, have not discernment to choose objects deserving to excite this sentiment; indeed if they had, seldom would they have the satisfaction of feeling it, for persons entitled to call it forth by peculiarly distinguished virtues, or even intellectual endowments, are not easily found. They therefore fix on some superficial accomplishment in the individual whom they eagerly seek to exhibit as deserving the highest applause, and, in consequence, their power to discriminate between solid worth and empty pretensions is daily impaired, instead of being continually increased by experience. Their pride and passions becoming interested in favour of the idol whom they have raised, they are tempted to cabal against his rivals, though perhaps among them there are persons far more deserving than he is of encouragement. At last their want of sympathy with those virtues or talents, which are worthy of inspiring a deep respect, having rendered them frivolous and capricious, they grow weary of upholding the favourite whom they had so injudiciously patronised, and, after having taught him to think that his mental qualifications entitled him to universal homage, they leave him in a state of abandonment calculated to cause him surprise and mortification.

§ 13.—Some women who avoid railing at their neighbour and bear ill will to no one, are yet a prey to those gloomy and restless feelings which usually ferment into malignant passions. Women of this description seem to take pleasure in tormenting themselves, so ingenious are they in discovering around them cruel circumstances, that amply justify the melancholy and despondency which continually oppress them. They cannot much pity any one else, for all their thoughts roll on their own sufferings, which they believe to be so great, that it is but just

that they should absorb all their attention. Sometimes it is an unfortunate tender attachment that causes their woe; sometimes it is the loss or the unkindness of a friend; but, whatever be the subject of their affliction, it is only while it affords them a plea for being unhappy that it predominates in their minds: once they are forced to avow that the grievances which it caused them have been removed, they turn elsewhere to look for fresh.

I must, however, observe that benevolent minds are not near so frequently their own tormenters as those which are overflowed with envious, vindictive passions. The quantity of active and lurid fire which inflames the latter is often such, that it can, not only quicken those of their thoughts which attach in a hostile manner to the idea of their neighbour, but it can also render them extremely prolific in reflections on their own misery.

§ 14.—I have made but a very imperfect enumeration of the various operations of those passions, which indicate a greater degree of restless vivacity in the human mind, than we must suppose would have been sufficient for mortals in a state of innocence; and which usually urge mankind to hostile proceedings towards a neighbour. It suffices, however, for my purpose, which is to show that, though we should incessantly labour to give to social love its due share of influence over us, yet that our fundamental duty is to leave no idle or disorderly thought stirring within us.

When we permit thoughts, or repinings, to rise within us, which depart from the order of nature, she usually ordains, that they shall either directly, or indirectly, make us neglect our duty towards our neighbour.

Directly,—if they inflame us with unjust anger against a fellow creature;

Indirectly,—if they immerse us so much in our personal concerns, that our heart becomes insensible to the claims of others, on our good offices and compassion.

Nature takes care, that the principal combats by which mankind are perfected, shall take place between self and social love; and the chief duty which she enjoins, for the sake of putting to the test the strength and sincerity of human virtue,

is that of making, with the aid of steady principle, self-love constantly to yield to social.

§ 15.—'Tis not only by giving to our turbulent passions such a direction, that they shall usually incite us to injure our neighbour, that nature marks it to be her intention, that human virtue shall chiefly be exercised by the task of duly upholding in the breast, the authority of social love; she also shows it to be her determination, that we shall fall too much under the government of self-love, unless we constantly struggle to resist its usurpations, by dealing out so scantily, the means of existing, and enjoying life, in proportion to the numbers whom she sends forth to claim existence, and enjoyment, that she makes men's interests greatly clash together, and obliges them to use strenuous efforts to triumph over competitors.

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## CHAPTER III.

### INQUIRY INTO NATURE'S DESIGN IN MAKING THE TUMULTUOUS ACTIVITY OF OUR MINDS, TAKE A DIRECTION HOSTILE TO OUR NEIGHBOUR.

§ 1.—As the tumultuous activity of mind, which we are bound, by virtuous exertions, to reduce into order, does not seem necessarily to inspire us with any ill will towards our neighbour, it is an interesting inquiry to demand, why nature chose to direct it so, that the constant proof of our not having sufficient virtue, steadily to govern it to orderly ends, is its causing us to transgress, often directly, but always, at least, indirectly, against social love.

I think, that there is ample room to judge, that she acts thus, because we best learn the necessity of vigorously regulating the movements of the active, sinful spirit, residing within us, when its unruly transports tempt us to sin against social love. She teaches us, in two manners, to beware of such a transgression :—

First—By making us perceive it to be our interest to respect each other's rights;

Secondly—By causing social love, where the mind is pure and well developed, to be so wrought into its affections and principles of right, that it cannot offend against it, without feeling a keen pang of remorse.

Let us suppose for a moment that social love was as firmly fixed as self-love in our bosoms, so that our wildest passions could no more have a propensity to transgress against the former than the latter. Let us suppose too all our essential wants to be so fully supplied, as to be no cause either of anxiety or competition. In that case human beings, had they still that great abundance of active, evil elements in their minds which they have at present, would be, I presume, very unhappy, since their active spirit, for want of other aliments, would turn inward and prey upon them, without ever finding out that it lay in their own power to establish within them a peaceful calm. Not being able to impute their misery to adverse circumstances, they would conclude that by their constitution they were doomed to suffer, since nothing would check their sentiments and imagination from giving an unbridled course to their propensity to find for them subjects of grief. Their distresses of mind would rise to a far greater pitch than they do at present, when they are so often stopped short in their career by the feeling, or spectacle, of the miseries to which mankind are liable, as being partly composed of a material frame. Those distresses would seem to them never ending, and they would want courage to support them, for, if they were entirely abandoned to the disorders of their minds, the power possessed by imagination to surround all the passions with vague, indefinite objects, denoting that the whole eternal order of things corresponds to them, would lead these unfortunate beings to regard the feelings that agitated them as being destined to have a never ending duration.

Nature has spared us such great and unavailing torments. The plan which she has followed in our moral organization, though at first sight, from rendering us liable to be enemies of each other, it appears harsh, is one to the accomplishment of which our understanding and feelings will at last surely lead us. In accomplishing it we have, no doubt, a very arduous

task to perform, but it is a task that is only commensurate to the quantity which we possess of mental force and vivacity.

§ 2.—Nature, in ordaining that the charge of providing for the physical wants by which they are warned to preserve their existence, shall furnish to mankind their principal occupations and studies, has done much towards indicating to them, by opening a way in their hearts to social love, the true route of happiness and virtue, notwithstanding that, ere they enter into it, their bodily necessities often tempt them to wander from it, by rendering them rapacious and interested. Laborious efforts, for the sake of sustaining the corporeal frame, arrest greatly in him who makes them, the progress of the sufferings derived from the sentiments and imagination.

Now sufferings which owe their existence to them are those which more especially render human beings selfish.

Were corporeal wants removed, there would be much fewer motives than there are to form in us the habit of sympathising one with another: and I doubt much that mental distresses would be alone sufficient to call forth in men a fellow feeling for the unhappy, or to render them kind hearted, when I consider the disposition, to which most persons are inclined, of thinking the woes which their mental feelings and imagination occasion them greater than those of any one else. Individuals in general, whose organisation dooms them to suffer peculiarly keen anguish of this sort, regard it as an honourable distinction, so that their sense of their dignity, instead of exciting them to forget their own sorrows for the sake of comforting a neighbour, makes them think that they do well to be entirely immersed in them.

The pre-eminence that we give to mental over bodily sufferings often renders persons in affluent circumstances, proud of a sensibility which turns entirely on themselves. They cherish their griefs, persuaded that they do them honour; and they despise the rest of mankind, particularly the labouring part of of them, imagining that their own organisation is of a remarkable fineness and delicacy in comparison of theirs.

Mental sufferings are nearly unknown to those who are obliged constantly to labour for the sustenance of their bodily frame. Nature has ordained that the wants of the latter shall

be so urgent and imperious, that, as long as they demand our attention, we are little sensible to those mental distresses to which imagination is apt to give rise. The wants, however, which merely affect the frame, do not, in the usual course of nature, render us selfish: we are not proud of being liable to them, nor do we, once we have appeased them, love to brood over the idea of our being exposed to them. We view them with a kind of disdain, while at the same time we feel the conviction that the greatest misery which can usually overtake men is to be deprived of the ability to satisfy them.

As they are so precise and universal, that every one is known to be equally subject to the torments which they inflict, we can all judge fully of the misery that they entail on each being deprived of the means of satisfying them. On this account they become a bond of sympathy and compassion among men, the more so, because every person commonly humane, and susceptible of a feeling of self respect, scorns to think that he has more occasion to satisfy them than others: his pride would on the contrary, rather lead him to wish to be better able than most men to support their privations. The labouring, industrious poor, therefore, joyfully share with the needy traveller the morsel which they have earned in the sweat of their brow, and feel happier in so doing, than did they churlishly refuse it to him, from a dread lest their own portion should fall short of the demands of their appetite. The persons too in easy circumstances and of a commonly good heart, when they see so many human beings pining in want around them, cannot forbear acknowledging that it would be criminal of them to abandon themselves to all the various torments, which a fertile imagination and an agitated mind can occasion. They are struck with the idea that they would be very ungrateful to Providence did they sink in sadness and despondency, though it has sheltered them from those terrible evils which extreme indigence draws after it, and though it has been graciously pleased to give them the means of alleviating those evils for some of the unfortunate objects who suffer them.

§ 3.—It is not merely the sympathy which the most essential wants of the corporeal frame excite among men, and the greater importance which they are forced to attach to them,

above sentimental or imaginary woes, that prove the care taken by nature, to fit mankind for at last accomplishing the design of their creation, by a recognition of the rights of social love.

The constitution of the human mind seems to me, in various respects, admirably adapted to its learning to perceive, that virtue and true happiness, call on it to cherish social love, equally with self-love, though it opposes insurmountable obstacles to its duly cherishing social love, without a courageous perseverance in strong efforts to vanquish its own passions and appetites.

Had a disposition to postpone social, to self-love, been manifested by a propensity to forget our neighbour, and think solely of self, nature would not have provided means for throwing the human mind into a state of cruel fermentation, which would give it no rest, until it should have steadily determined to view the whole human species, with sentiments of brotherly love. What is the peculiar kind of happiness which mankind would, in this case, have determined to seek as their supreme good, it is needless to specify. 'Tis enough to say, that it would have been a selfish one; for men would never have thought enough of their neighbour, to have become aware that they ought to love him as themselves, if nature had disposed them to view him with total indifference. But she has not done so: whatever may be the faults into which men are prone to fall, in regard to their neighbour, they certainly do not proceed from a tendency, coldly to forget him. They have their minds continually occupied about some portion of their fellow-creatures. To be respected, to be loved, to be admired by them, is frequently of more consequence to them, than the gratification of their most urgent appetites: so that they would willingly suffer in these respects, provided they could ensure to themselves an opportunity to make in their eyes, an appearance consonant to their wishes.

§ 4.—The mortification that individuals feel, when they think that they inspire their neighbours with contempt, or seem to them ridiculous, is such, as sometimes to excite in them, the most implacable wrath against them. Sometimes, too, they view them with keen resentment, merely on per-

ceiving, that their conduct, or opinion, does not entirely satisfy them, so anxious are they to obtain their unqualified approbation. Often, when they feel a pang at the sight of a neighbour's rise in the world, they do not bear him any animosity, nor do they dread his prosperity having for them any other ill consequences, than just that of inflating him with pride to such a degree, that he shall be induced to treat them with less consideration than he was wont to do, in more humble circumstances.

§ 5.—Nor is it entirely self-love, anxious to bend to its will the whole moral, as well as physical world, that induces individuals to occupy themselves greatly, with a neighbour's manner of thinking. They are richly provided with those disinterested, affectionate sentiments, which fit them to correspond to the pretensions that the self-love of other individuals may form on them. They can take great pleasure in bestowing love and admiration, on objects who, they think, merit to fix those sentiments: they can delight in adopting the opinion of another; and they often survey, with heartfelt satisfaction, a character which has claims to their applause. But it is foreign to my purpose, to enumerate all the affections which may make the human heart warm towards a fellow-creature: the reader is doubtless as well acquainted with them, as I am; and my only reason for slightly adverting to them, is to show, that nature has done much to make the idea of our neighbour, intermingle itself so thoroughly with the commotions of the human heart, that it shall perceive, that the only way of securing to itself a sweet repose, is to regulate, and steadily uphold within it, social love. When it happily rouses itself to act accordingly, it acquires, by its exertions, an intuitive glimpse of the eternal, moral order, which ordains, that social love shall go hand in hand with self-love, as its equal, and inseparable companion. This lovely, sublime glimpse, fortifying and chearing it, makes it apply, with redoubled ardour, to the virtuous undertaking by which it is to subdue within it, self-love, and exalt social.

## CHAPTER IV.

### MODE IN WHICH SELF AND SOCIAL LOVE ACT WITHIN US.

§ 1.—I shall now enter into some details, on the manner in which these two affections develope themselves in the mind.

Before I begin, it is necessary to premise, that I consider the near family ties, as being, in the main, partial branches of social love, though self-love is, more or less, greatly intertwined with them. Properly understood and purified, they serve as sources to universal social love, as well as canals to unite it with self-love, and to form an indissoluble, well assorted union, between these affections. However, as all our natural propensities lead us, till they are wisely directed, to deplorable errors, the family affections, as they are usually understood, contribute greatly to the selfishness of mankind.

Notwithstanding this fact, it would, I believe, be impossible to treat consistently of self and social love, without determining the family affections to be a branch of the latter rather than of the former: more particularly as they usually flourish and decay along with the other branches of social love. It is proved that the persons in general who are kind and just to all mankind, have a more profound and tender affection for their families than those who are selfish, and unfeeling in regard to strangers.

If some individuals, who are hard hearted for mankind, have notwithstanding a tender affection for their families, I judge that, although they have suppressed social love in their bosoms, so as to hinder its flowing in those courses which are the least prepared to receive it, they have not been able to prevent its rising within them, and precipitating itself into the channels into which it had the greatest tendency to enter.

§ 2.—Self-love, in reference to the subject whose good it seeks, is one concentrated affection, with no partial branch whatever. In regard, however, to the kind of good which it craves, it is divided into as many different sorts, as there are gradations between virtuous, and vicious, noble, and mean characters. But, whatever be its tendency, the following axiom

respecting it is ever, I think, a fundamental truth in ethics, namely: that every individual is necessarily and equally dear to himself. Where we wish, therefore, to place social love on a par with self-love in our bosoms, we can only succeed in *doing* so by strengthening the former, and identifying it with the latter, for we cannot weaken self-love, though we may regulate and even steadily suspend its operations. It is an affection which we could not get rid of if we would, for it is wrought into the very consciousness of our existence. Persons penetrated with a sense of justice, sometimes may have a desire to be angry with themselves for faults which they know that they would resent in others; nay, we have heard of their being pushed by remorse to treat their own frames in a barbarous manner: yet did their frenzy only proceed from a violent agitation of mind, produced by their will to hate themselves, in its combat with sensations that effectually baffled all the efforts which it made to that effect. The indignation that any one directs against himself is always very different from that which inflames him against others. It is really nothing more than a profound sorrow for an act of which his conscience accuses him, that assumes the tone of furious anger.

We have no occasion to have recourse to reflections, or memory, to know who is the particular being that exists in our own frame; our sensations acquaint us with it at all moments. Were our frame to change, so as no longer to be recognised by any one, it would not leave us an instant in doubt of our being the same particular entity we were formerly.

§ 3.—In respect to our neighbour, we can never penetrate into his soul, so as to have an intuitive knowledge of the individual which it constitutes. Were the soul of our nearest friend to quit his frame and another living being to come to inhabit it, we should be ignorant of the change which had taken place. Many fairy tales are founded on this kind of transmigration.

We cannot suppose that it would be possible for us to love our neighbour without loving ourselves. Entirely deprived of this latter affection, we should be insensible to pain and pleasure, as well as to every passion. We should then have no

means of learning to wish to do others good and to avoid doing them harm.

§ 4.—Though the hopes and fears which self-love inspires seem necessary to enable us to enter into the feelings of others, our social love is not merely a dictate of our self-love, teaching us to wish that beings like ourselves should avoid misery and attain to happiness. Were our social love nothing but a reflection of our self-love, it would have no higher importance when it would come in contact with it, than has the shadow in regard to the substance. Our wishes for the happiness of our fellow-creatures would be as faint in comparison of those that we should form for our own, as the reflected knowledge which, from judging of them by ourselves, we should obtain of their pains and pleasures, would be in respect to the lively sensations, that would force us to take into consideration the pains and pleasures which affected ourselves.

We should also not begin till very late to feel for others, for we should have first to learn to transfer, by an effort of cold reason, our sensations to them. The interest which we took in our neighbour would therefore always yield to that which we took in ourselves. In any clash between those two kinds of interest, we would never let ourselves be led by that which our neighbour would inspire us, otherwise than from being convinced, that we should in the end be repaid for a momentary sacrifice of our wishes to his, by some great or durable good which it would ensure to us.

At the same time, did our social dispositions solely arise from an application to our neighbour's case, made by our reason, of the inclinations inspired to us by self-love, we should never hate him, nor seek to do him any other harm than what would be necessary towards doing good to ourselves: our sentiments respecting him being exactly moulded on our self-love, we should always take more pleasure in seeing him happy than miserable.

The phenomena which our social affections present, are very different from what they would be in the case that I have just supposed. We begin to love our neighbour long before our reflections on our own sensations could have taught us to feel for him. Often and often we prefer his welfare to our own, not from a well understood principle of self-interest, but be-

cause pleasure and pain as they affect him are of more importance in our eyes than did they immediately affect ourselves. We are also too often disposed to hate him, and to take pleasure in his misfortunes without expecting to derive any benefit from them.

Our social dispositions have therefore an original source, independent of our self-love.

§ 5.—This source seems to me, to be our moral feelings and the faculty of imagination, whose peculiar province it is, to call those feelings forth, and to determine their character, by the objects which it presents to them. These objects are, at first, mostly sensible, but it is imagination which usually renders them pleasing, or displeasing.

When children begin to take part in the feelings of their friends, their sympathy is excited by sensible expressions of them: the look, the tone of voice, penetrate them deeply, and lead them to rejoice, or mourn, with the persons around them, without having yet had any personal experience of the sensations which agitate them. Their tender affections are roused by their imagination, for they do not attach themselves simply to the consideration of what passes within the objects of them. They always connect the attraction which they have for them, with looks, and manners, that please them.

'Tis imagination that inflames our hostile passions, and makes us take delight in the sufferings of our enemies. Could we, free from its influence, and simply by comparing their sensations with our own, form an idea of the torments which we make them suffer, we should forbear to afflict them unnecessarily. Imagination fascinates our mind by horrible illusions, when it makes us convert their anguish into an exquisite delight for us.

§ 6.—To guard against a detestable perversion of feeling, as well as against the hard-heartedness which the cares of self-interest are apt to inspire, it is desirable, that we should learn to feel for our neighbour, as for ourselves, by judging, from our experience of the past, of what our sensations would be, were we in his place. This manner of acquiring sympathy with his feelings, would, as I have said, be too cold and sluggish, to give much energy to our social love, were it the only

means of awakening this affection in our breasts; but, as we are constituted, it produces most powerful effects; for imagination never lies still, when our heart is moved respecting our neighbour. If, then, we be once put in a good disposition by the reflection, that we might be situated like him, and require to be treated with gentleness and indulgence, imagination immediately warms our kindly feelings into a pure flame of goodness and brotherly love.

§ 7.—Self-love, considered in a detached manner, isolates us from the system of order. We are, respecting ourselves, as we might suppose a water genius would be, if, placed deep in the earth at the source of a river, he were charged to watch over its springs, without being able to observe the stream in its course. We are thus, in regard to our minds, absorbed in attention to our feelings, as they rise in us; we have difficulty in seizing the ensemble of the character which they form, and in judging of the effect which it is entitled to produce on those who contemplate it.

Our social feelings connect us with the general system of order. We see others, as I may say, ranged in their place in the social system. We judge, both by an involuntary impression, and by comparisons of them with each other, of the effect which, as to mind and appearance, they are calculated to produce.

We are in a central position respecting ourselves, and cannot comprehend, in a general glance, the entire superficies of our character. In respect to others, 'tis the superficies we behold, and we cannot penetrate to the centre of their minds.

§ 8.—We have a craving to unite, both as to ourselves and those we love, these two species of knowledge. In regard to ourselves especially, we have a most restless wish to take the same outward, general view that strikes those who contemplate us. We are continually trying to get acquainted with their sentiments of us, in order to enjoy in imagination the idea of what we are when seen from abroad. Our *amour propre* mingles with our restless desire to know ourselves in this manner, and fans our ambition and vanity; our ambition which rejoices in seeing that we can produce great effects in the world; our vanity, that makes us think that we have a clear idea of the

*impression* we produce on beholders, and imagine that it is one of admiration.

§ 9.—The wish to penetrate to the centre of another's mind and feelings, acts on us in general more calmly and regularly. *Its* most usual effect is to contribute greatly to excite in us a social spirit. It also makes us sometimes, when we see a friend suffering bodily pain, sigh over our inability to share his sensations. Though our being tormented along with him would not relieve him, it would be a great satisfaction to us to render thus our sympathy with him complete.

Some individuals who appear to have a longing which they cannot gratify, to know intuitively all that passes in another's breast, seem to console themselves for this privation, by yielding in some sort to the persuasion that there are no feelings in existence beyond their own, and they become, in consequence, selfish and hard-hearted.

§ 10.—Persons of good sense and a good disposition often arrive at giving to the wish, to see themselves from an outward position, and others from a central, inward one, all the gratification of which it is susceptible, and they content themselves without seeking for more. This advantage is one of those particularly reaped from knowledge of the world. Those who have amply profited by this knowledge have learned, from observation, reflection, and a wide acquaintance with facts illustrative of the dispositions of mankind, to appreciate very exactly the feelings and wants of others. They determine always to have a due regard for them, not only without being intuitively acquainted with them, but even where the beings with whom they have dealings, have no opportunity, whether by their presence or other means, to excite in them feelings of social love. They determine to do whatever lies in them, to serve those who have claims on their benevolence, without demanding that they shall be rewarded for it, by the spectacle or the description of the good that they have done, and they concentrate themselves in the satisfaction of thinking, even though perhaps they do not know the objects to whom they have rendered service, that they have reason to hope that there are hearts rejoiced by their bounty.

They learn to appreciate their own character, as it appears, to others.

First—By studying, in regard to the traits of conduct and manners which direct the attention of beholders on their personal appearance, so to purify the inward springs whence they proceed, that they may have the conviction of their being such as ought to obtain approbation; and by observing nicely the impression which they make on by-standers, that they may learn the better to regulate these springs and acquire, by experience, the certainty of their producing the intended effect.

Secondly—In respect to those circumstances of their existence which do not attach to their persons, such as their sentiments, the productions of their talents and the results of their conduct, these are things which, if they vanquish their *amour propre*, they may hope gradually to arrive at viewing from the same distance, when they have proceeded from themselves, as if they had proceeded from another. The actions, the sentiments and the compositions of every individual may all appear to us as being thrown into one common mass, where we may judge of them by principles equally applicable to them all, without taking into consideration the person who has sent them forth into society. Our sentiments, while we hide them in our breast, are our own, but once we make them known to the world, whether by writing or word of mouth, they become the common property. We can, therefore, if we sincerely desire it, enlighten our judgment on them, just as if they were those of another person, either by the exercise of our reason or by hearkening to the criticisms and remarks of others. This is what persons distinguished by their good sense and knowledge of the world learn to do, and thus do they acquire the habit of judging of themselves, by taking a position, in which their own thoughts and actions appear as much detached from them as those of other men.

However, it must be allowed that their *amour propre* is not the only obstacle, to their thus taking an impartial view of the effects which their own character is formed to produce.

The thoughts which they have sent abroad, or which have given birth to their actions, and which have originally arisen in their mind, seem to them from familiarity to form a part of

their existence. They take too much interest in them to see them with the *sang froid* necessary to impartial examination: either they place too much confidence in their merit, or else, conscious of their strong attachment to them, they feel alarmed at the idea of exposing them to persons who will judge them with more severity.

§ 11.—Though we really always see even our nearest friend in the same manner that we see all persons beyond ourselves, and that we never can be placed in the centre of his existence as we are placed in that of our own, yet does familiarity usually make us judge the appearance and works of our intimate friends as we do our own persons and productions; but with this important difference, that it very often causes our judgment to be unfavourable to them, though it seldom does to ourselves. Familiarity destroys in them those charms which novelty gives to strangers, and frequently it does not teach us to view them with the same approbation with which self-love engages each person to contemplate himself. Sometimes certainly our ardent affection throws over their merit and charms a far greater lustre than novelty and surprise would give to the same recommendations, did they exist in strangers. But oftener, in spite of a tender affection, familiarity diminishes greatly the effect of either their talents or their attractions. In respect to the former, it renders us far more apprehensive of their compositions being handled severely by the world, should they be produced in it, than we should be were we ourselves the authors of them.

§ 12.—The more we can love our neighbour as ourselves, in extending to him the same principle of justice, as well as the profound sentiment of the miseries and wants of humanity, with which our inward feelings make us thoroughly acquainted when we are anxious about our own personal condition, and also the more we view ourselves as we do our neighbour, relatively to our place in the social order and to our manner of filling it, the more virtuous, if we act accordingly, we shall become, and the more we shall contribute to the true happiness of the world.

§ 13.—The equality which we are to establish between our manner of dealing with ourselves and our neighbour, is not entirely to be promoted by our extending to him the indulgence

with which we treat ourselves: that is often one of a weak kind. It is partly to be effected by submitting our treatment of ourselves to the same rigour which justice commands us to use to him.

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## CHAPTER V.

### SOCIAL LOVE, THOUGH MUCH WEAKER THAN SELF-LOVE, IS FOUND, BY OUR PRINCIPLES OF DUTY, TO BE A MORE POWERFUL ANTAGONIST.

§ 1.—Though self-love has its root in necessity, so that no one can get rid of it, while it is too possible to become insensible to social love, yet are we often hurried away more irresistibly by the latter: our nature is so marvellously complicated, that, while all our departures from duty tend directly, or indirectly, to render self-love more powerful within us than social, yet is it generally with the latter, that our principles of duty have the severest conflicts. In consequence, it often appears as if the antagonist with whom a principle of duty, supporting universal social love, had to combat, were not self-love, but some partial detachments of social love, that had turned against the great mass of it, from refusing to listen to a principle of duty and justice.

In fact, the inclinations to which self-love, entirely separated from social, gives birth, are no wise such, as that the human mind cannot stifle them, when it is roused to take an energetic resolution. The most important of these inclinations, are derived, either from the ambition to rise to eminence in the world, or else, from those physical sensations which urge us to take nourishment, to avoid fatigue, and every kind of bodily pain.

The ambition to obtain power, or acquire a widely spreading renown, is one that takes a strong hold on the persons who think themselves endowed with the faculties necessary for realising its pretensions; yet does it leave the heart so void, that it is not necessary to have an uncommon stock of philoso-

phy to discover, how much the blessings which it promises, are light and chimerical. Nor would it, I believe, be in general difficult to prevent its usurping too great an empire over the mind, on the supposition, that those who entertained it were convinced, that all the advantages that they might reap from it, would be entirely personal. 'Tis the prospect of raising, along with themselves, their family and friends, that makes the hope of rising to power and distinctions, have such charms for most men. 'Tis the idea of the honor which they may shed on their family, or country, or the age in which they live, that makes the wish to acquire immortal fame, have irresistible attractions for the most of those who conceive it.

However, once social love thus assists to give ambition too much empire over men's minds, it becomes the victim of its imprudence; for the ambitious soon learn to attach more value to the success of their projects, than to the happiness of their nearest friend. They sacrifice, without scruple, even the members of their family, when they stand in the way of the accomplishment of their designs.

As to those wants which refer solely to physical sensations, a sufficient number of instances have been furnished, of persons who suffered them courageously, rather than renounce their principles, to lead us to believe, that mankind could soon be taught to practice every virtue which social love commands, were there no other obstacle to the exercise of it, by each individual, than his wish to procure himself personal comforts. Few are the persons who would not learn to despise those comforts, whenever they were opposed to the performance of great and benevolent actions. If experience, notwithstanding, in general prove, that individuals like better to study their personal ease, than to perform acts of self-denial, for the benefit of mankind, it is because, that in the enjoyment of personal comforts, each individual is bound up in one faisceau with the objects whom he loves best. The husband, the father, who would brave with the greatest firmness, the privation of these comforts, did it only affect himself, is overwhelmed with anguish, when he sees his wife and children exposed to it. His affection for them, renders necessary to him a thousand pleasures, which he could readily deny to himself. But, when the

character of most of the members of society, becomes enervated by these habits of indulgence, they grow unable to resist the assaults of the selfish inclinations; and you see, in consequence, too many to whom their personal gratification is more necessary than the well being of their families.

Judging from these observations, I think one important part of instruction is, to teach men to detect the artifices of self-love, when it makes a dupe of social love, by putting it forward to withstand our principles of duty, though, by its fatal triumph, it destroys its own safeguard, and leaves our mind abandoned to the ravages of our selfish passions.

We could, indeed, without difficulty, imagine personal sufferings so dreadful and durable, as to make the fondest, most faithful breast, forget the nearest ties of social love, in its feelings for self. But real life never exhibits instances of such dreadful trials as the most courageous, disinterested resolution, must sink under. Providence, whose design it is to teach us to render, by careful culture, social love as flourishing among us as self-love, although it be not supported on such deeply-stricken roots, never, as I believe, exposes weak human nature to such tempests, that the principles of duty which serve for a support to social love, cannot withstand them, in a heart accustomed to cultivate tender and generous affections. What I think I discern of the moral scheme of the creation, leads me to believe, that, though it be ordained by the eternal and immutable order of things, that social love shall have to combat self-love in our bosoms, as far as is requisite towards rousing us to give to our intellectual and moral faculties, an intensely energetic, orderly developement; yet that, once that end is fully attained—which it never will be in this life—that same eternal order decrees, that social love, dispensed from any further trials, shall necessarily, in the minds of beings of consummate virtue, reign as powerfully and as immutably as self-love.

§ 2.—We should learn to resist resolutely the claims of social love when it demands from us unjust concessions. We should, however, resist them without harshness or exaggeration, ever remembering that self-love is the vigorous, indefatigable adversary whom we have constantly to encounter, and

that any combats which we have to engage with social love are only to be undertaken in its own interest, that we may be the better able to protect it.

When we make the mistake of looking on social love, taken in any of its branches, as our principal adversary, because it sometimes exerts its power to unnerve us, we are liable to become barbarians, and to give ourselves up to the harshest selfish passions. The ancient Romans, if I do not mistake, have offered the most remarkable instance of this kind of error. I do not pretend to blame all the examples which history has transmitted to us, of their severity to their own children, since the state of things seems to have rendered some of them necessary; but the principle that it became fathers to have sufficient strength of mind to pronounce the condemnation of their children, when the public good or their demerit required the forfeit of their life, was one calculated to deck pride, arrogance and hard-heartedness in the colours of noble and disinterested virtues.

A state of things, founded on such an insensibility to the claims of the private affections, must also be liable to fall quickly to ruin, for it is nature's will that we shall be weak, not strong, when we are called on to resist them. When once, therefore, the exaggerated enthusiasm which alone can stifle nature's voice, begins to subside, her eloquence speaks too powerfully to our hearts to permit us to support institutions that offend her.

A good patriot may possibly be urged, by a devoted regard for his country's weal, to turn a deaf ear to nature pleading in behalf of some dearly beloved object. In such a dreadful conjuncture he acts no doubt sublimely when, to secure the felicity of his countrymen in general, he makes the sacrifice of his own dearest joys. But his heart will recoil from the anticipation of such a case. If he be deeply sensible to the blessings which the flourishing state of public affairs may heap on his countrymen, it is because he knows how to value his own share of the advantages which it secures to individuals. The opportunity to enjoy all the sweets which love, friendship, and the ties of blood can shed over his days, is far from being the one of these advantages which he prizes the least; nor will he

consent to transform any sweets of such a nature into bitterness, without being very certain that the imperious voice of duty requires from him such a dreadful proof of obedience to it.

Modern legislators take every pains to prevent any one's being in a situation, in which his duty shall require him to act with a revolting rigour towards persons whom he ought particularly to love.

By thus forbearing to place the private affections and public duties of men in conflict with each other, they obey the will of nature. She contents herself with ordaining that we sustain constant and vigorous combats against self-love. Far more terrible would be our task, were we obliged to encounter social love with the same intrepidity. Nature shows that it is not her wish that we be put to such a trial, for her whole system evidently demands that we sustain and protect social love in all its branches; and were we to take the habit of assaulting it in any of them, with the same firmness which we ought to exercise against self-love, we should soon enfeeble it so, that the latter would reign uncontrouled in our bosoms. From all these remarks, it appears that social love can be surmounted in a manner that self-love never can, but that, when it exercises in our hearts its due influence, we are far more powerless to resist its demands than those of self-love.

§ 3.—If we examine why social love finds us so weak, when duty commands us to contend with it; while self-love, in a similar case, often finds us very strong, we may, at first sight, be struck with the idea, that it is because we are pleased with ourselves, when we perceive that we are very accessible to feelings of social love. It seem to us, in such cases, that our heart is what it should be; and though in some instances our reason tells us, that we ought to vanquish those feelings—as, for instance, when the interest with which a malefactor inspires us, makes us incline to treat him with an indulgence injurious to the society,—yet do we view ourselves with such complacency, for being capable of being deeply moved by the sufferings of the object in question, and so little are we disposed to pique ourselves on our firmness in doing right, in opposition to tender, social feelings, that we sometimes give

way, with a sort of self-applause, to sentiments of humanity, even though we know that we ought to suppress them.

However, though we may enjoy a sort of secret pride, on experiencing that, by the constitution of our heart, social love has an extraordinary power over us, I do not think that it is this pride which gives it such a power. The strength which we can exert in our combats with self-love, and the weakness by which we are overcome when we must resist the eloquence of social love, seems to me to proceed from the different manner in which these affections rise in our bosoms. Being placed in the centre of self, we comprehend, in one general feeling, all those separate ones which point to different species of good. When, on comparing them together, we arrive at the conclusion, that those that claim a good, the acquisition of which will require time, trouble and the courage to endure painful privations, are the feelings to which the sense of our dignity bids us adhere, we usually learn without difficulty to abide by them, and to suppress all wishes for ease and momentary enjoyments whose dictates are contrary to theirs.

Those proud feelings lead us especially to postpone in various instances, our own gratification to that of our neighbour, by telling us that a lofty mind ought to bear many grievances, for the sake of warding them off from another.

But besides that an elevated principle of self-love induces us, on many occasions, to prefer our neighbour to ourselves, imagination, or the faculty which awakens in our minds sentiments of social love, makes frequently on us, when we witness the sufferings of another, impressions more difficult to overcome than the suggestions of self-love would be, were the case our own. Imagination only shows us those detached portions of our neighbour's feelings which are called forth by the circumstance that immediately affects him, and she represents them in such a striking light, that often we experience, in considering them, emotions of sympathy which surpass, in strength and vivacity, the original feelings in his breast to which they refer.

Is the person absent for whom our sympathy is thus excited, imagination redoubles for us all the torments which we suppose him to suffer: she makes us too, though in a less degree,

enjoy the pleasures —if our passions or principles do not frown on them—which we believe him to taste.*

Are the persons present who inspire us with interest, our sympathy with their woes, and particularly with their pleasures, is, in general, still more lively. What anguish, for instance, do we not suffer sometimes, when a sudden suffusion of paleness over the face of a person beloved, reveals to us, that some melancholy news which has just been announced to him, has wounded him at heart. Were we in his place, we should have turned pale too, though, perhaps, we should not want for courage to bear up resolutely against a misfortune like his. Our afflicted friend may have still more firmness than we have; but, notwithstanding, we sometimes bear, with less fortitude, the image of his grief, than we would support a similar affliction. In our own case, the feeling reigning in us, might be the consciousness of the force, by the exertion of which, we could resist the attacks of disheartening sorrow: in our friend's, our thoughts would probably be struck, almost exclusively, with the image of the cruel conflicts, which the changes of his aspect would announce to pass within him. Supposing, even, that his sufferings, while experiencing these conflicts, were greater than ours in witnessing them, there might still be this difference to render the appeasement of them less difficult, that the sentiment of his power to baffle affliction, would be called forth in him, while we would not be induced to vanquish the grief which sympathy with his distress would cause us.

Have we, ourselves, no taste for joys that we consider innocent, and which we see those whom we love, partake; the pleasure that sympathy with their feelings inspires to us, is often far greater, than the original one which warms their hearts. In fact, it is sometimes so great, as to make us forget our principles, for the sake of enjoying it, and encourage those around us, to devote so much of their time to amusements, that they cannot fail to soften their mind too much, and to render it unfit for noble exertions.

* Our sympathy with absent friends, is in general far more awakened by the dread that they are exposed to misfortune, than by the image of the blessings, of which we may have reason to think them in possession.

§ 4.—We are so much the more inclined to occupy ourselves with the joys and sorrows of others rather than our own, that among the objects best beloved of persons arrived at years of discretion, are generally to be found some more helpless beings, perhaps under their protection, but at all events less fitted than themselves to bear hardship and affliction, and more exquisitely organized for tasting various kinds of innocent delight. It thence happens that the principal pleasures of their more firmly minded friends often consist in a sort of reflection of theirs. Those guardians think themselves at the summit of human felicity, when they have the satisfaction of screening them from every untoward circumstance that could embitter their existence, and of covering their path with all the flowers which can excite them to go along it rejoicing.

§ 5.—However, in this case, as in every other, when social love has tempted us to depart from just and firm principles, it becomes a sufferer by the error into which it leads us, and it is self-love that profits by it. Thus, to take, for instance, the strongest modification of social love that generally exists, when a mother has no other care than to spare uneasiness to her child and to amuse him perpetually, the pleasure which is reflected to herself from that which she procures to him, becomes so necesary to her, that she gets the habit of loving him merely as a creature destined to embellish her existence, and she neglects to take the least thought about giving him a suitable education, to prepare him to accomplish rigidly in the sequel the ends of his being. Her blind fondness for him continues as long as his infantile attractions hinder her from finding his caprices troublesome: but once she begins to grow weary of them, she yields him without pity to some rigorous pedagogue, whose severity, she hopes, will correct the ill consequences of her misplaced indulgence. If, contrary to her expectation, the evil propensities which she had at first encouraged in him continue to predominate in his character, they often in the end cool her affection to him considerably more than they would that of a tender, anxious mother, who from the beginning would have laboured, both from principle and a well understood affection, to form her child's heart to the exercise of his duties.

§ 6.—I have as yet only had in view domestic and particular affections, in remarking the weakness of our principles of duty, to resist in our hearts the solicitations of social love, and the address with which our self-love profits of this circumstance to usurp the dominion of them. But when I trace the operations of universal social love, in persons naturally inclined to extraordinarily lively sentiments of humanity, I still see reason to conclude that this affection is possessed of much greater force than self-love to withstand principles of duty, but that itself is sooner or later weakened, and self-love strengthened, by its fatal victories over them.

As social love is fanned into a flame by imagination, it is always liable to be acted on by strong, partial impressions, which inspire to it very different views, from the true one pointed out by goodness and justice.

Into such an error, persons of singularly tender feelings, are subject to fall.

On an occasion, wherein the general good of society, requires them to deal rigorously by an offender, they frequently cannot be convinced, that it imposes on them such a stern obligation.

They are extremely ingenious in alleging reasons to prove, that the good of society would be best promoted, by extending mercy towards the guilty person; or, they maintain, that justice obliges them to treat him with indulgence, for that circumstances were such, as to plead his excuse.

Their extreme tenderness for their neighbour, prevents their entering, with resistless ardour, into a glorious career; for they cannot take pleasure in acquiring trophies, which would give pain to less successful competitors. They like better, therefore, to pass their days in a peaceful obscurity, surrounded by friends, by equals, and fortunate dependants. Regulating in consequence their conduct on the principle that love, innocence and peace compose the happiness which men are destined to seek in this world, they conform themselves to a scale of perfection that is too limited to allow of the full developement of the energy of their minds. Disorderly passions accordingly assail them, particularly an inordinate love of pleasure, which is a failing that usually presents strong temptations

to the men, who naturally abound in the milk of human kindness. Urged, headlong on, by these fatal passions, they too often finish, by becoming more selfish and obdurate, than they would have been, had they originally been made of sterner stuff, and learned—as austere characters have, in general, no difficulty in doing,—to govern themselves, by the laws of equity. Unaccustomed to submit their conduct to the control of inflexible principles, the indulgence of their passions, becomes usually so necessary to them, that they refuse, without remorse, to listen to the claims of justice and humanity, when they are opposed to their gratification.

Should their social sentiments not hurry them to these excesses, they, at least, have commonly the effect of banishing them from those busy scenes of life, in which the ambition of various enterprising characters appears, ardently contending for the highest place. Thus, do they leave the principal affairs of the world, to be transacted by persons too intent on their own advancement, to have a scrupulous conscience.

§ 7.—From all these observations I infer, that did social love predominate in our nature, to near the degree that self-love does, it would render us unfit to offer those great and continual combats to our prevailing inclinations, which the laws of virtue require from us. We should have sentiments resembling those of the mother who declared, that God would never have demanded from a mother, the sacrifice of her child: when, in a manner equally painful to us, our duty would call on us to stifle the voice of social love, instead of performing it, we should be tempted to accuse heaven of cruelty, or we should try to adduce proofs of its not having issued such terrible orders.

A tide of social love overflowing our bosoms, would certainly, as long as circumstances were quite favorable to it, be a source of exquisite happiness to us. Our feelings give us notice that it would be so; and we perceive, in fact, that the happiest of all mortals are those, who owe their bliss to ardent and pure affections. Such a bliss, it is to be presumed, providence could bestow on every one, even on those who had no near natural ties; for, as it is only our imagination, and moral feelings, that make us regard our nearest relations, as if they

were more one being with us, than any one else is, it is to be presumed, that, without any fundamental change being operated in our organization, the laws of nature might, if providence thought fit, be such as to make our imagination and sentiments, thus unite us closely to all our fellow-creatures. We can conceive the floods of delight, with which such universal love would fill our bosoms, if nothing drew our attention but objects agreeable to it. But, what excruciating tortures would it not occasion us, if we were, as we continually are, condemned to see miseries which we could not relieve; and still more, if we were obliged to treat objects severely, for whom our hearts bled secretly with compassion.

§ 8.—When we summon up all the force of our mind, to withstand the encroachments of self-love, persuaded that it is the power with which providence ordains us continually to wrestle, we should not cease to be on our guard against the snares laid for us by social love. The brunt of the battle should fall upon self-love; yet, should we take care to prevent it from skreening itself behind social.

When we endeavour to overcome the weaknesses inspired by social love, we should, as much as we can, direct our efforts against the species of self-love inseparably united to it, rather than against itself.

In many cases, a forgetfulness of our own safety, or interest, from a zeal to serve the community, merits the highest praise, as a proof of a noble and heroic mind: but if our zeal transport us to sacrifice, in like manner, the safety or interest of a person whom we ought to love, and whom we consider as belonging to us, we direct a cruel blow against social love, in one of its principal modifications, and, where such a measure is not of urgent necessity, commit a wrong action, for extraordinary sacrifices are alone sublime, when the person who suffers by them, is pushed to offer them by his own independent will. However, our conduct is truly meritorious, and, perhaps, more sublime, than if we made such a sacrifice in our own person, when an object whom we tenderly love, undertakes thus to expose himself to imminent perils, for a noble cause; and when, far from exerting our influence to dissuade him from his generous design, we testify our approbation of it, even though our

heart be secretly breaking. This is one of the most glorious triumphs over self-love, that a firm and elevated mind can obtain.

In ordinary conjunctures, we should be watchful to rule steadily over self-love, in cases where it is conjoined with social. For instance, when we love, we wish also to be loved, and to render the objects of our affection, a source of various blessings to us. This wish is, to a certain degree, very legitimate. We conceive, that in a state of perfect felicity, the happiness of loving, and that of being loved, unite in harmony together, and that these two motives of enjoyment are so indissoluble, that it is impossible to view them separately. But, in this life, it is necessary to acquire the faculty of considering them distinctly, because, the encroachments of those united propensities, to which we give, in general, the name of social love, proceed much more from the returns that we make on self, than from the really disinterested part of the attachment. 'Tis the belief, that we are tenderly loved, far more than the strength of our own social affections, that resigns us so much into the power of flatterers, and wheedling tempters. If once we knew how to regulate, by the laws of right reason, our pretensions to being objects of love, we should have less difficulty than we have, in submitting to the government of those same laws, the affections of our breast, sprung from a purely disinterested motive.

It is true, that there is so close a connexion between our social affections, and the feelings of self-love which mingle with them, that if we try too much to curb the latter, the former will be liable to wither and decay. Once we grow insensible to the wish to please and be loved, if we do not, in consequence, harden our hearts against all tender feelings, our faculty to adapt our kind attentions, so as to render them really cheering and consolatory to the objects of them, will, at least, be greatly blunted. Instead of reviving by them the drooping heart, we will only, perhaps, increase its sorrows; for it is the wish to render ourselves amiable, that sharpens, so much, our ability to penetrate into all the folds of another's heart, that we know how to apply, with discernment, a healing balm to its wounds.

It is impossible, I believe, to distinguish the exact point at which a weak indulgence for the failings of those whom we love, should cease to be attributed to a disinterested, though too tender affection for them, and be ascribed to self-love.(*a*) It is certain, that a pure, disinterested wish to avoid giving pain to a dearly-beloved object, will force us, sometimes, though our conscience tells us that we ought to act with more firmness, to look with indulgence on faults, which should provoke our displeasure. But it is also certain, that the little concern which we usually give ourselves about the future destiny of those whom we encourage in their failings, and often the quickness with which we forget them, once we are separated from them, prove sufficiently, that self-love has generally a greater share than social, in exciting us, in spite of our better judgment, to be prodigal of marks of misplaced tenderness.

Though self-love, and social, are often so blended together, that if we be careful not to offend the latter, we cannot strike at the former, without very great precautions; there are almost always, some points at which self-love shows itself plainly, and unmixed; and if we repress it at these, we shall do much to prevent pernicious effects being produced by the weakness which social love occasions us. For instance, often a mother's tenderness for her child is such, that, though she knows that she would do well to reprove him severely, for his faults, she has not resolution to do it. It would be unjust, perhaps, to attribute this unwarrantable relaxation of discipline, on her part, merely to any selfish motive, such as a wish to please and content him, in order that he may like her the better. But the principal cause which makes the indulgence of a weakly fond mother, so fatal to her son's character, is not, in general, her pardoning, too readily, his excesses, it is, that she lets her principles sink to the level of her practice. It is evidently self-love, which pushes her to commit this error; her *amour propre* leads her to wish to deny her weakness, and to prove, in consequence, that the conduct which she winks at in her son, is not blameable.* A well minded woman, however weak

* Affection sometimes makes parents blind to their children's failings, but it is much oftener *amour propre* that does it.

her maternal affection may render her, has only to subdue her self-love, and she will seldom fail to guide her son in the paths of virtue, as well, perhaps, as if, in regard to him, she acted with more firmness. Let her constantly show him, that she is not blind to his faults, although she wants resolution to check them; and that, if he persist in doing wrong, he may break her heart, even though he never can abate her tenderness to him; let her thus acknowledge and deplore her weakness, in not restraining him; and few, very few indeed, are the children who will not, when time has opened their reason, repay such interesting proofs of love and upright sentiments, by a conduct that will render them justly, the pride and delight, of a dearly-beloved mother.

The practical inference to be drawn from these remarks on the various characteristics of self and social love is, that we should try to regulate the union between them, in a way that should leave us in possession of all the courage and resolution, which we should have little difficulty in manifesting, were self-love the only spring to set our hearts in motion. The influence of social love should serve to render us humane, noble and generous, but not to enfeeble us.

§ 9.—Self-love being the antagonist with whom we have constantly to wrestle in this life, it follows that the virtuous man keeps his attention much more steadily fixed on what passes within him, than does he who, without resistance, allows himself to be hurried astray by his passions. The latter continually regards his neighbour, from considering him the object of which he is to make use for the promotion of his own ends. The former continually regards himself, from believing his own mind to be the object to which, by his laborious skill, he is to give form and value. The study which he makes of his relations with his neighbour is followed by him as subordinate to his purpose of improving himself, for he knows that the sure rule to prevent his making an error in the performance of this task, is, to take care to render himself fit to forward the good and happiness of mankind, according to the various social relations in which he may be placed. As he does not, however, let his readiness to serve it transport him to an undue intermeddling with the affairs of his neigh-

bour, he frequently finds himself in situations in which he has nothing to do, but vigilantly to watch over the dispositions of his own heart. This isolated state does not impair his sense of his worth, for he knows that in attending to the improvement of himself, he performs the great fundamental duty which nature imposes on every individual. As to the opportunities that he may have to serve his neighbour, those are matters with which he has nothing to do, more than just to hold himself prepared to make use of them, whenever providence shall present them to him. Sometimes he knows that it affords to the virtuous man, who is little disposed to be troublesome or officious, far more opportunity to be of extensive and lasting use in the world, than any proud, vicious man has to corrupt and plunge it in misery. Sometimes he is sensible that the persons, who best fulfil their duties here below, go through this life, without their existence being apparently productive of any further good, than that of fitting themselves for a better state. Whether either of these lots shall be his, or in what degree the circumstances of his life shall draw him towards either of them, he leaves with cheerful resignation in the hands of the all-wise disposer of events.

The virtuous man then stands much more aloof from his neighbour, than the vicious or blindly passionate one. The latter places himself perpetually, though it may be with a view to his destruction, in as close a moral connexion with him, as is the physical one which unites the wrestler to the antagonist whom he presses in his arms, intending to stifle him. The idea of his duty towards himself and his God is interposed in the mind of the truly virtuous man between him and his neighbour, though it is in perfect harmony with his duty towards him and constantly calling it to his recollection. He thinks of himself as of the subject, all the emotions of whose heart he is bound to keep submissive to the laws of duty: he thinks of his God as of the master who prescribes to him this obligation, and as of the Almighty father, who will give him resolution to perform it, if he sincerely and assiduously supplicate him, and if he do his best to keep himself in a suitable frame of mind, by a continual recollection of his being present to his thoughts.(*b*)

## NOTES TO THE FIFTH CHAPTER.

(*See page* 120.)

(*a*) In my comparison of the nature and effects of self and social love, I do not observe an exact parity of reasoning in regard to each of these affections; since I consider the person who, in contravention to the laws of his conscience, indulges in frivolous or fatal tastes for his personal gratification, as much under the guidance of self-love as he who firmly represses every wrong inclination, in order to perfect his virtue and assure his permanent happiness; while I look upon those who seek to gratify momentary and erroneous inclinations, in the persons whom they profess to love, at the expense of their lasting good, as being usually more influenced by self than social love. Did I follow a method of reasoning analogous to that which I pursue in handling the topic of self-love, I should say that the parent who spoils his child by temporary indulgence ought to be considered equally fond, though his affection be of a more degenerate kind, as the one who anxiously rears him in the manner best calculated to ensure his lasting welfare both temporal and eternal. My reason for not treating self and social love as though similar principles were applicable to them, is that I do not think them in the same predicament. Self-love being a fixed, immoveable attribute of human nature, can only vary in its character not in its essence. Social love, on the contrary, is very variable in its essence, and continually liable to be weakened, or even annihilated by self-love. In proportion, therefore, as self-love, mingling with it, draws it down from that lofty height at which it sees and seeks the real good of its object, to attach it to the hope of pleasing that object, by procuring him vain or sinful enjoyments, in such a proportion does self-love usually absorb and enfeeble it.

(*See page* 122.)

(*b*) The notions which I have exposed concerning social love, will, perhaps, be liable to being condemned as unscriptural.

First—I may be censured as having exalted too much our duty towards our neighbour, by seeming to think it prescribed to us as our principal one, whereas, the first and great commandment relates to our duty towards God.

Secondly—I may be accused, on the other hand, of unduly degrading our duty towards our neighbour, by representing a tendency to transgress against it as a temporary one, which Providence, for wise ends, has determined our corrupt nature to take, whereas the commandment, which enjoins us to love our neighbour, is announced to us as being like to the one which prescribes to us the love of our Creator. It relates to a duty necessarily connected, as the fruit is with the tree, with our duty towards God. Both can only be perfectly fulfilled by a pure, unspotted mind, and he who fully accomplishes them does not neglect any of his duties.

Without giving a distinct, methodical reply to each of these anticipated charges, I shall endeavour to explain, as briefly as possible, such views of my ideas, on the subject of social love, as shall satisfactorily prove that I do not merit to have either of them alleged against me.

. The fall of our first parents was solely in consequence of their disobedience to the commands of God, and their offence did not apparently imply any disposition in them to violate their duty towards their neighbour. In Eve, the motive of it was a foolish, feminine, but—relatively to her fellow-creatures—harmless ambition or vanity. In Adam, it was a weak tenderness for his sinful help-mate.

But though the first inlet to vice, opened in our moral constitution, did not seem to afford to our selfish passions any vent for overflowing to the detriment of our neighbour, no sooner was evil introduced into our nature, by an act of disobedience to God, than those selfish passions did arise to spread wars and hatreds among men; thus giving us reason to think, that such an indissoluble connexion subsists between the love which we ought to bear to our Creator, and that which we owe to our fellow-creatures, that the former cannot expire without the latter perishing also. The whole tenor of scripture too enforces the belief that these two affections must fade or flourish together, and our own natural feelings, when, with our reason unclouded by passion, we hearken to their suggestions, harmonize on this point with the precepts of scripture.

However, notwithstanding that I firmly believe that the pure, holy mind, which humbly and devotedly loves its God, can alone truly love its neighbour, yet I conceive that our Creator might, had it pleased him so to do, have wrought social love so inseparably into our animal being, that, corrupt as we are, and alienated by nature from him our heavenly Father, we should never, when tormented by the fermentation within us of the elements of evil, have been tempted to transgress against our neighbour. I conclude that he might thus have counteracted, in the animal portion of us, the eternal laws which govern spiritual beings, and ordain that their love for the Creator and his creatures shall be one and indivisible, on account of observing the strong attachment often borne by mothers and other relations, whose heart is still estranged from God, to their children and those with whom they are connected by close family ties, and also because I perceive that several persons, who yet evidently partake the corruptions of humanity, are taught by nature to be much more kindly disposed towards their fellow-creatures than the commonalty of mankind.

Our Creator has not thought fit to give to the love of our fellow-creatures—notwithstanding its having lost its due hold on our spiritual affections—a powerful ascendancy over us, by weaving it firmly into the animal portion of our being, since, however strong may be, in some instances, our partial, social attachments, it is very evident that self-love, unsubdued by social, dominates almost universally among mankind. By thus submitting us to the im-

mutable law which governs spiritual creatures, and which causes that the love that binds them to each other shall be in direct proportion to what they bear to the Divinity, the Creator marks to us that we can no otherwise live in peace and comfort with each other here below, than by seeking assiduously to prepare ourselves—with the assistance of the grace of God—for ranking among blessed spirits, and by endeavouring accordingly to fulfil our duty at once towards our Maker and towards our neighbour.

This mutual dependency, which subsists in our bosoms, between the love of our heavenly Father and that of our fellow-creatures, greatly facilitates to us the success of an endeavour to become daily more subject to the government of both.

The belief that the word of God enjoins us to prove our love to him by serving our neighbour, tends to impel us to open in our hearts, to social love, regular channels, congruous to our sense of universal justice. Whereas, even the most benevolent mind would allow favouritism or caprice to render the operations within him of social love desultory and of little worth, did he propose to himself no other end, in following the dictates of this affection, than simply to do good to his fellow-creatures.

On the other hand, were we to look on the love of God as detached from that of our neighbour, and to seek exclusively to improve in a devoted affection to our Almighty ruler, we should readily mistake the wild fervours with which unholy and proud passions would frequently inflame us, for a zeal inspired by a sincere, religious spirit. It is easy for us to find scales and measures for comparing the power with which self-love and that of mankind, whether taken collectively or individually, rule our minds. With our fellow-creatures we are in perpetual collision; every usurpation of our self-love is visibly made at their expense. Candid meditations, therefore, on the various proportions in which we are swayed by the interest that we take in them and by our self-love, afford us a sensible test, enabling us to judge of the warmth and sincerity of our love of God. A test of this nature is, I believe, proper to stamp, on the most pious mind, a lively conviction of its own deplorable corruption, since, as much as its self-love excels its regard for its neighbour, so much, may it conclude, is its love of God weaker than what it would be, were it perfectly pure and free from the blemishes of sin.

If, in the chapter to which this note is appended, I have attached myself to analysing the operations in our mind of social love, while I have omitted to speak of the fountain head whence that affection should be derived, that is of the love of God, it is that my design leads me to treat of the dispositions of the human heart, in a secular point of view, relatively to man's condition on earth, rather than in a scriptural light.

# BOOK III.

SUBJECT.

*SPIRIT OF ASSOCIATION AND SPIRIT OF REPULSION.—PRIVATE AFFECTIONS.*

## CHAPTER I.

CONTENTS.

OBSERVATIONS, AND REFLECTIONS, ON THE OPERATIONS OF A SPIRIT OF ASSOCIATION, AND ON THOSE OF A SPIRIT OF REPULSION.

§ 1.—NATURE, whose design it is, that men shall at last learn from experience, and enlightened reason, that it is their duty to obtain incessant victories over self-love, to prevent it from encroaching on their neighbour's rights, has taken care to keep, from the first dawn of intellect, feelings that regard their neighbour, ever present to their minds. This she has done, by means of a spirit of association, and one of repulsion.

I shall now present to the reader some reflections, suggested to me by my remarks on the operations of these two principles, particularly as they first manifest themselves in young children.

§ 2.—A spirit of association is not necessarily accompanied by a disposition to a tender social affection: however, it constantly appears in infants united with it, and great care should be taken as they grow up to prevent their being prompted, by their reflections or passions, to dissolve this union. Children must indeed learn by degrees to examine the opinions of their parents, and change them according to the views of their own reason, otherwise they could only adopt them from habit and stupid prejudice. But still it is desirable that, even after they are grown up, they should feel at heart a predilection for that way of thinking with which affection for their parents and the members of their family, as well as the habit of associating their mind to theirs, had early imbued them. 'Tis by che-

rishing in children the disposition warmly to attach themselves to the friends, whose sentiments the spirit of association leads them first to partake, that you best prepare them to love their neighbour as themselves.

The infant who is not spoiled by injudicious management, feels as though his moral existence were identified with that of the persons whose joys and sorrows he shares.

He is not naturally disposed to think of his being dependant on protectors who love him less than he does himself, for the strength of his friends appears to him as much destined to his use as if it resided in his own frame. Should a child, old enough to reflect on his station in his family, do wrong and be punished for it, he does not, unless he be evidently treated unjustly, sigh over the thought of his being exposed by his weakness to unkind treatment, from beings whose love for him does not equal his self-love, so fully is he persuaded that it is just that his parents and preceptors should rule over him, and that they can seek, in correcting him, nothing but his good.

Children evince a lively desire to participate in all the sentiments of those whom they love, long before they have enough of intelligence to imitate their actions: and when the spirit of imitation appears in them, it seems to be at first, partly at least, excited by the propensity to compose but one heart and mind with the persons whose society they like. Self-love, however, if it be encouraged unduly to predominate in them, converts the propensity to associate themselves with their friends, into an arbitrary, exacting disposition. They expect to see them all constantly occupied about them, and on the watch to gratify their caprices.

The error, however, against which it is most particularly incumbent on parents and preceptors to guard, is, that of giving their pupils grounds to believe, that they are subject to tyrannical force, rather than to an enlightened, wise affection, more competent than their blind self-love, to guide their steps in the ways of true happiness. Never should children have cause to suspect, that the trust in the love of their parents and guardians, to which the propensity to associate their feelings with theirs, opened their hearts, was too confiding; nor be induced, by harsh or capricious usage, to adopt the soul-withering principle, that

every individual, parted essentially, by a separate, moral existence, from his nearest friend, exclusively loves himself.

Children ought to learn, gradually, that after individuals have had time to acquire the use of reason, they are committed, far more by the will of providence, to their own care, than to any one else's; that it is therefore, chiefly by their good conduct and wise exertions, that they are to become respectable and happy; that the most affectionate parent must, from a principle of duty, treat them with rigour, if they act unworthily: they should even be taught, that strangers may sometimes be inclined to disregard their rights; so that it becomes them, not only to give every one his due, but to defend themselves against lawless invaders. But the belief, that men may love a fellow-creature as steadily and sincerely as he loves himself, should be made constantly to warm their hearts and nourish in them tender, generous sentiments, by the proofs which they receive of the disinterested love of their parents, as well as of those friends whom it particularly becomes to view them with a parental or fraternal eye.

The idea of the joy which their welfare or their laudable conduct would confer on the authors of their existence, should make them take double pleasure in well merited prosperity and render a virtuous career more attractive for them: when they would have to deplore some wrong action committed by them, they should be more deeply pained by reflections on the affliction which it would cause their parents and friends, than by anticipations of their resentment.

Thus, though it would be necessary to warn them that a spirit of association is not always to be confided in as a bond of affection, yet a long and delightful experience would have taught them that virtuous, well-regulated minds, when called on by nature to associate each other to all their feelings and concerns, can readily become as united by affection, as though they were portions of one identical being instead of separate entities. When afterwards it came to their turn to preside over various friendly associations, there would be room to hope that they would evince a sincere desire to cast—in a manner agreeable to the design of their union—their cares in common

and a firm belief in the possibility of finding associates equally faithful and disinterested.(a)

§ 3.—The spirit of association, well regulated, causes each person to be much richer in virtues than he would have been, had he only had an opportunity to cultivate those of his good qualities, which his situation ande mployments could immediately call into exercise. As different persons are particularly excited to the cultivation of different good qualities; by identifying their feelings with one another, they all become so rich in sentiments, that they have an ample store for their reason to work on, in forming within their bosoms a solid system of principles applicable to the duties of every station, and endued with force to rule them as steadily as if, from personal experience, they had acquired a knowledge of what is right to do in each station.

§ 4.—The spirit of repulsion is not, in its origin, one of hostility. It is merely an anti-social one, or a wish in the subject of it to fly from all persons towards whom he is not sociably disposed. Thus the infant bears no ill will to the stranger whose aspect displeases him, though he shelters himself from him in the arms of the protecting friend in whose will to defend him he has an entire confidence.

§ 5.—However, these antipathies often quickly generate a hatred ready to give active proofs of enmity.

Without undertaking to trace their various mental operations, I shall merely remark that, while it is necessary to the perfecting of the human mind that the unjust and malignant sensations to which they give rise, should be entirely overcome by virtuous, benevolent principles, it is, notwithstanding, better that a tendency to dislike some portion of the human race should be subdued by a vigorous moral exertion, than that it should never be felt, for the mind capable of such an exertion can still cling to the advantages that usually accompany such a tendency, while it disclaims the vices of it.

The advantages are, that in general every dislike, conceived against one portion of mankind, tends to deepen and fix the channels of those affectionate sentiments, which flow towards the friends, whom our imagination places in opposition with the object of our animosity. The more steady and inflexible too

is our animosity, the stronger and more constant are those of our friendly dispositions which stand in contrast with it. Thus a person implacable in his private resentments, is commonly warm and faithful in his friendships.

Though a natural disposition to persevere in the same sentiments may partly determine the characteristic both of his hatreds and attachments, yet it is easy, by observation, to ascertain that most persons are pushed more ardently to love their friends, by a sense of the hatred which they bear their enemies. The love of country is more deeply rooted in the patriot's breast, by his animosity against a rival nation. Were that nation to be so crushed as no longer to engage his thoughts, there is reason to conjecture that he would soon grow more indifferent to the welfare of his native land.

§ 6.—I must observe, that furious and barbarous animosities are not those which dispose the human mind to warmth and fidelity in its attachments. The harsh, vindictive passions, which then overflow it, darken and contract it too much for any serene beam of pure, faithful affection to penetrate through the clouds which obscure it. A prey to rancorous feelings, it often suffers its misanthropic humours to vent themselves on the persons or parties, who appear in a position the most opposed to the principal objects of its wrath.

§ 7.—The animosity which produces permanently the good effect of rendering friendship more profound, is usually, in some degree, calmed by a sense of humanity and native dignity. Though firm and inexorable, it scorns to crush an enemy otherwise than by fair and open measures. Where it cannot have recourse to them, it leaves him tranquil, nay, it will not oppose assistance being lent to him, if justice and generosity call for it.

§ 8.—The kind of animosity which is productive of good moral effects, having then, a certain grandeur in it, I believe, that it would be far from impossible, by still increasing its noble tendency, entirely to change its character, so that its vicious qualities would be neutralized, while its good effects would be better assured. This would be done, by subduing it so, by means of a noble expansion of sentiment, that, ceasing to be an odious animosity, it would become a generous rival-

ship. Then, while the mind would still continue pushed, by all that impetuous ardour which a fiery animosity inspires, it would yet be capable of entertaining a lofty respect, nay, even friendship and fellow-feeling, for the antagonist over whom it would seek to assert a superiority. Scorning to oppress him, or to refuse acknowledging his merit, it would only contend with him, from finding the stimulus of emulation necessary, towards urging it to develope its own inherent faculties.

§ 9.—This motive does not appear sufficiently pure, for me to suppose it to have any influence over the highest orders of creatures; yet, did general experience demonstrate, as, I believe it might, that a noble competition can be the source of admirable virtues, and proper to prepare the parties engaged in it, for the exercise of the most arduous private and public duties, I should consider myself in possession of ample proofs of its being nature's intention, during the moral fermentation which human beings are destined to undergo in this low state of accountable existence, to make an eager desire to outstrip a competitor, or to extort homage from an antagonist, be one of the most efficacious principles, when it is duly regulated, which we can employ to purify our hearts from despicable passions, and set nobly in activity all their energy. An emulation, wisely directed and controuled, would more clash with the letter of the principle which tells us, that perfect virtue does good merely for the satisfaction of doing it, than it would with the spirit of it; since, after that men would have tried to surpass each other, in the exercise of all noble talents, they would just be as capable of loving and esteeming their rivals, and of viewing their successes with pride and pleasure, as if they had no other wish but to increase the glory of their species.

§ 10.—I have confined myself, in taking notice of the spirit of repulsion, to those of its operations, in which it appears to kindle in men the sentiments of animosity that make them enjoy humbling or excelling a rival. Any more comprehensive examination of it would be superfluous and foreign to my purpose. I also think it needless to inquire whether the silent workings of that spirit of repulsion which prompts men to look with distaste on a part of their species, be always so ne-

cessary towards kindling into a flame their hostile passions, as that, if that spirit did not exist, though self-interest might occasion many disagreements among them, they would constantly be conducted without anger or ill-will. I own that I am inclined to look on the spirit of repulsion as a sort of moral element spread indefinitely through the human mind, and greatly contributing to determine its restless, exuberant vivacity, to vent itself in a form inimical to social love.

§ 11.—Whatever be the origin of the angry passions, once they are in activity, they are liable to intermingle not only with the spirit of repulsion, but with that of association, to which they give an hostile character, while, at the same time, by their union with it they much augment their own virulence.

A spirit of association which is thus pervaded and rendered hostile in its nature by angry passions, does not assimilate the thoughts and views of the parties whom it puts in relation with each other. It leaves them, on the contrary, in complete opposition, and only establishes a similarity between the passions which inflame each of the parties, who endeavours to make his own opinions triumph over those of his antagonist. Rage and fury, by a dreadful sympathy, still mount spontaneously on either side, so as to preserve an equal level in the bosoms of all the combatants, giving them so much a similar appearance, that a spectator, indifferent to the subject of their dispute, and curious only to mark the degree to which the interest that they took in it operated on their minds, as a ferment of passion, would as much class them all together as though they were the champions of the same cause.

§ 12.—As sympathy flows with a much freer course, between countrymen, than between persons distinguished by a difference of national character, so do hostile passions rise to a much higher pitch of animosity among them, since they find many more points of contact, at which the deadly contagion of an enemy's influence can serve to make them intensely burn.

§ 13.—The only way to calm a universal frenzy, when, in an ill-fated country, it exasperates the inhabitants against each other, seems to be, either for some commanding character who soars entirely above the wrathful infection spread around, to inspire such an imposing awe as that he can make an amiable

and subordinate spirit of association, prevail over the hostile and equalizing one, that sets countrymen at enmity together, by engaging men, humbly to adopt his sentiments, and take him for the leader, who shall restore tranquillity among them; or else, for a soft, persuasive influence, to gain such an ascendency over the minds of the disputants, as shall assuage their passions, and make them remember, that they ought to love as brethren.

The former of these remedies against civil war, generally, as it is well known, leads to the despotism of one domineering chief.

As to the latter one, it would rarely be possible, in the days of strife and civil dissensions, to give rise to any efficacious influence of such a salutary, peaceable kind: 'tis only in tranquil times, that it could be nurtured up, and rendered of strength sufficient to shelter a country from the deadly effects of fierce, ungoverned passions. It should be used as a preventive, to hinder them from ever coming to life, and to make peace and brotherly love, flourish unalterably in the land, wherein these invaluable blessings may have taken root.

The art of establishing such a soft, powerful influence, in a country, particularly in one constantly rent by the hot, contentious passions, of its natives, presents to the disposers of social institutions, a *desideratum* which they should try to compass.

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## NOTES TO THE FIRST CHAPTER.

*(See page 129.)*

(a) The spirit of association which attracts young children towards their elder friends, is one of subordination; that is, it renders the same sentiments common to them and the grown up persons around them, not by inducing all parties to modify theirs, till they acquire a general similarity, but by impelling the children to adopt, implicitly, those of their grown up friends, from deference to their superior wisdom. The faculty which is thus given to the party in authority, to stamp an exact impression of his way of thinking, on a subordinate mind, is too apt to increase the vigour of his selfish passions, by opening to them a larger field of exercise. It is particularly liable to produce this evil effect on parents, who readily learn to believe, that

nature has vested them with the right to dictate to their children, on all important topics, opinions which they are to revere as orthodox. When they are imbued with this notion of the authority belonging to them, after making, as every man engaged in active affairs must do, self the centre of their plan of conduct, they extend it to comprehend their children within its compass, so that, instead of allowing them, after they come to man's estate, to be independent beings, moving in a distinct orbit, traced out to them by their own reason, they require them to be blindly hurried along by the vortex of their authority. The ascendency that this enlarged kind of selfishness, which spreads itself into a field that properly belongs to social love, sometimes gains over parents, is such, as entirely to stifle in them the voice of nature, which, if they hearkened to it, would urge them to love their children with a true, disinterested affection. As long as the projects which they lay for their children's advancement, are not baffled by any counteracting tendency, in the latter, they labour, assiduously, to promote their weal, from the habit of identifying their prosperity with their own; but once the children determinately oppose the projects formed by the parent, for what he conceives to be their benefit, his heart, by hardening to them, betrays its insensibility to parental love. He is completely, and for ever, alienated from them, for their having thus thwarted the plan, laid by his ambition, which he expected to fulfil in their persons.

It is doubtless true, that a father should imbue his children, not only with those primary maxims of virtue which are universally applicable to mankind, but also, with secondary maxims for the guidance of their conduct, drawn from the consideration of his own station; and it may be becoming him, to express the displeasure excited in him by the child, who trangresses against the latter class of these maxims, as well as by the one who violates the former. But, careful should he be, so to qualify his tokens of resentment, as to show that, impartial and disinterested, he poizes every offence in the balance of justice; that he is never tempted to throw into the scale, his ideas concerning self-interest, either to aggravate faults, in themselves venial, though they clash with his designs; or to mark heinous delinquencies, as light ones, if they tend to advance his views. Whenever he treats his children with rigour, self should be so completely out of the question, that he should only make them feel the effects of his displeasure, as the maintenance of his own virtuous principles, the good of society, and that of the offender himself, may demand.

By thus subordinating his parental affection, to nothing but an imperious sense of duty, he will do the utmost that he can to check the spirit of innovation, or that spirit which makes one generation like to overthrow the institutions and customs established by the preceding ones. Such a spirit is best stemmed, by that subordinate spirit of association, which engages children to revere, as maxims of truth, all their father's sentiments: and they are best determined, ever to persevere in identifying their way of thinking,

with his, by perceiving that he never abuses the influence which he thus acquires over them; nor exacts from them, as a right, a submission of mind that, after they are grown up, he ought to consider as a homage paid him of their own free will. A man who arbitrarily insists on his children, in all important affairs, taking his sentiments for the model to which theirs are bound to conform, may, indeed, chance to have a son who corresponds fully to his wishes: such a son, after forming, attentively, his character and opinions on his, will probably act, in his turn, still more tyrannically by his children, on the principle, that he has a good right to exact from them as much deference as he paid his father. However, generally speaking, even as a miser is usually, in the second or third generation, succeeded by a spendthrift, so in these days, when the human mind spurns, almost universally, undue control, the father who imperiously orders his children to tread in his steps, will, almost always, be soon represented by a successor who, rather than not differ from him, will delight in weakening, by dangerous innovations, the best combined system of society.

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## CHAPTER II.

### THOUGHTS ON THE DOMESTIC AFFECTIONS.

§ 1.—*I shall* now take notice of the provision made by nature to attach, not only the chiefs of families but men in general, to the whole human species, by means of the domestic ties.

This subject is not immediately connected with the spirit of association, but, as I purpose to make my remarks concerning it, serve to illustrate what remains for me to say touching the operations of that spirit, they are not, I think, displaced here. The domestic affections do not seem to us entirely consistent with our abstract notions of justice, which would require us to interest ourselves for all mankind with an impartial affection, making no other difference in our love for our fellow-creatures, than what could be fully accounted for by the diversity of their deserts. However, this doctrine is so repugnant to our feelings, that, even did our natural constitution not interpose insurmountable obstacles to our conforming our practice to it,

we should still believe that, without the entertainment of partial, social affections, we could have no enjoyment of life.

Our aptitude to form family connexions may indeed seem to indicate to us, that we are made of a coarse, perishable stuff, which does not enter into the composition of blessed spirits. But particular ties of friendship appear, I believe, to all persons who reflect on the subject, such an essential and noble part of happiness, that they must suppose them to be acknowledged and cherished by beings in a condition far superior to ours. If there be creatures whose social affection has no particular channels, because it is all one flood of intense, universal love, their state is elevated so far above ours, that we can form no conception of the kind of happiness which distinguishes it.

Our sentiments of natural religion tell us that the perfection of created beings requires them to be in this state, since all creatures, alike in their deserts, are equally dear to their Creator, and that he is the model to whom the creatures approach more nearly still as they become more perfect.

Such being the point of moral perfection to which our abstract principles of justice direct our thoughts, we have some grounds to presume that it is the point, which beings who perfect the work of their moral improvement, are destined at last to reach. At all events we should now, without allowing our warmth and constancy in love, friendship and family relations to abate, prepare ourselves for journeying towards it. This is done by our accustoming our private affections to propose to themselves ends so pure, just and generous, that they shall attach us more closely to all mankind, instead of teaching us to shrink within a narrow circle of family interests.

§ 2.—It is, no doubt, absolutely necessary for the attainment of this object, that we steadily guide ourselves by liberal, equitable principles: however, did nature prompt us to bound our concerns entirely to the welfare of those whom we particularly loved, it would be, perhaps, impossible to persuade us of the truth of the principle, that it does not become us to isolate ourselves, like birds of prey, from all mankind but our own family.

Nature has acted in an opposite and much kinder manner.

She has taken care to warn us of its being her intention, that the sentiments which accompany the domestic ties shall serve to unite affectionately all mankind, by surrounding those sentiments with sympathies so extensive, that they interest us for the whole human race, and indeed even for the irrational creation. Who does not, for instance, pity the feathered songster, who, in plaintive notes, bewails the mate, or the young family, of which it has been deprived by ruthless violence?

§ 3.—I have already mentioned how much personal wants relating to the preservation of life, excite fellow-feeling among mankind, from each individual being able to appreciate exactly the misery, to which they expose the unhappy mortals condemned to suffer from them: yet the fellow-feeling awakened by the persons, whom we see grievously afflicted in their tenderest affections, is warmer, and has more comprehensive bearings.

Though we may relieve the penury of the unfortunate creature whom we see labouring under the privation of the greatest personal necessaries, yet is there in his condition nothing on which our imagination loves to rest. It rather makes us recollect with a sort of loathing the humiliating evils to which human nature is exposed; but when we see parents, wives or children, anxiously devoted to the objects to whom they are bound by those relations; when we see them sinking under the affliction caused them, either by their ingratitude or by some fatal calamity that had overtaken them, though our hearts be rent by this sad spectacle, it has still a sort of attraction for us, which usually makes us long take a melancholy pleasure in recalling it to our recollection. It offers to us a kind of images which, it appears, were we free to choose the nature of our joys and sorrows, we should frequently present to our imagination.

§ 4.—The woes to which the relations above mentioned are so cruelly exposed, soften the horrors of civil war. For instance, the most enraged partizan would feel his heart bleed in pity for the enemy whom he saw, either bending in anguish over the disfigured corpse of a son, that had fallen the victim of infuriate strife, or else vainly supplicating triumphant foes to spare the living one whom they were determined to sacrifice.

§ 5.—Not only do the near domestic affections obtain, for the person who appears deeply moved by them, a sort of sacred sympathy from all beholders of common humanity, but they also cause them to take interest in the object for whose sake he entertains those affections. The beloved husband or son of a virtuous, attractive woman, appears to all who are touched with a sense of her worth—particularly if he merit to be the object of the affection that he inspires her—invested with a portion of that sacred, interesting character with which he is clothed in her eyes.

§ 6.—Nor is it merely those whose fond relations, by taking an evident interest in them, move spectators in some degree to do the same, who benefit by the general disposition in mankind to sympathise with the domestic affections of a fellow-creature.

The stranger, who is far removed from all his natural friends, excites on that account compassion in those who witness his forlorn state: for I think that it can scarcely be doubted that the kind spirit of hospitality with which the weary, unknown traveller is commonly greeted among barbarous nations, partly proceeds from pity for the wanderer, who is left without a friend to take a particular interest in his concerns.

§ 7.—The kindness with which all persons of humanity are disposed to view their fellow-creatures, as considering that each individual is or ought to be, in domestic life, dear to some anxious friend, is unspeakably increased in those tender relatives, whom experience has taught thoroughly to understand the alarms and cares, which a deeply felt domestic affection may cause. Thus, for instance, when a mother sees a youth of her son's age, who is far away from his own friends, in a cruel position, she is doubly impelled to succour him, both because he suffers, and because he is so unfortunate as not to have a mother near him. Should she learn that he possesses one remarkably tender, who counts with impatience all the moments of their separation, she pities the anguish to which she must be a prey during the time of his absence, and of his being exposed to perils which her imagination cannot fail to aggravate. For the mother's sake, she thence lavishes on the son all those parental attentions, which, should her beloved child be one day in a similar situation, she would wish some humane stranger to

bestow on him, moved by sympathy with the anxieties caused her by her inability to relieve his distresses. Does she find out that he is alone in the world, having no mother, no kind friend, to be concerned in his welfare, she watches him still with the same maternal tenderness, deeply pitying him for being left deserted. Thus, however he may be circumstanced in his family, her heart finds some motive of sympathy in her own maternal affection, for treating him, while he stands in need of her care, with as much attention as though he were her son.

§ 8.—Nor is our sympathy with fond domestic affections merely called forth, when the tender emotions which it causes us find an object towards whom they can flow. We feel it in an abstract manner, so that, laying aside all consideration of particular individuals, we are pleased in general with the idea of those affections exercising due power over the human heart. We are revolted when we see a proof of its being hardened to them, even though the party who may suffer in consequence, does not engage our pity. Thus, if a son determine to deliver a guilty father to condign punishment, every heart palpitates with horror, for though it might gladly see vengeance overtake the sinner, it recognises the whole society to be outraged in its most sacred feelings, by the son who aims, against a parent's head, the shafts of vengeance or even those of justice.

§ 9.—Whatever be the anarchy which the tumult of ungoverned passions introduces into a nation, the imagination and feelings of men still cling fondly to that portion of a peaceable, happy, social order, which depends on the right discharge of domestic duties. Where they alone are concerned, mankind in general, to a certain degree, act, as it is to be presumed they would do, were they unacquainted with any partial branch of social love, and exquisitely sensible to this affection in an universal form. In this case, they would see obvious reasons for dividing themselves into distinct families, in which each chief should charge himself with the care of as many individuals as nature might intrust to him, but every person, actuated by a warm interest for all mankind, would still watch fearfully, to see that the beings composing all the various families did their

part, so that no member of them should be neglected; from his being conscious that all mankind warmly interested him.

§ 10.—The private affections may, I think, be compared to the luminary, that vivifies the world by his glorious rays. As the light and warmth which we receive from him would be very feeble, in comparison of what they are, did they merely descend to us from his orb, instead of being reflected from every transparent particle of matter throughout the whole atmosphere, so our tender affection for some particular persons, would not do much towards warming our breast with humane sentiments, were it not that its light and vital heat, penetrates every portion of our mind, owing to the multitude of sympathetic feelings with which it is filled, and which are like so many brilliant atoms, reflecting the pure radiancy of the original affections.

§ 11.—Agreeably to the conclusions which I draw from the moral facts above stated, nature indicates it to be her intention, that our private affections should conduct us to loving all our fellow-creatures; and, as the sympathies with which they inspire us, have an inexpressible sweetness in them, that they should tend to shed over our intercourse with mankind, its purest and most heart-warming pleasures.

We may thence infer, that by expanding and multiplying those sympathies, to such a degree, that they shall attach us, warmly, to the whole human race, we prepare ourselves to love virtue, by learning, exquisitely to savour the kind of happiness that is sanctioned by her. According to this view of the private affections, they should delight us in the family circle, like a beautiful garden, spread round our dwelling for comfort and recreation. But, as in a country arrived at the height of sensible prosperity, the skilful agriculturists bestow on their fields, a great part of that judicious culture by which they have transformed their gardens into smiling paradises,—by these means rendering all their rural scenes enchanting to the eye of taste,—thus, in a land where moral civilization were at its highest perfection, a degree of that sacred charm which endears their domestic ties to the members of a happy family, would, as I conceive, be spread over all those civil relations, which unite the members of the same realm, or even foreigners,

together. In the largest assemblies, met to deliberate on public affairs, men would view each other with a portion of that kindness and respect, which persons of the same family ought mutually to entertain.

## CHAPTER III.

THE PRIVATE AFFECTIONS SHOULD BE CORRECTED OF THEIR ENERVATING PROPERTIES, BY MEANS OF THE SPIRIT OF ASSOCIATION.—FORMS IN WHICH THAT SPIRIT SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO MANIFEST ITSELF.

§ 1.—Though the family affections, like a fertilizing stream, might be taught gently to expand beyond their exact channel, and to fecundify all the humane, social feelings of a people, yet is it necessary, towards their producing that effect, that they sink into minds composed of a more tenacious soil than they bring to them. They have in their nature, as I have shown, a tendency to enervate, and they have it not only in their own original form, but also, in the sympathies which they kindle.

If men too often hearken to an undue pretension on the part of their own family, rather than to a legitimate demand made by strangers, it is, that enfeebled by these affections, they want resolution to refuse to comply with those of their entreaties, which are the most urgent.

The private affections render the mind selfish because they first weaken it. They appear sometimes, it is true, to harden into selfishness a father's heart, by teaching him to associate his children to himself, so that he determines to dispose of the one as absolutely as of the other. But this species of selfishness is really produced by the spirit of association, which first kills his paternal affection, and then assumes its form, as a petrifying substance, after having destroyed the life of vegetables, takes upon it their figure.

§ 2.—The spirit of association when it opens, to a methodical plan of conduct, a wide space through which it may be distended, tends greatly to brace the mind and determine it to

act steadily, on all occasions, up to the principle which it may have adopted for its guidance.

'Tis therefore in this spirit that we ought to look for an antidote to the relaxing effects of the domestic affections. Not that we ought, on that account, to approve of it in the father, who sternly forbids his children to thwart the projects which his ambition lays for them: such a spirit of association only tends to make the most hard-hearted selfishness predominate in the breast.

§ 3.—We should rather try to encourage this spirit in the circumstances wherein it draws individuals out of their personal concerns, and makes them devote themselves to the good of a community. It is then that it gives men, what they so much want, the strength of mind which they would possess had they no passions but those derived from a lofty self-love.

At the same time we ought carefully to employ domestic affections and the sympathies to which they give birth, to render them thoroughly humane and deeply attached to their fellow-creatures.

§ 4.—The spirit of association that might with advantage be made use of, to draw men out of their private interests, and yet render them capable of as stern, strong decision as if they were moved entirely by self-love, is,

First—That which makes them unite with their countrymen to form, as I may say, one mind and body.

Secondly—That which makes them identify their interests with those of the members of the same profession.

It would be needless for me to expatiate on the dignity which the human character derives, from a devoted attachment to one's country and the system of social polity, to which it may be indebted for happiness and independence. Though this be an important theme, it is one that—as far as my knowledge goes—contains no position with which almost every individual is not already well acquainted: for what person is there who, whatever his own conduct may be, does not in theory venerate and justly appreciate the worth of him, who sacrifices himself rather than allow his country to decline from a state of prosperity? I shall therefore confine my remarks on the love of country, to

the contrasts which I think I perceive between the movements of this passion and those of the domestic affections.

§ 5.—When a man identifies his own interest so completely with that of his country, as that an anxious wish to advance what he conceives to be the weal of the latter for ever engrosses his thoughts, the selfish part of the feelings dominating within him are not apt to kill the social, as in the case of the ambitious father who, after associating his children to the plans formed by him to promote his personal prosperity, is too liable to grow indifferent to them, if their views do not coincide with his. Self-love, which is from the beginning the spirit presiding over such a father's plans, acquires from his habitually cherishing it, sufficient vigour quickly to overcome his parental or social love, should it attempt to oppose it,

When a man, on the contrary, learns to treat his own interests, as being perfectly identified with those of his country, by that very act of his mind he erects social love, in an abstracted form, no doubt, into the leading principle of his breast; and the longer, and more closely, he associates the idea of his country's interest to that of his own, the more will his self-love be subordinate to his patriotic affection. No indignation nor disappointed hopes can usually wean the lover of his native land, from the object of his ardent attachment. What commonly cools him to it is, the gradual dissolution of the association of ideas, which had led him closely to connect his country with himself; and the formation in his mind of other associations that tempt him to forget it.

§ 6.—What seems to me most particularly to distinguish the character of patriotic love from that of the domestic affections, is, its not being surrounded like them by a radiancy of sympathetic tenderness, so comprehensive as to shine on all mankind. Patriotic love purifies the core of the heart, chasing selfish inclinations away from it, by a stream of disinterested feeling: but it allows a harsh selfishness to settle like an irreducible crust on its surface, completely paralysing, in its lofty aspirings and infinite bearings, social love, which thenceforth becomes too powerless to kindle in it a sympathetic interest, in any patriotic cares that regard a foreign land.

However, though I assume that patriotic love is subject to

contract the mind that it inhabits, and to render it insensible to sympathy with the patriots of other countries, yet I do not pretend that the contractedness which it causes in it is so very absolute, as to leave it utterly unable to yield to the expansive effects of a sympathetic emotion. Such is certainly not the case particularly of late years, when the well-educated part of mankind are become sufficiently enlightened to perceive, that the flourishing state of rival nations, far from injuring the country that they cherish, contributes to increase its prosperity. This discovery naturally inspires them with more interest, than men formerly took, in the the exertions of the foreigner whom they see toiling with patriotic zeal for the good of his native land.

Men were not, however, even formerly, totally bereft of a sympathetic sentiment of admiration for the generous, devoted patriot, to whatever country he might belong, provided indeed it were so situated, as that its interests could not be presumed to clash with those of the land whose welfare lay next their hearts.

That the sympathetic part which men not connected by a common country, take in each other's patriotic feelings, is so slight as to vanish instantly when any subject of competition arises between the nations to which they appertain, may be inferred, not only from the records of history, but even from the altercations that continually arise between persons who are foreigners to each other. When the listener on those occasions compares the insulting taunts with which they interlard the arguments adduced by them, to prove the superiority of their respective countries, with the kindness with which persons engaged in a competition, by warm domestic affections, usually manage each other's feelings, he can scarcely avoid concluding, that nature has surrounded these affections with sympathies, which make every one who is capable of feeling them know how to respect them in another, while she has little disposed the human heart, however it may adore its country, to entertain any sympathetic compassion for the stranger, whom a patriotic sentiment warmly attaches to a rival nation. Thus, if two individuals enter into rivality, owing to the endeavours of each to advance the interests of a son or brother, rarely in-

the heat of dispute will they seek contemptuously to outrage one another, in their parental or fraternal feelings; but let two men of different countries seek each to establish the pre-eminence of his own, each will probably take the utmost pains to mortify his antagonist, by uttering opprobrious invectives against his native land. To observe the fury with which they assail one another, it appears not only that they are totally deaf to the voice of fellow-feeling for his patriotic affections, but that they require from him an implicit adoption of theirs, not from sympathy with them, but in their original form, as though he were their countryman. Such seems to me to be the unjust pretension of the sincere, but arrogant and narrow-minded patriot. He thinks that, as far as his country's fame extends, every foreigner is bound to look to it alone as a land deserving love and admiration. I doubt not, were domestic slavery in use in this part of the world, that we should often hear a stern patriot assert, like the Roman of old, that even slaves ought to be attached to the constitution of the government of his country, and seek its preservation. As to himself, it is easy to conceive to what a pitch his pride and presumption would mount, did he see his pretensions to belong to a country, exclusively worthy the love and veneration of mankind, universally acknowledged, and did all foreigners look abject and humiliated in his presence, from tacitly making the avowal that the advantage which he possesesd, in being born the citizen of such a glorious land, rendered his situation incomparably more honourable than theirs.

§ 7.— Finding, then, that a warm, patriotic love does, to a certain limit, produce on the heart excellent effects, by animating it with a strength and resolution, such as self-love, did it reign in it alone, might be expected to infuse through it; and rendering it, at the same time, as disinterested as though the fire which impelled it to action, were solely kindled by social love; while I perceive, notwithstanding, that beyond that limit, patriotic love permits the accumulation of the harshest, most ungenerous, selfish passions, I conclude, that it is desirable, that both it and the domestic affections, should enter into the national character, and receive in it all the strength

and developement of which they are susceptible, to the end that they may mutually supply each other's deficiencies. That patriotic sentiments may impart to it a concentrated energy, and steady, active spirit of disinterestedness, while the domestic affections, surrounding themselves with their manfold tender sympathies, shall prepare it to hearken to reason, and religion, when they command it to be friendly and generous to all mankind.

§ 8.—However, though the mutual influence of the public and private affections, might be advantageously employed, to render the firm patriot mild and humane, and the tender chief of a family, steady, vigorous and lofty-minded, yet, could no other affections be found, to preserve in the human heart a just equipoise, I fear, that the public affections would gradually give way, and lose their ascendancy over it, owing to the preponderance of the private ones. That abstraction, representing a certain state of society, and a particular system of laws, customs and institutions, to which, when animated by patriotic affections, we attach ourselves, must frequently, in the common course of things, only occupy the back ground, in the pictures of our social condition which engage our thoughts. The near and prominent objects, show us a complete circle of private interests. The hopes and joys connected with tender affections; the anxiety to avert misfortune from a cherished object; the fear of being outstripped by a competitor; the continual occupation undertaken in the view, duly to maintain ourselves and families; these are the matters which constantly fix our attention, and which tempt us to forget our country. They do so the more readily, from her rights over us lying frequently in abeyance, on account of no opportunity to serve her, otherwise than by taking care of ourselves and families, occurring, to keep in exercise our patriotic zeal. It is true, I believe, that, under the system of government by which, after our arrival at the highest state of human perfection, nature intends that we shall be ruled, individuals will more clearly discern, than they do at present, the bearings, whether near or remote, which their actions may be calculated to have on the national system of morals and conduct. They will, of consequence, be more induced to keep the wish to promote the public weal,

ever active within them. Still, however, I am afraid, that in any state of society, that wish would, by degrees, grow faint, were the public affections left alone to withstand the encroachments of the private ones. A medium must, I think, be found to connect together those two classes of affection, and intervene so between them, as that the private ones shall not bear down, with their whole weight, on the public ones.

§ 9.—That medium consists, if I be not greatly mistaken, in the spirit of association, considered in the form, in which it prompts the members of the same profession to look on their interests as identified. I know that a brotherly attachment to the corps to which one belongs is, when injudiciously managed, productive of great evils, so that experience seems to warrant the conclusion of those who infer, from what they have seen of its operations, that government and society ought strenuously to endeavour to dissolve such attachments in their first formation.

But notwithstandstanding that I highly respect the opinion of many of the persons who are prejudiced against a corporation spirit, as I do not think that the social system, here exposed, could acquire a competent degree of stability unless it were partly sustained by similar associations, it is necessary, for me in these pages to treat the propensity to form an *esprit de corps*, as a portion of those moral dispositions implanted by nature in the heart of man, to fit him for entering into her scheme of universal moral order.

As the most remarkable specimens exhibited in the world of the effects produced by an *esprit de corps*, have been the result of a system of coercion, by which boys, from their early childhood, were forced to devote themselves to a particular corps, and often to divest themselves of all the tender feelings of humanity, that they might occupy themselves exclusively with the offices of their profession, little can be inferred, from the phenomena offered by the operations of the *esprit de corps*, when thus supported by violence, respecting the influence which it would have on the general state of society, were the parties bound by it, only drawn and held together by their volition, and were they under no obligation to denude their hearts of its natural, affectionate sentiments.

§ 10.—We may, I think, notwithstanding the forced manner in which this kind of spirit of association is generally upheld, satisfy ourselves from observing it, that it resembles patriotic love;

First—In disposing men to a stern way of thinking towards the persons, who are outside the pale which circumscribes the object of their peculiar attachment.

Secondly—In teaching them to pursue, within that pale, regular plans of conduct with energy, perseverance and firmness, yet, relatively to personal self-love, with an extreme disinterestedness.

Like a patriotic affection, an *esprit de corps* nourishes in men those vigorous, intrepid qualities, which a high, predominant self-love, would be calculated to unfold; and, at the same time, determines them to employ them in the service of a portion of their fellow-creatures. A spirit of association which thus takes men out of their own individuality, while it preserves the strength of their mind, and leads them to a love of strenuous and steady employment, though it may greatly require to be enlightened and corrected, lays in their hearts such a firm ground-work for virtuous principles to act upon, that it ought not to be entirely repressed and discouraged. There is the more reason for showing some favour to an *esprit de corps*, that, though it be characterized with defects similar to those of patriotic love, yet it does not, therefore, encourage the narrow-mindedness of the latter passion.

The illiberal sentiments inspired by it, clash with those engendered by patriotic love, and tend to weaken them; for hatreds seldom continue intense, when the objects on which the mind is compelled to fix them, are various and divergent.

§ 11.—It may be thought, that the sentiment of animosity towards foreign nations, and that towards foreign professions, which seem necessary elements for sustaining, in men, patriotic love and an attachment to their own corps, being neutralized by mingling together, the love and attachment will either both decay, or the one will expire while the other triumphs. One or other of these evils would, no doubt, be likely to occur, if pains were not taken skilfully to harmonize the national institutions.

The method of sustaining both passions harmoniously and vigorously combined, presents one of the *desiderata* the discovery of which, would enable us to adapt our social system happily to the constitution of human nature.

It must rest with the persons who shall see our social institutions remodelled, in the design of taking advantage of every germ of order deposited in the human mind, to discriminate the mode in which a corporation spirit and patriotic love can be made to act vigorously together, without either diminishing the force of the other. I shall only say that, whenever that time arrives, I believe that it will not be difficult to ascertain that ample powers exist in the mind of the community, for setting both passions judiciously in action, and hindering either from being weakened by the exertions of the other.

A spirit of association uniting the members of the same profession, if made to coalesce firmly with a patriotic affection, so that the party animated by it would cherish it doubly, from a consciousness that it rendered him more useful to his country, would infuse through his patriotic sentiments life and vigour, and hinder their being thrown too much into obscurity by more urgent, private interests.

The interests of the individual, in respect to those of the corps to which he belongs, do not, as is frequently the case in regard to the interests of his country, occupy the place of a smaller circle drawn within a wider, and tending often to obstruct the view of it to the person seated in their common centre. The individual sees his own private interests marching at the side of those of his corps, and either drawing evenly with them or else leaving them so totally independent, that both classes are at full liberty to present themselves closely and unimpeded before his mental view. His employments, instead of dissipating his attention from the interests of his corps, keep the idea of them continually in his mind, more particularly as they usually lead him to frequent the company of the members of it, and to converse with them of their common affairs. The corps to which he is responsible for fidelity to his engagement, is not, as is his country in a great measure, an abstraction which can impose no awe upon him, can call him to no account. 'Tis composed of sensible beings who surround him; who will

not allow him to forget for an instant his covenant with them; and who would make him feel dishonoured and humiliated, did he give room for suspicion of his being false to it.

Such a spirit of association, as I am speaking of, might with advantage attach all men to the members of their profession. They would, of course, be in some degree distributed into bands of rivals, but, enlightened by a judicious education, and united together by a common love of country, their rivality would inspire them, not with mutual contempt or ill-will, but simply with a strenuous desire to win each other's respect, which they would all be generous enough openly to grant where it was due, thence offering to the whole body of the nation great incentives to noble conduct.

§ 12.—A spirit of association with the members of one's profession, thus widely diffused and well directed, would serve as a great check on the love of innovation, a passion against which the guides of the people will have greatly to guard them, whenever man's reason is universally put in exercise, and that it has become accustomed to examine impartially every prejudice. In such a state mankind will be in great danger of not having their minds sufficiently ballasted by strong, steady attachments, to enable them to resist the veering impulsion of light, frivolous passions, particularly of the love of novelty.

§ 13.—A constant attachment to the corps of one's profession would contribute greatly to give a solid basis to society, by making every one proud of his station in life, and slow to change it. 'Tis when each individual views his own calling with too much respect to be desirous to mount into a higher one, that professions are well filled; that the country, if other circumstances be favourable, advances surely in the road of prosperity, and that a fine orderly spirit reigns throughout its inhabitants.

## CHAPTER IV.

### THOUGHTS CONCERNING THE MODE OF CORRECTING A DISPOSITION TO CLANSHIP.

§ 1.—In describing the different combinations* by which the spirit of association prepares men for establishing among them a solid system of national order, I have made no mention of those wide family circles called clans, and I must avow that I have not omitted specifying them, from considering them to be included in one of the subjects of my discussion; namely, that of family ties. Though the affections springing from these ties may appear to be the remote origin of clans, yet are they pervaded and held together by a spirit of association, very different from that which unites truly affectionate members of the same family. They seem more formed in a view to the convenience which results from numbers undertaking, in common, warlike expeditions, than from anxiety to promote the weal of any particular person: frequently they are only attributed, by the parties with whom they originate, to motives of consanguinity, because men are instinctively aware, that associations produced by ties of blood are the strongest of any, even though—as I have instanced in the case of the ambitious father—such associations frequently stifle those natural affections that appeared at first to give rise to them.

§ 2.—A disposition to clanship argues a propensity in men to extend their private relationships, so as that they shall have no other public governor than a domestic chief. An arrangement of this kind, wherever it takes place, must inevitably stir up, among the different tribes of the same country, rancorous and inveterate hostilities. Clans are distinguished by all that harsh illiberality of sentiment which usually characterizes uncultivated minds, who are associated together for the advancement of their own partial ends, and they are remarkable for being the cause of animosities as intense as is the desire of a person, devoted to his family, to promote its welfare or avenge its wrongs.

* Namely: the three different systems of attachment formed by members of the same family, of the same country and of the same profession.

§ 3.—As clans only tend to give to private affections public bearings which do not belong them, and to embitter, instead of softening, by their means, the spirit of association, where it unites men together for the furtherance of some special object, touching their interests; far from considering a propensity to clanship as among those tendencies to association, of which advantage might be taken to prepare individuals for figuring well in their place under a good system of social order, I think that wherever a propensity to fall into clans appears in the members of a nation, it ought to be carefully subdued, otherwise they will never be fit to be cemented into one national corps with all their countrymen.

§ 4.—I know that at present, in this part of the world, clans are but little organized; a strong, over-ruling public power prevents their birth. But it is not enough for the formation of a good national character, that clanship be discouraged from assuming a tangible form, the spirit of it must be dissipated, otherwise it will effectually render the people unruly and disorderly.

The symptoms from which the existence of such a spirit may be inferred, do not lie in a deep attachment to one's family, or even to distant relations. Such an attachment, if it be innocent and unobtrusive, may rather be looked on as the sign of a steady, sober mind, that is capable of fully appreciating the blessings of good order. A disposition to clanship, evinces itself, I think, most commonly in a restless, acrimonious temper, which finds it necessary to be on a footing of animosity with some portion of the surrounding society. The attention of the persons filled with this spirit, is often principally fixed on their relations; but, as they cannot clan with them, and are sometimes unconscious of any wish to do so, it is often a moot point, whether their disposition to keep their minds closely occupied about them, shall determine them to love, or to hate them. One thing is certain, that it is with their relations that they are sometimes engaged in furious contests.

A propensity to clanship is not, however, merely to be inferred from a temper that engages us continually in angry strifes with relations, or the society around us. Since a turbulent disposition of this ungenial kind, may be the result of

social inclinations, that a harsh and unbridled gloominess of character, has converted into sources of gall and bitterness. What indicates, I think, that a propensity to quarrel with relations, and the surrounding society, is connected, in the people whom it characterizes, with a love of clanship, diverted by law and custom from its native channel, is a great steadiness in their feelings, respecting their neighbour; a steadiness, however, which has far more the effect of perpetuating feuds, than of strongly cementing friendships.

Though a love of clanship appears to have its first rise in affection for our friends, and that hatred of our common enemies, seems to be only a collateral result of this attachment, yet, like all zealous affections, which serve us as an excuse to persecute the objects with whom we consider that they place us in hostility, the love of our clan is almost entirely nurtured in us, by malignant passions: our affection for those to whom we are bound by amicable ties, takes little consistency, if it be not fanned by the pleasure of raging against their enemies.

A propensity to clanship, when it is repressed, still, usually generates a disposition, firmly to combine with associates, for some purpose that stirs up a hot dissension between us, and a portion of the community.

§ 5.—One great means of correcting a people of a tendency to clanship, is, to train them to warmth and constancy in friendships, that are no wise abstracted from the consideration of the deserts and welfare of the individuals with whom they are formed, nor founded in any kind of party spirit. In a word, a selfish spirit of association, or that which impels us to seek the good of our companions, because we identify it with our own, must enter, not at all, or as little as possible, into the friendships of which I speak.

They must, therefore, be distinct from that attachment to the members of our profession, which I mentioned, with a qualified approbation, in the last chapter. An attachment to the members of our profession, though it may have an appropriate character, distinguishing it from a love of our clan, may easily, if not cautiously watched, contract a similar one.

It ought also to be distinct from an affection for the mem-

bers of our family, since this affection, if our hearts be entirely surrendered to it, will, naturally, make the nation fall into clans, or engender in it, all the evils attendant on a general propensity to do so. I do not mean, however, that the ties of friendship, should be more sacred than those of blood. Such a doctrine, did it influence a nation's practice, would woefully encourage in it, those rancorous passions, which a spirit of clanship particularly directs against our own relations, when it fails in associating us to them. A salutary and noble friendship, is confined within just bounds, and, far from weakening the bonds of consanguinity, it strengthens them, by habituating the mind to steadiness in its affectionate obligations.

§ 6.—But what are the just bounds within which friendship should be confined; what is the proper place assigned to it in the order of nature?

The sentiments of almost every heart, could probably suggest, readily, a just and precise answer to this question. However, though a disposition to disinterested friendships, unconnected with the ties of relationship, is a fact, in our moral nature, which we have no difficulty in ascertaining, it may not be amiss to revert our attention, an instant, from this truth, for the sake of fixing it on the domestic relations, in order to discover where it is, that they leave an opening for friendship to introduce itself, and take a place among them. By such an examination, we shall determine the rights of friendship on our hearts, not only from our native sense of its value, but also, from a perception of the situation which it fills among the domestic affections. This inquiry, induces me to return to the subject, of the manifold sympathetic feelings, which render the domestic affections, a means of opening the heart to tenderness for all mankind, and I propose dedicating to it, the two following chapters.

The first of them, I avow, may be considered, in a great measure, a digression: since treating of this matter, offers me an opportunity, which it would not be advisable to neglect, to unfold my views relative to the operations of the sympathy which those various affections give rise to, more than would be necessary towards a clear exposition of the thesis that I have undertaken to illustrate.

The strict domestic affections are:—

First—The conjugal one; under which head I include a virtuous attachment, impelling the parties who have conceived it ardently to hope, that they may yet be united by the marriage bond. These two affections have, it is true, often distinctive characters, but my present purpose does not require me to enter into such details.

Secondly—The parental one; including the filial, as its correlate.

Thirdly—The fraternal one; my thoughts respecting which I shall, however, reserve for the chapter following the next, as it appears to me, that it will answer better the purposes of distribution, to dedicate the ensuing one entirely to the two first of the domestic affections.

## CHAPTER V.

### CONJUGAL, PARENTAL AND FILIAL AFFECTION.

§ 1.—I shall not expatiate on the nature or effects of a conjugal or amatory attachment. It is enough for me to remark, that if as warm a flame of love as that which we conceive ought to animate it, be frequently supposed—by poets at least—to vivify the whole creation, and even to have called it into being, it is not merely because the subject of such an attachment is sensible that it enlarges and embellishes his moral existence, giving him delightful aspirings towards infinity, and making him exquisitely conscious of an intimate though mystic union with every lovely scene, by which earth and heaven enchant his eyes and warm his heart.

Our sympathies, with a tender attachment of this sort, are what principally exalt our sentiments and imagination, so as to make us more intensely sensible to all the beauties lavished on the creation. Whether we see interesting real personages under the influence of such an attachment, whether—as is much oftener the case—our roving fancy represents it operating on fictitious beings, 'tis sympathy with the feelings of lovers, far more frequently than a tender passion conceived by ourselves,

that causes love's fire to have so much power over us, in enriching our heart with delicate, benevolent sentiments, and rendering us fit subjects of refined happiness.

§ 2.—Though no other affection has so much power as the passion called love, to unite mankind by sympathy together, and attune their hearts to that true kind of felicity which is favourable to benevolence, yet, it must be observed, that a sympathy with love is weakened or ceases altogether to exist, if once it be tempted to pass the strict bounds prescribed to it; that is, if once it become so exalted as to tempt us to imagine, that we are in the place of another, in respect to the object of his affection. When we feel so exactly like him, as to love the same identical person, instead of sympathising with him, we hate him as a rival and an enemy. Every honourable, uncorrupted mind is also very careful to guard against this full similitude of sentiments with a lover, for once it has reason to believe that two fond hearts are plighted to each other, it avoids the temptation either to feel, or to endeavour to inspire, a passion inimical to their engagement.

§ 3.—The parental and filial affections are not surrounded with such multitudinous rays of sympathy as those which encompass the passion of love. They, comparatively speaking, strike our imagination but little.

On a fine day in the country, the view of the whole creation seeming to rejoice beneath the vivid beams of the sun, does not awaken in us the idea that the universe is sustained, and decked in heart-touching charms, by parental and filial affection, in like manner as it excites in us the sentiment, that a warm tide of love, analogous to that which attracts the sexes towards each other, is diffused through the universe and fills it with life, beauty and order. Thoughts disposing us to melt in sympathy with the tenderness inspired by parental and filial love, seldom occupy our mind, except when they spring from attention to sensible objects or their images. Nor are the objects which induce us to feel for a parent or child near so often ideal, as are those which engage us to sympathise with lovers. But, though seldom in comparison is our sympathy with parental and filial affections awakened otherwise than by scenes in real life, when any of these do occur calculated to give it a great

excitement, our emotions have a deep and solemn tone which usually distinguishes them from every other species of sympathy, and which announces to us, that parental and filial affections are those most entitled to excite in us a warm fellow-feeling.

When we compare the sensations which agitate us, on witnessing a father and son suffering agonies on each other's account, with what we experience when, owing to their mutual passion, two lovers are in similar distress, we may, in the latter case, be touched with as deep a sentiment of commiseration as in the former, yet, does it seem to us, that nature, after exquisitely organising our hearts to sympathize in a lover's sufferings, so that it is impossible for us to refrain from doing so, trusts, in some measure, to this disposition, for assuring to him from us, a due share of compassionate indulgence, and leaves us at liberty to steel, if we can, our bosoms against his sufferings: while, in the case of the parent and child, not only are we organized to sympathize intensely in their anguish, but a sense of its being our duty to respect it, speaks audibly to our hearts, and makes it appear as something sacred to us, which, if we did not endeavour to assuage, we should violate one of the most peremptory commands of our Creator.

§ 4.—What chiefly distinguishes our sympathy with the parental and filial affection, from that excited in us by an amatory attachment, is, its power to amalgamate with the original affection which gave birth to it, so as not only to excite similar feelings, but to direct them, freely, on the same object. When the friend of a father or a son, sympathizes in his tenderness for this beloved relation, he may, nay, he usually does, feel, in some degree, for the cherished object in question as if he, also, were bound to him by filial or parental ties. This sympathy is remarkable for its tendency to identify itself with the affection whence it springs, nor would it be unreasonable to expect, that an upright heart, inclined to sympathize, in general, with parents and children, would, in a society so well constituted as that all its members were worthy of exciting an affectionate interest, look to the elderly persons of the preceding generation, with a kind of filial deference,

and to the young of the following one, with a portion of parental tenderness.

§ 5.—We are particularly prepared by nature, to allow the parental or filial affection to expand in its primary form, and comprise an indefinite number of objects, because the sense of duty which imperiously commands us to fulfil weighty parental or filial obligations, towards the objects who strictly stand to us in the relations that impose these obligations, is not itself confined to an exclusive consideration of those objects, by dykes which it cannot pass. On the contrary, it overflows its narrow banks, directing itself towards the tutor and pupil, more particularly towards the uncle and nephew, as persons who have, in some degree, a right to be the objects of parental and filial obligations. A kind, respectable man, even in the countries where marriages between uncles and nieces are sometimes allowed, is usually viewed by his brother's children, if they be true to the voice of nature, and though he may not have over them the authority of a guardian, as a person whom they are, in some degree, bound to reverence like a parent; while he, on his part, entertains for them correlative sentiments.

The parental and filial affections being thus, even by a sense of duty, taught various gradations, it is natural that they should, in a weakened form, be capable of great extension. A child who, from a sense of duty, treats his uncle with filial reverence, will readily perceive, that a small superiority in worth or kindness entitles his father's friend to equal homage from him; and when he has arrived at yielding him, though more voluntarily, an equal tribute of respect, it is easy to convince him, that every respectable aged man merits to be viewed by him with a certain degree of filial tenderness and submission.

§ 6.—Returning to the sympathy raised in us by a love attachment, I shall say, that were it not for it men would ever have continued hard-hearted barbarians, incapable of relishing social happiness; without that abstract sympathy which they feel for lovers in general, an amatory passion conceived by themselves with a view solely to their individual gratification, would never have had the effect of softly vivifying their imagination and disposing them to benevolent sensations. It would, on the contrary, have placed the individuals under its influence,

as it does those of the brute creation, in a state of warfare with all beings of their own species and sex.

Sympathy with an amatory flame, prepares us to feel, that true happiness is of a nature to demand universal diffusion, and to receive increase in each individual, in proportion to the numbers who are seen to enjoy it. Sympathy with parental and filial affection, would not have power thus to lay, in the sensations of our hearts, an expansive, unlimited ground-work of true felicity; but once it finds us disposed to acknowledge that, to render us truly blest, the whole creation should present itself to us decked in the smiles of happiness, it inclines us, much more than does sympathy with the feelings of lovers, seriously to reflect on the practical means of securing to men their portion of real good; and it leads us to recognise, that it is only by teaching them to obey the austere precepts of virtue, that they can be put in possession of it. It is true, that the youth who looks towards aged men with filial deference does not, therefore, trouble himself with inquiries into the nature of virtue, and the means of making it flourish in his country. He leaves such an occupation to the elderly men whom he reveres from believing, that they are particularly called to be the supports of virtue and good order. But, when he asks his own mind, why he treats them with reverence on account of their superiority in age, he feels conscious that he does so, from his respect for virtue and good order, over the maintenance of which they do, or ought, to preside. It is our sympathy with the parental affection, that peculiarly exhibits itself as an attribute of the human mind, which tends to make men study the nature of virtue, and adhere to the practice of it.

Were this sympathy encouraged by aged persons finding that they had it in their power to act, in some degree, as parents to all that part of the surrounding community, composed of persons of the rising generation, it would be found to be a very strong incentive to a virtuous course, for few are the grown up persons who, did they believe themselves called upon to bear a part in the education of the younger portion of the society, would not be conscious of its being their duty cautiously to guide their own steps, that they might be entitled

to be looked up to with veneration; and also to define to the satisfaction of their understanding the precepts of virtue, as well as deeply to meditate on the best method of recommending them to the observance of youth.

§ 7.—I shall now conclude these observations on the different modes by which sympathy with lovers, and with parents and children are destined to contribute to give, to the sentiments of the heart, a right developement, by informing the reader, that the system of society of which I wish to impart to him a conception, aims at exalting these two kinds of sympathy to the highest state of excitation, at which they can universally and permanently subsist. The more mankind are taught to be aware of the exquisite nature of the happiness which they are competent to enjoy, and to be convinced that it courts the widest diffusion, the more vast and just will be the foundations on which they can erect the fabric of their virtue: and the more each grown up person looks upon every infant around him as being, in some degree, an object of his parental tenderness and cares, the more throughout the nation will education be conducted to the true end of forming citizens distinguished by their virtues, and their unanimity in seeking the public good. The more too will parents be induced, by adopting the views of the circle of friends around, to soar above sordid interests, and to rear their children to be, both in public and private, virtuous characters, inaccessible to the temptation to serve themselves rather than their country.

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## CHAPTER VI.

### FRATERNAL AFFECTION—FRIENDSHIP.

§ 1.—Obvious reasons exist for the dissimilarity which I have noticed between the sympathies awakened in spectators, by an amatory and a parental or filial affection. This dissimilarity—let me be allowed again to repeat it—consists in our sympathy with a lover being strictly confined to a tender sense of his feelings in regard to an object, for whom honour and principle forbid us to entertain an affection in the slightest de-

gree resembling his: while our sympathy with a parent or child, allows, and, in some degree, impels us to adopt a portion of his affection for the object in question. I have mentioned also, that even our sense of duty requires us often to comprise, within the sacred range of our parental or filial sentiments, other objects besides those to whom they most strongly and imperatively attach themselves.

As to the fraternal affection, the urgent reasons which, in the case of an amatory attachment, command us to refrain from sympathizing so fully with a friend as to love the same object, do not at all subsist: it is, in that respect, precisely in the same predicament as parental and filial love. It might, therefore, be presumed, since the human heart is formed for allowing these latter ties to become so comprehensive, as to communicate some shades of a sacred character to all relations between young and elderly persons, that it is also equally susceptible of having some sacred feelings of fraternal love developed in it, by means of which all men, equals in years, might be led to testify, towards each other, a degree of brotherly regard.

This, however, is not the case, and reflections on the final cause of our actual organization may lead us to account for this difference, in these two classes of affectionate feelings. The peaceable order of society does not render it so absolutely necessary, that brotherly love should tend indefinitely to diffuse itself, as it does that parental and filial love should thus widely spread: the care and education of youth, the infirmities of old age, and the necessity of tempering the ardour of the young by the wisdom of persons of riper years, make it so indispensable, that individuals of a different time of life should have suitable feelings for each other, that, did not nature incline them to cherish such feelings, it would be impossible, as I believe, to make the world emerge from a state of barbarity.

This evil has been guarded against in the constitution of mankind, which ordains, that their filial and parental affections shall be extremely expansive, in reference to the numbers embraced by them; but, as fraternal tenderness may keep confined within the strictest limits assigned to it, without opposing

insuperable difficulties to the progress of civilization, channels which might lead it to take a more extensive course, are not much opened by nature. It is comparatively a stiff, unyielding affection, which, flowing towards the objects fully placed in relation with it, refuses to dilate itself any further. Our sense of duty, too, sanctions its refusal, by not presenting to us any relation, more distant than a brother, wrapt in the folds of our fraternal sentiments.

Men, from affection and early intimacy, as well as from family considerations, often treat an uncle's son as holding a rank among their dearest kindred: but still they feel, that it is their election that has placed him in it, and that they are bound but very slightly to treat him, as being invested, by nature, with a portion of those sacred rights to their tenderness, which a brother would possess; while they consider their uncle, if he do not act so as to forfeit his claims on them, to be invested, by her, with a considerable portion of paternal rights.

§ 2.—But, if there be no regular channels by which streams derived from fraternal affections, may be taught to flow towards objects not immediately included in the main current of them, do we, therefore, conceive ourselves to be told by the voice of nature that, unlike paternal and filial ones, fraternal affections are not of a kind to overflow their strict, appropriate limits? We certainly do not give any such interpretation to the language by which she announces, to our hearts, her intentions: far from believing that fraternal affection cannot be partly conducted, like parental and filial love, from its primary objects towards secondary ones, we are well convinced that, it can, much more than they, bear with its whole force towards them. But, it will not like them permit, that secondary objects shall be marked out to it, by established rules and customs. Thus, a youth will not consent to treat a companion of his own age, with any portion of the regard due to a brother, merely, because his character may be meritorious, while, if he have been carefully trained, he is usually conscious that, it becomes him to behave to respectable old men, with a certain degree of filial deference. He selects for himself, without allowing the freedom of his choice to be in any degree con-

troled, the companions with whom he is willing to enter into a fraternal covenant.

The members of a clan to which he may belong, or of various associations, into which he may have been received, are, perhaps, the persons to whom he promises a brother's support: the strongest tie, however, of fraternal attachment which he forms is with the beloved friend, his heart's dearest confidant.* This last is the one of which I now wish to take notice. It is it that gives to fraternal love the principal expansion of which it is susceptible.

The friend comes next the brother. Nay, he may be loved with a still livelier affection, though I think that, wherever services which clash together are required by both, if no particular duty engages us to give the preference to the friend, our general one imperiously tells us that it is due to the brother. In his favour, and only in his, has nature imposed on us the most sacred, fraternal obligations, and those by which she binds us, ought to be still more holy in our eyes, than our voluntary engagements of a similar kind. But, though friendship, where these two affections interfere ought, I think, to yield to fraternal love, yet when their claims are no wise opposed, we ought to consider compliance with the demands of both, to be exacted from us by duties equally sacred. I consider, then, a faithful friendship to walk, usually, side by side with brotherly love, never retiring behind it, except in those conflicting circumstances where it is necessary that one should have the precedence.

But I am very far from thinking that, every young man is bound to contract an engagement, which ought not to be formed without ample opportunity to weigh the merits of the

* In asserting that parental and filial sentiments are much more capable than fraternal ones of being taught to expand by determined rules, distinct from voluntary engagements, I do not mean to imply, that we are not always liable to indulge preferences, very strongly manifested, towards persons belonging to a different generation from ourselves, though they may be equal in worth and equally connected with us; nor do I wish to insinuate, that we are not justified in doing so. My only intention is, to remark that nature has somewhat laid, in our moral feelings, a ground work of the parental or filial sentiments which we ought to bear towards persons differing much from us in age, while she has not made such a provision to warn us, that our equals in years ought, in some degree, to be viewed by us with the respect and tenderness which it becomes us to feel for brothers.

object, and a conviction of their being such as to do honor to his friend.

§ 3.—However, in a country too much inclined to clanship, I believe it to be very desirable that, young men should be stimulated by the spirit pervading the society, to form disinterested friendships, and steadily abide by them. Such attachments, originating in the sense entertained by individuals of each other's worth, and not in the hope of finding associates for some enterprize, would do much to correct men of the party spirit which, either clanship or associations entered into in the view to advance some partial end, commonly engender: they would make them sensible of their ability to love their companions merely in reference to their intrinsic worth; and by thus teaching them to occupy kindly their thoughts with an idea of the good qualities of human nature, they would mellow their dispositions, round their affections, and prepare them lovingly to embrace the whole circle of their country's interests, instead of allowing, as clansmen usually do, their affections to receive only such a partial developement, as to make them the enemies of some of their countrymen and inimical to its universal prosperity.

In countries where men have the good of their country so much at heart, as to be little inclined to clanship, or to associations formed in the narrow view of exalting a party, they are much more disposed, as I have reason to think, to contract warm, disinterested and faithful friendships, than they are in those countries whose inhabitants are usually prompt to enrol themselves under the banners of a clan or party.

But if men determined by patriotic sentiments to seek the general good of their country, rather than the triumph of a confederacy more limited in its views, are also peculiarly disposed to steadiness in disinterested friendship, it may be thought that this steadiness is one of the collateral benefits resulting to the character of a nation, from the diffusion in it of an energetic, patriotic spirit.

I am not inclined to dissent from such an opinion: however, I shall take this occasion to remark that, in the science exposing the theory of a good moral order, cause and effect may usually be so transposed, as to produce converse propositions

equally true. For instance, if a patriotic spirit incline men to fidelity and warmth in friendship, by habituating them to warmth and fidelity in their friendly engagements, we prepare their hearts for the conception of a true patriotic spirit.

§ 4.—While we train men deeply to feel the worth and charm of the most exalted kinds of friendship, those that cope with brotherly love, we ought not to neglect encouraging them steadily to persevere in the fulfilment of the obligations of more distant friendships. If every one according to his means cultivates a certain munificence of disposition, which shall lead him to sustain with persevering kindness—according to their situation and connexion with him—the persons whom he may have encouraged to trust in his friendship, each bond of this kind, entered into with discretion, will have some effect in strengthening within the individual who forms it, liberal sentiments, and giving him energy to soar above private or party considerations, in order to grasp, with their affections, the whole round of his country's interests.

# BOOK IV.

## EXPOSITION.

In the following book, I shall treat:

First—Of ambition in general.

Secondly—Of the military propensity, or the principal inclination to which ambition gives redoubled ardour.

Also—of those forces of mind and frame which enable their possessor to take an ascendency over the commonalty of men. These forces supply the principal means by which the passion of ambition can be gratified.

Thirdly—Of indolence, or the principal antagonist which an ambitious inclination has to encounter, in the mind susceptible of it.

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## CHAPTER I.

CONTENTS.

### AMBITION.

§ 1.—By ambition, according to the sense in which I employ the term in this chapter, I mean those inclinations which push men to strenuous exertions for the sake, either of indefinitely aggrandizing their own being, or of taking a great influence in the world; or finally, of pursuing in concert both these ends. And I alike ascribe those inclinations to ambition, whether they be, in the individual who feels them, but a positive form assumed by the abstract wish to assert the dignity of his nature, or that they rise in his bosom without his having any consciousness of such a wish, and that they have no further bearings than the simple attainment of the object which excited them.

Ambition, thus understood, is the moral excitement neces-

sary for upholding the world in a state of civilization, and for stimulating mankind to aim at individual, as well as social perfection.

I do not, therefore, at present restrain this word to the signification to which I believe it is generally confined; namely: that of a vicious passion that prompts the entertainer of it to seek to act an important part in the world, merely to answer some selfish end. I consider every strenuous exertion on the part of an individual, to enlarge indefinitely the sphere of his moral existence, or change the state of society, to be derived from ambition, whether his motive be selfish or disinterested.

According to the above definition, the passion of ambition is composed of a desire to effect, either the aggrandizement of the individual, or the progress of society from one state to another; and of an ardent, efficient resolution to undertake every labour possible to crown this desire with success. According to the view which I now take of this passion, the monarchs do not rank amongst ambitious men, who employ their armies in the conquest of foreign states, while they lead themselves an enervated life. They have sufficient pride and pretension to constitute them ambitious, but they have not an energy of mind proportionate to their projects.

On the other hand, I do not consider that a freely unfolded passion of ambition actuates men in a savage state, though they continually affront perils and fatigues, from glorying in their ability to brave them. They feel ambition indeed in its first wintry germ, and the secret workings of this passion push them to take pride in their hardy, independent life; in the constancy with which they bear pain; and in the intrepid animosity with which they assail their enemies. But, according to the meaning which I attach to the word ambition, it signifies a passion which, when it is at all developed, is penetrated, by a consciousness of the progress from one state to another of which human nature is susceptible, so that it labours either at the advancement of the individual whom it sways, or at the accomplishment of some change in the world, or finally, at the

maintenance of society at the height of civilisation to which it has already made progression.

I do not, however, count a person ambitious though he may ardently labour to introduce into the world some remarkable change, if he only sets value on the object for which he contends, because it is extolled to him by a guide whom he thinks himself bound to believe and obey. In that case, he may rather be looked on as a fanatical instrument in the hands of an ambitious man, than as one deserving himself of that appellation.

§ 2.—From the above definition it appears, that mankind must be determined to advance some steps in the routes of civilisation, before the passion, destined, for ages, to be to them a source of misery and errors, and that is finally to guide them to the summit of human perfection, can be fully called forth in them. They must first be induced to establish among them, such a system of civil economy and order, as that the labours of a part of the community, shall serve to sustain all its members. When this is done, then do many of those who are maintained in idleness, begin to feel the goadings of ambition.

§ 3.—Those who have then leisure to hearken to the voice of this passion, commonly think themselves ennobled by listening to its dictates, and despise all those whom they see too much occupied by their daily labour, to have time to give themselves up to the workings of ambition.

Did they well know how to interpret the mysterious voice of nature, they would understand that, by teaching men to consider an exemption from the necessity of labouring for a maintainance, a noble privilege, she means to signify, that those who enjoy the benefit of this exemption, should be filled with the ambition to labour, to the utmost of their power, to forward the civilization of mankind, and to improve, by indefatigable exertions, their own character, with a view to rendering themselves competent to the discharge of such a glorious task.

§ 4.—Ambition is sometimes of a very laudable kind, being stimulated, merely, by the contemplation of a just and noble object, and the hopes of winning it.

An ambition of this pure, inoffensive kind, is oftener entertained by scientific men, than by any other. Their curiosity is, not uncommonly, so passionately excited by some object of science, that they bend their minds to assiduous study, prompted by no other motive than a wish to get thoroughly acquainted with the object that fascinates their attention, and thus add to their knowledge of nature's laws.

§ 5.—The most laudable flame of ambition which a mortal can feel, is one of this kind, when it has the effect of determining him, particularly in affairs where he must contend with the passions of his fellow-creatures, to come very forward into general notice, not for the sake of exercising authority, courting applause, or excelling competitors, but simply with a view of raising his own worth to the highest level that he can, and of serving mankind to the utmost of his power.

So pure a flame of ambition is rarely felt, and seems, generally speaking, above our nature.

It would be in vain, in the most perfect state of society, to expect, that men who were called on to fill a distinguished situation, demanding extraordinary energy, should be solely moved by such unsullied ambition, and yet be competent to overcome the difficulties of their arduous undertakings.

§ 6.—Men are much oftener impelled by a far coarser kind of ambition, by one merely selfish, an ambition which urges them to great actions, to acquire power and fame, and to outstrip competitors. To denote a passion of this description, is the term *ambition*, generally, I believe, confined.

This last kind of ambition, if no sentiments of a more generous nature, mingle with it, is so ignoble a passion that, I do not think it possible to conceive one more vulgar. To illustrate my meaning:—The conqueror who submits whole nations to his sway, for the sake of proving how much he is superior to other men, imagines that he has perfectly established the justice of his pretensions. Yet, the utmost that he has proved is, that he is remarkable, by his talents and fortune. As to what really ennobles or debases a man, that is the nature of his sentiments, he is on a level with the commonality of his fellow-creatures. They would all, like him, admire themselves prodigiously, were they placed on an emi-

nence whence they could see the rest of mankind at their feet.

If it be agreeable to the Creator, that all human beings should rise to the full dignity of their nature, the way to become really noble is, to think and act magnanimously, whatever be our station, and not to try to take up so much room in the world, that every one else must, necessarily, be straightened and humiliated. We are all engaged for each other; no one can aggrandize his own mind, unless he try, also, to ennoble that of his fellow-creatures; he cannot respect himself, without respecting the species to which he belongs.

§ 7.—We ought ever to remember that, our principal duty in this life—particularly in our early years—respecting the regulation of our ambitious sentiments is, to be kind and generous in our competitions. That an ambitious wish to distinguish ourselves above our neighbour, is necessary to us in our present state, to make us act with sufficient energy is evident, not only when we undertake, seriously, to improve our talents, but even in the most of our amusements, particularly those of a very active kind, which cannot be sustained otherwise than by a contest to obtain some kind of victory.

They who know how to render full justice to the competitors who equal, or perhaps eclipse them, are usually capable of learning to be so noble and disinterested in all their undertakings, as to think more of the cause of the public, or of humanity, than of their private advantage.

Our duty in this life is to struggle perpetually, since we are bound to aspire after such an improvement of the happiness and glory of the world as cannot be attained or secured, unless all the individuals, worthy to take part in promoting it, make constant efforts for that purpose. Our principal virtue also relates to a struggle, for it consists in the magnanimity and kindness with which we treat our competitors.

§ 8.—Though one essential measure towards rightly disciplining the daring passions of young aspiring minds, is to teach them to be noble and just to their competitors, it is necessary, in order to gain that point, and to give to their ambition a salutary direction, to impress on them the conviction, that

that ambition is the purest and most elevated which prompts men strenuously to exert their talents, without proposing to themselves any other recompense than the ennobling of their own character, and the hope of doing good to mankind. They cannot, perhaps, at first be solely guided by this lofty, disinterested motive; the hope of acquiring honour and distinction may, in spite of them, animate their zeal to perform great exploits; yet will their ambition be still regulated and directed by their just apprehension of the manner in which that passion would operate on the mind, urged by it to display all its grandeur. Though this little spring of disinterested zeal may at first be too feeble, to act as the sole incentive of their ambition, yet if—as ought to be the case—the influence of the principles, acknowledged throughout the community, tend gradually to give it new force, the individuals who, amidst the fiery tumults of their youthful ambition, were but weakly influenced by it, will at last, at a more sedate age, be fully penetrated with its truly glorious spirit: they will then in their turn, by their precepts and example, contribute to diffuse through their country, a ray of the pure ambition to employ your talents solely in the view of perfecting yourself and of improving the happiness of your fellow-creatures, which we may well suppose to be the only kind of ambition, relative to other created beings, that can animate the blessed inhabitants of more glorious worlds.

An ambition corrected by a generous feeling towards your competitors, as well as by sound principles and a sincere wish to improve yourself and serve mankind, which shall purify it more and more, tends so essentially to develope the human mind and invest it with its full dignity, that it cannot be too widely disseminated.

§ 9.—The path to the lofty temple of virtue, whither a pure ambition points, is, in reference to an entire nation, beset with dangerous morasses, so that any mistake, respecting the route, may tend to lead the community fatally astray. I must remark, however, that once the ambition of an entire nation is developed and rightly directed, the difficulty of continuing to confine it within proper channels ought to be much less than that of controling this passion in a few individuals, indulged

with opportunities to obey its dictates, while the crowd around them are too enslaved to be at liberty to hearken to them. It is nearly impossible to prevent the ambition of individuals thus partially favoured from becoming selfish and encroaching. The too uncontroled career which the want of a sufficient number of competitors opens to it, and the habit of looking down, with contempt, on beings who do not enjoy the same advantages, tend to inflate it with pride and arrogance. But where every one is free to be a candidate for ambition's prizes, there, if a good spirit of ambition be once infused into the nation, the competitors must naturally help to maintain it in vigour by their mutual influence and example. They must the more readily learn to value, as the highest prize which ambitious hopes can promise to them, a conscience satisfied with the thought of their having done the utmost that they could to fill their own part well, and promote the true felicity of mankind, because such a prize is always in their power. Their efforts to serve mankind are not usually vain, while, from the immense number of competitors who are striving to win the same positive object, they cannot often count much on any reward, excepting that of reaping an internal satisfaction from their efforts, and of making them, though they obtain for them no public applause, conducive to the welfare of mankind. The general disposition of men to seek a practicable good rather than a hopeless one, would doubtless determine many of them, were a generous flame of emulation once kindled among a people, to look for the reward of their noble labours in the satisfaction of their conscience, and the idea of the services that they rendered to their country, rather than in sensible honours and emoluments. I believe too that it would be very practicable to communicate to the passion of ambition, were it universally diffused through a nation, a common glorious impulse, proper to carry unanimously the great mass of its members towards one noble end.

§ 10.—Yet I am, I avow, nevertheless persuaded that, it would be very difficult long to prevent a selfish pride from actuating many of the youths, who were conscious of the possession of extraordinary talents, and filling them with an ambition

so mischievous in its tendency, that it would be employed to sap the foundations of the social order. Where the talents of the whole community are developed, and seek to display themselves, it is usually much easier for an individual to render his remarkable, by endeavours to shake the established system of government and morals, than by exertions to support it. For instance, we have much less difficulty to shine as writers, when we introduce new opinions and doctrines, than when we try to recommend, in some original manner, those already entertained. In all ordinary occasions there are a multitude of false routes open to an overweening ambition, that is, a multitude of routes leading, more or less, to disorder, for one which presents to those who tread it, the means to do service to mankind. In consequence, numbers of individuals who do not know how to attract public notice by laudable undertakings, are tempted to distinguish themselves by dangerous innovations, so that a people which has attained the height of civilization, has greatly to guard against pernicious changes in its customs and morals.

The danger attendant on a full developement of all the talents comprised within a nation is accompanied with an antidote, since enlightened men will not be so liable to be misled by ambitious and perverse teachers, as an ignorant multitude. However, mankind, created with a disposition to relish change and novelty, which is useful to them to urge them on in their progress from barbarism to civilization, will, it must be expected, continue to feel the stimulus of that disposition, when they shall—considered as divided into national corps—have improved themselves so highly that they can mount no further towards perfection. In this case they will be induced, by a restless love of change, to listen to innovators whose doctrines cannot fail of corrupting them.

Those, therefore, who may be at the head of a virtuous, enlightened nation, should seek skilfully to lead the spirit of innovation working within it, in a manner that, if it do not do good, it may at least do no harm. They should endeavour, I think, to make it spend itself on the superficies of the national character, without, in any degree, altering it essentially; and

they should watch the most trifling change introduced into the customs or the opinions, trying to manage matters so, that the innovators, in proceeding from one change to another, should constantly return, as nearly as possible, to the same point.

However, though I believe that,—agreeably to the views which I take of moral order,—much might be done to prevent the decline of a good system of morals and government corresponding to those views, yet, if the world be destined, one day, to arrive at the highest degree of perfection of which it is capable, I think it probable, after it has long sustained itself at it, with the aid of many revolutions of little importance, that the spirit of innovation will, at last, make it deteriorate, and lead to the ruin of the social system, and I presume, that it is then that the end of the natural order of things, at present existing, will arrive.

Whether this opinion be well or ill founded, it seems certain that, we are, as yet, far removed from the time when the nations in general will be in danger of growing corrupted, from want of the faculty to make any further progress in knowledge and virtue.

§ 11.—Between the pure ambition which pushes men to perform great actions, from a sincere wish to promote the reign of virtue, as well as that of happiness, on earth, and the sordid ambition which inflames them to the pursuit of worldly grandeurs, merely to have the pleasure of being envied and admired, there is another modification of this passion, freer from alloy than the latter kind, but yet less pure than the former.

It is the ambition to make continued, strong exertions, not to surpass our neighbour, but merely to equal him, and sustain, becomingly, our place in the social system.

A spirit in some degree like to that which pervades an ambition of this nature, animates, in the countries where an hereditary difference of ranks is established, the persons of the upper classes. However, though ambition cannot always press forward, though it may be very fully employed in supporting mankind at a height of civilization already attained, yet I do not think, that a person of the upper classes is entitled to be called ambitious, if his endeavours to maintain the dignity of

his station, cost him no laborious efforts incompatible with a life of indolence or idleness. As far as he is attentive to act with becoming dignity, he is only influenced by an honourable pride, which pride indeed forms a main spring to give activity to the species of ambition now under consideration, but it is still distinct from it.

Notwithstanding that this ambition savours of the weakness of humanity, since our abstract conceptions of perfect virtue teach us that, though it be just to rejoice in obtaining, by a good conduct, the approbation of our fellow-creatures, yet, that we should be impelled to pursue such conduct by higher inducements than the hope of winning it; notwithstanding that we must acknowledge, therefore, that the best actions performed, in the view of earning the esteem of some of our fellow-creatures, proceed from a defective motive, yet is it necessary, in a well constituted society, that the bulk of its members should have an ardent wish, influencing greatly on their conduct, to earn each other's esteem. This wish, at a time when a dangerous innovator succeeds in dazzling some disciples, or that fashion sanctions erroneous tenets, may, no doubt, have pernicious consequences, by causing folly and delusion rapidly to spread throughout a nation.

Nevertheless, the kind of ambition of which I treat is, in the main, favourable to good order. Though the persons actuated by it may sometimes yield to innovations, they do not usually introduce them, being little inclined to dart beyond their companions, for the sake of following an original track. What they principally demand is to feel conscious of being so closely cemented with their countrymen around, as to form with them but one national corps.

Their sensibility to this ambition excites in them a profound love of social order, which passion is apt fondly to nourish itself with tender recollections of life's early scenes, as well as with family traditions. It induces, in consequence, those who entertain it, to cling with affection to the long established system of society, instead of desiring any change in it.

§ 12.—This ambition ought to be encouraged, not, however, to such a degree as to cause it to degenerate and lose its proper characteristics, which it would be tempted to do, were

such facilities for upholding their station afforded to men of high rank, that they would have power to rest secure in their place, without making an effort to maintain it, merely by availing themselves of an opportunity—unwisely granted to them,—to crush, in their inferiors, the ambition to cope with them.

They should be placed in circumstances in which they would see the necessity of making, in a laudable manner, unremitting exertions in order to remain a head of those of whom they had originally the start.

Rightly regulated, the species of ambition under consideration would form the principal cement of a perfectly organized community.

§ 13.—It could not, however, be wholly trusted to for long preserving, universally diffused through it, the lofty and vigorous sentiments, the influence of which could, alone, prevent its speedy deterioration. If no man had the ambition to be a leader, all the members of the society would soon come to a sort of tacit agreement together, to let it sink to such an ignoble state, that each might indulge his favourite passion, without having to fear the censure of his companions. A rivalship between the members of society might continue, but it would only relate to the efforts of each individual to secure to himself the largest portion of the gifts of fortune. The spirit which should determine them all not to be left behind in devotedness to the good of their country, and the cause of virtue, would be gone. Nay, even the industry which their private wants would require them to exercise, would not long have charms inducing them to apply to it, should it appear to them that idleness, though joined with poverty, contributed more to their happiness than riches obtained by labour. Leaders, then, who are animated by their own native sentiments, independent of the influence of society, to press on to the summit of virtue, are necessary to communicate their spirit to the rest of the nation. The greater is the number of these determined, self-directed minds, the more widely diffused among the people will be a virtuous energy, provided, however, that its guides be unanimous in their sentiments relatively to the ends prescribed to them by virtue.

§ 14.—This unanimity is best attained, by habituating them to entertain such a respect for the opinion of society that, though they be not led by it, it shall prevent them from indulging too great a confidence in their own understanding, and determine them to follow the evident track in which the prevailing system of order enjoins them to tread, rather than to endeavour to mislead the community into unknown paths.

To the end that the guides of society might thus respect their followers, it would be desirable that, the strong minds capable of taking the lead, and the weak ones requiring to be led, should be separated from each other by such imperceptible gradations, that each class into which society, in reference to intellectual distinctions, might be divided, should feel a degree of deference for the opinion of the one immediately following it: from being aware that, its deficiency in ardour and resolution was made up by some other advantage, entitling it to have the expression of its sentiments listened to with attention.

In fact, nature usually divides her gifts with such impartiality among mankind, that those who have less fire and resolution than others to combat difficulties in a good cause, have often a sounder judgment to counsel the combatants, that they may not err in their endeavours to promote it. Those too, who can neither shine as leaders nor counsellors in a virtuous and laborious undertaking, are frequently much more endued, than persons of graver talents, with the ability to render mankind sensible to an elegant and refined happiness. In consequence, they ought to have a certain influence over the guides of society, in order to hinder them from acquiring too austere a way of thinking, which might lead to their making a false separation between happiness and virtue.

§ 15.—Another species of ambition is that, which pushes men eagerly forward towards a glorious end, by filling them with the hope of rendering service to, and obtaining the approbation of, some being or beings with whom they do not, in the least, enter into rivalship.

This ambition, in some of its modifications, enters into the one which I have just described, since the ambition to main-

tain our place in society and be esteemed by it for so doing, is composed partly of the desire to obtain the approbation of competitors running the same career, and partly of the wish to be praised by persons who may reap the benefit of our exertions, but who are not called on to make any that can establish a competition between us and them.

However, the ambition which I have at present in view, is, where it is strongly marked, very distinct from that which urges us to court the esteem of society; instead of looking to the opinion of an indefinite number of persons, it concentres its attention on that of some judge or judges whom it considers as distinct from the society.

§ 16.—This kind of ambition, when it is not well-directed, is liable to lead us into great errors.

First—When the persons whom we erect into supreme judges of our merit are our flatterers and dependants. The suffrages of such judges only echo back the voice of our selfish pride; inflate us with unwarrantable pretensions; and, by appearing to us the dictates of truth, engage us to turn a deaf ear to its real language, whenever we have opportunity to hear it.

Secondly—When we are ourselves dependant on the person whose suffrage we ambitiously court: as, for instance, when we seek the favour of the chief or monarch whom we are bound to obey.

In this case, we pique ourselves on our disinterested attachment to his person and zeal for his service; we honour ourselves for our ardent devotedness to him; for a sentiment of affectionate devotedness to a master is certainly noble if duly directed, and it is one which, when men allow themselves to be entirely governed by it, makes them, agreeably to the appointment of nature, feel singularly exalted in their own eyes.

But this proud spirit of devotednees to the monarch whom we serve, is liable to betray men into two grievous faults.

First—It makes them ready instruments to execute a master's will, however cruel and unjust it may be.

Secondly—It causes them to deceive themselves in thinking that they have a disinterested affection for him, whereas they

are, very commonly, solely moved by the selfish consideration of the honours and riches which he has it in his power to bestow: whence it happens, that, after having appeared to adore him in prosperity, they will often be seen to abandon him in adversity.

§ 17.—The ambition to gain the approbation of a judge, whose functions differ too widely from ours to leave room for competition between us, can be productive of great advantages, when the person who feels it is guarded, alike, against the temptation to listen to flatterers, and to become one himself. Were a large proportion of the society composed of persons who, without being themselves fit subjects of an enterprising ambition, were fully adequate rightly to estimate those who were formed to feel its impulse, and did they know how to engage them, ardently to covet their approbation, the desire to obtain it would serve, greatly, in respect to the men fired by ambition, to calm that asperity of temper, and that intemperance of passion, which the habit of constantly contending with rivals is apt to produce. It would dispose them, tenderly to affect a kind system of social order, and they would, in consequence, inquire more coolly into the object of their undertaking to ascertain whether it were a just one.

The wiser part of society would also find it much easier to obtain a rational ascendency over the passive judges whose good opinion ambitious, enterprizing men, would strive to win, than they would to gain such an ascendency immediately over those daring spirits, whose consciousness of their innate force and fire, would make them disdain acknowledging, that any one had a right to criticise their conduct, excepting the persons whose good opinion they voluntarily sought. By carefully forming, then, the minds of the judges whom they had thus freely elected, the wiser part of the community would have an opportunity, indirectly to influence the way of thinking of ambitious, active-minded men, to rectify their views, and even to infuse into them the resolution to fulfil their duties, with unconquerable zeal and energy.

§ 18.—But notwithstanding that it appears to me that, with judicious management, many persons among the more passive members of society, might be taught to take such an influence

over the members most actively employed in ambitious occupations, that they would engage them wisely to choose the objects of their labours, and even inspire them with an indefatigable zeal in pursuit of them, yet do I freely allow, that the influence of the more passive part of the community cannot be expected, for any length of time, to determine the more enterprizing portion of it, to display, in the introduction or preservation of a good social order, as great and persevering an energy of character as the cause of virtue demands.

Though the mortals formed by nature to be the most efficient agents, in carrying on the world's momentous affairs, may accidentally be roused, by the call of beings less endued with active forces, to resist the assaults of indolence, and assert, in a good cause, all their native vigour, yet will they not, in the regular course of things, consent that beings less equal to the task of engaging in toilsome pursuits, shall prescribe to them the quantity of strength and enterprizing energy which it becomes them to exhibit. They will often allow counsellors, unable to undertake the same toils, to dictate to them the moral end, for the attainment of which they shall employ the quantity of their native forces that they are willing to exercise; but, as to what should be the amount of that quantity, they determine to be themselves the judges, or else only to consult the sentiments of companions and competitors engaged in the same pursuits.

§ 19.—To keep up long, in undiminished vigour, an ardent flame of virtue, among the portion of the nation the best organized for the accomplishment of difficult enterprizes, it would be necessary to present to all the competitors and companions, holding together an arduous career, some object whose attractions determined them to exert the full measure of their forces to attain it. This object ought to be presented to them by their principles of duty, but still if it did not also arouse their ambition, they would, in the eagerness of the race, be tempted to forget it and to turn aside to ends flattering to the passions excited in them by temporary circumstances.

An object thus calculated to fix ambition universally and permanently must be so vast and attractive, as evidently to be worthy of drawing the mind out of every partial concern; at

the same time, it must have a social bearing captivating to the loftiest ambition.

The passion of this kind awakened by it, ought to be of that species of ambition which I have last described, that is, the species of ambition which pushes men eagerly forward towards a glorious goal, by filling them with the hope of rendering service to, and obtaining the approbation of, some creatures with whom they do not in the least enter into rivalty.

An ambition, merely aroused by the attractions of the object, would be liable to the same objection which I have already made to a principle of duty, considered as the sole motive to excite a nation to glorious conduct.

The object on which it undertook to keep the attention fixed, would be liable to be forgotten in the heat of the race.

The ambition, either to excel a competitor or to keep pace with companions, is evidently short-sighted, so that it does not precipitate the mind towards the ultimate object of its pursuit.

The ambition to render service to, and deserve the approbation of, a judge, not embarked in rivalities with us, must, to be improving to the human mind, eye a collateral object, that is, a judge who is to pass sentence on the nature of its direct object, and on the steps which it may take to attain it, so impassive and impartial, that it is neither accessible to flattery, nor liable to contaminate, with sinful passions, the mind that looks with deference to its decisions. A little further on, I shall indicate the quarter to which we are to look to find such a judge. At present I shall give the reader notice, that I do not wish him to suppose, that it is my belief that any such infallible judges exist among the creatures of our acquaintance. The judges to whom I allude belong, I avow, to unknown spheres, and we are only to please ourselves with the imagination, that they rejoice in our good conduct, because we are convinced that it is right, and that analogy tells us that they are to benefit by it.

If, then, without any knowledge whatever of them, or of their mode of existence, we infer that, they are pleased with us, because we are conscious of living agreeably to the laws of justice and reason, we conclude that, our conduct is satis-

factory to these invisible judges, precisely on the same grounds that we believe it acceptable to our Creator: and it may be asked, why not mount at once from the sentiment of our duty to the hope, that by discharging it we shall be approved of by Almighty God, without making the image of any created being, more immediately than his idea, the scope of our thoughts; since the wish to please the highest creature should, and must, be a feeble incitement to us to persevere in well doing, in comparison of the hope to be received into favour by the eternal Lord of all.

I answer, that a wish to fulfil the laws of the immutable fountain of right, ought certainly to be the great incentive ever to animate us with increasing ardour in the path of duty, and prevent our love of virtue from waxing lukewarm. However, when we are in the habit of being actuated solely by the desire to please our Maker, we are too apt to lose sight of that temporal order of society, which we ought to study to preserve in a virtuous and flourishing state, and which partly serves us as a measure to ascertain the wisdom of our conduct, since, generally speaking, it ought to be calculated to add, not only to its dignity, but its strength. Our principles of duty become, in consequence, so vague and undefined, that we are liable either to be misled, by a dangerous fanaticism, into a false route, or else, to allow of our principles being so modified by the suggestions of private interest, as to accommodate themselves to all its measures. The wish to please and benefit the higher class of creatures whom I have in view, would, on the contrary, be suggested to us by reflections on the advantages and the bearings of a good social order, were such an one widely established on earth. It would not hinder our love for our Creator from being equally ardent, but it would prompt us clearly to exercise our understandings in determining the practical line which that love ought to engage us to pursue.

An invigorating spirit of ambition, filled with a lofty consciousness of our dignity, would also be more kept alive in us, by the thought of higher creatures, whose approbation we might gain, and whose condition we might improve, by our efforts to establish, here below, the reign of virtue, than it

would be by constant religious meditations on our relation with the Omnipotent Ruler, before whom, with profound reverence be it spoken, we feel an annihilation of self, which, if some counterpoise be not provided to this sentiment, does not appear to me exactly to suit the conditions of humanity.

§ 20.—Without anticipating on the explanations of these obscure hints respecting our relations with higher creatures, which, before I terminate this part of the work I mean to give, I shall now enter into some details on the advantages that I think might result, from thus fixing human ambition ultimately on an object which would accustom it to come to decisions, respecting what is ennobling for human nature, exactly coinciding with the eternal laws of justice, and which would therefore inspire it with a brotherly interest for all mankind.

Emulation is what principally incites us to get the better of our indolence for the sake of distinguishing ourselves by praiseworthy labours. However, though it be in itself a generous and social passion, since it only counsels us to make as great exertions as others, or, if we can, greater than they, and that it does not suggest to us to try to damp their zeal or to rob them of their due reward, yet is it apt to degenerate into the vice of rancorous envy. The more the views of the mind are short, so that the prizes for which we contend lie just before us, and the persons who dispute them with us, are those who immediately surround us, the more we are likely to be preyed on by gloomy passions, rendering us envious and vindictive. Thus, the first born man slew his brother from a motive of base jealousy, and were brothers, even at the present day, usually the sole objects of each other's jealous passions, we should, perhaps, too often see such a cruel war waged among them, as would teach us not to look upon Cain as having been a being singularly depraved; for envy, when it does happen to exist between brothers, has usually a darker character than when strangers are the objects of it. But brothers, as soon as they mix with other companions, beginning usually to perceive that they ought to make common cause together, learn to take pride in one another's successes as if they were their own; and this union prevents any feelings of envy from converting into hatred their fraternal affection.

A degree of emulation almost always subsists among them,

but it is constantly prevented from taking a gloomy, heinous character, by the recollection of their having the same interest, which their disputes with persons less connected with them keep ever lively in their mind. In the same manner near neighbours are prone to have a jealousy of each other, exciting bitter animosities, but these soon cease when, in consequence of being engaged in a warfare with more distant enemies, they have learned to class themselves together and to make but one party. The jealousy subsisting between them and those more distant enemies becomes in its turn appeased, when a still more distant and greater foe obliges them to enlarge their views and to comprehend, in their own party, those whom they lately looked on as the opposite one. Every time that the spirit of rivality is thus made to embrace a wider circle and to regard, as being ranged on our side, those whom it lately considered as opposed to us, it becomes more magnanimous, not only towards our friends but foes. It still makes us view, with a sort of jealousy, all those who, though now embarked in the same cause with us, we at first considered as our competitors, so that it does not fall with its whole weight on any one object. It is lightened of that load of anxiety which tends to convert it into acrimonious envy, and it attaches itself, in a mitigated form and without exasperation, to all its objects.

Such appears to me to be the true manner of disciplining the spirit of rivality, and I am convinced that it would be easy to make it completely generous and humane, were it thus, wherever it sees an antagonist, with whom it can actively engage in dispute, also to see a more distant one, the thought of whom would oblige it to welcome the former as a friend; and were its views finally to fix upon an object above the reach of any malignant passion, though capable of inspiring an ardent emulation.

But the spirit of rivality is constantly stopped suddenly short in its true progress, when it arrives at the distinction of being employed to animate patriotic zeal. The patriots, ready to brave every peril to make their country triumph over her enemies, have certainly, in many respects, a much more magnanimous way of thinking than the peasants whose only wish is to humble the inhabitants of the next village. But the patriot, all

whose affections are concentred in his country, is very far from being as generous as human nature might and should be. In consequence of what he feels to be noble and lofty in his affection, he is as proud of it as if it were completely beneficent and honourable, yet, of all social attachments, it is, perhaps, the one that most resembles self-love. It produces a hatred of rival nations nearly as strong as that which fills, in respect to competitors, the breast of the narrow-minded man, whose mean ambition regards nothing but his own personal success; and, on account of what is noble in it hiding what is base, it makes the zealous patriot satisfied with himself when he gains his end by the most unjust means, whereas even the greatest egotists feel commonly a degree of compunction, if the wish to serve their own private ambition have pushed them to unbecoming actions.

It is therefore, I think, very desirable that the spirit of rivality, once it has become sufficiently liberal to embrace patriotic considerations, should be excited to go on enlarging still the circle of those whom it makes us look on as friends, until it becomes completely generous and disengaged from all sordid passions; instead of being forced to recoil into a demesne where selfish pride and arrogance again take hold of it.

The principal means to attain this end would certainly be, to have the different nations of the earth stand together in such relations, as that those lying contiguous to each other should find it necessary to unite in friendship that, by their mutual support, they might become so strong as to have nothing to fear from distant and formidable empires. When they principally had to encounter people far removed from them, by their local situation, they would learn to become much more just and generous towards their enemies; for national rivalities, like those subsisting between towns, are most apt to degenerate into an envious spirit of animosity when they are confined to parties bordering on each other. The ambition to cope with a distant nation would not hinder two neighbouring people, forced to unite for this end, from feeling each of them a wish not to be surpassed by the other; but it would help to teach them, that they ought mutually to conduct themselves with the greatest kindness and respect, and show that nations as well

as individuals, when they are filled with a generous pride, honour their rivals and think them worthy their friendship.

But it would hardly be possible to hinder the spirit of *rivality* from retaining in it some lurking principle of degeneracy, if, after having learned to attach itself to the greatest objects within the sphere of its activity, it did not ultimately fix its attention on some elevated point whence a pure stream of moral light might descend on it, which would tend to enlighten and ennoble all the thoughts by which it would be animated. Such a point seems to me to be offered by the opinions hinted at in this chapter. A spirit of rivality, properly speaking, cannot take for its antagonists the inhabitants of other worlds. But though nothing but the height of frenzy could make us think of them with any kind of jealousy, if the opinions, to to which I thus beforehand allude, should finally be considered worthy a degree of faith, our spirit of rivality might be warmed and refined by them into one of noble emulation, which would excite us to cherish all mankind as being embarked in one cause with us, and to look on the inhabitants of other spheres as beings whom it would be in our power to serve and rejoice, by effecting so well the utmost improvement of our world, that it would no wise disfigure the order of the universe, nor retard, in their progress towards perfection, the worlds destined to receive from it fresh supplies of inhabitants.

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## CHAPTER II.

### DUTY.

§ 1.—In distinguishing the different characters that ambition usually assumes, I have observed that the purest, most commendable passion of this kind, is that which prompts an individual to do right, merely because he is smitten with the attractions of the virtuous end that it engages him to pursue. The voice of ambition, in this case, coincides with that of duty: on which account, before I close my discussion concerning this

passion, I shall make a few remarks on the manner in which it mingles with a sense of duty.

When the incitements of ambition perfectly agree with those of duty, the passion appears so completely confounded with the active and rational principle, that it is not easy to determine how far we are under its influence: nor does it seem to me of consequence, so long as we only receive right inspirations from it, that we arrive at nicely discriminating the point to which it holds us in subjection. This much, in general, may be said of it, that it makes us fill a virtuous career with more pride and pleasure than an exclusive sense of duty could do; and, of course, where it is kept within due bounds, so that it does not inflate us with arrogance, and dazzle us with illusions, it proves, by enduing us with strength to run the race which duty prescribes to us, a useful auxiliary to the weakness of human nature.

§ 2.—We often mistake the dictates of duty, or find ourselves unable to obey them. Such evils can frequently be prevented, by effecting a right union between our sense of duty and our ambition.

An imagined sense of duty, or, in other words, our belief that we rightly understand the ordinances of virtue, occasions us, sometimes, to precipitate ourselves towards an end which we consider a virtuous one, with an enthusiasm that costs us no moral effort, because the only good which captivates our imagination, lies in the attainment of the end proposed, and that we would not have resolution to pursue it, did the wish to accomplish it require us to exert any severe self-control.

Persons who thus interpret the laws of duty in a manner that makes them fall in with the bent of their passions, are liable greatly to deceive themselves, and to take pride in the performance of a duty, when they are entirely under the guidance of an inordinate, arrogant ambition. The good which they undertake to effect, consists in tutoring and regulating those whom they persuade or compel to hearken to them; not in rightly ordering their own hearts. They aim at raising themselves into authority, and when they succeed in their endeavours, they exert their power over their fellow-creatures with vain glory and presumption; imagining that, since they

have the means of obliging them to submit to their decrees, they must be infallible guides for them. Yet do their decrees only tend to the perpetuation of their own domineering power: as to the improvement of the persons in subjection to them, they are too little acquainted with the nature of virtue to understand how to effect it. Nay, they generally do them great harm, by inculcating on them false principles, which do not leave their volition sufficient scope, and by exhibiting to them the example of a character in which pride and passion reign uncontroled. Not to mention that they scruple the commission of no crime which they think necessary towards the maintenance of their authority.

He then who pretends that it is his duty to erect himself into a guide in the paths of virtue, to men in an inferior condition, while he does not, in his person, set the example of a virtuous self-denial, is either a false hypocrite or else is led into a terrible deception by his ambition.

§ 3.—Sometimes persons resolved to obey the laws of duty, begin with disciplining themselves and with severely repressing their most urgent passions.

They cannot keep their own minds and persons in such rigorous subjection, without summoning into activity all the inherent force of their character: the consciousness of which great, concentrated force prompts their imagination to detach itself from fascinating images of pleasure, and steadily to contemplate some sublime object worthy to fix the affections of strong, powerful minds. Their ambition to accomplish great ends then mounts, and gathers energy, in proportion to the force of the resistance with which they have overcome passions and appetites of a more lowly nature.

An ambition thus rendered powerful by the efficacious determination of the individual whom it inspires to triumph in all other respects over himself, may certainly become very dangerous: it may teach him to steel his heart against every kindly emotion, as though it were a weakness, and determine him to give himself up to the guidance of the most unfeeling arrogance and pride, with a blind persuasion that he is only performing a duty. However, much as an ambition of this nature requires to be vigilantly watched over, both by its pos-

sessor and society in general, it is necessary that it be widely diffused in a nation, to enable it to attain to the most glorious eminence whereon a virtuous social system, flourishing within it, can place it.

Nothing but the exertions of an ambition, strengthened by the abnegation in other respects of self, and animating many of the guides of society, will give to the mental energy of mankind that intense activity which is necessary towards making them virtuous: till this ambition duly prevail in the national character, the members of the community will always labour more at the acquisition of happiness than of virtue. Their minds will in consequence, in a great measure, stagnate and grow corrupt.

§ 4.—Sometimes ambition deprives entirely of its support a principle of duty, leaving it to govern alone the mind sincerely submissive to it. The most remarkable occasion on which a principle of duty thus appears bereft of its aid is, when every inclination, stirring within the heart, points to what is wrong; when ambition lies dormant being unable to draw off our attention from the passions which originally beset us, by exciting in us more elevated desires; when, in consequence, what is right has no charms whatever for us, but yet that we follow it from a rational conviction that we ought to do so. Cases of this nature are susceptible of two kinds of distinction.

The first is, when the forbidden fruit which tempts us, and which we resolutely refuse to touch, excites in us glowing desires, making us feel that our vital faculties are in their full force and vigour, and that it is necessary to offer to ourselves violent combats, in order to check their exuberant expansion. Cases of this kind enter however, in fact, into those that I have last described, wherein ambition enables us to shake off an unlawful desire, by fixing our affections on nobler objects. The person conscious of his heart and frame being animated with an impetuous ardour, though he may at first wrestle solely from a principle of duty against his fiery passions, when they crave a vicious indulgence, yet, if he manfully resist them, is not left long abandoned by the ambition which can render a victory over them less difficult, by drawing off his desires and warmly attaching them to loftier aims.

The second distinction relates to the cases wherein our vital forces seem to desert us, so that they do not inspire us with too exuberant inclinations, but rather shrink from the task of giving us any vigorous one. This happens when a too desponding regret or an ignoble fear takes full possession of our mind, and makes us conscious that the stream of life flows but languidly in our bosoms. In such a case, if, doing violence to the pale, cold passions dominating in our breast, we resolutely pursue the line of conduct which virtue prescribes to us, we exhibit examples of persons strictly under the government of a sense of duty and steadily performing its commands, without being roused to do so by the invigorating call of ambition. Very meritorious indeed is such conduct, nor can it be too much encouraged and commended. However, it is not to be expected, that the obligation to perform the cruel task fulfilled by it, will often lead to the accomplishment of any of those hardy enterprizes, which it is sometimes necessary to undertake for the good of mankind. When we are in such a disheartened state of mind as I am now supposing, we constantly contract the sphere of duty as much as possible; we listen to the suggestions of the most fearful, cautious prudence; every thing that we do is coldly measured; all that we can obtain from ourselves is to meet the inevitable evils of life with resignation and fortitude, we are unable to display an active courage in going in search of them.

§ 5.—The sum of these remarks on the different positions which a sense of duty may fill, relatively to ambition, is, that that sense of duty is the most suitable to human nature, from encouraging it to penetrate itself with every virtue, and from offering it a support for its weakness, which makes ambition its ally in such a manner as that, when duty commands an individual painfully to stifle some dominant inclination, ambition may render obedience to its injunction less cruel to him, by captivating his desires with grander views.

In thus withdrawing men's thoughts from the original object of temptation, care should be taken not to blunt their sensibility to its attractions, which could only be done by withering and impoverishing their minds.

Men in their highest state of perfection are fully sensible to

the charms, whatever they may be, which a refined, artless character would naturally perceive to exist in the vice that they ought to shun, but they are still more profoundly moved by those of the opposite virtue.

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## CHAPTER III.

### FORCE.

§ 1.—By the word *Force*, I mean to design those qualities which appear to render their possessor more independent than other men, by giving him a just confidence in his strength of mind; in his ability to support toils and hardships; and which, in particular, induce his companions to look up to him with awe and deference, as one that might properly be their leader in laborious, perilous enterprizes.

A consciousness of the possession of an extraordinary force of this kind, is apt to engender a passion for warlike achievements. It is also, in those who are smitten with the desire of military glory that I shall principally, though not exclusively, consider the effects produced on men's character and destiny, by the common propensity of each individual to admire in another the display of distinguished force, and to take pride when he displays it himself.

§ 2.—I do not believe, that it would have been difficult for nations making progress in civilisation, to have arrived, at an early stage of it, at unanimous conclusions respecting the nature of right and wrong, were it not that mankind, dazzled by an admiration of warlike qualities, are inclined to applaud actions which attest, in the doer of them, the existence of these qualities, without examining whether the actions, considered in themselves, be laudable or no. Thus, children and ignorant people easily learn to shun, as criminal, an action undertaken directly in the view of injuring a neighbour, while it is difficult to persuade them that, they ought to refrain from others equally unjust and pernicious, if they are tempted to

perform them by a wish to prove with what talent and courage they know how to exercise a warfare.

The military passion is excited by a law dictated by the heart, and which is in opposition to that voice of conscience which recommends living in peace and good will with our neighbour. This law speaks of our duty to ourselves, and exalts him who, by his courage and ability, knows how to secure his own rights, and even to become master of those of other people.

Were the character of mankind thoroughly improved, the sentiment which speaks to us of the kindness and benevolence which we ought to exercise towards all our fellow-creatures, would point out to us what ought to be the habitual state of our mind, and the ultimate aim of our actions; and the law of the heart which tells men that they must distinguish themselves by their contempt of danger, and their resolution to humble those who dare encounter them in a hostile manner, would warn them, that it is only by displaying, constantly, an energetic courage and an unshaken firmness, that they can make peace and brotherly love reign on earth.

§ 3.—The internal law, which orders men to be courageous and warlike, differs from the law of conscience in this respect, that it points out to them what it becomes them to do or to avoid; whereas conscience speaks to them of what is right or wrong in itself. These two manners of recommending or forbidding a certain line of conduct, ought to lead to the same results; but among the greater part of mankind they guide very different ways. He who resolves to do what is becoming him, is generally inclined to determine what that is, in a manner much more agreeable to his pride and selfish passions than to his conscience.

§ 4.—The internal law, which makes it a duty to have a martial character, differs from the law of conscience also in this, that the latter bids you seek chiefly your own approbation or that of the Divinity, and it is particularly in the eyes of the world that we desire to appear courageous. Those who would reproach themselves but little with having yielded to sensations of fear, when there was no witness of their timidity, would rather die than appear cowardly before any spectator.

§ 5.—Men are particularly urged to approve of warlike qualities in their own character, because they are little diverted from the pleasure which they take in the contemplation of them, by a consciousness of the charms of good order, that is, of virtue, as exhibited in their persons. They admire in themselves the ability to act a great part in the world much more than the use made of it. If they distinguish themselves greatly by their hardy exertions and undaunted courage, they are generally applauded be their vices almost what they may.

It is true that mankind are now so enlighted and so well taught by experience, that, in their speculative meditations on the nature of right and wrong, they readily acknowledge the truth of the maxim, that a virtuous man, leading a peaceable and obscure life, is more deserving the esteem of his fellow-creatures than a vicious one who may have attained, by heroic exploits, the pinnacle of glory. Still, however, a man may, in general, be possessed of all the virtues that deserve to render him respectable, and that fit him to be a real friend to the human race, and, if he cannot place himself, by his talents, in some situation that fixes the general attention on him, he obtains by his good qualities very little notice. Virtue rests then generally in obscurity, because the modesty, essential to it, does not permit it to manifest itself otherwise than as it is compelled by circumstances.

Even those who have a fair opportunity of becoming great by really virtuous conduct, do not ordinarily make a right use of it, from being intent solely on the advancement of their own glory and fortune.

There is such a universal wrestling with competitors whose views are egotistical—for where there is a general disposition to pay more homage to talents than to virtue, most ambitious men will always be egotists—that, inflamed with emulation, the few who feel a wish to act generously become as selfish as their rivals, more particularly as they perceive, that, notwithstanding the eulogiums with which mankind extol a disinterested zeal for the public good, they generally, in practice, forget those who have ceased to be powerful, even though it were a noble public spirit which had engaged them to sink back into obscurity.

There are great numbers undoubtedly who continually express the conviction that the solid virtues which all men with an upright heart might acquire, without having any brilliant endowments, are what are really the most noble prerogatives of human nature. But the effect of this conviction on their conduct, in making them accord their esteem to the men who have only those virtues to recommend them, is constantly cold and languid, as being the result of a principle formed by reflection not of a lively sentiment.

When men detached from ambitious pursuits profess an high opinion of each other; they do it more from *amour propre* and to raise their own character than from a genuine feeling. Their heart impels them to fix all their attention on the men who influence greatly, by their lofty talents or their daring exploits, on the destiny of the world, as if they alone were worthy of exciting interest. They are, in spite of them, inclined to sigh over the obscurity in which they themselves pass their life, for it seems to them that they do but vegetate. Too often this exclusive respect that they yield to men who know how to distinguish themselves, by superior mental powers, is such that, since their indolence or their incapacity prevents their following their example, they think that their wisest part is to taste freely all the fleeting pleasures which their momentary inclinations can procure them, considering that where glory or power cannot be had, nothing remains worthy a man's pursuit but to enjoy life as he can.

Nature, in thus framing men to admire the successes which can only be insured by an extraordinary force of character, reminds them that it is their lot continually to labour and courageously expose themselves to perils, in order to improve the condition of the world. However, they will never succeed in giving generally to their ambition a really noble, beneficial direction, till they have found out the way to make a cordial esteem of virtuous men rise as spontaneously, and in as lively a manner in every one's breast, as does now the admiration of those who, by the prodigious faculties of their mind, appear capable of giving to the world what form they please. Till then philosophers will descant vainly on the beauty of disinterestedness and a devotion to the public weal. Most people

will approve in theory of their principles, but in practice the commonalty of men will submit every other consideration to that of their private advantage, and the world will continue to exhibit, on account of the clashing aims of individuals, such a violent struggle, that men in general seem acted on by a sort of feverish agitation, rather than by any sentiment of the general system of national order, the simple, sublime majesty of which can never have an opportunity to unfold itself in the midst of such a troubled scene.

§ 6.—Yet, though men are dazzled by the exhibition of superior force, their admiration of it is usually combined with a latent contempt for its possessor, if he do not also shine by qualities more truly praiseworthy. Nay, even the possessor of it, in the midst of the most dazzling triumphs, secretly despises himself, though, to banish from his breast this mortifying feeling, he may, perhaps, inflate himself with pride and self-admiration.

These vices he will probably display with so much the more ostentation, as the sense of his meanness is stronger and more painful to him. All persons proud of a superiority over their fellow men, which they have acquired by ill employed talents and forces, have more or less the feelings of upstarts. They endeavour to stifle their consciousness of their inherent vileness, by glorying in those superficial advantages that give them a lustre in the world, and conceal, as they hope, from every spectator their native obscurity. Yet do they constantly betray that no sentiment of their native worth exists within them to give them notice of the dignity of the human species, for they view with extreme contempt most of their fellow-mortals, and they usually make no scruple of groaning over the deplorable abjection and hopeless misery of mankind.

§ 7.—The latent contempt for themselves and for the species to which they belong, that persons who admire, exclusively, in men, the power to rise to eminence by their vigorous faculties, usually entertain, is what leads to ambition, and superior force finding such facilities for attaining their ends. They are little checked by that calm, steady resistance, which a consciousness of the dignity of the human race ought to rouse all mankind to present to them. The ambition and the force of

the one, are only opposed by the same faculties in another; and the discomfitted party makes no scruple of becoming the obsequious slave of the successful one.

A lively sense of the true laws of order, or, in other words, of virtue, is what disposes us to think nobly of ourselves and of human nature. But the exertions of force, when they are not subservient to a good principle, tend, entirely, to the subversion of true order. The more, then, they succeed, the more they make us think, with despondency, of the miserable conditions of our existence.

§ 8.—When I observe, that nature impels mankind to yield a solid respect to nothing but virtue, while, at the same time, she urges them to slight it, and to follow, with implicit admiration, wherever they may choose to lead, persons distinguished by peculiarly strong bodily and mental powers—when I make these observations I conclude, that nature has formed us on a plan which is to receive its accomplishment by our own efforts, and that, after a long and woful experience of evil, shall have taught us to appreciate our good.

To effect this design it was necessary, that she should give us some disposition towards her system of social order, otherwise we could never arrive at the discovery of it, but it was necessary also that, this disposition should not be so complete as to guard us from committing a multitude of errors, otherwise we should fall, spontaneously, into her system, without acquiring any experience of evil, or making any use of our reason. The method which she follows to prevent the miscarriage of her plan from either of these causes is, I remark, to impress us, strongly, with all those sentiments which enter fundamentally into her sytem of social order, but to dispose us much more faintly, towards those which it would be necessary to cultivate, for the sake of counterbalancing, and rightly directing the former, so that it is the unbridled excess with which these primary sentiments act in us, and not the want of them, which makes us so continually give society a wrong form. In regard to the construction of the human heart, in the view of rendering it fit for the maintenance of a social order, nature acts, I may say, in a manner analogous to what she does respecting many of those places which, on account of their

natural strength, governments choose for placing garrisons in them. She leaves little to be done towards rendering it secure on one side, whereas on another it can only be made impregnable by great art and industry. But here the resemblance finishes. Those who fortify strong places never commit the error of raising their works in the spots that could best do without them, rather than in those that most require them, while the persons who wish to give to the society a form that would secure it from the invasions of evil, constantly make the mistake of strengthening the dispositions, necessary towards fitting the human heart for a good system of moral order, which are sufficiently secured by nature, and of neglecting those that she has left too weak.

Most persons, it seems to me, let themselves be indolently led along by the tendency of society, just as if in a vessel moved to and fro on the waves, we should allow the ballast to yield to the impulsion of the current, and to slide, constantly, to the part already too low, instead of fixing it, that it may steadily maintain the equilibrium.

In nothing does nature let the intention, which I have ascribed to her, so evidently appear, as in the sentiments with which she disposes the multitude to view superior force.

It is certain, that in a state where such vigorous action is required, both to maintain the social order and carry it to perfection, it is necessary that strong minds should have a great ascendency over their fellow-creatures.

It would be impossible, if they had not, to hold mankind together in one society, and particularly to make them advance in civilization.

Now, this point nature has fully secured, but, to excite us to the exertion of our free will and our reason, she makes our respect for great force be so blind, that we allow those who exercise it to take over our character an ascendency extremely detrimental to it.

On the other hand, though she makes us readily learn to acknowledge, theoretically, the worth of those peaceful, benevolent sentiments, whose influence ought to induce men to give a right direction to their vigorous talents and enterprising spirit, she but faintly engages us to do homage to them in our

practice, that we may feel the necessity of exerting our understanding, and vigilantly controlling our hearts, so as resolutely to submit ourselves to their ascendency.

§ 9.—Whenever the world is carried to its utmost perfection, there is nothing which mankind will more assiduously have been taught, than to watch over their disposition to admire force, and to temper it wisely.

At the same time, as we are all liable, while we avoid one extreme to run into the contrary one, it will be necessary, also, to take care not to give envy and malice an opportunity, under pretence of curbing strong, aspiring minds, to lay too great a restraint on the persons meant by nature to guide and enlighten the multitude.

In a perfectly well ordered state, vigorous, sagacious minds would have less opportunity than elsewhere, to lead the people astray; but they would be much more constantly at the head of public affairs, because they would continually succeed one another, from each of them, still as he mounted to power, being denied, by a vigilant, enlightened nation, the opportunity to enchain it so, that he could hand it, helplessly, over to the government of weak successors.

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## CHAPTER IV.

### INDOLENCE.

§ 1.—I give to the word *Indolence* a very extended sense: not only I use it to denote that propensity to inaction which generally goes by the name of indolence, but I employ it, also, to signify that disposition which renders it so difficult to us to exert ourselves with energy and, at the same time, to reign over our own heart, to maintain a just equilibrium between all our desires.

I call a man indolent, let him be ever so active, if he be only rendered so by any other illicit passion than that of an over ardent ambition.

I give the word *Indolence* this signification, because I remark that persons, who are much hurried away by strong, short-sighted passions are, in general, indolent when they are not under their government. I remark, also, that the species of happiness which they usually sigh to realize, shows that indolence prevails in their dispositions.

It is ordinarily of such a tranquil kind, that it approaches too much to what we imagine would be the bliss of a state of innocence.

The power to reign firmly over ourselves, is what the order of nature particularly requires that we should strenuously endeavour to attain. However, sooner than take this trouble, we allow ourselves to be tormented and driven about in all directions, by our passions.

§ 2.—Indolence becomes very fatal to us when we have to oppose the usurpations of ambition.

Most men, however indolent they may be, have in their heart the elements of the passion which would prompt them to take pleasure in reigning over other men. If they see any prospect of attaining this point, their ambition immediately kindles, and pushes them, with an indefatigable ardour, towards it.

But when they have no hopes of this kind, they yield to their indolence and, instead of repressing the ambition of the daring spirit who is opening to himself the way to dominion, they forward his projects, because it is by pleasing and flattering him that they can, for the moment, best live at peace with him.

§ 3.—I do not call the persons indolent, who are constantly and regularly impelled to undergo toil and fatigue by a strong principle of ambition,* however wrong may be the direction which they take, because they fulfil, according to their manner of thinking, the duty of surmounting their momentary inclinations to follow an energetic and steady rule of conduct.

* When I make use of the term ambition in this chapter, I understand a passion such as ambition usually is, that is, one that is proud, selfish and domineering.

Nature writes, in a confused manner, all those sentiments in our heart which, if well developed, would serve as sure laws to guide us in the paths of virtue, but we are liable to misinterpret them, and to pervert them to be incentives to evil.

Thus she tells us that our most glorious prerogative consists in the power to vanquish all our weaknesses and passing inclinations, in order to pursue, with steadiness, one noble object, and ambition takes advantage of this disposition, to engage those whom it animates, to pride themselves in having strength to make every sacrifice necessary for attaining its ends.

§ 4.—However, if many let themselves be thus duped by their ambition, I believe, that it is in some degree owing to the secret suggestions of their indolence.

This weakness makes them feel it an easier task to yield the entire empire of their mind to one unbridled passion, than to watch vigilantly over themselves, that they may remain ever prepared to go through the severest tasks with ardour and constancy, and yet keep all their passions properly tempered.

What gives room to infer that ambition is closely connected with indolence is, that the ambitious man constantly looks to joys compatible with indolence as what compose a state of happiness.

He undergoes hardships to prove the grandeur of his character, or to compass his ends, but still he flatters himself that, when by his exploits he shall have made that grandeur blaze on every eye, and that his ends shall be accomplished, he will heap up the measure of his felicity, by giving to his senses and inclination to lead an easy, peaceful life, the gratification that they demand.

Whether or no, his enterprizing habits allow of his ever attempting to realize these dreams of felicity, does not affect the point that I seek to establish, which is, that the ambitious man looks, I will not say to a state of innocence,—he may be too corrupted and inordinate in his desires, to do so,—but to one, wherein an indolent indulgence of every passing inclination equally prevails, as his supreme good.

§ 5.—It appears to me that all the vices of mankind are at their root nourished by indolence.

Certain I am, that this weakness inclines them constantly to form to themselves views much too tame of perfect happiness, whether relating to this world or the next. As they do not let the idea of a very energetic state of existence enter into the very nature of happiness, they fashion their views to an order of things which cannot call forth a due activity in their mind.

The agitation which this restless activity causes them, seems to them either a disorder that their passions occasion, and which will cease when they disappear, or else a torment that they must suffer as long as they are obliged to undergo the trials which, for some mysterious reason, Providence inflicts on them in this world.

They do not, from their reflections on the restless fire which consumes them, and continually lights up their passions, draw the conclusion, agreeable, I think, to right reason, that they are destined, through all states of existence, to display an activity and an energy, that, instead of lessening, will continue to develope themselves more and more; and that the various vicissitudes of life will ever continue to excite them to action, until they shall have got so consummate in the art of self-government, that they may live and act with the greatest energy, in as calm and orderly a manner as all the spheres perform their rapid revolutions, in which there is no more confusion nor appearance of hurry than if they were resting still.

§ 6.—Benevolent persons, who form theories for the improvement of the character and condition of their species, are apt to proceed on the principle, that men ought to be rendered good, by the removal of all temptation to evil, rather than by being taught to encounter it firmly.

It is certainly our duty to diminish, as much as we can, the temptations to vice, by such an amelioration of the morals of mankind, as shall prevent the existence of those vicious examples or counsellors by whom so many are led astray.

We should also try to screen the persons submitted to our influence from such temptations to do wrong as, in the ordinary course of things, are above their strength.

Thus we should carefully hinder children from being exposed to such incitements to evil, as it would require all the force and experience of a riper age to resist.

But we proceed in a different direction from nature's plan, when we try to make each individual good by denying him the opportunity to get acquainted with evil. Supposing that we could succeed in it, the principles of the passions would rest for ever in their original state in mens' minds; nor should we have purified them by forcing them continually to bend to the laws of our duties.

The well-intentioned persons, who would fain banish vice from the world by denying it any aliment, contemplate a state of innocence, rather than a state of virtue, as the supreme good which we should try to attain.

Yet, notwithstanding the facility with which our imagination receives a lively impression of the charms of a state of innocence, it is impossible for us to realize it.

In respect to such a state, we are like to passengers on board a ship, in the neighbourhood of a delightful coast, whose smiling aspect invites them in vain, from its not being possible for them to approach it more nearly.

The state of virtue, though apparently much further off, and, though to reach it, it be necessary to cross a sea full of dangerous shoals, offers the only sure port where we may at last repose in peace, if we pursue our voyage with skill and attention.

§ 7.—To vanquish indolence it is absolutely necessary that we pitch our notions of virtue sufficiently high.

If we have too lowly an idea of it, so that we conceive that we can attain the height where it is placed, without observing the vigilance and making the exertions which suit our nature, indolence will soon gain possession of our mind.

First—Because a core of it will remain within us which will ferment and increase, by prompting us still to keep our affections fixed, as on our chief good, on joys which suit a disposition not sufficiently braced to the exercise of a vigorous self-government.

Secondly—Because we will not be sufficiently smitten with

the august charms of virtue, to have resolution to deny ourselves every ignoble enjoyment for the sake of erecting in our hearts a temple to her.

'Tis only when she exhibits herself in her most sublime majesty, that virtue appears invested with attractions which are found irresistible by every mind, susceptible of elevated or refined sentiments.

When we are accustomed to believe, that to be virtuous is simply to refrain from being vicious, we entertain abject notions of virtue, and the duty to obey its precepts seems to us wearisome, insipid, perhaps unmeaning; for frequently we can discern little difference between virtue and vice, except that the latter has allurements, from meeting with indulgence the wants of humanity, which cannot combine with the cold, stately rigour of the former.

To avoid then laying a stumbling block in the way of the young and inexperienced, by giving them of virtue groveling conceptions, which shall exhibit her allurements as being little superior, in character, to those of vice, and far inferior in power, it is of importance that they should be taught, both by precept and by an opportunity to see in society unnumbered examples, exhibiting virtue in her true light, to look on virtue and vice as seated at the two extremities of a long scale, with numberless gradations subsisting between them, the conduct adjusted to which it would be calumnious to call vicious, while it is far from being entitled to be pronounced virtuous. The judgments by which we determine, in any given case, the highest degree of virtuous conduct, should be accounted for by comparisons of the different lines of action which persons, all well intentioned, might pursue in the same circumstances. Never should our expressions convey the opinion that pure, solid virtues occupy a juxta position to gross, palpable vices.

It is well, no doubt, to warn frail man never to think himself so secure in virtue, as that inclinations to some flagitious vice may not surprise him. Such warnings represent virtue as engaged in a conflict with vice, from motives quite different from those under consideration,* and it remains not the less true, that it is

* Those warnings imply that, as far as removed as virtue is from vice, the virtuous man, if he be not on his guard, may slide back into vicious in-

robbing virtue of her grace and dignity, continually to speak of her as having no adversary to contend with, but acknowledged vice. Whereas the enemies immediately surrounding her are inclinations that appear good or innocent, but the indulgence of which would eventually be detrimental to the establishment of her reign in society.(*a*)

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## NOTE TO THE FOURTH CHAPTER.

(*See page* 204.)

(*a*) Lest the meaning of my sentiments respecting the distance which separates virtue and vice should be mistaken, I think it better to subjoin some remarks even at the hazard of being thought prolix.

In maintaining the principle that virtue ought, in general, to be looked on as so far removed from vice, that numberless gradations lie between them, proper to serve as accurate measures of a host of actions of which the best do not deserve the praise due to virtue, nor the worst the censure that ought to stigmatize vice—in maintaining this principle, I would not wish to be understood to inculcate the doctrine, that steadily well-intentioned men do not regulate their line of conduct and all their important actions, by principles of duty. I believe, on the contrary, that every truly respectable person is always guided by such principles, unless when frailty makes him offend against his conscience. But where the uncommon strength and magnanimity of an individual's character lead him to aim at an admirable line of conduct, above the reach of the multitude, he draws from his own heart the law of duty which governs him: though his conscience may upbraid him if he fail in obeying its dictates, the public, in many cases, has no right to do so, unless he has given it reason to confide in his determination to fulfil them, and that it may, in consequence, justly reproach him with inconsistency.

I must also add, that virtues may justly be often ascribed to those who cannot shine by their virtue, considering this word in its most abstract sense. Nay virtue, even taken in this sense, is perhaps susceptible of as many different characters stamping more or less value on it, as there would be varieties to be found in the disposition of individuals, had they all arrived to the highest pitch of perfection, to which their natural constitution renders them capable of attaining.

dulgencies. The opinion, on the contrary, which I am condemning, and which is often, I think, implicitly advanced in society, is that virtue and vice are continually engaged in a direct combat with each other, because they stand closely together as owners of contiguous demesnes.

What I mean then, by advancing that virtue ought to be looked on as far removed from vice, is, that there are many shades of conduct which divert the attention of the individual marked by them, from the care of improving his character, and which have pernicious effects on the order of society, and yet which we cannot—without being cruelly severe—brand with the title of vicious ones. I think too that, in order to keep our notions perfectly clear, we should be carefully taught to make a just comparative estimate of each particular description of virtuous character.

# BOOK V.

SUBJECT.

*ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF TIME, AND ON THE DISTINCTIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OLD AND THE YOUNG.*

## INTRODUCTORY REMARKS.

I shall consecrate this book to maxims and observations, concerning those conditions of human nature, the right management of which chiefly enables us to impose on the spirit of innovation some check, as far as a judicious one can be suggested by considerations exclusively relating to the stronger sex.

The conditions to which I allude are the necessity of employing time, and the distinctive characters usually stamped on the mind of man by youth and advanced years.

I shall begin with the employment of time, and take occasion cursorily to make observations and lay down maxims, concerning the different regular occupations and pastimes of men, with a view to exhibit the moral advantages of which each kind may be productive, and the evils to which, if due precautions be not taken to guard against them, it may give rise.

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## CHAPTER I.

CONTENTS.

### INDUSTRIOUS AND STUDIOUS HABITS.

§ 1.—SERIOUS occupations, of a nature to augment the material comforts of life, when they are assiduously attended to, by a person free to choose with an independent mind his mode of applying to them, prepare him, if he reap from them sufficient fruit, greatly to prize the blessings of a peaceable order, and

in consequence to be repugnant to any change in a state of things which crowns his labours with a reasonable success.

He clings to the tranquil order which he finds established, because his principal thoughts, whether relating to business or enjoyment, flow in a track which implies its existence. He loves to reflect on the method of conducting his business to the most advantage, in the state in which he finds mankind; on the profits which he may hope to draw from it; and on the recreations which they may give him the faculty to procure for himself, to alternate with and relieve his hours of toil.

All the suggestions, therefore, of his heart, which cling to a particular mode of individual existence, adapt him to the station filled by him in the established order of government. He shrinks from the image of any innovation introduced into it, dreading lest it should encroach on his own loved habits and pursuits. The fondness with which he abides by them is such, that he thinks that his affection for them has been inspired to him by nature. He believes that, in supporting the order of things favourable to them, he upholds the one which her voice clearly recommends, and he is so much charmed by it, that it would grieve him to imagine that, even after his death, it should quickly be overthrown.

For these reasons, in a well organized community, employments of the nature above mentioned ought to be widely encouraged; more particularly as the persons engaged in them discharge one of the great tasks imposed by virtue, which consists in vanquishing the love of ease or pleasure, for the sake of applying steadily to some useful, laborious undertaking.

§ 2.—Such employments, sedulously pursued by a large portion of the nation, lay a wide and strong basis for the erection of the temple of virtue, whether individual or national, whose foundations, it is essential to remember, must be fixed in the cares taken to promote temporal happiness. However, these employments, without the use of vigilant caution, may fatally mislead us, by tempting us to lose sight of virtue, in order to toil exclusively for the acquisition of temporal happiness, which they encourage us to look upon as seated in a plentiful flow of worldly prosperity. Their immediate object is to increase our prosperity, and the habit of constantly toiling for

this end, joined to the belief that happiness and prosperity are identical, accustom us to looking with such eagerness towards our immediate object, that we entirely forget that duty presents us an ultimate one towards which we should ever press forward, and that all our plans to assure our prosperity should be subordinate to the hope of daily improving in virtue.

The obligation to consider the duties imposed on us by virtuous principles, as the final end of our laborious exertions, while those exertions force us to keep happiness immediately in view, certainly makes the art of establishing in a nation a good moral government extremely complicated, and causes it to be difficult for legislators to prove, by rendering the people whom they undertake to serve, both virtuous and flourishing, that they are proficients in it.

§ 3.—Employments which immediately look to positive comforts and an easy subsistence, frequently unfit the persons engaged in them for bearing, with courage, any unexpected reverse.

Often, too, they render him so interested, that he would gladly embark in the most unjust wars, and steel his heart to the most urgent claims of humanity, for the sake of seeing his occupations become more lucrative.

Sometimes, they give such an excitement to his love of gain, that the sure profits that regularly result from his labours, appearing to him too scanty, he seeks to augment them without measure, by hardy and, usually, unprincipled speculations, which commonly end in his own ruin, and help to introduce into his country a disastrous, gambling spirit.

§ 4.—Where a man of business preserves respectable, orderly habits, those habits do but attack, indirectly, most of the passions that tempt to vice, which they wear out from not leaving him leisure to attend to them, and by forming him to other tastes. However, the truly virtuous mind does not content itself with thus eluding its wrong propensities; it resists them directly; for it well knows, that if it neglect this, its bounden duty, the same evil propensities will be liable to return and take possession of it at an unguarded moment, or else, other inclinations, equally sinful, will gradually creep into it, and it will become their victim, from having lost, by disuse,

the faculty of vigilantly watching over all its movements, and subjecting them to right principles.

§ 5.—Employments, therefore, of the nature above-mentioned should, in respect to some of the leading members of the community, give place to more liberal studies, in order that these persons may be induced to penetrate themselves with sound, comprehensive principles of virtue, and to spread, by their influence, an attachment to them throughout their country.

The aspiring minds that aim at acquiring such an authority or ascendency, as shall give them a great opportunity to influence the manner of thinking of the public, are particularly called upon to imbue themselves with the justest and most effective principles of virtue.

They are very subject, however, to neglect this duty: either they are principally moved to endeavour to rise to distinction, by the workings of ambition, in which case they are liable to be led astray by the deceitful illusions of that passion, or else, they are chiefly determined ardently to prosecute their studies, by the hope of obtaining an honorable livelihood. When they are actuated by such a motive they, like persons engaged in humbler labours, too commonly regard happiness, rather than virtue, as the end for which they toil. Like them, also, they become too interested, and too feeble, steadily, to repel from their hearts vicious inclinations.

§ 6.—All labours undertaken with regularity and assiduity, in a view to increase our fortune, attain to honours or arrive at excellence in some line that may render us eminently useful, have this in common, that, not only they sharpen our attention, so that we attain such skill in the art or science which we have embraced, as, were our self-love less concerned in the success of our undertakings, we never shonld acquire, but also, where the issue of our labours greatly depends on the judgment of society, our anxiety about them usually teaches us to acquire a very fine discernment, respecting the method of of pleasing it. We, accordingly, learn to discard from our mind presumption and senseless arrogance; we get a habit of nicely proportioning our ends to our means; and continue, daily acquiring a valuable stock of experience. Where the

projects which we pursue place us, as do most ambitious ones, much in contact with the dispositions of our fellow-creatures, we become, in some sort, characters correlative to theirs. Even when we acquire an ascendency over them, or affect to despise them, we do so from perceiving how we can turn to our profit some weakness or defect which we recognize in them.

§ 7.—The address with which most ambitious men conform their sentiments and manners to the disposition of the persons whom it is their interest to please, has too often a baneful effect on their character: they have commonly to flatter a chief spoiled by adulation, and distinguished by those groveling sentiments that emanate from a narrow-minded pride; or else to captivate a multitude of ignorant, hot-headed persons, disposed to admire those who speak to them the language of intemperate passion, and to turn a deaf ear to the voice of enlightened reason.

§ 8.—Men of inflexible virtue, who allow themselves to be moved by ambitious hopes, frequently do not know how so to win the hearts of those, on whom the success of their designs depends, that they may wind them to their purpose. There is something in their character rigid and unbending, which urges them to pursue their course straight forward, without stopping to study the method of insinuating themselves into the spirit of those who have power to place obstacles in their way. When their career is, in consequence, arrested by them, they prefer abandoning it altogether and sheltering themselves in retirement, rather than have recourse to expedients for mollifying and engaging them to remove the impediments that obstruct their passage.

§ 9.—To render the desire to shine by liberal occupations, that invest the persons engaged in them with some degree of authority, salutary to the virtue of those whom it inflames, and to enable those distinguished persons, in consequence of their ascendency over persons employed in inferior occupations, to contribute to elevate the minds of the latter, so that in pursuing happiness they would still aim at fulfilling their duty—to draw these beneficial results from that desire to shine in some liberal department of the system of government which

often animates persons conscious of great mental endowments, it would be necessary;

First—To train those vested with the right to name the successors to the government of those departments, whenever they were vacant, to the exercise of wisdom and discernment in bestowing them.

A wish to conciliate their good opinion should fortify the candidates in a wise and virtuous conduct, instead of tempting them to evil.

Secondly—To encourage persons to aspire to those departments, who would know how to blend the firmness of upright minds, with manners sufficiently soft and flexible to ensure the good will of the judges of their merit, and render virtue amiable, by treating, with becoming deference and indulgence, their opinions and singularities.

The example and influence of persons of this description would incite more unbending, upright minds to endeavour to render their good qualities also available, by studying sufficiently the art of pleasing, not to discourage the rewarders of merit from advancing them according to their deserts.

§ 10.—The mind accustomed to study merely to acquire general knowledge is liable, though from a different motive, to fall into the same error with the men whom either ambition or the necessity to earn a subsistence, bend to laborious occupations. Neglectful to fix its attention on the laws of virtue with a determination to practise them, it seeks happiness as the ultimate end of its pursuits. Men of business do so from being habituated to eye happiness as the direct moral object, towards the attainment of which their labours are directed. Those who study merely to acquire general knowledge have usually no precise object in view. But their indolence, daily fortified by the habit of avoiding severe, laborious tasks, attempers their moral feelings to take pleasure in the idea, that a state of innocence, rather than one of virtue, is the supreme good after which the wise ought to aspire. It is accordingly the one that, as far as unruly passions allow them, they seek to realize. I must remark, however, that their passions are rarely sufficiently tamed by their light occupations, to allow of their displaying in practice such a mild, peaceable disposition as would accord

with their speculative views concerning a happy mode of existence.

Mankind, as it appears, were born to labour, with patience and assiduity, for the attainment of some specific object, and when a stimulus to urge them to do so is wanting, any studies in which, agreeably to pass their time, or becomingly to adorn their mind, they may engage, are not sufficient duly to chastise their thoughts and give them that mild, temperate character which they ought to have, to fit men for the enjoyment of a peaceful, innocent kind of felicity.

§ 11.—Thus it appears, that diligent, studious habits, whether they be acquired from ambitious motives, from interested views, or solely from a desire to pass time honorably and agreeably, constantly render us obnoxious to the temptation to regard temporal happiness as the sole object of our pursuit.*

§ 12.—To induce men to bend their minds to industrious or learned labours, and yet keep their thoughts steadfastly fixed on virtue, as the ultimate aim attracting them, it will be necessary, let me just slightly observe by anticipation, fully to develope the female character, and to give efficacy, in all its bearings, to its influence over the manly one.

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## CHAPTER II.

### SEDENTARY AND ACTIVE EMPLOYMENTS.

I shall at present treat of two principal kinds of employment, namely, those active ones which strengthen the bodily frame, or render it agile, and those sedentary studies which enlarge the views of the mind.

* Employments undertaken from the innate workings of ambition, do not usually immediately regard happiness as their moral object. Their aim is rather to develope the mental grandeur of the individual engaged in them. However, as they point commonly to the gratification of pride and not to the fulfilment of duty, it is needless to distinguish them from the employments undertaken from the other motives mentioned above. They all agree in making us lose sight of virtue, if the establishers of social institutions do not contrive to infuse through them a spirit, that shall induce us to keep our gaze steadily fixed on her.

§ 1.—Relatively to the former kind of employment I have to remark, that the exercises which render the frame robust and active, strengthen also the mind. They make our vital faculties act with vigour: if they do not furnish us with all the sentiments whose developement and right direction constitute virtue, they prepare our mind for producing them in abundance, if it get a suitable cultivation.

In respect to those kinds of magnanimous sentiments which the consciousness of a vigorous organization tends, naturally, to produce, hardy exercises do more than prepare the mind to entertain them, they call them forth in it; not indeed, when they are unassisted by any kind of culture, in that majestical, enlarged form, in which such sentiments ought to appear to be the supports of virtue and the benefactors of the human race. However, they call them forth in a form which, though rude and savage, gives a presentiment of the dignity to which they might attain. Thus, the whole education of the savage tribes of America is directed towards making them hardy and robust, and it appears that, joined to the most revolting inhumanity, they discover a fortitude in bearing with dreadful sufferings; an undaunted firmness in executing perilous enterprises; and a high sense of the grandeur with which it becomes them to act; which, if they existed to even a much less degree in enlightened nations, would render the practice of the most sublime duties easy to them.

These remarks induce me to conclude, that some time habitually devoted among us to robust exercises, might help to prepare us for reaping full benefit from the arts and sciences which lead to civilization.

§ 2.—Robust exercises, being generally pursued in the country, have usually the advantage of forming the habit of taking pleasure in the majestic scenery of nature.

This scenery does not unfold and sharpen the faculties of the mind, by continually varied sensations and observations, as does the intercourse which men hold with one another; but it raises in us the sense of our dignity; it accustoms our sentiments to take a lofty direction; and it spreads through our minds a calm whose salutary influence renders our affections profound and con-

stant, at the same time that it disposes us to like a system of moral order.

§ 3.—As it is merely my intention to contrast sedentary studies with hardy exercises, I shall not distinguish between the different kinds of mental culture which induce the necessity of applying to the former.

What I have said, in favour of those exercises, shews what is my opinion, respecting the disadvantages which attend too great a habit of sedentary study.

By means of it we may acquire all the knowledge requisite for comprehending the grandeur of our destiny, and for perceiving the manner in which we ought to fill it; but the forces of our mind decay, as well as its power to put forth an abundance of noble sentiments, when a fountain of true knowledge darts its prolific rays on it.

It has, by its sedentary studies, placed itself in a position in which the light of science falls most favourably upon it, but, its soil being exhausted, the orb to which it owes its splendour only shines upon a desert, or at most upon a ground which can produce but a sickly harvest.

It knows perfectly how to admire the charms and the beneficial nature of virtue, and is convinced that vice is the greatest of evils.

Its passions also are weaker than if they animated a robust frame: and, in many respects, it is attached to regular, becoming habits.

Yet it is not, on that account, the better able to master its disorderly passions. Though they be weakened, its power to soar above them and to follow, with ardour, the species of good which virtue recommends, is weakened still more.

Each particular passion is greatly strengthened, by the general uneasiness which the languid state of the mind occasions it to feel.

It yields easily to whatever passion assails it, because it is greatly in want of lively and joyous emotions.

§ 4.—To these causes is partly, I believe, to be ascribed a fact generally acknowledged and deplored; which is, that all the just and extensive knowledge for which the present time is

remarkable, and which entitle it to be called the enlightened age, has not produced an improvement in morals, any thing like what would have been expected from it by a learned philosopher, if, in an age sunk in darkness and ignorance, he had foreseen a time when mankind would be as accustomed to contemplate the enlarged views agreeable to right reason, as many of the nations of Europe are at present.

The knowledge which men acquire by laborious studies will, as a general rule, only serve to exhibit to them what is right, without determining them to seek it, so long as they do not take as much pains to fill their minds with the energetic and noble sentiments, which manly exercises rightly pursued would dispose them to entertain, as they do to put themselves in possession of all the lights which can teach them to distinguish their own real good and that of the world.

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## CHAPTER III.

### INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE OF THE ADVANTAGES OF SEDENTARY STUDIES—OBJECT IN MAKING IT.

§ 1.—A question which appears to me important to examine is, whether sedentary studies forward the improvement of the mind, merely in consequence of the knowledge and the views of order which are acquired by them; or whether a great part of the advantages reaped from them does not depend upon their setting in motion the student's own thoughts, and upon the steady exertion of will which they lead him to make, to fix attentively his wandering mind.

§ 2.—It appears to me that it is principally for these two latter reasons, that such studies become necessary towards conducting mankind to their perfection.

As to the knowledge and abilities gained by them, they are often inferior to what entirely illiterate men obtain by their attention to manage well their affairs, and by their observations on the world.

Yet the latter are frequently barbarians, while studious men,

even though they have not near so much sagacity and talents are much oftener peaceably and humanely disposed: the clever self-taught barbarians would probably have been so too, if their knowledge had been the fruit of painful studies to which they had compelled themselves to attend, instead of having been gleaned spontaneously in following the bent of their dispositions.

§ 3.—I make these observations because the species of education which has much prevailed of late years, that of mutual instruction, does not seem to me to keep sufficiently in view all the advantages which ought to result, from opening to the minds of children some access to science.

Previous to modelling, on this plan, the whole of the instruction given to children, it appears to me that their preceptors would do well carefully to examine its results, relatively to the character and talents of the men who have been formed by it.

I should like to train children to vigorous exercises, for the sake of rendering their frames robust, and their minds determined, courageous, and full of the sense of their dignity.

I should wish also to have all children acquire, at least, the first elements of learning; in a great measure for the sake of teaching them to fix steadily their thoughts on the objects which ought to engage them, and to give them a habit of calm and patient application.

The method of communicating knowledge to children much in use at present, instead of uniting the advantages of an active and sedentary education, seems to me to unite their disadvantages; the child no more learns how to captivate his attention, by the force of his over-ruling will, than do those whose time is given up to robust exercises; and the constant mechanical motion in which he is kept, instead of elevating his courage, appears to me more likely to leave him as incapable of vigorous, noble resolutions, as he would probably become, were his hours assiduously and exclusively employed at sedentary occupations.

We have the satisfaction, say the defenders of this system, to prevent, without any severity, all those distractions to which even the most studious children are so liable, and which

were formerly the principal cause of the terribly rigorous treatment, that most school-masters gave to their pupils.

Far am I from wishing to revive the times when children met with such cruel usage, but I would not, therefore, try to prevent the necessity of treating them, sometimes, with rigour, by eluding defects, which I think the children ought to be tanght to correct.

If they cannot correct them entirely; if, in spite of their utmost pains, they have still some distractions, these distractions, if I be not much mistaken, envelope the first shoot of those original thoughts, whose subsequent growth may afterwards make them men of genius or talents.

'Tis often the child's meditations on what he reads, that occasion him these distractions; which it is, no doubt, necessary to check, lest they lead him to waste his time in useless reveries; yet may it, however, be desirable, that he should, to a certain point, indulge them.

'Tis thus, perhaps, that he begins to appropriate to his own use, the knowledge that he gleans from his studies, and to lay in a fund of reflections which he will augment daily, and which, when he has put them into order, and drawn from them luminous principles, may tend to increase, gloriously, the lights which guide the wise to virtue and true happiness.

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## CHAPTER IV.

OF THE INTEREST WHICH MEN TAKE IN THE LITERARY COMPOSITIONS HANDED DOWN TO THEM FROM PAST AGES, COMPARED WITH THAT WHICH ACTUAL EVENTS, AND WRITINGS NEWLY PUBLISHED, EXCITE IN THEM.

§ 1.—Whatever interest studious men may take in the objects of their studies, the world, and even they themselves are disposed to think, that the interest inspired by such objects ought to be subordinate to that resulting from the scenes of active life.

'Tis what mankind is busy about at the moment, which engages, principally, almost every one's attention; 'tis the results

which the works of learned or ingenious authors may have, for the improvement or embellishment of society, which chiefly makes them be observed with interest: every one's curiosity is so excited by these works, at the first instant of their appearance, that it would be in vain that a nation possessed such an abundance of *chefs-d'œuvre* in literature and the arts, transmitted from age to age, that it would seem that every person could find sufficient occupation for his whole life, in studying them; few individuals, even among those of the most correct taste, would consecrate to them half so lively an attention, as what they would bestow on much inferior compositions, which should have just appeared for the first time, in the midst of the scenes wherein they lived, particularly if they were the productions of persons of their acquaintance.

This is certainly a beneficial disposition, which may prevent the world's ever becoming indifferent to the development of the talents that it actually holds in its bosom, because those which once filled it have stocked it, even to satiety, with noble productions.

If there were not always sufficient encouragement given to the cultivation of a people's talents, they would soon sink back into the vices of sloth and apathy, and probably fall again into the darkness of the grossest ignorance.

§ 2.—However, the disposition to pay more attention to the literary works produced at the present moment, than to those handed down from past ages, has, if it be not carefully managed, a very injurious tendency.

Though the *chefs-d'œuvre* of other times be slighted, they are not forgotten nor despised.

They are still held up as a standard which those who emulate the fame of their authors must try to attain, without, however, treading in their footsteps.

To elude the difficulty which is thus presented to men ambitious to shine, in civil life, by an original genius and cultivated mind, they frequently choose another career.

Profiting of the public's love of novelty, they send abroad into the world, compositions calculated to astonish and to give men's minds an entirely new direction, at the expense, per-

haps, of depraving the public taste, or even of sapping the morals of the people.

Sometimes they endeavour to divert their countrymen's attention from those arts and sciences, whose professors, through a long succession of ages, have produced many immortal, inimitable works, to fix it entirely on the public affairs of the moment, the opportunity to handle which, opens a field to their talents where they have little reason to dread their being obscured, by injurious comparisons with those exhibited by departed men of genius.

§ 3.—When many persons of genius choose the political sphere, as one in which they will have to contend with none but living rivals, the public attention is soon, exclusively, drawn to the subject of their contentions.

Literature and the fine arts, then, fall into neglect: the people are, in consequence, in danger of relapsing into barbarity; the more so as such an excessive excitation cannot be communicated to their disposition to take interest in public affairs, without party spirit running so high, that their passions are inflamed, even to a degree of ferocity.

It would therefore be a highly beneficial discovery, to find out the means of abating, in the public mind, the passion for literary novelties; of diminishing, also, in that of authors, the ambition of a glory on which they can only seize by works of a pernicious tendency; and yet, at the same time, of holding out ample encouragement to persons endowed with some literary talents, for assiduously giving them such a developement as may tend to advance civilization, and make the charms and worth of virtue better felt and understood.

§ 4.—Though the duty of attending, with diligence, to some respectable employment be general, it does not follow that we ought always to try to render our labours immediately useful to the world.

It appears to me, that in a populous nation where occupations are judiciously distributed, all the wants of the society, whether material or intellectual, can be supplied by a smaller number of persons than those whom it counts among its members.

This circumstance is too frequently taken advantage of, for

the sake of living in idleness, by those who do not find it necessary to work for their subsistence.

They ought, however, to cultivate a habit of patient application to some well chosen employment, if not to increase their fortune, at least with the intention of improving their character; and they ought to be determined in their choice of it, by the consideration of the most effectual means to unfold their natural talents, and make them subservient to the amelioration of their heart.

Those who are diligent in their calling, without any other view than that of perfecting their character, besides that they hold themselves in readiness to seize every opportunity that may offer of doing good to their fellow-creatures, are constantly, in some sort, the negative benefactors of the world, by abstaining from doing harm in it.

Though the order which presides over the destinies of mankind generally ordains that the good, both physical and moral, of each individual, shall be effected by the concurring cares of a great number of persons, yet, when we distribute, in our mind, to every person an equal portion of these cares, we just obtain the same result as if each individual had been charged, exclusively, with the duty of working out the good of one being, that is, of himself.

Those who can find no way of making their labours useful to the world, and are in no want of them for their own subsistence, are partly situated as if the natural order gave, exclusively, to each individual, the charge of perfecting his own character.

It is true, that they have great obligations to the world, since the toil of others supports them: they ought, therefore, to labour the more assiduously to render that one being committed to their care, so perfect, that he shall always be prepared to serve his fellow-creatures the instant he has the power.

But in the circumstances in which he has it not, he does greatly better to confine the drift of his occupations to the amelioration of his own mind, rather than to try to make them obtain for him the notice of the public, when they cannot do so advantageously.

It may easily happen that the man who lives in obscurity, contenting himself with scanty means of subsistence, and employing the faculties of his mind merely for his own satisfaction, is far more deserving the esteem and confidence of his fellow-citizens, than another who, with much the same talents, pushes himself on to fame and fortune by indefatigable exertions.

I do not make these reflections to justify indolence, nor to excuse the weakness of yielding to an undue bashfulness.

I know that where a man has talents of a scientific or literary kind, he in general does well to produce them in public, particularly if his country be *en arriere* in respect to those mental lights, which at present adorn and civilize so great a part of the world.

Supposing his labours to produce no other good effect, they will contribute to set in motion the minds of his Countrymen, and to inspire them with an emulation tending to accelerate their progress in the path of civilization.

My design is to draw from these reflections the conclusion, that we ought to respect the studious persons of whose labours we see no direct results, when their deportment and conversation give reason to think that they reap from them a love of what's right, a clear knowledge of it, and a vigilance to fulfil all the duties which their usual situation, or accidental circumstances impose on them.

§ 5.—It is the more necessary that studious men, without incurring blame, should be free to lead a life apparently of ease and leisure, because the tranquillity of a mind exempt from ambition, is often necessary for making important discoveries. He who, from natural character, or the situation in which he is placed, thinks it necessary to shine continually in the eyes of the public, is always affected with a sort of inward dazzling, which prevents his distinguishing objects clearly. His principal passion being, not to become acquainted with truths of his own discovery, but to represent notions that he offers as such to the public, in a manner that shall acquire to him praise for his penetration and ingenuity, his judgment is, on that account, warped, and he never examines the objects of his

studies with an attention sufficiently calm to obtain a radical knowledge of them.

Those, on the contrary, who propose to themselves by their studies, no other end than their own solitary improvement and gratification, have their minds entirely captivated by the object towards which they are directed: no extraneous passion divides them. They therefore consider this object, at all moments, with unalterable attention, whence it sometimes arrives that they make at last such discoveries, in respect to it, as it is their duty to communicate to the world. In consequence, without having at first designed it, they become in the end authors, by committing to the public the productions to which their meditations have excited them to give being, and which may, perhaps, render them the lasting benefactors of their species.

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## CHAPTER V.

### THOSE WHO SHINE BY THEIR ABILITY TO ESTIMATE JUSTLY THE CHARACTER OF MEN, ARE TOO APT TO DESPISE LABORIOUS, SEDENTARY STUDIES.

*§ 1.—I have mentioned that every other kind of mental instruction which mankind acquire, occupies, in general, their thoughts less than do their observations and reflections on what is actually passing in the world. The busy scene of life is as the sea into which all the streams of the arts and sciences flow, in order to render it greater and more imposing.

I shall now add that, in consequence, as it is to be presumed, of the instinctive feeling which leads us to look on the living world as the final object of all our pursuits, those who have much penetration in divining the character of men, are liable to have a singularly great confidence in their own abilities. They often disdain to cultivate their talents, thinking that they can do very well without taking so much trouble; and they even look down with a sort of contemptuous pity on those whom they see patiently labouring to overcome the difficulties

* In this description of the dangers resulting from a singular tact to penetrate into our neighbour's character, I allude particularly to the Irish.

of some art or science, imagining it a creeping method, only suited to dull, sluggish minds, of pushing ourselves on in the world, while, as they presumptuously believe, they can, at any time they please, surmount, by one daring flight, all the obstacles to their advancement.

As the organization, which gives them a great facility for penetrating into another's mind, often renders them also in many respects of a quick apprehension, they please themselves with the idea that they could readily become masters of any science to which they would apply. This confidence in their own abilities serves to increase their contempt for patient study.

They are extremely mortified when they find out, at last, that they are less considered in the world than the persons who had laboured assiduously to cultivate their talents: but this discovery is made too late to correct either their pride or habits of idleness. They then retire scornfully into themselves, looking with disdain on all the efforts made by studious persons, to support the arts of civilization or to advance their progress. They constantly ask, with an air of superior wisdom, what is the use of these arts, or, priding themselves in their discernment, they point out the defects which may be found in the works of those who cultivate them, and seem to congratulate themselves on their good sense in not attempting any work that might distinguish them, since it is not given to human nature to produce often *chefs-d'œuvre* entirely above criticism. Frequently to escape the humiliation of seeing persons who, on account of their own honourable labours, respect them less than themselves, they choose idle, dissipated companions, who are glad to encourage them and be encouraged by them, to think highly of those who waste, without profit, all their moments, instead of turning their time with patience and assiduity to the best account possible.

§ 2.—The faculty to penetrate, quickly, into another's mind so as to have considerable ground for judging of his character, is a very dangerous gift, if it be not accompanied with a sound judgment, a steady resolution to try to excel in some kind of honourable labour, and a generous wish to render full justice to our neighbour's merit. Otherwise, the lights which we receive from it to point out the course that we should do well to

follow, are far from sufficient to light the vast and obscure space into which it emboldens us to penetrate: if it increase, in some degree, our ability to find a sure path in the labyrinth of life, it increases, in a far greater proportion, our confidence in our ability; so that, instead of adding to our security, it becomes the cause of our losing, irrevocably, our way.

§ 3.*—The persons who pretend the least to the possession of a tact to find out, by a sort of intuition, the characters of men, can, if they have good sense and that they reflect and observe attentively, get sufficiently acquainted with the world, to perceive what is the conduct by which they may best escape all snares laid for them, and assure to themselves general respect; or, if such be their object, advance their fortune: in fact, there are no persons who succeed better in fulfilling all these objects. If they have little ability to get acquainted with the interior of other men's minds, they have, also, little disposition to study them in any manner that might dissipate their attention from the cultivation of their own talents. 'Tis on that, that their attention usually concentrates itself: 'tis to their talents that they trust, principally, for their success in life. They thus take the surest method of not being disappointed in their hopes, more particularly as they watch, carefully, over themselves, so as never to be betrayed into any action that might expose them to censure, or diminish their consideration.

They have advantages for succeeding well in works of imagination, for, as they never get into habits of vulgar familiarity with the world, and that they observe it closely, the order, the beauty, and the variety which prevail in it, often make a great and faithful impression on them.

§ 4.—The persons endowed with great penetration into men's characters, are liable to form their judgment of them much too hastily. However fine may be our tact to discover what passes in a neighbour's heart, we still have need of a long experience, and the opportunity to see him in a variety of circumstances, in order to become thoroughly acquainted with his character, even when we are accustomed to observe him coolly: but the persons of whom I treat at present, are

* In this paragraph I allude, particularly, to the Scotch.

little disposed to cool observation. Their lively feelings keep their passions constantly awake, and constantly disposed to direct themselves on the society which they may be in: they are at once prepossessed in each of their companions' favour, or filled with animosity against him; whence they judge all his deportment with a prejudiced eye. Convinced that they can read his thoughts, particularly in regard to them, they are liable, either to be angry with him unjustly, from supposing that he does not view them favourably, or else, to leave it in his power readily to make dupes of them, by well disguised flattery. In consequence, determined by their passions in the selection of objects of friendship, they are prone to shun men of integrity, from finding them stiff and inflexible, and to affect the society of those who meditate to do them harm, because they put on the appearance of thinking well and highly of them.

§ 5.—Persons who are disposed, instinctively, to observe with interest, the various characters of mankind, and who have a considerable tact for penetrating into them, appear, when they are left in a state of ignorance, to have, naturally, an extraordinary degree of intelligence. Observers are, therefore, apt to suppose, that they would have had very eminent talents, had they enjoyed the advantage of a good education. In fact, they have, without knowing it, merely in following their instinctive inclinations, given to their principal talent, that for judging of mankind, a very great developement, probably a much greater one than it would have received, had their education obliged them to acquire a habit of steady, abstracted attention. 'Tis persons of this description that I had particularly in view when I observed, in a preceding chapter, that we often see men of the lower classes, who have grown up in ignorance and idleness, and who have, notwithstanding, a fund of knowledge, that would be more than sufficient to make them appreciate the blessings of good order, if it had received a good direction, and been acquired by means of patient, assiduous studies, which had habituated each of them to keeping his mind steadily controled. As it is, their knowledge, in general, only leads them into mischief. They feel themselves gifted with a sort of quick penetration in dealing

with man kind which,—like almost every one, in respect to his peculiar talent,—they take pleasure in exercising.

They do so accordingly, and in the most obvious manner that offers itself to their mind, namely, by trying to dupe every one with whom they have any affair to settle, in particular by plotting against their superiors.

Nor is it alone in the completely illiterate that the faculty to observe the world with a very discerning eye becomes dangerous. Those in whom this faculty prevails are often, when they have got a smattering of literary knowledge, disposed to make a very bad use of it: they look on it as nothing but a weapon by means of which they may succeed better in the warfare, that they carry on against the order established in the society.

§ 6.—To conclude, it is peculiarly necessary to train to habits of industry, and to inspire with peaceable, refined tastes, any people whose principal national characteristic consists in a singular propensity to study mankind, and the ability to do it with remarkable shrewdness.

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## CHAPTER VI.

### RECREATIONS.

§ 1.—Laborious pursuits ought to be succeeded by hours of recreation and enjoyment. Such hours are commonly their recompense, and should we, by a wrong combination of things, find ourselves defrauded of them, we should no longer have any sufficient inducement to go through our tasks. If those who live by the labour of their hands cannot procure to themselves the means of replacing it sometimes by domestic or social pleasures, they are discouraged and apply to it but languidly. Even men in affluent circumstances, whose means of existence do not depend on their occupations, find it necessary often to relax their minds by innocent amusements.

Were persons, diligent in their callings, to afford themselves no leisure for chearful pastimes, it is greatly to be feared that they would lose sight of the true order of nature, in which in-

nocent and social pleasures have a certain share. The zeal with which they would attend to their occupations would usually be fed by covetous motives, such as too greedy a desire of gain or of worldly honours.

Nor would even the most laudable employments, without the aid of well-chosen recreations, probably succeed in raising our minds to a high pitch of virtuous refinement, or at least of long preserving them at it. 'Tis at the moments of tasting elegant pleasures, subordinate to virtuous principles, that we most feel the charms of that true happiness which virtue seeks to promote.

Our amusements are generally in harmony with our occupations. The individuals who employ themselves in their hours of business in a manner tending to elevate their minds, manifest also, in their choice of recreations, a taste more refined than that of the vulgar.

§ 2.—Well chosen recreations do not, so frequently as employments undertaken to promote our worldly interest, withdraw our thoughts from the consideration of virtue, to fix them entirely on the hopes of obtaining happiness: when we give ourselves up to a sense of calm enjoyment, our minds are freer than when we meditate on the toilsome affairs that occupy our busy hours, to consult the nature of their own sentiments and to ascertain, from the examination of them, that our supreme good lies in getting acquainted with and obeying the requisitions of virtue.

It must, however, be allowed that, when we seek to recreate ourselves from laborious business, we are too often in such a hurry to enjoy as to be tempted to bound our views to happiness, from weakly imagining, that our sovereign good lies in the possession of it. We should, therefore, be on our guard against such a fondness for recreations, as that we should be tempted to prefer them to a rigorous discharge of our duty, at those moments when we might have to undergo some of the severe trials to which virtue is not unfrequently put, in order that, by the exertions which a temporary separation from happiness cost her, she may become more worthy to be at last indissolubly united to it.

## CHAPTER VII.

### ALMS-GIVING, OR CHARITY TO THE AFFLICTED.

§ 1.—A portion of their cares, and, where it is reasonably practicable, of their time, is usually bestowed, by conscientious persons, on comforting and relieving the afflicted and needy.

A regular fulfilment, from principle, of these charitable offices has, in addition to its other advantageous effects on our character, that of contributing to keep lively within us, the sense of being bound to live for the discharge of our duty, rather than for the research of happiness.

It reminds us, continually, of the claims which social love has on our heart, whereas, attention to business and habits of recreation, have a tendency to absorb us in self-love, comprising, among the objects of this affection, those members of the family circle with whose interests we consider ours identified.

§ 2.—We are, however, to guard against the illusion of supposing that, by assigning a certain portion of our goods to the use of the poor, we pay a sort of tribute to our Creator, which gains for us the tacit permission to live, in other respects, as best suits our interest or promotes our pleasure.

A compassionate attention to the unhappy, is not one of the radical duties imposed by social love on a virtuous character. It is, no doubt, the duty that perfects it, by investing it with a beautiful verdure, of which were it deprived, it would wither and consume away. But the radical social duty which gives strength and support to virtue, consists in holding ourselves exempt from envious dispositions; in other words, it lies in justice and generosity towards competitors. Feelings of compassion for the unfortunate are far from engaging us to exercise ourselves in the habit of cultivating this duty. The objects of our pity are seldom those who excite in us jealous sentiments of rivality. Persons greatly inclined to nourish in their breast envious, malevolent passions, are sometimes remarkably prompt to succour the distressed, from pride in

occupying the superior situation belonging to a benefactor, and from liking to flatter themselves that their disposition is a singularly kind one.

There are persons, too, who think that they are exceedingly charitable because they constantly mourn with the afflicted; and who render the strong sensations excited by the view of misery, too necessary to them. Did they really love their neighbour as much as they imagine, they would rejoice if the means were found to improve the condition of mankind in such a manner, that there were no longer a single unhappy person. But, on the contrary, the view of universal happiness would weary them, since they would pine from want of an opportunity to be affected by a lively sentiment of compassion.

Separated from a steady habit of being just and kind to rivals, the wish to succour the unfortunate is one that may easily warm a mind which is neither noble nor generous: nor is it any where more exercised than in countries whose inhabitants are in a miserable state of degradation.

To exhibit then a compassionate sensibility as deserving to rank high among the qualities that ennoble the human mind, laborious men, engaged by their occupations in continual emulations and strifes, which they still conduct with magnanimity, should show that a humane anxiety, to lighten to the utmost the miseries to which mankind are subject, influences their actions in their relations with their suffering fellow-creatures, not less than does a disinterested brotherly love regulate their contentions with eager competitors.

§ 3.—Those who contribute to the advancement of mankind in the path of civilization are usually inspirited by the contemplation of a positive good, affecting self-love, to contend with the rivals who strive also to attain it.

Charitable minded persons are moved by social love, and, in doing good offices to the unhappy, they seldom have rivals to contend with, for a spirit of rivality mostly takes its rise in self-love. They usually contemplate a negative good, or the diminution of misery, and on that account, as well as from their system of conduct being too tame to discipline haughty, jealous passions, they do not, where they are exclusively moved by

the desire to relieve the unhappy, assist in pushing the world forward to a higher state of either virtue or prosperity. On the contrary, they retard its progress towards perfection, for, encouraging the idle to abuse their goodness, they extinguish in many bosoms, the desire to live independent by honest exertions. This desire should be felt by every member of a virtuous community, though all may not have it in their power to act accordingly.

It is then desirable to multiply, to the utmost, the number of persons who labour assiduously to gain an independent existence, and who, in consequence, are often forced to vie with rivals engaged in similar pursuits. Hence it follows that it is also desirable to diminish, in the same proportion, the number of individuals who do not obtain, by their honest exertions, a decent maintenance.

§ 4.—In a defectively organized society, where the poor are frequently trained to bad habits and corrupted by the example of the rich: where commerce too is in such a languishing state, that often the wealth of the latter cannot pass, otherwise than by alms-giving, to the use of the former, it would be the height of cruelty and injustice for the opulent to turn usually a deaf ear to the supplications of persons, reduced to extreme indigence, by their own misconduct; or to refuse gratuitous assistance to the needy whom they see endued with ample inherent powers to earn a livelihood. But in a perfectly organized community, the most charitable minded would very commonly, for the good of society and even for that of the objects of their severity, be bound to treat, with a stern rigour, those of their suffering fellow-creatures, who were comprised in either of the above-mentioned catagories. Opportunities to do good by alms-giving would, in consequence, be greatly diminished.

However, the consecration, by persons in easy circumstances, of some portion of their substance, and, where imperious duties do not render it impracticable, of their time, to the relief of suffering humanity, is enjoined them as a sacred obligation, nor can they omit to discharge it, even from want of opportunity, without being in danger of growing selfish and hard-hearted. On that account, it appears to me, that, in a thoroughly well constituted society, every individual ought

to be laden with his full share of the duty of affording relief to the necessarily helpless and indigent. No one generation should be allowed to interfere with the charitable works that properly belong to the succeeding one. The governors of the nation should, therefore, consider well, before they suffered the foundation of any institution intended to stand in lieu of private generosity and kindness, which was not established for the benefit;

First—Of persons who have an immediate claim to the gratitude of the nation.

Secondly—Of objects bowed under some affliction to which relief can better be administered, in houses in which many patients are collected, than it could be in private families.

Thirdly—Of helpless beings, in the disposal of whom their friends and family, were they left a burden on them, would be tempted, even by tender affection, to commit an error injurious to the social order.

Excepting relatively to the objects placed in one of these three predicaments, the government who would allow an individual to perpetuate a charitable foundation beyond his own life and that of the identical beings whom he had received into it, would, I think, either give to charitable deeds too wide a scope and thus aid the degradation of the people, by encouraging them to a slothful dependence on the bounty of benefactors, or else it would render the rich egotistical and hard hearted, by lightening them of the trouble of taking care of those who, in the ordinary course of things, ought to be a burden to them.*

§ 5.—It may be advanced, in favour of the charitable institutions which appear to me injudicious, that the unfortunate objects whom a humane disposition would most wish to relieve, and who deserve that it should be done with delicacy, are those whose high spirit recoils with horror from the idea of having important obligations to a capricious, perhaps arrogant private benefactor, and who would more enjoy a sentiment of inde-

* If, in the countries where parents can rid themselves of the charge of a numerous family, by placing many of their children in convents, they become often insensible to the strongest of all natural affections, what must be the consequence of allowing men easily to disencumber themselves of objects, less nearly related to them, but whom they are bound to take care of?

pendence, were they placed under the protection of a regular, and permanent charitable institution. But I own that the pride which makes utterly helpless, forlorn beings take pleasure in the thought of being independent, appears to me displaced and to foster it in them is doing them an injury. The virtue of mortals is intended to be partly called into exercise by means of the assembling together of the rich and poor, the fortunate and unfortunate, and of the fulfilment, by each class, of the part assigned to it. If it is the duty of the fortunate to help others without arrogance or ostentation, it is the duty of those who require assistance to receive it with meekness and gratitude.

Among people distinguished by the purest and most simple morals, an individual forced, by infirmities or inevitable misfortunes, into a state of dependence, may certainly chance to have his hard lot dreadfully embittered to him by unfeeling protectors. In that case, he is particularly called upon to exercise the virtues of patience and resignation. In all situations of life it is to be expected, that there will ever be some persons whose unmerited misfortunes prove that this world is a place of trial.

I do not believe, however, that in an industrious nation, whose morals were in general good, persons deserving compassion would often be treated unkindly. If those whose duty it would be to take care of them, refused to hearken to their claims on their pious tenderness, there would usually others be found to supply their place. Judging from what I have been able to observe, I am convinced, that uncorrupted minds are generally inclined to succour those who cannot help themselves. In states advanced in the arts of civilization, men often learn to appear more hard-hearted than they really are, because so many persons who like to depend on others rather than help themselves, or control the passions which lead them to ruin, are continually on the watch to find benevolent minds whom they may dupe by false pretences.

## CHAPTER VIII.

### OLD AGE AND YOUTH.

§ 1.—To enter into the order of nature, we must learn evenly to balance, in our bosoms, opposing sentiments.

That this is the method which she requires us to pursue, is particularly remarkable in regard to two contrary sentiments, of which the one tells us that we are confided principally to our own care, and that, by our vigorous exertions, we ought to make ourselves independent of all mankind; while the other bids us trust to the men of principle, who take interest in us, with as full a confidence as what we place in our self-love, in their determination to serve us, if we do not merit to forfeit their favour.

Nature has admirably prepared youths to feel that they ought to cultivate both these sentiments. She has given them a buoyant confidence in their own powers exciting them to push on hardily and independently through life; at the same time, she has disposed them to trust implicitly to the affection and sentiments of justice of the aged friends on whom they are usually dependent.

To make them particularly inclined to do so, she ordains that, before they are grown to manhood, they shall have had opportunity to acquire a long experience of their being faithful, anxious guardians to them. The sentiments of respectful confidence, with which they, in consequence, look up to them, tend—from the expansive nature of filial tenderness—to make them affectionately venerate the old in general.

§ 2.—Where men are not trained to be individually the guardians of their own personal rights, and to determine to use all their efforts to put themselves in the enjoyment of an isolated independence, the nation becomes readily the prey of an abject despotism, which has it in its power totally to enslave it.

On the other hand, where the haughty spirit, urging each individual to prove himself the powerful protector of his own rights, is not mellowed by being blended with a full confidence

in the good sentiments of the friendly and well principled, the whole social fabric is ready to fall to ruin, for the love of a noble and refined moral order is not stamped in the heart of the members of the nation. Each individual concentres himself in selfish inclinations, since the belief is universally adopted that self-love is the only spring to give activity to the human mind. Conventions are, indeed, entered into, binding every one to respect his neighbour's rights that his own may be respected also, but the laws of this cold, calculating policy are constantly forgotten amidst the tumultuous uprears occasioned by uncontroled selfish pretensions. Human nature seems, in this case, to the observing eye, to be morally dwindled. Though man appears truly great when a consciousness of his own dignity impels him to make, with firmness, some highly painful sacrifice to just and honourable principles, or to undertake a hardy, perilous enterprise in the service of a fellow-creature, yet does he appear little and contemptible, when the sole end of his unceasing exertions is evidently his own individual prosperity. When self-love thus reigns unbounded over all the members of a community, their punctilious irascibility, in resenting any imagined personal insult, only serves to betray their mean opinion of themselves; for it seems to us that men, conscious of deserving respect, would not let their thoughts revert much on the attentions personally due to them, and that they would be slow in attributing, even to their enemies, a design to offend them. Self-love, by becoming the sole, efficient principle to operate on the conduct of every member of the community, gives to the whole assembly of them the appearance of a contentious and disorderly mob, such vulgar and turbulent passions does it stir up in it.

At last the people themselves, wearied of their senseless pride, so different from a magnanimous consciousness of inherent greatness, and tormented by all the evils introduced among them by the selfishness of every member of the social corps, are glad to take refuge under the protection of one supreme chief, whom they willingly invest with despotic power, believing that, since they are not sufficiently capable to attach themselves to the blessings of a good social order, nothing but

the strong arm of force can render them peaceable and tolerably happy.

To avoid these two extremes, both tending to slavery and oppression, it is necessary that youth should learn vigorously to exert its own powers, in struggling for independence and in maintaining its rights; and that it should also learn affectionately to venerate old age from looking with deference to its wisdom, and from feeling a confidence in its disinterested tenderness.

Never will men acquire the disposition to place that rational and noble trust in the integrity, the understanding, and the social love of the virtuous, enlightened members of society, which must be unfolded in them ere they can be fit to live under the rule of a fine system of social order; if they be not early accustomed to look up to their parents and guardians, with a confiding belief that their experience and affection render them eligible guides for them. Nor will they venerate these guides as they should, if they do not, in general, survey the persons belonging to the same generation as their fathers, with a certain degree of tenderness and respect. Such is the expansive nature of filial sentiments, that, where they do not flow in an unconfined manner, spreading light and warmth throughout the whole of the region adapted to feel their vivifying influence, they are liable to be extinguished entirely, so as not to burn in the focus in which their heat should be intensely concentrated.

The kind, respectful sentiments which well trained youth is inclined to feel for persons of ripened years, present the first opening prepared by nature to give tutors an opportunity of infusing into the hearts of their pupils a love of order, founded in the idea that human nature is formed for virtue and for the firm exercise of a sublime social love. This opening is capable of being dilated so that, by means of the principles imbibed through it, by far the greater number of men shall prove themselves magnanimous and worthy of confidence in their dealings with one another.

We need only consult our own feelings to be convinced, that wherever there is not a general disposition to look up with tender veneration to persons far our superiors in years, mankind must appear too much like a contentious rabble, occupied about their own individual or party interest.

§ 3.—'Tis in vain to think of placing old age in the high rank which good order requires it to fill, if it be not capable of deserving to be the object of the sentiments which youth should entertain for it; that is, if nature have not given it a propensity to tender, disinterested affections, and if it have not understanding to make so good a use of its experience, as that youth may acquire wisdom in studying its example and listening to its counsels. If the old be not gifted with an understanding sufficiently good and enlarged, to render their experience useful to mankind, it would avail little that they should, by their amiable qualities, gain the affection of the young. They would not acquire such an influence over them as would calm their fiery passions, and make the love of a virtuous and happy social order sink deep into their minds.

§ 4.—As to the first of these necessary attributes of the old, namely, a propensity to tender, disinterested affections, it appears to me, that they are very sufficiently endued with it, though I own, that this belief is in contradiction to the opinion commonly entertained of them, which accuses them of being prone to selfishness and avarice. That where a man enters, in youth, a wrong career, he may advance further and further in it, and, in consequence, become singularly depraved in his latter years, I do not deny. Avarice and many kinds of selfishness, are particularly vices which may strengthen in old age, because they are not of too violent or boisterous a nature to keep pace with the dilatory movements of the mind and frame at that period of life. However, I believe, that most of the complaints, touching the selfishness of the old, proceed from their not corresponding, as they should, to those secret feelings, which warn us of its being the duty of men to become more disinterested as they advance in life, rather than from their being positively more absorbed in selfish inclinations than they were in their youth. That the tender affections of persons somewhat advanced in life can, on the contrary, more be counted on than those of youth, almost every one occasionally recognises, since there are few who do not expect that middle-aged men will behave with more indulgent tenderness as husbands and fathers, than very young ones, and who would

not sooner see them placed in public stations conferring authority, from believing them less likely arrogantly to abuse it.*

Elderly men sometimes appear to be peculiarly selfish, because the persons whose youth is passing away, are too often not prepared, gradually, to undergo a change, which should render them less moved by self-love and more by social. The selfish vices which the obsequious attention of those around them, and their own pampered appetites engendered in them, still cling to their affections, and when, at last, they are descended into the vale of years, the consciousness that these vices can no longer find favour in the eyes of the world, answers, unhappily, no other purpose than to irritate and mortify them. If they have power they determine to use it to oblige their dependents to fly to anticipate their wishes, with as much zeal, as formerly prompted the persons who, captivated by their youthful attractions, had been most assiduous to please them.

Once embarked in this wrong course, they naturally go further and further in it; for, after having exacted attentions with authority, they can no longer obtain them from affection. Yet, in exerting authority to ensure the continuance of them, they are still miserable, from being well aware that the spurious coin of forced good offices, was not what they had received in the joyous days of youth, when every one appeared solicitous to make them happy. They accordingly grow fretful, vent their ill humour on their dependents, augment, by so doing, their fear of them, and with it their own misery.

They are further tormented by a secret consciousness of having taken a false direction: their own feelings tell them, that more disinterested affections would better become their age; but, having once attached themselves to the enjoyment of superior power, as what can best procure them a compensation for the lost pleasures of youth, they have not courage to part

* I have frequently, in France, heard of elderly ladies who were astonished themselves, believing that they must be exceptions to a general rule, because, as they advanced in life, they became more sensible to the pleasure of living in the midst of a little circle of near friends, the wish to add to whose happiness absorbed all their cares relative to this world. I think, that where the minds of elderly persons have not, in their youth, received a very false bias, a similar change commonly takes place in their disposition.

with it, dreading, did they renounce it, to be entirely helpless and abandoned.

When they begin to sink under the infirmities of old age, they find that they stand as much in need of the assistance of tender friends, as they did in early childhood; but alas! how differently are they circumstanced! In childhood every thing that troubled them seemed, still more, to trouble their alarmed friends; in age, no one administers to their wants, but with distaste and by compulsion.

Disheartening, indeed, is the view which an old age, thus sunk in misery and selfishness, offers of the final term of man's earthly career. Yet the vices which render it hideous, much seldomer are caused by the inherent defects of that period of life, than by the mismanagement and misconduct of the young.

Youth is naturally greatly occupied with itself: nor is this, to a certain degree, any vice, since it is in the true order of nature. However, its habit of seeing itself the continual object of friends' solicitude; its unceasing projects for its amusements, employments, or future destiny in the world; readily tempt it to indulge in a vicious selfishness, which, if allowed to take root in it, will, in the sequel, disgust by its monstrous deformity. This danger is too commonly overlooked, for the charms of youth, which so evidently mark it to be the age of enjoyment, make elder persons delight in gratifying it, while the selfishness that, by an injudicious complaisance, they often inspire to it, is concealed from them; because youth, in openness of heart, and an ardent love of action, flies, usually, to serve a friend, with an eager impetuosity that appears very interesting; although the impartial, calm observer can perceive, that the share which social love has in these sudden, unequal transports,—frequently to the full as much dictated by pride or joyous spirits, as by benevolence,—is small, in comparison with its influence on the conduct of many an elderly person, the even tenor of whose actions, though seldom affected by impetuous starts of emotion, is constantly directed to promote the welfare of one or more beloved objects.

The old, as is generally supposed, find a consolation in resigning themselves to the passion which is said to be peculiar

to their time of life, that is, the passion to count over their hoards of wealth. But I own that I have reason to think, that a disposition to amass riches is originated so rarely by old age, that those who note avarice as a passion to which the old are peculiarly liable, do not give a just notion of the moral characteristics which commonly distinguish the latter periods of life.

Some old persons are accused of being avaricious because they discover jealousy and reluctance in parting with any portion of their riches to their children or natural heirs. But, however blameable they may be, an accurate survey of their proceedings must acquit them of avarice, since they lavish the whole of their revenues on artful favourites, whose interest they think, engages them to prolong, by their cares, their existence to the utmost.

Some old men, in possession of lucrative posts which they cannot bequeath to their families, appear avaricious, because they allow greedy relations to transact their affairs, and to seize the opportunity of enriching themselves, by increasing with avidity their emoluments and appropriating them to their own use.

Having subtracted from the number of elderly persons, accounted avaricious, those who may be found in either of the foregoing categories, I believe it will be perceived that there remains of them but very few, in whom the vice of avarice either originated or received increase in the decline of life. A sudden change of fortune, whether from prosperity to adversity or the contrary, will often convert an apparently liberal man into an avaricious one; but such a metamorphosis occurs as commonly ere youth is yet fled as at a later age. The old are peculiarly subject to cold, distrustful apprehensions, which sometimes suggest to them, in their dealings with mankind, excessive precautions, and which also make them look forward with groundless alarms, to events yet hidden among the shades of futurity. But it very rarely, I believe, happens, that their fears respecting the evils that may oppress them in their latter days, determine them to shelter themselves from the danger of being exposed, ere they die, to the horrors of a state of penury, by laying by all the treasures which an abject parsimony can enable them to accumulate. The fears which are liable to as-

sail the old are of a kind, indicating it to be the intention of nature, that persons passing through the vale of years shall sit loose to worldly interests. Whether or no they fulfil their destination, in preparing themselves to enter on a better life, nature makes them recollect, by the fears with which she fills them, that every hope which would tempt them to trust to their power of building for themselves, on earth, a secure barrier against misfortune, might prove vain and deceitful. If they be, though in easy circumstances, troubled by the fear of poverty, they also think with terror of the dangers to which the suspicion that they were hoarding might expose them. They recognise, therefore, their want of ability to prevent their riches from making to themselves wings and fleeing away. To escape from being tormented by the dread of not being able to guard against all the evils, one or other of which, it appears to them, threatens to overwhelm them, the course which they commonly take is to trust themselves and their affairs to the guardianship of some one better enabled, as they fondly hope, by the vigour and activity of his character, to secure them against exposure to any trial of adversity. The individuals whom old men, preyed on by a timid foresight, mostly entrust with the care of their persons and concerns, are wives, housekeepers and stewards.

As far as my knowledge goes, no peculiar passion intent on the acquisition of some positive worldly good, such as riches, can justly be attributed to old age. Instead of having a new passion of its own, it is liable to re-assume, by the intervention of memory, those that in reality are long gone past, so that it appears in mind as well as frame the wreck of what existed in former times. The passions, the reminiscences of which revive in the old, are not even the ambitious desires which might have engrossed them at a middle age: their memory, in every respect flies back to what interested them in the hey-day of youth, and is liable, in consequence, to stir up passions in them which appear very displaced indeed. This natural disposition, when proper precautions are taken wisely to temper it, has very great advantages, for it prevents the mind of aged persons from becoming jejune and contracted, by enabling them tenderly to sympathise in the ardent transports of youth, and by

awakening their imagination with sufficient vivacity for them still to view the world with a chearful, benevolent interest. It also renders them an ornament to society, sweetly harmonizing with the rest of it, by making them feel it incumbent on them not to cast aside that lovely modesty of deportment which became them in their youth—though they may mingle through it a graver dignity—and which is the expression of a mind, meekly determined to keep itself armed against the invasion of licentious wishes.

Any knowledge that I have been able to glean, concerning the march from youth to age, of the human mind, does not sanction my adoption of the principle which we so commonly hear proclaimed as a moral dogma, that every period of life has its distinct passions; that the love of pleasure impels youth, while ambition sways men of mature years, and the old comfort themselves by counting their treasures.

This discouraging doctrine teaches us to assume, as a fact, that men are inclined, by the laws of their nature, to lay down one folly or vice merely to take up another. Such a belief checks, in the young, the growth of the noble sentiments which should set orderly bounds to their love of pleasure, by inspiring them with a magnanimous resolution to aim continually at mounting more and more in virtue. It becomes, in consequence, itself the cause of its being, in some degree, justified by facts. The youth imbued with it lays his account to pursue what are looked on as the pleasures of his age, as long as his appetite for them is keenly whetted, and when it begins to be palled then to turn from them to the pursuits of ambition.

It appears to me that in general, from the time of a youth's full arrival at manhood, all the passions which in future life are to govern him have already ample place in his bosom. The supposition that he is not then warmed by stroug ambitious hopes, because he is addicted to pleasure is, I think, just as erroneous as would be the assertion, that two ranks of a military corps, ranged in battle array, did not belong to the same army, because the general had decided that the one should not advance to the engagement till the other had retired from it. The young man's own volition keeps unemployed, in his breast,

the passions that he does not intend to call into action till his thirst for pleasure begins to subside. An unforeseen deterioration or amelioration may certainly, in the sequel, take place in his disposition—particularly if he be placed in unexpected circumstances—but, as a general rule, the whole character which a man is to exhibit at different stages of his existence, is clearly distinguishable in his youth. All the change which mature years operate in him is to teach him to modify, and practically regulate the passions which he had early conceived, not to inspire to him a new one. I venture to say that youths are so far from being less prone to indulge ambitious hopes than middle aged men, that twenty of the former are buoyed up with them for one that is of the latter.

Two causes serve, particularly, to make middle-aged men renounce or moderate the ambitious thoughts by which they had once been dazzled.

First—Those flowery vales of pleasure in which presumptuous youths think that they may, for some time, amuse themselves, before they enter on the arduous career that ambition points out to them, sometimes fascinate them till they want resolution to quit them: they therefore linger in them, ingloriously, till it be too late to apply to the toils by which they had once hoped to obtain, in time, ambition's prizes.

Secondly—Experience convinces them of the flattery of the hopes, that they had entertained, of being able to vanquish all obstacles to the success of their projects. Mortifying and hopeless disappointments make them, at last, weary of the undertaking, by which they had once sought to clear their way to the pinnacle of fortune or renown. Their knowledge of the world has even so abated their esteem for it, that they think its honours not worth contending for. Thenceforth the ideas of a peaceful competence, a little circle of friends, and a lovely retreat have more attractions for them.

When a man who has misspent his youth, forsakes afterwards his evil ways, if he have undergone a reform of character truly deserving of that name, it has not merely been effected by a detachment from vices which decaying nature no longer relishes, but by good resolutions that providential circumstances or reflections have inspired. So sincere is his repentance, that

it would have made him turn to a virtuous course in the ardour of youth, had he, at that period, been under its influence; and he must ever regret having suffered it to elapse without his having demonstrated to himself the strength of his good resolutions, by constant victories gained over the internal foes whom he would then have had to combat.

When a middle-aged man degenerates from what he was in the bloom of youth, it is not because he has less strength to resist the passions which are supposed to assail that period of life, than those which besiege the young. It is true, that very brilliant gratifications offered to the passion of ambition commonly pervert the principles of the middle-aged, and so they would—more infallibly too—those of youth. But much oftener, when a middle-aged man becomes less estimable than he had been in the early part of manhood, the reason is that, less on his guard, or urged by affliction or infirmity to seek some temporary solace to his weakness, he falls into the indulgence of passions or appetites, generally considered to present at least, as much inherent force of temptation in youth as at any time of life. Sometimes he finds relief from the *tedium* of existence in intemperance, but oftener do the charms of some wily fair one lead him to forget the care of his reputation and the respect which he owes to himself. In fact, what both the one and the other sex have, it seems to me, most to guard against, at all stages of their mortal course, is the danger of being surprised into weakness by the seductions of a misplaced love.

The doctrine which teaches that man, in his progress through life, is destined to move in a circle of vices and follies is so much the more pernicious to the youthful mind, that those who inculcate it spread a seductive varnish on the disorderly propensities of youth, making them appear as vices entitled to peculiar sympathy on the part of the benevolent, from being engendered by far more generous, guileless feelings than those which govern the men who, later in life, addict themselves to the passions at that period seasonable. Whereas, the vices of an advanced age are usually the consequences of an ill-spent youth, by which the heart has been early withered and its good qualities nipped in the bud. Nothwithstanding this fact, credulous youths are taught to believe, by the praises bestowed

on the ingenuousness of their age, that they have already reached that at which nature decrees that the moral character shall be at its highest point of excellence; so that the changes, which it must in process of time undergo, can only serve to make it more and more decline. Such a doctrine must infallibly tend to introduce into society vice and disorder. Youths cannot become reconciled to it without forcibly dissipating their thoughts from futurity, and determining to live solely for the enjoyments of the present moment, for enjoyments that are constantly selfish, frivolous and licentious, when they exclusively engage the attention.

It is not possible to engage a young man to hearken to the dispiriting compliment which praises what he is, at the expense of what he looks forward to becoming, without rendering his internal sensations cheerless and depressing. The idea of what he shall be, at a more advanced period of existence, ought naturally to present itself to him in an exhilarating form, to animate him with glowing hopes. Scarcely are the young beyond childhood, when they begin to be alarmed at the rapid flight of their youth, and to look with anxiety to the years during which they will probably survive it. And well may they reflect, with deep emotion, on the short interval that must ensue, before their ripened years shall demand, that they be occupied with grave and important cares; for, by a wise provision of nature, at their arrival at those early years of manhood, when an independent spirit and the fiery passions of youth, urge them to scorn the admonitions of the wise, their memory can already look back on a long and interesting vista, formed by a charming portion of their life, that is past never to return. The experience of the evanescent nature of the joys of childhood and adolescence, with which young men come forth, as it is called, into the world, ready provided, is not lost on them. Many are the moments at which it disposes them to sigh over the fleeting nature of all earthly pleasures, and greatly then are they disposed to listen, with satisfaction, to those who give them a cheering prospect of old age; who assure them that, if they make a wise use of the advantages of youth while they possess them, they shall lay by in their memory, to console their decline, the most soothing enjoyments, and increase in moral

worth and respectability to the latest term, at which the infirmities of age shall leave unclouded the powers of their understanding.

§ 5.—To animate young men to virtuous exertions, by the hope of continually rising in the scale of moral excellence, it would not be necessary to teach them that old age has, in every respect, the superiority over youth. On the contrary, it would be right to advise them to look on their own period of life with awe and reverence, as the one at which man is most called on to display, in baffling his passions and undergoing hardships in a good cause, that intense energy of mind which must, we have reason to think, be developed throughout the moral universe, wherever the order destined at last to reign every where in it, is carried to perfection. Nature, it might be observed, by giving so much energetic activity to youths and by subjecting them to the duty of exerting it, has made known to us that the moral order of virtue requires the mind, fully in accordance with it, to be intensely vivacious and powerful. However, as this is but the first state wherein we receive an education preparing us for practising virtue and enjoying true happiness, it does not appear that in it every branch of our education is carried to its full perfection.

As we recede from youth, which would be the state of human perfection, were it accompanied with the moderation, experience and wisdom which characterize a virtuous, enlightened old age, our passions weaken, and, in consequence, we cannot display the same energetic vigour in subduing them. Before we are called again to a state of existence, burning, within the bounds of good order, with such an active flame of life, as that which distinguishes a well spent youth, we may presume that it will be necessary for youth to be restored to us in a future world. Such a provision seems further necessary to us—as I have already remarked in a former chapter—in order to enable us to enjoy the plenitude of happiness promised by virtue to her followers. However, if we go through the severe trials appointed to youth in this world, with unfaltering resolution—or, where we fail, effectually repent—if we further, in our progress through life, never relax in our vigilance to resist the temptations which still beset us, we may humbly hope that,

though our renovated youth, in a future state, shall enable our love of virtne to burn intensely through moral faculties in the highest state of excitation, yet that our virtuous sentiments shall ever remain thus ardently awake in our minds, without its being necessary, for their maintenance in intense activity, that the fiery temptations which surround the youth of man should again assail us. We may hope that the calm respite from temptation that men grown old in the way of righteousness in a great degree enjoy, is only an imperfect foretaste of that blessed repose which—from having no inclinations that war with the love of virtue—we shall permanently taste in another life, if we steadily surmount in this every temptation to forsake her paths. Here, indeed, the progress which the aged, exercised from their youth up in a salutary self-control, make in the enjoyment of a virtuous repose, is gained at the expense of some vital heat and energy. Yet may we justly hope that a kind Providence—who inflicts no unnecessary sufferings on its creatures, who purposes to promote their advancement in virtue and true happiness—will not deprive the righteous, in a future state, of that truly glorious repose which, by constantly, at all ages, baffling temptation, they may have gained here. On the contrary, we may indulge a well founded trust that it will unspeakably increase it, and at the same time furnish them with a youthful vigour, which shall be ardently developed in the service of virtue and the enjoyment of happiness.

According to the view, which offers itself to me, of the present subject, nature, as man advances in years, abates his strength and vigour, that he may gather wisdom from his cool reflections; and her intention is to restore them to him in a future state of existence.

§ 6.—Those of her proceedings which are at present visible, and which seem to me to refer to the design that I have just ascribed to her, are certainly wise and beneficent. I mean those proceedings by which she usually ordains that, still as elderly men advance in years, the flame of life shall burn within them more and more feebly. It is very evident that, were men to remain in possession, during their entire abode on earth, of the fire and vigour of youth, their passions would

be in such an universal uproar, that they would completely drown the voice of wisdom, if any one chanced to endeavour to make it be heard. But wisdom would, in general, dwell in complete banishment from this world. No one would inquire where she could be found; for her total want of interpreters among the old, who would neither have any knowledge of her, nor obtain veneration from its being imputed to them, would prevent the desire to get acquainted with her, from being awakened in mankind. A perpetual war would be waged between the different generations of men, and the rising one would, commonly, be enslaved till it found opportunity violently to break its bonds; for men once in possession of power, would endeavour to exclude all younger competitors from taking share in it.

The change which actually takes commonly place in the constitution of men, as they pass from youth to age, is admirably adapted, where they learn not to deviate from the order of nature, both to make the different generations coalesce happily together, and to give wisdom occasion to penetrate them all with her precepts. When men draw towards a middle age, their personal passions begin to decay; and with them, the brilliancy of their imagination,—which converted their individual sensations into sources of joy,—begins also to fade. They then, insensibly, learn to nourish in their hearts, by their sedate reflections, a more disinterested tenderness for their fellow-creatures.(*a*) Their love of them, becoming more deeply rooted, contributes greatly to compensate to them the diminution wrought in their happiness, by the abatement of the vivacity of those of their pleasurable sensations, which referred, immediately, to their individual enjoyment.

If they do not so intensely relish existence within the bounds of their own period of life, they give, by sympathy, a much greater extension to their sources of gratification, for they make them spread through that whole portion of man's career on earth, at which life is new, and our sensibility to delight is exquisite. I mean, that while the young man is commonly, almost entirely, absorbed in the consciousness of his own forces and of the freshness of his power of enjoyment, the imagination of the middle-aged and elderly one fondly returns to

childhood, and prepares for them delicious gratifications, by engaging them sweetly to sympathize in the innocent delights of the thoughtless, happy beings, still in the early morning of existence, whom they see sporting around them.

§ 7.—Nor is it in happiness alone that the aged gain by taking an affectionate interest in youth and childhood. Observing, with tender alarms, the manifold dangers which threaten the inexperience and temerity of these inconsiderate objects of their solicitude, they quickly recognise that it becomes them to be faithful, unerring guides to them, and they are, in consequence, induced seriously to endeavour to acquire, from their experience and meditations, the fruit of wisdom. They the more readily learn that it is incumbent on them to regulate their hearts agreeably to wisdom's laws, from perceiving that nature admonishes children and youth to look up to the aged with deference, impelled by the idea that, by their respectable example and enlightened precepts, they ought to prove good instructors for them.(*b*)

Thus excited by the desire to appear, in the eyes of the younger part of the community, as beacons, erected by wisdom, to guide their course through the perils of this world, the old would, in general, become worthy such a high destination, did the system of social order encourage in them a respect for themselves, tending to arouse in them magnanimous sentiments. They would, in that case, be humble, from being sensible that the only excuse for pride and arrogance is, that these vices are liable to be engendered in men in the prime of life, by the fermentation which the consciousness and developement of those energetic powers, that the old no longer possess, occasions in them. They would love mankind with warm benevolence, because they would be fully impregnated with those sublime sentiments of order which sink an attachment to our private interests in an ardent wish to promote the universal weal. They would fill with mild, unaffected dignity, the high place allotted to them in the social system, pleased with the thought of being indebted for it to the good, orderly dispositions prevailing in society, not to the display of despotic force. They would receive with meekness, and without exacting them, the attentions of which their infirmities might

make them stand in need, conscious that they ought to deserve to be the objects of them, by their patience, gentleness and benevolence, rather than haughtily to command them, or to allow their thoughts, in any manner, to roll too much on the subject of their own persons.

That a judicious spirit, diffused throughout society, and maintained by suitable institutions, could render old age thus amiable and disinterested, I am well convinced. Though no step be taken, at present, to induce, in men, the resolution to make their old age honourable, loved and respected, yet do a number more considerable of the old, than is perhaps generally thought, give room to suppose, by a constant culture of mild, benign sentiments, that, did judicious provisions on the subject enter into the order of society, the old, in general, would display a character so amiable and disinterested, as would amply verify the assertion that it is the intention of nature that men, as they advance in years, shall become more inclined to entertain feelings of warm, effective benevolence to all mankind, and less disposed to yield to the influence of selfish desires.

§ 8.—The passion which, as it appears to me, favourable circumstances could most generally kindle among the old, is one that emanates from their disposition still to take interest in what passes among the persons embarked on the ocean of life, rather than to shut themselves up in a sphere of interests peculiarly adapted to their age. I have said that the old have no appropriate passion, nor is the one by which they are most governed, and to which I now allude, distinct from the ambition to be admired for acting a distinguished part that animates men in their prime. 'Tis the same passion purified so as to suit a more disinterested character. In a word, the passion which the old are still more subject to feel than are the young to be fired with ambitious hopes of distinction is, for being useful in the world.

Let it be called forth in them by circumstances which denote that their life is of great value to their species, and it is not uncommon to see them brave the most cruel infirmities, with heroic fortitude, and with an unconquerable resolution to persist, in spite of them, in the enterprises which may render them

serviceable to mankind. In lesser occasions, they cling, with the fondest pertinacity, to the idea of their life being of great importance to some one or another beloved friend. They recoil, with horror, from the thought of being regarded, in the world, as useless lumber: too often their injudicious dread of this evil is the cause of their being exposed to feel it, for the notion that those, whose duty it is to take care of their declining years, may look wistfully towards the time when they shall no longer have such a troublesome charge, renders them so peevish and fretful, that they force their wearied attendants to think that Providence would act kindly by them and all around them, in calling them to their eternal rest.

They are prone particularly to treat their heir with such distrust and unkindness, from supposing him to be impatient to step into their place, that they effectually prevent a sincere affection for them counteracting, in his breast, the wish to be possessed of their property.

§ 9.—The desire to be still useful to the world which is readily awakened in the old, is an honourable feeling that has a just claim to be gratified. No extravagant sense, however, of their own importance, liable to inflate them with arrogance, should be instilled into persons, in the course of nature, approaching the awful passage that conducts into an unknown world. 'Tis the consolations that unassuming wisdom may taste, and that tend to nourish it, which should be offered to the old, not such as engender pride. When they are too much flattered by the belief that they are still useful to the world, they are in danger of becoming selfish and ungenerous, from being tempted, both to take pleasure in the idea that, that circle of society through which their influence is felt, will deteriorate after their departure from this life, and to treat with contempt the younger persons over whom they have authority, from supposing them beings blinded by a presumptuous conceit, which, did not their wisdom avert from them the consequences of this error, would lead them deplorably astray. To prevent the wish, still to be of utility in the world, from thus manifesting itself in the old, in a pernicious manner, it should receive its due measure of contentment, and, at the same time, an orderly developement be given to it. I do not think it necessary, for the attainment

of these ends, that any aged person should consider his individual existence as of great consequence to society: but the whole fraternity of the old should be taught to think that they compose a class, which must be placed in high honour, and must prove, by its wisdom, that it merits to be thus distinguished, ere a truly virtuous, happy system of social order can be established and consolidated.

§ 10.—The success of any plan formed in the view, to excite old age onward in the path of wisdom, and to strengthen its influence over youth, must depend, greatly, on the rank in the social system allotted to the young. They must obtain due consideration as the members of society who, by the strength of their constitution and ardour of their mind, are the fittest to keep up, in the nation, that vigorous, energetic movement, the maintenance of which is essential to its virtue and prosperity. If youths do not find that they obtain sufficient regard on account of their appropriate advantages, instead of yielding to old age a reverential homage, they will confederate together to deride its counsels and to cabal against it.

It is necessary towards inducing the old wisely to give heed to their ways, that a lively wish be maintained in them to merit the good opinion of the young, and this will not be done, if the latter have not liberty freely to declare their sentiments. Should the old have authority to forbid the expression of them, when they do not suit their way of thinking, they would be in danger of acquiring the habit of indulging arrogant pretensions, instead of cultivating the meek, amiable qualities becoming their age.

They would be tempted to exact from the young, a blind submission to their authority, founded on the principle, that they must be wiser than they, merely because they are older.

On the other hand, if the young be not curbed by a sentiment of order, disposing them to hearken, with deference, to reputable aged persons, and to venerate old age in general, as the season in which the fruits of wisdom ought to be mature, they will audaciously riot in the sentiment of their force, and glory in abandoning themselves to the vicious excesses which it may urge them to commit.

One of the problems, therefore, that must be practically resolved under a perfect social system, is, that of assigning to old age such an ascendency over the young, as shall keep their hearts under the control of a fine sentiment of order, without forcing them to submit slavishly to a blind, tyrannical authority.

Without entering into a thorough discussion of this subject, I shall here remark that, to attain the end proposed, it is essential that the young learn, from their infancy, to attach themselves, with a deeply rooted affection, to the system of social order which they see established in their country, and that they evidently perceive that the maintenance of it requires old age to be venerated and had in honour. Though nature imparts to the young a disposition to reverence old age, yet, in order fully to develope it and make it influence their conduct, it is requisite that their hearts be warmed by a contemplation of the good effects, produced in society by the wisdom of the old. They cannot, however, look up to them as beings who make use of the power and rank assigned to them, to keep the nation subjected to a fine system of order, proper to promote in it virtue and happiness, without having a good opinion of their intellectual endowments, whether natural or acquired, for those who are deficient in understanding, or whose intellect has not been developed, however right may be their intentions, seldom have recourse to judicious measures for strengthening and supporting the social system, because they do not take a sufficiently comprehensive view of it.

The old, however, would act very injudiciously did they fundamentally rest their claims to peculiar veneration on their intellectual advantages. They cannot in general—and mankind must decline from generation to generation if they could—obtain on that account singular marks of deference, since the course of nature ordains that every man, still in the bloom of youth, is already in the full vigour of his understanding; so that where an old man chances to attract reverence, for the force or clearness of his intellectual powers, it is simply as a person of superior talents that he is looked up to, without any reference to his age.

When the old expect to be venerated by the young on account of the better use that they can make of their understanding, it is on the supposition, that they have laid in a fund of knowledge and experience, which gives them more opportunity to exercise it wisely.

But the young will scarcely be induced at present to pay much homage to the old on account of their knowledge and experience, since the discoveries in science made by the studious in all ages of the world, and the maxims of conduct which the wise and experienced have laid down, are stored in a countless number of books to which the young have as much access as the old; the former, therefore, think themselves quite independent of the latter relatively to the knowledge of nature and mankind. They would smile contemptuously did they advise them to be guided by their experience of the world, when they can consult that of many authors who appear to have had much more opportunity to observe it.

Though it would be necessary then, were aged persons placed in a high rank—implying in them a title to the veneration of the young—that they should prove themselves possessed of a capacity sufficiently enlarged to keep in view all the bearings of the social order, and to appreciate justly the relative value of each of them, yet would it be in vain that they should attempt to found their claims to submission and deference, on the quantity of knowledge which they had gleaned from experience. Any homage which the young may pay them on that account must be completely voluntary, for did the aged require it as a right, they would only compromise their own dignity. The young—many of whom would be fresh from their studies—eager to engage in the combat, to prove their superiority in the knowledge that guides civilized nations, to which the old had unwarily challenged them, would quickly demonstrate, entirely to their own satisfaction, and often, perhaps, to that of the auditors, that they were far better acquainted with all those principles of morality, policy and economy, to which persons instructed by the world's long experience ought to adapt their practice.

The privileges of the old ought to rest, in the first place, on a moral sentiment. They should conduct themselves so as to

convince the young that, though their understanding may not be more vigorous to comprehend abstruse and complex maxims of truth, their heart, mellowed by time, is far more fit to guide itself in a manner agreeable to the laws of right reason.

However, the young will not be induced to quit the arena, wherein the meed of superior merit is accorded to intellectual superiority, if they be not strongly captivated by images of virtue and happiness which endear to them moral worth; nor will they duly reverence old age, if these alluring images be not of a nature to impress on their hearts the conviction, that the blessings of which they are a symbol cannot be assured to the nation, unless the aged portion of its members be maintained in honour and authority.

The point then, at which I aim, and respecting which I shall hereafter unfold some practical views, is to prove that the old cannot be placed in high honour in the nation, otherwise than by the establishment of a social system to which the hearts of the persons, living under its dominion, shall in general fondly warm, while the most thoughtless of the young shall evidently see the impossibility of long sustaining it in vigour, without committing it to the particular guardianship of the old.

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## NOTES TO THE EIGHTH CHAPTER.

*(See page 247.)*

(*a*) Some persons pretend, that as the passions or appetites which imperiously demand selfish gratifications decay, the individual released from their bondage, becomes more indifferent to the weal of his fellow-creatures. One great proof adduced of the old being more insensible than the young to feelings of social love, is, that they appear less afflicted by the death of a friend. But without supposing any diminution of social feeling, it seems to me natural to expect, that those who have often had occasion to sigh over the fragility of human life, should be less moved on seeing beloved objects snatched away from them, by the final stroke of fate, than the persons to whom such a misfortune were entirely new. When I reflect on this circumstance, and further consider, that elderly people are universally, perhaps, convinced that this world offers few joys to awaken regret in those who are quitting it; when I recollect moreover that they usually remember their departed friends with a hope of soon rejoining them on a happier shore, far

from accusing them of insensibility because their loss affects them so little, I frequently perceive, with surprise, that it affects them very deeply; and I conclude, from this observation, that Providence has decreed that, whilever the old remain in this world, their affections shall fondly cling to it, to facilitate to them the means of being useful in it, by inclining them strongly to participate in the feelings of the younger part of mankind.

(*See page* 248.)

(*b*) I do not know a more injudicious method of affording relief to old age, than that of opening an hospital for the exclusive reception of old men, where any other mode of succouring them can be devised. 'Tis such a method as would suit, I think, the taste of a gloomy satirist who, while he chose to stretch out to the old the hand of a benefactor, determined also to exhibit, in a contemptuous light, the misery into which human nature sinks towards the close of its career. A number of old men confined to each other's company, see nothing that reminds them of the dignity which ought to distinguish their age: nothing that does not seem to proclaim that they are only the wretched relics of the glorious beings that they once were. They treat each other with the same familiarity that they did in their youth: in their own eyes they are not entitled to more respect. When they talk of former times, the inference is always expressed or understood by them, that it was only in their youth and prime that they truly lived; for that at present they merely drain the last bitter dregs of their mortal existence. Can it be wondered at if, thus humiliated and discouraged, they torment their attendants—as I am told that they usually do—by their fretful, dissatisfied temper, and that they have recourse, whenever they have an opportunity, to the only and degrading pleasure which they find that they still have power to relish, namely, that of intemperance, in the use of spirituous liquors?

Care should be taken to place the old constantly in company with the young, that they may perceive themselves to be essential and honourable portions of the social system, and be warmed with the ambition to deserve to be the objects of filial respect, from finding that their companions look up to them with affection and deference. Old men should also be allowed to mingle much in the society of amiable women. When they would find themselves soothed and enlivened by their kind attentions, they would enjoy the proper consolations reserved by nature for cheering their decline.

# BOOK VI.

SUBJECT.

*HOPE AND FEAR—PENAL LAWS.*

## CHAPTER I.

CONTENTS.

### HOPE AND FEAR.

§ 1.—In a world where persons in general are disposed and impelled to look forward to what is to befal them at a future day, hope and fear must be leading passions. In fact they are so to such a degree, that they pervade all the other passions of mankind, and give to them a warm or pallid complexion. In order, therefore, to conduct nations on in the path of improvement, it is necessary that the law-giver know how skilfully to manage these two fundamental passions, in the persons for whom he legislates.

§ 2.—We are naturally disposed always to seek to attain some end. Hope is then the passion by which we are regularly and permanently governed. It animates us in all our pursuits, and excites us to perform the great work which we are called on to execute, namely, that of perfecting our own virtue, and contributing, as far as we can, to improve that of mankind.

The nature of the pursuits to which we apply ourselves, and in consequence that of the hope which inspires us, depends in a great measure, on the sort of images which take possession of our mind.

§ 3.—As fear only shows what we are to avoid and not what we are to seek, we are little inclined to take it for our guide: and when natural cowardice or the experience of evil, engages us to listen to the suggestions of this passion, we are bewildered. If our alarms be such, that our fear is entirely without any mixture of hope, it is then despair, and we either do not act at all or else act with indiscriminating frenzy.

§ 4.—It rarely happens that fear is not greatly mingled with hope in a negative form, that is, with the hope to avoid whatever be the object of our fear. This is not, however, a form which hope is disposed long time to adopt. It waits, if I may be allowed the expression, with impatience, till the evil be past, that it may re-assume its natural form and seek a positive good.

If the evil be such, that it is not likely to pass away; for instance, if we be dependent on a hard-hearted master, whose severity we have continually to dread, in that case hope usually contrives to find objects which it may pursue, and which are analogous to the servile images that fill our mind. It makes us contemplate, with satisfaction, the pleasure of duping and defrauding an odious master, and it does not fail to present to us the idea of all those licentious enjoyments which can please a vulgar taste. It drives us on to seek them at all hasards, for the attraction that they have for us is too strong to let us listen to the fear of the punishment, which they may draw after them.

§ 5.—In the same manner the hope of arriving at some desirable object constantly makes itself the leading passion of the mind, let the laws of the land do what they may to substitute, in its place, the wish to avoid some cruel punishment. It is well known that some ancient legislators have thought that it would be easy to prevent crimes, by making them draw down, on those who committed them, terrible retributions. They judged that this method would be effectual, from remarking that fear, when it is strongly excited, is sufficiently powerful to overcome every other passion, and from reflecting that to be free from pain is of much more importance to us than to taste pleasure; so that the highest enjoyments would, in general, be greatly embittered, if those to whom they were offered, were sure that they would be succeeded by severe suffering, even though it were to be of much shorter duration. Those who argued in this manner, were little aware of the human heart's being composed of such opposite principles that while, in one point of view, it seems entirely under the direction of one particular motor, if you regard it in a different aspect, you may, with equal truth, assert that it is governed by a quite contrary

one. The activity of their mind and the force of their passions, hurry men in search of what is good, in spite of the attempts made to paralyze them by awakening their fears.

Their legislators, in trying to restrain them, by the severity of their penal laws, only stamp, on their minds, images of cruelty and ferocity, which communicate their character to their ideas of the good that they make the object of their pursuit; rendering them thus more implacable and inhuman than their rulers.

In imitating their unfeeling conduct, they go much further than they, on account of their abandoning themselves to their unbridled passions, whereas, their rulers are kept within some bounds, because they are calmer and have more or less a wish to act justly.

All the terrible images which may be presented to the human heart, in order to make hope yield the government of it to fear, are surveyed attentively by the former passion, less for the sake of directing her views so as to avoid encountering the evils represented by them, than for the purpose of making her types of what is good and worthy to be sought by her harmonize with those images. It is essential then, towards raising the character of a people, that they be taught to fix their hopes on the most noble objects, and, that they be not subjected to any kind of penalty, the contemplation of which might tend to degrade their views.

§ 6.—It is not, however, by the establishment of laws framed in the view, expressly to reward virtue instead of to punish vice, that their hopes could be thus elevated: for the good that we do to obtain a recompense does not proceed from virtue, but from policy, vanity, and calculation.

Virtue is agreeable to the laws of order. He who is filled with it finds that he is in the path that nature prescribes to him, and would blush to be rewarded for it. Crimes appear entitled to punishment, since they derange the order of nature. It is also easy to inflict it on them, because the proof of them consists in the establishment of the fact, that the person accused has committed a certain lawless action: we are not obliged to scrutinize the dispositions of his heart. If they were such as

to acquit him of guilt or to claim forgiveness, it rests with himself to demonstrate it.

In rewarding virtue the principal thing to be attended to is the disposition of the heart; and the persons entitled to have virtue attributed to them, would derogate greatly from its dignity, did they unfold to the eyes of the world, every circumstance tending to prove their latent worth. A noble mind sometimes opens to the knowledge of the public all its character to clear itself from unjust obloquy, but never to lay claim to a recompense.*

§ 7.—But though virtuous minds shrink from the idea of laying open to the public their good actions and dispositions, in order to obtain a recompense, it is nevertheless certain that virtue both deserves and needs encouragement. It is also equally certain, that a fair reputation is one of the most desirable rewards that this world can offer her. What is repugnant to the feelings of the virtuous is, not to be rewarded, but to be so in such a manner as if the good that they had done were something out of the course of nature, or, as if worldly honours were the proper rewards of virtue. Now, though, if there were no good prospects open to the virtuous, there would be but little virtue to be found in the world, yet it is not the less true that the really virtuous are determined to act right, by the love of what is just and noble, not by the hope of an express reward.

The hearts of the good and virtuous generally evince a kind of weakness which, in a well combined community, would have useful results, for it would serve to unite more firmly together, all the members of the social corps. Owing to this weakness, the good and virtuous usually link their hearts more closely, than is consistent with perfect righteousnes, with those of their fellow-creatures, so that they are discouraged if they do not perceive that the sentiments, reigning in the society, harmonize with their own.

* I do not wish, by these remarks, to be understood to mean that heroic actions, of a nature to be publicly known, should not be publicly rewarded. The government or the public might, with great propriety, proclaim their approbation of a righteous deed, demonstrative of a force of mind beyond what virtue commonly exhibits, when, by so doing, they would not be obliged to offend her, by removing from her the veil of secrecy.

Where such a happy harmony exists, the good and virtuous naturally expect to receive ample proofs, both of society's being affectionately and reverentially disposed to them, and also of its being willing to confide to their integrity and zeal, important trusts.

The recompenses, then, which encourage virtue, are not those that are specially destined to be the reward of a certain action, or a certain line of conduct. They are the demonstrations of being generally esteemed, and the attainment, in consequence, of honourable distinctions, without its being necessary to urge its claims to them.

§ 8.—The good opinion that we inspire does not, it is evident, depend directly on the laws; since, though they can assign rewards and punishments, they cannot prescribe the sentiments which we may entertain of each other. It is necessary to establish institutions that teach us to love and judge of virtue, and that give us ample opportunity to manifest, publicly, the esteem with which virtuous persons inspire us.

Almost every one who has had much opportunity to remark the persons, exemplary for their virtue, has discernment enough to distinguish them, even though they have not been allowed, by their natural modesty, to make any ostentatious parade of their good qualities. But should no reason occur to determine the eye witness of their virtues, to give openly any proof of his esteem for them, it lies dormant in his breast, and is stifled by his active cares, instead of being blown up into a flame, as would be the case, were many persons induced to pay a marked homage, in concert, to virtuous characters: nor does it offer any encouragemcnt to such characters to persevere in their laudable course, nor to others to imitate them.

§ 9.—In framing penal laws, we should remember, that they are only meant for securing the barriers, outside of which an individual could not roam without producing confusion, but that it is beyond their reach immediately to regulate the employments of the people within these barriers, or to determine them to any particular line of proceeding in forming the national character. A government should carefully avoid trying to render fear a predominant principle of action. It is better

where not driven by necessity, for it to refrain from threats of a positive evil.

§ 10.—That fear is the most salutary which, without abating the vigour of hope, accompanies it, just to warn it that, if it do not let itself be wisely directed, it may fail in the execution of its projects. The hope which entirely rejects the counsels fear, is rash, presumptuous, and leaves the mind unprepared to meet all events with wisdom and courage.(a)

§ 11.—The laws instituted to decree exact retributions universally, to precisely determined actions, can have little to do with the kind of fear last mentioned, for, if they cannot encourage a well directed hope by holding out rewards to virtue, neither can they deal directly with the fear which owes its origin to hope, and takes a form analogous to the one assumed by it. There is, however, another kind of fear that does not march in the train of hope, but which, notwithstanding, the penal laws may advantageously employ to induce hope to take a right direction. The fear in question warns this, our leading passion, not to seek gratification in any erroneous path, and, at the same time, presents no obstacle to impede its advancement in the course which it ought to follow. The better to illustrate my meaning, I shall observe, that the surest way to engage hope to contemplate, exclusively, the idea of a future state, is to ordain that every prospect which could allure it in this life, shall be closed by fear or despair. In like manner, without urging hope to look beyond temporal advantages, the penal laws might be so framed that fear should induce it to disregard criminal or ignoble pleasures, and to fix its attention, ardently, on a praiseworthy career, from finding itself free to exert in it all its activity. The punishment whose aspect should deter hope from entering into a wrong course, ought to be moderate, but it ought, invariably, to be applied to those who had legally incurred it. A slight and evidently well merited disgrace, is sufficient, if it certainly follow the error on which it should attend, to make hope refrain from deviating into forbidden paths, where it is at liberty to pursue an honourable one.

A moderate punishment has this advantage over a severe one, that it does not arrest the attention of hope on gloomy,

ferocious images, calculated to make it listen to the suggestions of vindictive passions, and to delight, in consequence, in the attainment of their sanguinary ends. A punishment evidently decreed by a humane and pitying, though just legislator, elevates the minds of the persons, restrained by the dread of it, to the temple where justice sits calmly enthroned with benevolence; and encourages them to let their hopes expatiate midst noble, liberal views. They commonly, in that case, find themselves so exempt from the temptation to become, by their misdemeanor, obnoxious to legal pains, that it appears to them that they are withheld from the offences which the law denounces, not by a dread of its menaces, but by their own unbiassed volition.

§ 12.—In order that each individual of the community may feel such a freedom of volition as ought to be secured to him, that his mind may be unfolded in all its native grandeur, and attain a vigour which will guard it greatly against corruption, many are the faults—nay, some of them are even grievous—to which no legal penalty should attach. Never will penal laws, however just and moderate a spirit may apparently breathe through them, tend, in a considerable degree, to make virtue flourish in a nation, if they encroach on the bounds within which, as far as depends on them, the volition of individuals ought to be supreme.

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## NOTE TO THE FIRST CHAPTER.

*(See page 261.)*

(a) In the inculcation of religious principles to restrain men's passions, it is necessary, I think, to draw their attention more strongly to the idea of the punishment that awaits the wicked, than it is in expounding to them the laws which regard their temporal condition.

First.—It would be difficult to confirm them in the belief of a future state, if it were not represented to them as one in which the wicked, who so often here below triumph over the virtuous, shall finally receive the just retribution of their mis-doings.

Secondly.—We cannot take positive, sensible views of the condition wherein we shall be after death, and we cannot, therefore, offer to self-love attractive objects, relatively to that condition, which shall excite it to noble pursuits.

The only description that natural or revealed religion warrants us, I think, to make of the mode of existence of good men arrived at a state of blessedness, regards their inward dispositions. Perfect love and a spirit of implicit obedience towards God shall, they tell us, reign within them along with a love towards their fellow-creatures equal to their self-love. But the belief that the good, after their resurrection, derive their bliss from the exercise of these disinterested affections, cannot offer much inducements to sinful men to reform their ways, since they know not their value: it appearing to them that happiness or misery can alone result from the gratifications or mortifications of self-love. On that account, it is necessary to hold principles, respecting a future state, which serve to keep mankind in check, by directly interesting self-love. And these, I think, can be no other but such as deter them from sin by the dread of future punishments. However, the mind is I think, farther advanced in piety, which burns to be pure and good, like the just in heaven, than is the one that studies carefully to obey the will of God, merely from dread of his displeasure.

## CHAPTER II.

### INQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLE WHICH SHOULD ACTUATE THE PENAL LAWS.

§ 1.—Let it not be thought presumptuous, if I say a few words to elucidate the principle which should preside over the redaction of the penal laws. I do not pretend to say any thing new on this subject, but merely to expose a received principle in a light, that shall tend to render more strikingly evident the system of social order, which I offer to the contemplation of the reader.

Legislators, in punishing offenders, had at first, at least as much in view the effect which the example of the punishment might have on the by-standers, as the project to requite the criminal according to his deserts.

Such a motive exposed them to the inconvenience of not being able to ascertain the punishments the best calculated to maintain the peace of society, until they were enlightened by a long experience. Nay, this method of groping to find out our way, could scarcely lead us to any positive results, for the evils produced by a wrong distribution of punishments would

for the accomplishment of the sentence, ought always to be one of solemn mourning in the place of execution; and it is only by deepening the tokens of affliction, that we ought to express our horror of an unusually atrocious crime.

Capital executions thus ordained reluctantly, from a well founded belief of their being indispensable to the security of a good, established social order, might have a salutary effect, in impressing on the minds of the people, a reverential fear of the law of the land, and a deep regret on witnessing any of their members wantonly, or viciously, incurring its fatal penalties. Whereas capital punishments, as they are too commonly conducted, seem likely to have the effect of stirring up among the spectators, disorderly passions. They must contritribute to render them barbarous if, filled with approbation of the severity of the laws, they are pleased at seeing them put in execution; and they incline them, on the contrary, to view them with disrespect and ill will if, as more generally happens, they sigh over the lot of him who falls a victim to their unrerelenting rigour.

However, the greatest care taken to exhibit capital punishnishments as sad but necessary acts of justice, ordained by an enlightened humanity, will fail in exciting, in the spectators, reflections calculated to deter them from imitating the sufferer's guilt, if such dismal spectacles be, by their frequency, rendered familiar to them. They will, in that case, arrive at thoughtlessly enjoying them, as though, like tragical, theatrical compositions, they were representations exhibited in no other view than to make them pass time agreeably, by agitating them with a variety of emotions.

§ 3.—The principle that the legislator, in instituting the pain of death, does not seek to punish, but only to return to the power, who sent him hither, a criminal whose further abode on earth would be detrimental to society,—this principle would be presumptuous and profane, were penal laws to be founded on it which lightly took away a delinquent's life. Where the governing class only look to the general prosperity of the nation as their ultimate object, then do they appear in some degree excusable if, averting their attention too much from individuals, they heedlessly sacrifice them to what they hastily

consider as the good of the entire population. But when a government proceeds sincerely on the principle that the subjects, of whom it has undertaken the charge, are all the children of the great universal ruler, before whom the points to be considered are the dispositions of each person's heart, it must perceive, that every individual submitted to its sway, is an important trust consigned to it, and that the general good is only of inestimable value, because that of each particular is, since to improve the virtue and happiness of a nation constitutes him, who succeeds in this enterprize, the benefactor of mankind, merely on account of the number of individuals whom he trains to be virtuous and happy. The government that thus learns to be aware of the great intrinsic value of the meanest of its subjects; that acknowledges that he is sent into this world to learn to fulfil the glorious ends for which he was created, and that it is responsible to his Creator for its misconduct, if it do not do its utmost to excite him to fulfil them—the government thus penetrated with a sense of the importance of each individual in the eyes of his heavenly father, and of its own consequent responsibility, will show an extreme reluctance in yielding to the necessity—should it believe itself forced to do so—of shortening an offender's days, and thus irrevocably losing the power of attempting, by chastisements, to stir him up to repentance.

§ 4.—Individuals, in the heat of their contests with each other, cannot always show the same forbearance and impassibility that the laws of the land, at least in ordinary times, ought to do. The laws, in a well-regulated state, are peaceably enthroned; no one disputes their power; so that the organs of justice have only to apply them in a dispassionate, impartial, manner. On the contrary, individuals who contend are often obliged to go further than they would, in cold blood, wish to do, from the necessity that they are in to vanquish the resistance offered to them.

However, persons heated by angry passions, are not, in general, so different from what they usually are, that the principles and ideas which commonly rule them do not take considerable effect on them. Those who at all times, when they are calm, are penetrated with the love of justice and humanity, will not

often forget their laws at the moments of being exasperated by some personal offence.

For these reasons, though all men are not called on to enforce the penal laws, it is nevertheless desirable, that every one should know how to judge, without passion or prejudice, of the motives on which they are grounded, and the justice of their application. He who acquires the habit of placing himself above the region of the passions, to consider offences which do not immediately concern him, without either indignation or an undue pity, will greatly strengthen his reason and his principles, so that they will be much less likely to desert him or abandon him to blind passion, when he is himself the offended person. It seems to me, on that account, highly necessary to accustom young people always to keep the exact rules of justice in view, when they are expressing the wish to see any transgression punished, which excites in them a disinterested indignation. Most men, desirous of marking their abhorrence of any sort of unbecoming action that has taken place, by describing the punishment which it deserves, or which they would have inflicted on the doer of it, had it been directed against them, are apt to assign to it a chastisement entirely out of proportion with it, or else one of which a person who esteems himself ought to scorn to be the executioner. This violence usually escapes, more than it should, the animadversion of the hearers, because they look upon it as a generous kind of emotion, since it has been occasioned by the idea of some wrong done to a neighbour, and they know that he who expresses himself thus with too much warmth, would, if he were put to the proof, be much more humane than his words announce him to be. They do not consider that, in taking pleasure in the idea of too severe a punishment inflicted on the aggressor against his neighbour, he gives the reins to his furious, vindictive passions, allowing them all the satisfaction which they at that moment seek, and that it cannot be expected that his mind, acquiring thus the habit of listening to their suggestions on the occasions on which they are weakly excited, will refuse to be guided by them when provocations arise calculated to rouze them in all their strength.

If the angry passions do not, in general, move with the

same force at the call of social love as that of self-love, there is the more reason to hope that, by a careful discipline of them when they are enlisted in the service of the former, they may be taught, habitually, to yield to the laws of reason and justice. We should profit of opportunities thus to train them, by often drawing the attention of young people, on the sentences pronounced legally against offenders, and explaining to them the salutary effect of laws couched in a humane, moderate spirit.

There is little danger that, by thus accustoming the young to ponder all the reasons which recommend a great moderation in punishing offences, we may render them too indulgent to crimes: it is those, on the contrary, that abandon themselves to all their passions, who are liable, when pity moves them, to make the laws of justice bend to an excessive indulgence, just as they forget them to act with an extreme severity, when they are prompted by indignation.

At those times at which the conversation with young people turns upon some crime that has been committed, their preceptors do well, I think, to encourage them to mark a due detestation of it. But when they speak of the criminal and the chastisement which he merits, then should they be careful to let nothing be said that would not be avowed by one who respects and pities human nature. By thus letting indignation take its course, until it be stopped by a liberal sense of justice, they would, I think, impress deeply on the hearts of their pupils, a respect for justice as an imposing, lofty virtue.

# BOOK VII.

SUBJECT.

*REASON AND IMAGINATION.*

I shall dedicate the following book to considerations respecting the two principal faculties, on the right exercise and regulation of which our improvement in virtue, agreeably to nature's laws, depends. These faculties are reason and imagination.

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## CHAPTER I.

CONTENTS.

REASON.

§ 1.—By reason, I mean that intellectual faculty which, when it is well employed, is constantly exercised in discriminating all the sentiments that ought to flourish together in our bosoms, and in maintaining a just proportion between them: which also pays a due attention to every consideration that is entitled to have any weight in forming a wise character, and a virtuous, happy community.

Reason is very subject to go astray in the discharge of this momentous office.

Paradoxical as my opinion may be thought, I must avow that, it appears to me, that one cause of her errors lies in the comparative perfection in which she is accorded to human nature.

Reason, as she manifests herself in the men distinguished by the strength of this faculty, differs no otherwise, we may fearlessly assert, when she is employed in sciences homogeneous to her—that is, in intellectual ones wherein sufficient data is afforded for her operations—from the same faculty, as it acts in beings of a higher order, than in the slowness with which she arrives at her conclusions: for those conclusions are the

same self-evident, eternal truths which, we may suppose, that their more vigorous understandings comprehend at once, without being obliged to move cautiously towards them through an intricate process.

Accustomed, in consequence, to perceive that, though weak and sluggish, she labours under no infirmity that disables her from discovering unerring truths; reason, when she takes in hand the regulation of the human heart, is liable to persuade herself that she has power to elicit, from the consideration of it, first principles, by the application of which she can render the laws appointed by the eternal order of nature for its guidance, as clear and indubitable as a mathematical theorem. In forming this belief, she overrates her power, not, as I imagine, from a want of rectitude in herself, but because the self evident data on which it is necessary that she advance to the discovery of immutable truths, are not furnished her by the moral sciences. The finest feelings of our nature, instead of urging us to seek proofs that may satisfy reason of its being right to hearken to them, speak to us in an authoritative tone, of its being our duty to obey their dictates; and tell us that we should act unworthily, did we hesitate in allowing ourselves to be guided by them, till we had calmly taken counsel of reason. This substitution of an authoritative tone in the place of discussion and examination, is a mode of proceeding to which reason can with difficulty reconcile herself. Treated with contempt by those feelings, she too often contemns them in her turn, and, refusing to counsel them, suffers them to act so inconsiderately, that they appear to be—what she considers them—unruly movements of the mind, which, were they generally yielded to, would prove the source of lamentable disorders.

§ 2.—Reason, owing to her disposition to advance in her operations by measured and precisely calculated steps, is liable to turn her attention, too exclusively, to the means of procuring to mankind those sensible gratifications which are evidently necessary to them, as she finds herself able to determine, with tolerable exactness, the quantity of them which the country can furnish, the most effectual method of calling

forth all its resources, and the number of inhabitants which it can sustain.

When reason thus quits the guidance of the heart, to occupy herself, chiefly, with the care of supplying the people, to the utmost possible degree, with food, clothing, and personal comforts, she often becomes the instrument of the passions, instead of being their governour. The facility with which she supplies these sorts of wants, renders a full indulgence of them too necessary to men's happiness; encouraging them thus to look for complete enjoyment upon earth, and in their personal gratification: which error causes them to give to reason ample employment, in combining the means to vary and refine the blessings that their senses or their indolence crave.

§ 3.—Reason, parting from the indisputable fact, that every living being has a claim to a species of happiness commensurate to its faculties—which fact serves her as the ground whereon to establish many a clear proposition—can very readily expatiate by well combined arguments, through the whole region of abstract justice; but when she has fully explained the theory of it, she soon perceives it not to be in exact harmony with the demands of our nature, some of which demands are so imperious that they will be hearkened to: nay, attempts to silence them could only occasion mischief and disorder. Struck with this circumstance, she is apt to abandon, in despair, the task of teaching men to engrave deeply in their minds, clear universal principles of justice, as well as that of engaging them steadily to keep in view the ends proposed by these principles, as the ultimate aim of their conduct, though the necessity to support a practicable system of order may oblige them to take a circuitous course to arrive at it.

Since she cannot, by rigorous arguments, instruct the human mind fully of its studies, she often renounces, in despair, the helm of its government, and, avowing her own impotence to guide it, she hands it over to the control of blind prejudice and degrading superstition. She might, perhaps, warn men not to follow such unworthy rulers; she might rather be induced to tell them that worldly happiness is life's only good, and that, since it cannot be the prize of all, it becomes those who are so fortunate as to be able to grasp it, to profit of this

advantage, leaving others to shift for themselves. But she clearly perceives that, in the nation in which true virtue is little known—for she cannot flourish where the maxims of eternal justice are disregarded—some principles, some authority, must be substituted in her place, to keep men within certain bounds, otherwise their eager contentions to obtain the means of happiness, would lead them to the commission of every crime, and plunge the whole community in misery.

After having ceded her throne to prejudice and superstition, in hopes that they will keep men peaceable and orderly, reason—if she still retain possession of any province of the human mind—has continual occupation in endeavouring to stem the progress of the encroachers to whose first rise to power she tamely submitted: so different is the sense in which they govern from the one which she approves, that, were they not vigilantly controled by her, they would soon plunge the nation into as deep a gulf of wretchedness as the one from which she hoped to save it, by means of their elevation to the supreme government of the human mind. Her embarrassment is very great, from her endeavouring to expose the fallacy of their pretensions, without her daring, at the same time, to investigate those sound principles of justice, by the clear exposure of which their power could be effectually unhinged.

To extricate herself from this difficulty, she generally takes a sort of middle course, engaging men to make a vigorous use of their intellectual faculties, in studying all sciences, as well as all questions of interest which do not concern the government of the human mind. She flatters herself that persons whose understandings she has thus fortified by exercise will not, even in paying a degree of homage to prevailing superstitions and prejudices, suffer themselves to be drawn by them into a deplorable slavery.

Her calculations on the good effects of this scheme, are not altogether erroneous. This evil, however, attends it in the nation where it is reduced to practice, that it makes two moral governours preside in it, who issue opposite commands.

Reason governs the more sedate, thoughtful portion of the people, and tells its followers to bend their minds entirely to the acquisition of temporal prosperity; observing to them,

however, that they ought to treat popular superstitions and prejudices with reverence, that they may awe the vulgar. On the other hand, the persons unacquainted with the exercise of reason, are taught, by their superstitions and prejudices, to regard, as sinful, every attempt to embellish the world and fill it with enjoyments: they accordingly preach the duty of trampling it under foot, and they do not cease to declaim against those of their countrymen who labour to increase life's blessings. The confusion occasioned by those clashing motives of conduct is so much the greater, that, owing to the sympathy existing between the reasoning and superstitious part of the society, they are frequently communicated from the one to the other, influencing both the same persons, and occasioning between their actions and professions a glaring, nay, even revolting discrepance.

§ 4.—In some ages and countries, superstition and prejudice triumph altogether over the opposition of reason, but they do not, on that account, entirely forbid the use of this faculty. After having enslaved her, instead of silencing, they make her their instrument. They extort from her an acknowledgment that dogmas, of whose total contrariety to her laws she is very adequate to judge, lie entirely beyond the limits of her jurisdiction; and, when they have obtained from her this concession, they oblige her to receive those dogmas as the unerring principles from which she is to deduce, by abstruse, subtle arguments—that perhaps logically flow from them—a system of articles of belief respecting matters into which it is not possible for her to have the slightest insight; so that her whole concatenation of propositions on this subject, only serves to exercise vigorous understandings in regularly marshalling unintelligible sentences, and to wither the hearts of those who imagine that eternal recompenses are promised to the understanding which can employ itself with such futile acuteness, rather than to the disposition to do our duty towards God, our neighbour and ourselves.

§ 5.—To prevent reason from being thus led astray by outstepping her demesne, she should be induced to learn to distinguish its bounds and firmly to intrench herself within it, that she may not be driven from it. She should carefully dis-

criminate from the doctrines that are contradictory to her, those that are simply above her reach, and that, at the same time, are well authenticated as a divine communication, both by external proofs and their own nature, which should render them proper to magnify the mercy of God and to do good to man. Doctrines of this latter description she should humbly and gratefully receive as the dictates of unerring truth, but the former, agreeably to my opinion, she should, with unshaken firmness, reject. However incompetent she may be to disclosing to mankind such distinct views of the design of the creation, as shall sufficiently encourage them to walk in the ways of uprightness, she should still carefully remember that she is the only judge to whom we can appeal, to decide on the authenticity of a supernatural revelation that undertakes to supply her deficiency. What we learn from revelation respecting the mysteries of our destiny should, though it give to our hopes a much surer ground to expatiate on, be in perfect harmony with the conclusions on the subject, which meditation, observation, and the generalization of ideas present to unclouded reason. If, in forming our belief on these awfully important matters, we treat reason with contempt as supposing her inadequate, not only to making valuable discoveries in them, but even to judging whether those which it is asserted have been made to us by a heavenly revelation, have a character that testifies that we owe the knowledge of them to the fountain of eternal truth—if we do not deign to interrogate reason, to know how far she gives her assent to doctrines promulgated as those of revelation, we resign the distinguishing prerogative of human nature, and are in danger of descending to the rank of silly sheep, who blindly rush along wherever they may be driven.

§ 6.—A more delicate task than that of shaking the fabric of superstition has reason to go through, when she undertakes duly to develope, regulate, and class the feelings and desires belonging to human nature.

I have already, in the beginning of this chapter, touched on the causes that render it so difficult for her freely to develope and rightly order these feelings, but I shall here enter into some further details.

One cause of such an occupation being peculiarly embarrassing to her, seems to me to be, that it places her in a very different predicament from that in which she stands, when she is engaged in investigating or fixing the principles of any art or science not immediately treating of our moral nature.

In examining these arts and sciences, reason arms herself with all her powers. She behaves as a despotic chief invested with the right to handle, without ceremony, the data to which she applies the scheme of her operations, as considering them nothing but the materials with which she acts. The more too she subjects them to her keen inspection and argumentative powers, the more she perceives them to be fruitful of other data, by means of which she can advance to new discoveries.

But the feelings of the heart which are the primary data that must guide her in unfolding the principles of the moral sciences, will not bear to be thus authoritatively examined. They shrink from her penetrating gaze; and if she attempt imperiously to grasp them, to submit them to a rigorous scrutiny, they wither and apparently exist no more.

When the individual, gifted to a remarkable degree with the faculty of reason, determines vigorously to exercise it, in studying the constitution of the human heart, and that he dives into his own, in order to discover the nature of the various sensations which give life to it, he commonly finds very few feelings stirring within it, except just the ambition to conduct his studies to a good issue. So completely has the activity of his mind run into intellect, that the unusual vigour which his reason, by exercise, has acquired, has been gained at the expense of his moral feelings, that have become proportionably languid and been reduced to the greatest penury.

Does he endeavour to acquire sufficient lights for prosecuting, with advantage, his favourite science, by a vigilant research into the dispositions of other men, his labours are very nearly as fruitless as when he seeks to scan his own; for such is the fear which his scrutinizing glance and superior intellectual powers inspire, that few of the feelings which agitate the human heart dare to manifest themselves in his presence. Nay, the symptoms of them that do appear he is not skilful in deciphering; the sympathies which could make him quickly

comprehend them are not lively in his breast, because the original feelings whence they should emanate are almost unknown to it.

There are, however, some clamorous appetites and passions to which he never grows insensible. Though the habit that he has acquired of nourishing his mind with pure ideas, may prevent his abandoning himself to their suggestions, still he can easily sympathize with them.

To them he commonly becomes indulgent, both because he sees in them almost all that he knows of the wants of human nature, and that he perceives, that by treating them with the utmost condescension, he will have opportunity to ingratiate himself with most of the members of society, by abating the awe,—the witnessing of which is painful to him,—that inclines them either to avoid, or be silent and constrained in his presence.

It follows from these remarks, that when reason makes the various feelings which agitate mankind the immediate object of her studies, her observations, reflections and deductions will scarcely lead to real discoveries, or advance the cause of good order and morality, if she do not know how softly to moderate her exertions and veil her lustre. She should contrive to walk by the side of the moral feelings, scarcely noticed by them, in order that they may fearlessly display to her view their strength and variety: yet should she carefully open before them the path—so often closed by passion and prejudice—to which they ought to confine themselves.

When reason skilfully fulfils this office, the moral feelings, from their nature, offer her great facilities for crowning, with success, her endeavour to guide them.

On her disclosing to them a vista of the line in which they should urge the mind to proceed, they become so conscious of being, when they are warmed by the view of it, in the order of nature, that it appears to them that this line of action owes the attractions which it has for them, to their own native impulsion, rather than to a process of reason.

Sometimes this provident guardian is forced to assert her authority, in order to bridle the passions when they are inclined to rebel against her. Yet even then—if she rightly dis-

charge her functions—she will, in most cases, make it appear to the mind submissive to her injunctions, that its better feelings are triumphing over its disorderly passions, and not that it is obeying an intellectual power.

§ 7.—Where reason shows herself entirely detached from feeling to the mind which she orders to repel invading passions, her commands enter into the catagory of the injunctions issued by a cold, stern principle of duty.

I have already mentioned that we should, as much as possible, avoid placing frail humanity in a situation so trying and dispiriting, though to issue from it victoriously is often a very sublime action, which the leading minds in a community should know how to accomplish, otherwise they cannot conduct it to its highest state of perfection.

§ 8.—There are cases in which reason, in opposing the excess of passion, must appear denuded of feeling, nay, the mind that hearkens to her excites a much livelier interest in spectators, when it is seen stemming a violent passion, merely in obedience to a deeply felt, cheerless principle of duty, than it would do could reason teach it to vanquish the passion to which she is opposed, by awakening in it one more consonant to her views. These cases mostly are those of too violent afflictions caused by legitimate, tender affections. They may also spring from a variety of passions, founded in a good disposition, but prompting the mind to erroneous proceedings.

Passions of this nature, however, if we have long to combat them, wither the imagination; and dry up in the heart the sources of blameless joys. It is, therefore, desirable that reason, whether acting within the mind which a passion of this kind troubles, or addressing to it its language by the voice of a friendly counsellor, should quickly awaken in it a vigorous passion approved of by her, that may bear it triumphantly beyond the gripe of the one which it ought to repress.

§ 9.—Reason should unite itself so closely with the better feelings of the heart, that it may become quite identified with them, and not only teach them to flow in an orderly form, but be itself so penetrated with their spirit that they may lead it to take an intimate survey of the moral nature of man and vigi-

lantly to watch over its amelioration, particularly in the individual whose mind may be the peculiar seat of reason.

When reason, as is commonly the case, keeps itself too detached from the moral feelings in determining, amidst the tumult of active life, the laws by which men, in all its various conjunctures, ought to be guided, instead of engaging individuals to look inward on themselves, that each of them may correct his own passions in their source, she teaches them to look solely abroad on the world, in order to observe the results of human passions, to acquire a general knowledge of their nature, and invent the dykes that ought to be opposed to their ravages: so that it would seem, that the business of improving mankind is a sort of abstract work, to be performed by the judicious arrangement and application of general principles, which permit every individual to keep his attention aloof from himself, and fix it entirely on the great mass of the community. The world becomes, in consequence, a strange scene, where a sublime basis of government is laid by an intelligence that would seem to put men on a par with much higher orders of created beings, and where little is erected on this foundation but frail, paltry fabrics, raised by contemptible passions.

To conclude—the discovery of the means to make the moral improvement of the people go hand in hand with their intellectual, is a great desideratum in the sciences which relate to the government of mankind. I hope, too, in the concluding part of this work, to suggest various hints that may eventually prove of great use in leading to such a happy discovery.

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## CHAPTER II.

### IMAGINATION.

§ 1.—Imagination is a faculty in direct correspondence with the feelings of the heart.

The latter, decide on the merit or demerit of the exciting

objects, agreeably to their intrinsic emotions, which may be either those of aversion or liking, modified in a numberless variety of manners.

Imagination presents to our view, an object of whose merit or demerit we are to judge, by the kind of aversion or liking that it excites in us, in other words, we are to judge of them by the feelings which it raises in us.

By this assertion I only mean, that when we know how to pronounce a judgment on the impressions made on us, by the objects of our imagination, we do it from consulting our feelings; but we are liable to be affected by those impressions, long before we are capable to pronounce a judgment on them.

In the chapter in which I treated of social love, I intimated my opinion, that our sensibility to that affection is first excited by imagination. Though some persons are much more richly endowed than others with that faculty, I believe that we all have a considerable portion of it, which operates in us from the first dawn of intellect, and teaches us spontaneously to sympathize in the inward emotions of the persons around us, when the appropriate signs of them are expressed in their aspect.

According to this principle, the aid of imagination is always necessary in calling forth social feelings, at least in the young and ignorant, who have not been taught by reflection, and the remembrance of various sensations experienced by them, to feel for another as they would for themselves, in circumstances similar to his. But though imagination is continually at work in our minds, and though, as I believe, she is the means to set most of our feelings in activity, it is not at all times evident that they are quickened by her agency.

Where she attracts the notice of the reflecting or observing, it usually appears, that this faculty and the feelings of the heart, have a great and equal influence; so that either may be first affected, though both instantly communicate to the other the impression that they have received, with the rapidity and force of an electric shock. I shall add, that it appears to me desirable, that imagination should habitually so identify herself with, and lose her separate existence in the feelings of the heart, that they should always appear to receive the original

impression made on the mind by any object. They may afterwards communicate it to our imagination, which will probably by its participation in it, react on our feelings, causing them to be still more energetic; and this increase of energy, will in its turn react on our imagination, rendering it still more lively and more fertile. Such a succession of mutual action and reaction, may sometimes continue till both our feelings and imagination are wrought up to a high degree of excitation. But in the course of this reciprocal reaction, it is better that our feelings,—insensibly indeed called forth by our imagination,—should have the lead, supposing the affection which moves them to be a good one, than that imagination, viewed as striking the attention by her own distinct operations, should get the start of them. Our feelings are much more likely to be durable and solid, and also, to produce emotions truly suited to us, so that all persons of sensibility or of good taste, may take part in them. The tact of the true order of nature, is more given to our heart than to our imagination. When the latter precedes our feelings, it is apt to render us as inconstant as impetuous. Not being kept within orderly bounds, as it is when it has to reply faithfully to a feeling, it gets into a false direction, and the feelings which it calls forth, are not the simple, sincere ones that it thinks they are. They are usually little else but those of vanity, and the wish to make a striking effect; sometimes they are merely the desire to experience strong emotions.

Seldom do they impose on the spectators, or excite sympathy.

§ 2.—Reason and imagination, in considering the order of things which determines the destiny of mankind, begin by directing their attention to opposite portions of it. Reason thinks first of supplying the people's physical wants, and of gratifying their native love of liberty, as far as may be necessary to shield each individual from injustice, and enable him to enjoy in security, the fruit of his labours.

Imagination begins, by trying to procure to men, the highest mental enjoyments of which they are capable.

She disdains to take into consideration their physical wants, any further, than she can make the idea of them enter into the picture which she forms, of the pleasure that the feelings of

the heart occasion those to taste who are affected by them. Thus, the image of a person satisfying his hunger, has in itself no charms for her; but when she thinks of the labourer seated under a tree, which himself or his father had planted; surrounded, while eating of the produce of the field which he has cultivated, by a beloved and joyous family, whom his labour sustains; she contemplates this interesting picture with an ever fresh delight.

As reason begins with what is necessary, she ought to be consulted before imagination, and to keep her under control, lest she stray into wild, impracticable paths. However, she ought to be careful not to constrain her motions, since 'tis imagination who chiefly penetrates us with warm admiration for the charms of virtue, and who gives us energy to rise superior to our strongest passing desires, captivated by the attractions of the good which it is our duty to seek, in preference to their gratification. She often renders practicable to us, noble undertakings, that, without her aid, would seem entirely above our forces. 'Tis she in short, who best secures us from falling into that painful situation, in which nothing attaches us to our duty, but a firm though cheerless principle, while all the inclinations stirring in our breast, are contrary to it.

Imagination has so much the more need of being guided by reason, from her being, notwithstanding her contempt for the gross, material part of life's affairs, very liable to be perverted by the necessity we are under to attend to them. Though she scorns calculations of interest, she is very ready to lend her colours, to hide whatever is paltry in the results of those calculations, and to persuade us, by tempting us to admire their brilliancy, that we act honourably, in letting our mind be engrossed by them.

She teaches us to love riches and honours, and to become mean sycophants to the persons in whose power it is to confer them.

She induces the courtier to admire himself equally, when he has the honour to approach his master to offer him servile homage, or when he receives it in his turn from his dependents.

She persuades the ambitious man who climbs the pinnacle of power, that he must really be a god upon the earth, since he is

the centre, round which are collected so many symbols of authority, wealth and grandeur.

Imagination requires to be ruled by reason from another motive. It is that she creates images of a beau ideal, analogous to every passion. Sometimes she renders those images so enticing, that, unless controled by right reason, she would soon mislead men to actions entirely contrary to the laws of virtue.

§ 3.—Imagination influences the mind in two different manners, to seek the good presented to it by her. In the one she directs its attention solely on the charms of the object which she exhibits to its hopes; in the other she only makes this object a secondary consideration; the mind's consciousness of its own powers, and the wish to exert them in a way which shall fully display them, are what are principally present to it.

The persons whom she ardently influences in the former manner, are peculiarly under her power, nor is it difficult for her so to dazzle them, that they yield themselves up implicitly to the guidance of rulers, who throw them into abject slavery. It is not so easy for her thus to betray those whom she strongly influences in the second manner; they are more independent of her, being less sensible to her radiance. However, as military glory has great attractions for them, the rulers who kindle their imagination, by giving them an opportunity to perform warlike exploits, can reduce them imperceptibly into slavery, and make the proudest beings amongst them, rejoice in revolving like satelites around them.

§ 4.—The objects presented to us by our imagination, are not always distinct images. On the contrary, it delights in the vague, the indefinite, and the mysterious. It is never perhaps excited to a high degree of enthusiasm, that the images which it offers to our contemplation, however clear they may be in the centre, do not appear to spread out and lose themselves in infinity.

§ 5.—The aspirations of imagination towards infinity are, I believe, one cause, though an indirect one, of the singular pleasure with which she contemplates spectacles of ruin and destruction, when they are exhibited on a large scale. It is not merely the resistless conqueror, marking his progress by a

widely-spreading ravage, who commands her admiration: the aspect of the physical globe, when it testifies a great overthrow of the happy order usually prevailing in it, fills her, also, with awe and delight.

She gazes with rapture on barren mountains, whose wild, disorderly form, announces that they are the produce of some great convulsion of nature.

She stands happy and composed on the brink of the tremendous precipice, at whose base lie scattered huge fragments of rock, that have rolled thundering down the steep: and she enjoys the idea of the powerful earthquake which has thus transformed a scene formerly, as she supposes, fair and fertile, into one of horrible desolation.

Yet I do not believe that when she enjoys contemplating the signs of the passage of a gigantic, devastating force, she ultimately arrests her attention on the thought of the destruction caused by it. Life, happiness and order seem to me ever to animate the furthest views that present themselves to her gaze. These views, are, indeed, usually so vague and confused, that she is not herself aware of their nature. But her aspirations towards some grander order of things than the visible one never cease. She cannot form the slightest image respecting that order: she has merely a presentiment that it will satisfy all her wishes, and particularly give full indulgence to her craving to launch into infinity. Not able then to nourish herself with images of this order, she pacifies her eager desire to see it accomplished, by a sort of negative gratification, when she contemplates scenes that remind her that the order of things at present established shall pass away, and that it shall be dissolved by a power whose amazing force can readily make it be succeeded by one commensurate to her vast desires. The scenes of partial havoc which she beholds, seem to her to indicate a ruler who marches to the accomplishment of his designs with bold, unmeasured steps, not bestowing a minute care on perfecting the order of things at present existing, since it is only one of the transitory states through which he decrees that nature and mankind shall pass, ere they shall be subjected to a final and unspeakably glorious system of order.

Filled with mysterious aspirations which prompt her to look

down on the order and beauty prevailing in the physical and moral world, imagination admires the ruthless conqueror as the minister of him, who ordains that destruction shall go forth, to prepare the way for the fulfilment of his lofty purposes. In like manner she views the ruinous earthquake and the overthrowing tempest, as mighty events that forward his great designs.

§ 6.—It appears to me that imagination is a faculty which, were we entirely under its government, would aspire to teach us the whole order of the universe as exhibited in times past, present and to come, from presuming that it must agree with the types of it which this faculty can produce within itself.

We commonly see ignorant people, greatly under the influence of their imagination, who trust to their presentiments as to an oracle; who believe that they have an intuitive knowledge of events that pass far from them; and who think that they can foresee the arrival of those which they wish to occur; merely because their ardent desire appears to them an assurance of their accomplishment. Nay, they not unfrequently persuade themselves that it depends with them to ensure the success of an undertaking, mistaking an eager wish to see it fulfilled for the power to execute it.

These observations lead me to remark another contrast between reason and imagination in their manner of proceeding.

Both love order, or a system of things harmoniously combined, but, in respect to the affairs of the world, reason seeks to discover the order that does or might reign in them by an attentive observation of facts, their connexion and results. If she direct her glance inward, to take a view of the mind of her possessor, it is only that she may become thoroughly acquainted with human nature, as being at once the subject which her laws ought to regulate, and the source whence they are to emanate.

Imagination, on the contrary, troubles herself little with trying to enlighten her ignorance of the human mind, either by an attentive study of its inward or outward operations; for she thinks that she sees within herself images which represent faithfully what it is, and that she has a sure presentiment of the laws which preside over its destiny.

This difference exhibits reason as a faculty which likes to study realities, and imagination as one which, if she be not controled by reason, contents herself with illusions. But though she must be kept in strict subordination, she ought not to be despised, or deprived of her energy: if reason be not held, by her, at that elevated point at which she can contemplate, with admiration, fine ideal archetypes of moral order, she will be led to give the preference to what is apparently useful, and this error will quickly engage her to fix her choice on what a cold spirit of calculation judges to be expedient.

Though imagination, if we be implicitly guided by her, sends us wildly wandering in search of illusions, it is a dangerous error to suppose, that she thus dazzles us falsely at a time when, animating us to support some noble cause, by the notion that it must triumph, because the eternal laws of order require that it should, she gives us force to verify our presentiment. On such occasions as these she ought only to be considered, I think, as clothing the immutable maxims of truth and justice in the form which best adapts them to our weakness. If there be any thing false in her manner of acting, it lies in this, that she is too apt to let those noble images vanish from before our sight, as if, indeed, they were but illusions. Could she engage us for ever resolutely to keep them in view, and to strain, continually, every nerve to make our own sentiments, and those of the persons who hearken to us, correspond to these glorious archetypes, impressing us with the conviction that, though we be continually disappointed, it is our duty still to strive to establish on earth the virtues which they exhibit, imagination, instead of being a false guide, would be a faithful light shining in darkness, to lead us on to the term whither we ought to tend.

It is reason's office, once she becomes penetrated with a sentiment of the beauty of these archetypes, and that she is convinced of their being true to the proportions required by the order of nature, to keep imagination, even when she begins to flag, steady to the contemplation of them, so that the mind which she has, by presenting them to its view, warmed with the love of virtue, and with a determination to obey her laws,

shall, with unshaken constancy, continue, throughout its whole career, faithful to the same principles, though it may, in the end, be forced to renounce the hope—which might originally have animated it to great exertions—of communicating to some portion of mankind sentiments similar to its own.

It is common to speak of the illusions which imagination furnishes to the young, and it cannot be doubted that she does frequently blind them by very dangerous ones. Thus, for instance, what fatal errors is not a youth liable to commit, when, under the influence of a fiery imagination, he seeks to produce some impracticable good, or acts with too much precipitation to bring about a good which he might effect in using caution and moderation.

The illusions wrought in youth by imagination have been so often and so fully discussed, that I think it needless to dwell on this subject. In the few remarks, therefore, which I am going to make, my principal design is to notice the exaggerations which, I think, may sometimes be attributed to those who speak of the illusions of imagination.

She sadly deceives the young when she flatters them with the hope that, because fortune smiles on the morning of their existence, it will ever continue to do so, and that they may lay their account to go joyfully through life without any care or trouble.

She deceives them cruelly when she hides from them the privations, the regrets, the despondency which will prey on them in their old age, if they do not, by a youth spent in laudable toil and labour, earn to themselves the advantage of looking back, with satisfaction, on their past life.

But when imagination excites the young to devote themselves to a life of business and fatigue for a good purpose, instead of meriting to be called a deceiver, should the hopes which she held out to them not be realized, she resembles the prudent father in the fable, who engaged his sons to cultivate their field by the hope of finding a treasure, and who by these means made them obtain a most abundant crop. She stirs them to enterprizes which will have their reward, though not in the manner in which she led them to look for it. They have the satisfaction to find that they have done right, and experience

teaches them that this satisfaction, independently of good or ill fortune, is the highest that they could have obtained had their projects been successful. They thence learn to persist in the same praiseworthy course, from motives that become every day purer.

When the young keep within the bounds which I have indicated, they are not in the main under an illusion, in seeking to embellish this world, as if great happiness were to be found in it, even though facts speak literally against them. To do what we can to make this world the abode of happiness, and then to submit, with patience, and without despondency, to the decrees of Providence, when it pleases it to visit us with afflictions, such is the duty imposed on us; 'tis, no doubt, to learn to fulfil it well that we are placed in this chequered scene.

Far greater is the illusion which the old allow to torment them, when they conclude that it is wise to pass mournfully through this world, as if it were a vale of sadness, to which it would be useless to try to give a more cheerful aspect.*

§ 7.—'Tis in respect to future time that imagination, when she becomes unbridled, pretends to the power of discovering written within herself, the course of events. In regard to the past, she makes little opposition to our consulting every document which can give us authentic information. Our interests, to whose influence, in spite of her lofty pretensions, she is greatly subject, impel her to occupy herself chiefly about the future, from its presenting the field in which they have to contend, and she yields easily to the hope of discovering in herself the types of what is contained in it, because of the utter darkness which precludes her gratifying, in any other manner, her wish to penetrate into its mysteries. She is calmer when she turns to past time, particularly as she can withdraw from a great portion of it the veil that covers it.

* It will be readily understood that, in counselling the old to endeavour to preserve a portion of those glowing hopes, and of the faculty to deck the world in brilliant colours, which peculiarly distinguish the young, I do not mean to say that they should be impelled to act thus by any more personal motive, than an indulgent sympathy with the latter; or that they should not carefully guard against the temptation to measure back their steps to earth, from forgetting that they are no longer young, nor fit receptacles of worldly pleasure.

She is induced to acquiesce the more freely in the consciousness of her utter incapacity to find within herself the types of the events which fill it, from having the hope to glean, from an historical acquaintance with it, the power to see in herself a faithful representation of its principal productions.

When she has enriched her thoughts with a great number of the images of what past time has produced, how much does she not delight in retracing them to the mind! For instance, she makes us exquisitely enjoy treading on what we call classic ground, where every object reminds us of memorable events, obscurely seen in the night of antiquity, but of which imagination presents us an image far more beautiful, and particularly far more sublime, than the reality would probably justify. She fills the immense interval that separates those events from our time, with a sort of vague glow, which makes them appear to lose themselves in infinity whether of time or space.

It is to be remarked, that the facility with which the images that she presents to us awaken in our breast the sense of infinity, furnishes the principal means that she posesses of elevating and delighting our mind. She further shows how active she is to extract, from past time, the essence of all that charmed us in it, by the pleasure with which she makes us look back on our infancy and adolescence. What sweets does she not pour over those periods of our existence; sweets that often they never in reality knew, but which, heedless of memory's true language, she is so pertinacious in attributing to them that, though it was for many ages the custom to treat children tyrannically, she always, till of late years, when reason has become vigilant to examine faithfully into facts, made most parents believe, that, in spite of the oppression which they then suffered, their childhood was the happiest time of their life, and that the tyranny which they exercised, in their turn, over their unfortunate children, did not hinder their enjoying a felicity surpassing that of the happiest grown up persons.

Thus does imagination labour continually, by the contemplation of the exterior world, to enrich herself with those types or representations of the moral scheme pervading it, and the events that have taken place in it, which she considers

that she ought to have. It is true that, when she has laid in the greatest abundance of images, she is not the nearer having an intuitive perception of what is, was, or is to be: she has only collected materials by which she may form, at will, ideal worlds. If, when she thus amuses herself, she be guided by reason and true feelings, she creates such, as shall appear to those who study them faithfully, to represent the passions and characters which act in real life, though the events and personages be fictitious. She gives, nevertheless, to what she represents, a kind of picturesque beauty, which makes it appear that the objects that she exhibits are not direct copies of real life, but rather those of the types of a beau ideal, analogous to real life, which she has obtained by the contemplation of it.

It may be further observed, that in general the more her compositions are of an elevated kind, the more the likeness which they bear is not immediately to real life. In her familiar works, such as comedies and many kinds of painting, she often does represent very exactly its physiognomy; though even then she less tries to charm the spectators by immediate copies of it, than by those of the impressions which it has made on their minds: it is true, that these impressions are to be reproduced exactly such as they were received, and therefore the language of comedies must often be completely the same as we are accustomed to hear in the world, or it would offend us, while other dramatic compositions, more particularly designed to correspond to that beau ideal of the world which we love to contemplate, please us better when the personages express their sentiments and passions in fine verses, or even in music.

In regard to paintings of familiar subjects, particularly portraits, we require an exact representation of the original rather than of a beau ideal. However, even portraits are not meant to raise an illusion in our mind, as if the original were present, which illusion would be the mark of their perfection, if their design were literally to re-produce his figure. They are intended, as it seems to me, to give a visible and exact form to the images left in our memory by his appearance, if we knew him; or, if we take interest in him without having known him,

to let us have the satisfaction of depositing, in our memory, images that resemble him. The original of the portrait being indeed always the object whose features it represents, we are naturally led to think that the use of it is to make him appear present though he be absent. Imagination is very prompt to confound the types of things, which she lays by in our mind, with what has a real existence. 'Tis not only from real life that she receives the impressions by means of which she composes her types, but her pleasure in seeing objects which furnish her with models for these compositions is such, that often she looks on them with as much pleasure as if they were images which, without our being aware of it, had existed in our mind, and which, by some magic power, we saw suddenly called into existence. 'Tis from such a motive, when she sees a faithful representation of some image which our memory cherishes, that she likes to persuade herself that it is not a copy of what is painted in our mind, but a really animated figure.

But notwithstanding these illusions; the vague, the melancholy pleasure, and the musing disposition with which we contemplate the portrait of a friend from whom distance or death separates us, explains sufficiently that we know we are looking, not at the artful representation of a living being, but at the visible expression of an image imprinted in our breast, and over which imagination casts an indefinite charm. When we go into a gallery of family pictures in which we take interest, we have, I think, a feeling similar to that that is excited in us, by our treading on the ground which has been long since the scene of great actions. In both cases the objects we behold serve to warm our imagination, and to render it active in opening to our view ideas of events and scenes that are now no more, but which it connects majestically with the present moment, by means of the sentiment of infinity that it awakens in our heart, and that makes us feel as being in some measure spectators of the ancient facts, of which the objects presented to our gaze remind us.

One proof of our always wishing to remember that the creations of imagination, which are exhibited to the eye, are representations of the types collected by the mind from the view of sensible objects, rather than copies which literally ex-

press those objects, is, that we do not love to see in them such exact likenesses of the human figure as would be produced, were the art of the sculptor and that of the painter united in the formation of them. The sculptor displeases us if he do not show that his figures correspond to ideal archetypes by their wanting colour, and the painter if he do not leave them without relief.(*a*)

§ 8.—While I am exposing my views relative to the operations of imagination, I shall take the opportunity of adding, on the subject of this faculty, and more particularly on its predilection for the fine arts, some further remarks which, though less proper than the foregoing to throw some light on my conceptions concerning the nature of man, and the analogies of his faculties with those of higher beings, will still contribute to render more perspicuous the notions which I have undertaken to explain, touching the scheme of moral order that is at length to preside over the destinies of mankind.

I have mentioned, cursorily, that imagination creates images analogous to every passion. This fact, I think, merits to be more particularly noticed.

Though imagination be a faculty which aspires to contemplating, within herself, the whole order of the universe, yet is she much less inclined to take immense views which can only offer indefinite combinations, than to fix her attention on a few, or even single images.*

By thus concentrating it, she enjoys the pleasure of seeing distinct objects; of recreating herself by an endless variety of them; and of warming, continually, the feelings, by her vivid and rapid creations. However, even in presenting to us isolated images, she still prompts us to aspire towards confounding our existence with a mysterious infinity, and gives us notice of her pretension to the possession of the power of unfolding to us all its depths.

Whenever a strong passion of any kind sets her in activity,

* On account of her propensity to contemplate continually distinct images, she does not seek to dive into any portion of future events except that which particularly interests her. But the facility with which she persuades us of her ability to unfold to us that portion, however vast and complicated may be its bearings, is sufficient to ascertain her proneness to believe that she can, with an unerring glance, descry what is wrapt up in the bosom of futurity.

she colours the entire universe so as to persuade us that the whole order reigning in it corresponds to that passion. Thus, warm and joyous emotions of love, dispose the lover to find far more beauties beaming throughout nature than those which strike an unimpassioned eye. In the coldest climate of the north, where only pale, scentless flowers mark the arrival of summer, he thinks that he sees it pouring from its lap all the perfumes of Arabia, and inviting him to taste the sweets of a delicious repose, in a bower of roses, beneath a starry sky so soft, so voluptuous, that the night would seem to have taken the place of the day on purpose to delight fond lovers with an agreeable obscurity.

Is fear the passion which agitates violently our bosom? With what tremendous phantoms does not every scene seem peopled! The light of day can scarcely convince us of their non-existence, and with the return of night they constantly re-assume a menacing form.

In like manner a profound grief clothes all nature in mourning, or, if it allow her to appear brilliant and joyous, it disposes us to wonder at her corresponding so little with our feelings.

This tendency of imagination to present to us an entire order of nature in harmony with the sensations which prevail in us, may be remarked from the first moment that this faculty begins to display itself in infants. A gloomy object that strikes a young infant with terror, seems to be one of the first things that usually excites this faculty in a remarkable manner; and the fright with which he is seized on beholding such an object, manifests that his imagination begins already to invest it with a sort of indefinite power and grandeur.

§ 9.—Having been led by my subject to touch on the workings of imagination, in the minds of young infants, I shall, before I quit this topic, remark that, though imagination receives its first impressions from something which naturally pleases or displeases infants in the objects which they behold, it soon begins to be painfully affected by what has an unusual appearance in the forms in which they take interest. For instance, a timid child of ten or twelve months old, and of quick, lively perceptions, is as much alarmed when his hand is strangely

discoloured or appears to be wounded, as though he were really hurt: in like manner, if he be remarkable for tender sensibility, he is distressed on observing any sudden change, which strikes him as sinister, take place in the aspect of a friend.

Another instance of a child's imagination being liable to be affected by an unexpected derangement of the order of things to which it is accustomed, may be derived from the apprehensions manifested by a timid infant, after it has begun to walk alone, on approaching suddenly the edge of an abyss. Children, it appears, have no instinct which warns them to avoid falling from heights, since it is well known, that, when they are too joyous in the sentiment of their existence to attend much to impressions made on them by outward objects, they long require to be closely watched, from the confidence with which they expose themselves to the most dangerous falls. But notwithstanding this fact, I have observed that timid children, of lively perceptions, soon learn to start back with terror from the brink of a precipice, because habit leads them to expect to see the ground constantly stretched out beneath their feet.

§ 10.—In respect to our employments, considered relatively to their intrinsic worth, 'tis imagination, generally speaking, that furnishes those which are the most fit to procure us a pure and elevated happiness, of a kind that is not immediately connected with the consciousness of having discharged our duty.

The highest happiness of all proceeds from those actions which we believe to be peculiarly acceptable to God, and, either in their immediate results useful to mankind, or else a triumph gained over our own wrong passions. But suppose, for a moment, that we had no wrong passions to surmount, and that all mankind were so virtuous and fortunate as to leave us without an opportunity to do good to any one, in that case the best employment which most men could make of their leisure moments, for the sake of tasting a happiness pure and refined, would be to cultivate one of the fine arts.* Now the most

* Some might be employed with equal advantage in penetrating into the mysteries of the material universe. But this study would not, for many, be productive of a permanent and lively satisfaction, because it would lose its interest for those who had reached the last limits to which knowledge had arrived, unless they were animated with the hope of advancing, by fresh discoveries, its further progress.

perfect character seems to me to be that of the man who, while he would willingly strain every nerve to lessen, as much as he could, the misery of this world, would know how to make himself supremely happy, did it contain none, and that he never, of course, had an opportunity to assume a sort of superiority over any of his fellow-creatures, by filling the part of a benefactor.

This appears to me a reason for the cultivation of the fine arts, not, certainly, by every individual, but by every people, for, as far as the perfecting of our character depends on the nature of our employments, the idea of perfection is only applicable to an entire nation. One, desirous to advance to a high state of improvement, ought to cultivate every art and profession to such a degree, as that it may throw, into the common mass of civilization, the due proportion of advantages which it is proper to produce. But individuals must confine themselves to one particular calling. For instance, though it be pernicious to a nation that the duty of doing good to the distressed be pushed in it to an exaggerated length, some individuals,—such as the sisters of charity,—make a most noble use of their time, in consecrating it entirely to the suffering part of humanity. In like manner, the cultivation of the fine arts should only occupy that portion of the national attention which can be bestowed on heightening happiness in a world, whose principal cares should ever be directed on the means of making the various conditions of mankind easy, and as free from misery as possible.

The cultivation of the fine arts, like every other species of occupation whose immediate object is to open, to him who pursues it, very exquisite sources of enjoyment, will enervate the mind and make it unfit for very daring efforts of virtue, if it have not an opportunity of being braced by the example and conversation of persons to whose character more hardy employments give a firmer tone.

The members of the nation too much addicted to the enjoyment of the fine arts, will grow corrupted and selfish, from learning to keep solely in view their own individual happiness. Even though they be conversant with noble sentiments and fine actions, it will only be for the sake of enjoying the beau

ideal that they present to them: persons in real life will appear to them as creatures too dull and material to be worthy of inspiring them with interest; or, if they be sometimes excited to wish to serve them, they will proportion their zeal to the elegance and the charms which they admire in them, not to their merit or necessities.

In a community, then, where the fine arts are cultivated, the greatest vigilance should be continually employed to prevent the prevalence of the fashion of attaching too high a price to their enjoyments.

Where they flourish within due bounds, they serve as an excellent corrective to that selfish, wrangling disposition,—incompatible with elevated sentiments of order,—which is engendered by a habit of studying our isolated, personal rights, and which reason, who loves to discuss them, is apt to foment.

The fine arts contribute to correct this disposition, because, as far as they treat of the feelings of the human heart,—and their principal province is to treat of them,—they represent mankind almost solely under that point of view in which all individuals appear as destined to undergo a great mutual influence, and to live, in a manner, for each other.

They deck authority in all its majesty, and a generous submission in all its devotedness; they teach us to sympathize with the emotions of an ardent, disinterested love, as well as with those of every other tender affection.

Sometimes, it is true, they invest wrong passions with attractions, but when they do, it is usually by blending with them something good or noble that really deserves esteem. Their appointed office is to make us feel the beauty and grandeur of a system of order agreeable to the laws of nature, and to impress us with the conviction of how noble a rank each person may fill in it, without quitting his place.

I admit, however, that, though the fine arts* exalt and warm in our breast those sentiments which place us in immediate relation with the public, by extolling every heroic sacrifice of self-interest to the public weal, as well as an implicit submission to the laws, or to the orders of superiors when the public

* I allude particularly to the art of historic painting.

weal requires it, yet they are prone to encourage such daring speculations, respecting the nature of the government adapted to promote the public weal, as could not often be reduced to practice.

In this respect, as well as in every other, reason ought to be vigilant to prevent the dictates of imagination from leading us into error; but it is, nevertheless, true that the latter renders us service when, by means of the fine arts, she makes the sentiment of our relations with our fellow-creatures, and of our having, in consequence, social duties to perform, reign paramount in our minds, instead of the notion of our own personal rights.

When imagination thus unfolds, in all their energy, our sentiments of civil and political order, she leaves to reason no other task but that of modifying and tempering them.

Imagination, if she be well directed in the exercise of the fine arts, tends remarkably, even though happiness be the sole immediate object of our pursuit, to make us conscious that virtue is the true source of unclouded felicity, in spite of the painful sacrifices that she sometimes demands. The fine arts often display these sacrifices in such an attractive light, that they warm those who consider the imaginary representation of them with admiration, impelling them to acknowledge that the power to make them is, by a just law of nature, one of the principal qualities which we must possess to become susceptible of real happiness.

Where the fine arts are judiciously cultivated, the characters of men and the events determined by them, acquire, by degrees, a great part of the elevation and beauty of the images by which real life is represented, in the ideal world that imagination is accustomed to create. The interval which separates that world from real life becomes, in consequence, greatly less, and is sometimes so completely annihilated, that the arts, even in conferring on the personages whom they form all the nobleness of character and graces of manner, by which they wish their finest productions to be distinguished, find living models that they may copy exactly.

By refining the taste of mankind, the fine arts open to social love and the wish to act right a much wider field for ex-

ercising all those good qualities which they put in activity; since we have far more opportunity to procure to our neighbour pure and delicate joys, as also to avoid paining his sensibility, in a highly polished society than in a barbarous one.

The persons, however, endued with the most splendid talents for the fine arts, should avoid the fatal and common error of priding themselves on an organization that gives them an exquisite relish for very refined happiness, as though they derived from it that title to respect which the steady exercise of their duties, often perhaps rude and painful, can alone confer on them. Though a taste for the fine arts, well directed, offers to him who possesses it a wider range, in some respects, for the exercise of virtues than that which lies within the compass of minds of a coarser mould, yet do these latter often possess advantages by which their defects are compensated. Frequently, for instance, are they capable of serving their neighbour with a more devoted ardour, because they are not so much tempted to occupy themselves about their own pains and pleasures; and, though the services that they render him may relate to necessities which affect equally the most ignorant and highly educated part of mankind, yet are they sometimes such as require the greatest sacrifices on the part of the doer of them; while he who receives them is forced to acknowledge, even where his sentiments are highly refined, that the person to whom he owes them is a far more valuable friend to him than he would be, did he merely know how to procure him the elegant enjoyments consonant to a polished taste.

§ 11.—I have endeavoured to draw the attention of the reader on the fact of imagination being prone to believe, that she can find within herself sure notices of what future time is to bring forth. I have also bidden him remark the pleasure which she takes in seeing the mind store up in its memory a great knowledge of past events, since she thus recreates herself by launching into the abyss of time elapsed, or by modelling ideal scenes, but more picturesque and interesting, on those which the world presents to her gaze.

I shall now request the reader to arrest his thoughts on the notions which we form respecting the relation in which created

beings, whose minds have attained the highest possible perfection, both intellectual and moral, stand with the universe, considered as the object of their contemplations, and to draw some comparison between their mode of connecting themselves with it, and the effects produced on mortals by imagination.

The notion that suits my apprehensions of them is, that they not only see within themselves clear types of the whole creation, such as it has been through the past and is to be through the future time, but that they also can contemplate images within their minds, of the infinite variety of destinies which every different combination of events would prepare for every creature.

I judge, too, that all the images that they survey fill them with unspeakable pleasure, on account of the exquisitely harmonious spirit breathing through them, and that more particularly the types which represent to them the actual creation, bear, throughout, so much the impression of order and harmony, that, even supposing them only to see a part of them, they could complete the whole series from discerning what the plan, reigning in the types in their possession, required the remainder to be in order to complete it.

Their conviction, I judge, that the creation is the work of perfect goodness and unerring wisdom, reposes on as self-evident principles as those which guide reason in exploring the labyrinths of the exact sciences.

Imagination would also willingly persuade mortals, that her judgments are founded on principles whose undeniable truth must be evident to every mind to which they are clearly unfolded. When she is strongly affected by a sentiment of admiration or abhorrence, and wishes to communicate to bystanders her impressions, how does she labour to arrive at self-evident principles whence her judgments could be plainly deduced. Her usual object is to endeavour to demonstrate them to be conformable to the eternal laws of right, order, beauty, or harmony. Since it is impossible for her to prove her thesis with mathematical precision, she strives at least to blind the spectators to this fact, by inflaming their minds with images and sentiments congenial to her views, and that shall

determine them to adopt them with universal applause, as though their justness had been fully manifested. Hence she abounds in metaphors and tropes, in various enticing figures of speech, and in inebriating bursts of eloquence.

I have already discussed her pretension to the faculty of surveying at once the whole creation throughout the entire duration of time. I have also remarked the delight that she takes in creating ideal scenes, which are modelled, no doubt, on the existing world, because she can have no images but what are derived from it. However, she would willingly, if she could, invent scenes entirely dissimilar from any thing that occurs in the known creation, as I think she proves by the wild, grotesque views which she sometimes opens to us of other worlds, nor have I a doubt that she would gladly transpose the universe into as many different forms, and vary as frequently the nature and destiny of every living creature, as the types deposited in the minds of the beings who see all things of which the existence is possible, would admit of.

The creatures on whom their Creator has conferred such unlimited knowledge of the beings contained in the universe, and such a boundless sensibility to their joys and sorrows, as that they can personally distinguish and feel for each of them, love, I conclude, every individual in the world as warmly as he loves himself, but not in the same manner.

They enter into his feelings, I presume, in like mode as that in which imagination, where we have a strong attachment, engages us to take part in those of the beloved object, with this difference, that their capacity to do so is equal to their inclination. They are not seated in the centre of the individuals whom they regard, as each mortal is in the centre of himself. They look at him in a manner analogous to that in which, with the aid of imagination, we view our neighbour, that is, in observing first the outward appearance, and penetrating through that into the soul. But as they have no personal wants to distract their attention from the interest which they take in other beings; as they can sympathize, not only with the feelings of the mind that exhibits signs of its emotions through the medium of a well known and dearly loved form, but can also through each change of form still identify souls, so as to know

the peculiar *I* whose happiness is desired by the self-love of each of them, I conceive that the social love of these exalted beings is, conformably to the natural order of things, full as strong as their self-love.

The conclusion which I wish to draw from these reflections on the faculties which—as I presume—are possessed by superior beings, and on the analogies which exist between their results and the effects of imagination is, that the latter is probably some very confused, feeble participation that has been made to us of an attribute that distinguishes the highest orders of beings; nor do I suppose that imagination serves more to give us an insight into the advantages which that attribute ensures to those who possess it, than do eyes so feeble as barely to distinguish light from darkness, to point out to the attention of their owner the beauties of a richly diversified landscape.

If our imagination be extremely limited in regard to the enjoyments it can procure us, it is certainly not bounded in respect to the wishes which it inspires to us. It is like a person who is poor, not on account of having but a very small propriety, but because, though he has a vast demense, he has not the means of cultivating it.

All the reflections that I have made known to the reader, respecting the nature both of imagination and of that presumed attribute in superior beings, to which her pretensions would fain assimilate her, lead me to conclude that any radical defect in our natural capacity which unfits us for penetrating to the first self-evident grounds of the eternal system of moral order, and which disables us from comprehending infinity both of time and space, lies probably in the faculty of imagination.

'Tis it that by its boundless hopes and pretensions, contrasted with the extreme circumscription of its power, keeps our mind in a constant state of fermentation, exciting it to develope, with energy, its faculties, and often, obedient to passion's influence, leading it grievously astray: till at last we discover, that though we cannot stamp conviction on every understanding, in analyzing into their first elements the eternal laws of order, yet that we have within us a monitor, which, if we diligently enlighten it and then humbly obey, will make us feel assured, by the holy peace that it will diffuse throughout

our bosoms, that we do not deviate greatly from the line of conduct which we would gladly follow, were the abstract elements of the laws of right order made known to us by clear demonstration, and were we able in the most minute, practical details, to determine the course which they dictate to us.

'Tis the imperfect state of our imagination, which urges us onward in that process, by means of which all our intellectual and moral faculties shall at last be vigorously and intensely unfolded, and at the same time, in the midst of the most lively action, keep strictly obedient to the eternal laws of order.

If imagination have such vast and unerring bearings as I suppose, in the highest order of created beings, it would appear that in them reason is a faculty that has no employment, since by means of that attribute which the want of a more appropriate term obliges me to call imagination, they possess a thorough insight into the laws which regulate the universe, and are intuitively acquainted with every species of knowledge.

I think it indeed probable that various single faculties of such perfect creatures would alone suffice to overflow their minds with a clear perception of immutable truths, and of the unalterable nature of order; but I think it probable also that the combination of them all, in imparting to them the same knowledge, forms within them an ineffably delightful concert.*

However, I shall not dwell longer on conjectures concerning the nature of the powers to enjoy an overflowing tide of felicity, possessed by beings so immeasurably above the reach of our conceptions.

As to the more imperfect creatures who, though far our superiors in virtue and happiness, are still, perhaps, but one step removed from us on the ascending scale, conducting toward intellectual and moral perfection, I judge that reason is greatly stronger in them than in the men the most remarkable for their ability to exercise that faculty, and that it is incomparably

* In hazarding some conjectures on what appears to me a perfect state of existence, I have, from a dread of mentioning our heavenly father with too familiar a tone, confined my remarks solely to the highest class of created beings. I think it right, however, to avow that they equally explain the few notions that I have ventured to form concerning the attributes of Almighty God, as I conclude that created beings, arrived at their fullest perfection, are exact images of him.

quicker in arriving at the demonstration of every truth, for the attainment of which the other mental powers and the senses afford it sufficient data. I think it probable too that imagination in them is so much rectified and enlarged, that she can at least distinguish those first principles of moral truth, by the following of which, into all their consequences, it can be demonstrated, that the system of order to which the universe is formed to correspond, which shall promote, at last, the perfection of mankind, and probably of other creatures, is, when fully developed in practice, more propitious than any other towards the advancement of virtue and happiness: though perhaps, she will not equally have an unerring insight into the necessity of allowing creation to pass through the exact process it is at present undergoing—in which so much misery and disorder prevail—ere it shall be arranged under a system of order relatively perfect.

I conclude, however, that among those glorious, yet imperfect beings, an inequality proportionate to what subsists here still remains between reason and imagination; so that the former is considerably the more advanced. Imagination, probably, as reason does here, often only arrives at the knowledge of fundamental truths, by a process which she finds tedious and difficult: often perhaps, she is tempted, by partial considerations, to lose sight of those unerring maxims on which she should keep her gaze steadily fixed, for the right regulation of the mind: and reason may have ample employment in constantly recalling her attention to them.

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## NOTES TO THE SECOND CHAPTER.

*(See page 292.)*

(a) We like to see, in some of the compositions of the fine and imitative arts, direct copies of nature, nor could I trace an exact line of demarcation between such compositions, and those productions of the same arts, whose immediate means of pleasing consist in enriching our mind with images agreeable to it, or representing those that it possesses. I doubt even that an exact line of that kind exists. I shall, however, mention some cases in which, it appears to me, that we can clearly determine from which of these sources our pleasure flows.

In the historical or fictitious subjects, by which, as far as I recollect, the fine arts have interested me—I except some pictures of a religious tendency which more seem to make a real scene present to us—our pleasure, I think, arises from observing the sensible representation of those images of the beau ideal that exist in the artist's mind, and from adorning our imagination with similar ones. Thus we long continue to gaze with pleasure and admiration at the group of the Laocoon, because it strikes us solely as being a representation of the beau ideal which we conceive of a father and children in such a dreadful situation. Did it appear to us faithfully to represent a scene of that kind which had really taken place, we would turn away from it with horror.

In gazing on the representation of landscapes, particularly in painting, we enjoy, on the contrary, the idea that we are beholding the copies of nature's archetypes, so that the highest merit which the painting of a landscape can have is to convey to us the illusion that we are looking on a natural rural scene. We are also satisfied that human figures, where they are surveyed in perspective as the accessories of a landscape, should appear to us living.

Poetry descriptive of rural scenery, is more at liberty to refer its power of charming us to the sentiments which it awakens of a beau ideal. We see the descriptions which it offers to us pervaded by the spirit of poetry; nor do we wish the words imitative of the sounds which, in our country habitations we are accustomed to hear, to be very exact imitations of them. They please us better when they are softened down and co-ordinated by the elements of harmony reigning in the poet's mind.

He has the power of affecting, in his descriptions, various senses; of making their enjoyments blend exquisitely and tastefully together; he can also, by an intermixture of touching traits of sentiment, breathe in some sort through his compositions a rational soul; and he has further this advantage over the painter, that he gives to our thoughts an impulsion causing them at once to expand through as immense a scene as the natural one that is the subject of his verse, because he does not copy but describe it, while the painter is forced to let them rest, at first, on the contracted dimensions of his canvas: yet our imagination, in representing to us the beauties of the country, requires to spread abroad unconfined. It is, therefore, easy to conceive why the most immediate pleasure arising from a poetical rural description consists in the consciousness of its enriching our mind by images, referring to a beau ideal, while the more we see in a painted landscape an exact copy of the beauties of nature, the more we are pleased with it.

We are partly determined to consider paintings of human figures as the expression of images which our acquaintance with real life had stamped on our minds, and those of inanimate nature as immediate copies of their originals, by the inability of the painter to imitate the signs of life with such truth as that his creations, when closely viewed, should appear like living beings.

Two causes, besides, engage us to make this distinction.

First—Our respect for the vital principle which animates the human frame. This respect is such, that we do not wish the painter or sculptor to assume the appearance of having really re-created the soul of the fellow-creature whose image he offers to our view. Were it possible that he could effect such an exact, living representation of him, as that, on a near examination, we could not distinguish the image from the original, we might, indeed, contemplate his work with the interest of wonder and curiosity, but I believe that, leaving these emotions aside, it would pain and offend us. I am sure, at least, that works of such a kind would never rank high among the inventions of the fine arts.

Secondly—Our inability to give intimations in our landscapes of our having learned, from the contemplation of nature, to conceive more glorious images of charms which might invest her than those which she actually displays. A sweetly rising or setting sun, a richly variegated country and a clear expanse of water, present us with beauties of the highest order, the beau ideal of which our imagination cannot transcend, and which our finest paintings are unspeakably deficient in expressing. We do not then ask the landscape painter to embellish nature; for the superficial, accessory ornaments which imagination and taste sometimes engage him to lavish on his compositions, are not, in this discussion, worth taking into consideration: We know that in important matters he can convey to us but a feeble notion of nature's charms, and we therefore confine ourselves to demanding of him that he shall use his utmost endeavours to render them in faithful copies.

I must, however, remind the reader that I have been led into this discussion simply by the desire to illustrate my ideas on the propensity of imagination continually to labour to enrich herself with agreeable, harmonious images, derived from the contemplation of the sensible world. Whether the productions of the fine arts induce her first to look in on herself, and enjoy the view of the types of the outward world treasured within her, to which these productions correspond, or the store of which they augment; or whether they immediately engage her to call to mind the external objects that they represent, it is, in either case, equally certain that the ultimate pleasure which she takes in the compositions of the fine arts, flows from her finding herself enriched by them, with a number of captivating and harmonious types, analogous to the views that the world offers to her attention, as well as to the feelings which our mode of surveying it has excited in us, and which are in direct relation with her.

# BOOK VIII.

SUBJECT.

*CONJECTURES RELATIVE TO A FUTURE STATE.*

## CHAPTER I.

CONTENTS.

REASONS FOR FORMING SOME CONJECTURES, RESPECTING THE MORAL CONNEXION WHICH SUBSISTS BETWEEN THIS WORLD AND MORE DISTANT PARTS OF THE UNIVERSE.

In the course of the foregoing part of this work, I have often alluded to conjectures to which I attach some degree of faith, namely—that there are other worlds as well as this, whose inhabitants are destined gradually to work out the relative perfection of their character.

I have also hinted, that it seems to me probable that the happy issue of their efforts to attain this end, is greatly dependent on the success with which the nations on earth shall labour to raise themselves to the summit of a virtuous prosperity.

I shall now proceed to detail my motives for indulging such opinions.

I have been principally led to do so, by considering men as portions of a national corps, rather than as isolated individuals.

The idea that this world is a prey to multifarious evils, because it neglects to govern itself by laws, the observation of which would happily submit the multitude of mortals, swarming on the face of the globe, to one virtuous system of civil polity, enables me to assign a satisfactory reason for the miseries which overwhelm it; for I perceive, that the experience of the infinite number of ills occasioned by the diverse manners in which they go astray from the true system of social order, will, at last, teach mankind to discern it clearly, and conform themselves steadily to it, from having a full knowledge of its value. On the contrary, if I suppose this world

to be merely a place of trial for each individual, and not to be susceptible of being rendered itself the abode of well constituted happiness, I can discern very little of the advantages to be produced by all the strange and afflictive scenes passing in ill-governed countries, otherwise than as my personal experience makes me acquainted with them. It may, perhaps, tell me that many events which, at the time of their arrival were a matter of lamentation for me, have proved in the end salutary, either by causing some unexpected good fortune, or by teaching me to distinguish the real joys of virtue from the false ones of vanity, and by making me acquire sufficient wisdom to prefer the former. I may also, perhaps, recognize that there are a few persons to whose virtue the ills of life prove a purifying furnace.

But when I look abroad on the great mass of mankind, I scarcely see any thing which denotes that the various ills that afflict them, are sent to them for their good.

Did I see any such design in them, it would be either in consequence of perceiving that they serve for trials to strengthen the virtue of individuals, or else that they engage them to exercise their sagacity in discovering the means to render themselves as happy as possible, by eluding, with address, all the dangers that threaten them.

But it does not appear that they are intended to improve their virtue, for, in general, nothing tends more to degrade the character of a people, than to be oppressed and miserable.

The use of them is not either to teach individuals to have a prudent care not to compromise their own security, nor to engage them to study the means of assuring to themselves a happy existence, in the midst of all the troubles and calamities which they see around them, for this is exactly the fault which every good mind ought principally to avoid, in a misgoverned country, where the people groan beneath cruel burdens. 'Tis because in such countries most persons confine themselves to the care of their own private interest, and flatter the ruling party to render it favourable to them, that it becomes so easy for unprincipled men in power to govern the mass of the people with a rod of iron. Though when we see an entire nation in a flourishing, happy state, we are led to admire it, as sup-

posing it to be governed by respectable, virtuous principles, what inclines us to admire individuals, from attributing to them such principles is, not the apparent prosperity of their situation, but the proofs that we see of their being always ready to sacrifice their own weal to that of the public.

To conclude, the belief that this world is a scene in which men are destined solely to regard themselves as a collection of individuals, whose duty it is to strive to obtain an absolute, isolated perfection, allows of our having clear ideas of the principal kind of virtuous sentiments which are to animate good men after a glorious resurrection, but it does not admit of our making any rational conjecture on the form in which these sentiments will be called into action, and the circumstances wherein they will be displayed. Yet is it necessary that we should be able to make, on this interesting subject, conjectures satisfactory to our understanding, in order to give to our sentiments of natural religion a regular, firm basis, and to stimulate us to seek to improve our minds in the mode that shall best render our conduct conducive to the reign here below of happiness, and virtue.

'Tis the belief that mankind, amidst all their wanderings, are still tending towards the perfection of the social system, which leads me to think that I see a portion of the moral plan of the creation large enough to enable me to form some well founded conjectures on its general structure. If, after unnumbered errors and the lapse of many ages, mankind, possessed at last of a thoroughly enlighted reason, and made wise by a sad experience, are to know how to govern themselves, so that the nations, in general, shall rise to the full dignity of their character, and live together in fraternal union, this world will then have been the seat wherein an immense system of education will have conducted mankind to all the perfection of which, with their present organization, they are susceptible.

Supposing then the same individual men to exist as long as the world, they would commence in a state of savage ignorance, and arrive, at length, at the highest pinnacle of virtue and civilization, after having been taught to value it by such painful lessons as they could not easily forget.

But the same men do not live from the beginning to the end of time.

Yet the virtues which adorn society are only a combination of those of individuals, and the reason why it is such an advantage to perfect the arts of national government, is because it is the means of improving, to the utmost, the virtue and happiness of individuals.

As individuals then are continually perishing and succeeding each other, it follows that the education of which I suppose this world to be the theatre, though very complete in itself, if the same persons always rested to benefit by it, is exceedingly defective relatively to those who receive it. Each individual only acquires, by means of it, such a little particle of experience, as often turns to no account for him, or even to a wrong one; since it sometimes leads a man of the clearest discernment to a quite opposite mode of reasoning from what he would perceive to be a just one, had he time to make fuller observations on the results of the various undertakings of mankind.

Ignorant persons rest, for many generations, as untaught as their ancestors, while those born in a corrupted state of society, however long their life may be, usually descend to the grave, without having acquired any principles superior to the depraved ones, which they imbibed in their early years.

Even the persons who may live after the world is come to the full maturity of civilization, will only have been made perfectly wise by the knowledge of their ancestors' experience; and, though it may be sufficient to open their eyes on the duty of upholding their own dignity, and of labouring for the general good of mankind, it cannot be supposed that their attachment to the laws of reason and equity will be so very deeply rooted as it would have been, had they lived through all the diverse revolutions which mankind will have undergone, and acquired thus, from their own personal experience, the conviction that the good of each individual ought to be confounded with that of all his fellow-creatures.

When we add to these considerations, that of the immense number of mortals, who are snatched from the world before they can have reaped any benefit from the education given to

its inhabitants, we are struck by the idea that, though the plan of moral order which is to be accomplished in this world, be a majestic one, it is utterly inadequate to giving to all the human beings called into existence, the discipline which might perfectly form their character.

There is, if I may be allowed the observation, such a profusion of persons employed, just that a practical system of moral perfection may be wrought out, which will only include the smaller number of them, that it seems as if the important matter were to erect a fine social edifice in the world, and that, as to the individual persons who exist in it, they are only to be considered as materials possessed of no other value than what they derive from the place which they fill, so that the power who presides at this construction, casts them away when they do not serve his purpose, as the mason does all the refuse of the stones which he employs in a building.

We are, however, certain that the finest social system derives all its importance from the improvement, which the character of each distinct person acquires under it. When we see, therefore, a great number of ages consecrated to conducting one education, from its beginning to its highest perfection, we are strangely perplexed: fancying to ourselves, that we behold a most ingenious and apparently useful machine, which, however, on a near survey, seems unfit to serve any purpose, since, instead of being composed of one coherent matter, it is formed of an infinite number of detached atoms, nicely arranged so as to appear united.

I do not think that we can account for such a quantity of little fragments of immortal destinies being put together in such a manner, as to appear to be all one series of causes and effects relating to the same beings, otherwise than by supposing that we only see one wheel of a great complicated machine, all of whose different parts act in concert to attain the one object.

According to this conjecture, if our system of existence here below, work out an education which would be complete did it all regard the same beings, other worlds, by adding their action to that of this life, and by doing as much as it for the improvement of the myriads of beings who appear for an instant in it,

will effect the education of them all as well as if each world had received, in the beginning, one set of inhabitants, destined never to quit it, till they had reached the highest point of perfection which they were capable of attaining.

Our imagination and feelings are prompt to give us notice, that the functions of this earth consist in the thorough education of one race of men, of whom the various generations that in turns possess her are the representatives: the pleasure which they awaken in us on beholding the theatre of any ancient, remarkable event, is as lively as though the sight of it stirred up a reminiscence of matters that had interested ourselves in the early ages of our existence, or recalled, at least, to our memory, the history of ancestors so much indentified with us that their concerns were immediately ours; while our thirst of glory, our eagerness to prolong, throughout all time, the existence of our country and family, prove that our imagination and feelings engage us, whilever this world shall last, to look on it as our home.

The primitive structure of each class of beings—as I judge from what is observable on earth—is never to change in any world, as long as the present natural order of things subsists; for, whatever improvement the progress of civilization may cause in the character of men, those who may live after human societies shall be carried to their highest perfection, will not be, on coming into existence, of a nature superior to that of the infants born among their unenlightened ancestors.

We may also judge that the relative position, morally speaking, of the different globes continues always the same. The functions to be falfilled in this world after its societies shall be perfected, will be much superior to what they were when it only contained ignorant and barbarous men, and we may justly hope that the other worlds which act along with it, will also have made as great a progress.

At all times this earth is a place where the moral education, whose design is to teach intelligent beings to govern themselves, is to have its commencement.

The intent of this education being to lead us to form sound notions of good and evil, and to make us wise by the experience of the fruits which they produce, this object cannot be

attained without the aid of memory; therefore, having no recollection of a past state of existence, we are to conclude that we are only at the first entry of the kind of life which belongs to free agents. When we pass into another world, we must suppose that we retain enough of memory of the present one, to preserve our principles, remember the conclusions which we may have drawn from our experience, and retain our principal affections.

If the conjectures which I have advanced concerning a future state, be well founded, we may infer from them, that the best men will not pass immediately from this world to the highest state of felicity and perfection prepared for them. It seems probable, that they will have to go through other states of being, much more glorious than their existence upon earth, though far short of the last term of their improvement.

Were the perfection of mankind to be wrought out solely by the events of this life, I have remarked, that it would appear necessary for the one generation to remain in it until, from a state of barbarity, it had been conducted to its highest perfection. I have also observed, that in that case the preference which it would have learned to give to good, in opposition to evil, would probably proceed from principles more deeply engraved in the heart of individuals, than are commonly those of the most enlightened persons. It is, at all events certain, that the advantages of a high state of civilisation are counterbalanced by some disadvantages.

Men, in such a state, never almost acquire that invincible intrepidity in braving pain and danger which, among barbarous people, many persons exhibit.

Even the distribution of labour which takes place among them, tends to render their character, in many respects, defective.

As the calling forth of several of our good qualities depends on the nature of our occupations, there are few of them which are not more favourable than others to the developement, in us, of some species of merit: of course, the persons entirely engrossed by one kind of occupation, will remain in want of that species of improvement which a mixture of other employments would enable them to acquire. To illustrate my mean-

ing, I shall choose, for instance, the occupation which seems the most adapted to making us know and love our various duties; I mean scientific or literary pursuits.

Those who attend to them cannot, in general, do it with sufficient profit, unless they consecrate their whole time to them. They are thus forced to choose a plan of life entirely adapted to their own tastes, and they have little opportunity to practice that renunciation of self which is often familiar to the most ignorant persons, whom we see not unfrequently devote themselves to the care of their friends and their family, or the service of the sick and infirm, with an ardour which makes them totally forgetful of their own ease.

Many of the men entirely occupied with the culture of their mind, would be ready, no doubt, if the occasion required it, to abandon this beloved employment, and to dedicate all their time to offices very contrary to their taste, for the satisfaction of doing good to their neighbour. Still, however, the exercise of good dispositions which had never before been put into practice, would cause them to feel infinitely more pain and embarrassment than they would have done, had they always been in the habit of calling them into action. It appears to me therefore that, however their solitary meditations may have served to impregn their minds with noble sentiments, they are still in want of a further discipline or education, to put them in some respects entirely on a level with those who, in active life, are accustomed to postpone their own satisfaction to that of others.

Perceiving then that the nature of our occupations leaves some characters imperfect in one respect, and some in another; and presuming that the business with which this world would have been charged, had a detached, absolute task been assigned to it—namely, that of conducting the character of its inhabitants to the highest point of perfection suited to their organization—must be fulfilled somewhere, ere men can enter on their highest state of existence, I judge that, previously to their admission to the enjoyment of that state, the most virtuous mortals must learn to exercise every different virtue with at least as much facility, as though, from having been placed on earth from the beginning of time to the fullest consumma-

tion of the plan of order that is to be accomplished here, they had, in unnumbered different circumstances, become familiarized with the practice of the most opposite virtues.*

I do not suppose that the work of our education is to cost near the time or trouble which it is to be presumed it would have done, had the different worlds been separated in the use made of them, and been charged, each, with finishing, from beginning to end, the education of a distinct race of beings. Scripture,—in whose promises I have the fullest faith,—assures us, on the contrary, that, after an infinitely shorter trial here on earth, the righteous shall be received into mansions of unspeakable bliss.

Though I presume that good men, ere they can enjoy the fulness of felicity, must advance so far towards perfection, as to be fully as forward as the point to which earth would conduct its inhabitants, by exposing them to the most contrary vicissitudes of fortune, yet, I do not infer that they will ever exactly arrive at that point. They may be far more gloriously constituted in a superior world, and yet receive in it a discipline that shall amply supply any deficiencies in the education given to them on earth.

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## CHAPTER II.

### HYPOTHESIS CONCERNING THE STATE OF THE JUST AFTER THEIR RESURRECTION.

§ 1.—I shall now venture to offer an hypothesis concerning the local habitations and the condition of the righteous who, after death, are admitted into happier regions.

* I own that I think it very improbable that the present organization of man, even were his disposition and faculties improved to the very utmost, would, agreeably to the course of nature—for I do not speak of special dispensations of Providence—allow of his passing at once from this world, into a state of the fullest perfection prepared for him.

As to the nature of that state, reason—implicitly, as I think, sanctioned by revelation—induces us to believe that the glorified beings received into it, without being confined to any particular globe, fill, in the immensity of space, the office of ministering spirits, who are prompt to execute the Almighty's orders in all parts of the universe.

In doing so, I shall thread my way by the combined lights of scripture and of nature; though I would not presume to erect any conjecture on the former, which did not evidently rest on the authority of its words, I think myself warranted in making use of its revelations, to arrive at a better understanding of the hints given by nature, on the design of the creation.

Nature leads us to believe—from reasons which I have already explained,—that the future abode of mortals lies amidst those worlds scattered in the firmament.

Scripture tells us, that the just shall rise from the dead, clothed in glorified bodies.

I therefore conjecture, that they are destined to revive in those pure, brilliant suns* that stud the heavens,—whose inhabitants, it is to be presumed, must have far more glorious bodies than those which invest the sojourners on this earth,—and not in the opaque planets, equally terreatrious with our own globe.

Scripture further tells us, that the righteous, after their resurrection, shall be free from the dominion of sin; that they shall be received among angels and the spirits of just men made perfect.

Nature,—as I interpret her voice,—assures us that the long education which the inhabitants of this world go through, to teach them to understand the worth of public virtues, and with enlightened wisdom to practise them, has advantageous bearings on their lot beyond the grave. If so, it must affect the future destiny of the just. Those virtues then are still to be exercised by the just in heaven.

Christianity, however—though it always prescribes to us the accomplishment of the known duties of our station—flourished a long time in the world without directing the attention of mortals on their public duties, and before they were understood; yet, during that period, it promised a blessed resurrection to pious christians, of whom we have reason to hope that very many existed.

* The diversity of the appearance of the fixed stars seems to me to sanction the notion, that the inhabitants of these celestial regions are far from being all at the same point of perfection.

Since they passed then into happier worlds without having knowledge of public virtues, yet that we have reason to believe, that the long education that mankind go through to engage them to acquire them, shall, in a future life, have a beneficial influence on the destiny of the good men who shall have fully profited of the instruction, which that education, when perfected, is proper to communicate, we must conclude that the social polity of the just, after their resurrection, has been for many ages of a very defective kind.

Arguing from these premises, I infer that the perfection attributed, by scripture, to the spirits of just men, signifies that they are purified from the stains of sin, not that they are arrived at the summit of their moral and intellectual perfection.

I also think it probable that the angels into whose society they are admitted, are the original inhabitants of those globes, into which the just enter after their resurrection, and I judge that the mind of these angels does not receive, sooner than that of the companions sent to them from earth, the full developement which an acquaintance with public virtues could communicate to it. Otherwise they could instruct these companions in them, who would soon, by their means, supply the deficiency of their earthly education.

The condition of the inhabitants of these blessed abodes is then, according to my manner of reasoning, defective, though some of them have never fallen, and though the others have been restored—by the blood of our Saviour—to a state of purity. To enable them to supply that defect in their social constitution, I judge that they wait with patience, till a sufficient number of persons from earth, versed in the mode of uniting public to private virtues, and habituated to holding both in strict subordination to the precepts of christianity, shall arrive and enlighten them on the method of giving to their own minds a full, orderly developement.

The better to form a general abstract conception of the nature of that developement, let us, from considering what our own race would have been had it never fallen, and by marking the characteristic which would then have distinguished it from the class of just men who, in the actual state of things, arrive at the fulness of earthly perfection, determine what is the

mental advantage which persons in a state of virtue have over those in a state of innocence.

This advantage, I have already—in the first book of this work,—specified in what it consists, but it is advisable here again to describe it.

It does not consist in holy purity and a thorough devotion to the will of God; for our first parents, while they were sinless, had these blessed attributes in perfection.

It consists in a most intense energy possessed by the virtuous; which energy, widely displaying itself in an orderly form, induces them to arrange, for their own government, social and individual, an immense code of laws, and combine them harmoniously together. Thus do they rule themselves by a vigorous use of their reason, keeping it, however, in a strict subordination to their duty towards God.

They are beings adoring their Maker and profoundly attached to him, as to the fount of that universal order with which all their thoughts harmonize, but still living under the empire of laws enacted by themselves.

Purely innocent beings live under the empire of laws immediately emanating from their Creator. They know not what self-government is, otherwise than as it consists in obedience to his decrees: they cannot devise, by the exertion of their own mental powers, a system of institutions for the direction of themselves, and it appears to them, till they are taught the contrary, that they have no occasion for so doing.

They have no occasion for it, to the intent of keeping them faithful to the course prescribed to them by the love of God and of their neighbour: they have not the shadow of an inclination to wander from it, their hearts being overflowed with filial devotion to the former, and with fraternal tenderness for the latter.

But they have great occasion to take the government of themselves into their own hands, by the digestion of a system of laws to reign over them, for the sake of placing the faculties of their own mind in an intensely energetic state, and converting themselves into living founts of righteousness, instead of being simply reflections of the glorious countenance of their Creator.

It appears to me that, if mankind had ever continued in a state of innocence, they could not, of their own accord, have mounted into a state of virtue.

However willing they might have been to have done so, the stimulus, the knowledge, the experience requisite, for succeeding in this undertaking, would have been wanting to them.

I therefore conclude, that God permitted sin to take possession of this world, that mankind might thereby be stimulated to unfold the latent energy of their minds, and be taught, by long and woful experience, to employ it wisely, in the practice of all the arts of self government, national, domestic and individual, harmoniously combined together.

The virtue, however, of the mortals, who best fulfil their destiny here below, must remain too impure, owing to their fallen nature, to gain them admittance into abodes undefiled by sin, till they have been cleansed from guilt by the atonement of our blessed Redeemer.(a) But after that the corruptions of sin shall have been expunged from their nature, I judge that the advantages which they shall have derived, from having been once subjected to it, will still remain with them, and that they will, in consequence, have understanding and knowledge to keep their minds in an intense state of activity, by an enlightened application to practise of the whole science of self-government.

Arguing from analogy, I conclude that the original inhabitants of higher worlds, unacquainted with sin, have, though greatly superior to what man was before his fall, been still created like him in a state of innocence; and that they labour under the same disadvantages of not being able, by their own untaught exertions, to mount from it to a state of virtue, to which, however—as I still infer from analogy—the Creator intends that they shall at last rise. I therefore suppose, that they are to profit by the experience that good men shall have acquired, when the science of self-government shall at last have been fully developed, and carried so wisely into practice here below, that mankind shall—as far as their evil nature admits of their doing so—guide themselves, in all their manifold relations, by a system of laws of their own devising, in harmony

with the eternal, moral scheme which, when the design of the Creator is accomplished, shall pervade the whole universe.

According to this view of the plan of Providence, the inhabitants of all the globes, which rise in a regularly connected, ascending series from the earth, await, with an ardent longing, but with a holy patience, the period when new comers from the world immediately below theirs, shall instruct them in the method of giving to their character such an energetic, orderly developement, as shall place them on the summit of their relative perfection.

The source of all this mental improvement, which is to flow upwards through a chain of worlds, lies in the trials, the knowledge, and experience, by which virtuous men learn to conduct themselves here below, in a manner justly to develope their own dignity, and, as far as lies in their power, that of human nature.

We may therefore conceive that an immense class of invisible, glorious creatures, are deeply interested, both in the natural improvement of the condition of mankind, and in such a complete purification of pious mortals, by the blood of their Saviour, that they may be received into the society of blessed spirits.

Perhaps there is such an harmonious connexion in the whole moral system of nature, that, when mortals have remained a sufficient length of time at that pitch of relative perfection, to which, I trust, they will at last arrive, for the holy worlds in connexion with earth to have, by her assistance, accomplished theirs, then that degeneracy, which in the latter days is to take place among her inhabitants, will begin, and her destruction will be nigh at hand.

I know not how this hypothesis, concerning the nature of our relations with future worlds, will be received by the enlightened part of the public, to whose consideration I humbly submit it; but, as well as I can judge, it offers no opinion in the slighest degree opposed to the doctrines of scripture; and it accounts, satisfactorily, for the phenomena presented by our natural history.

Should it ever become universally respected as probable, and should candid, inquiring minds, think that it is raised on

a rational foundation, they must also perceive that it opens to the ardent desire to do good, that inflames upright and fervid minds, an immense region wherein it can nobly expatiate. 'Tis to this hypothesis that I alluded when, in my chapter on ambition, I mentioned the possibility of fixing the views of that passion, ultimately on a term, the contemplation of which would fire it with the highest degree of energy that could impel it, and yet incline it to hearken to none but the most generous, disinterested motives. Unnumbered glorious worlds may be waiting patiently, attending their full perfection, from the time when earth shall have consummated the task of establishing, within her bounds, the reign of the true moral system. We are to suppose, no doubt, that these worlds are to be replenished with inhabitants from various globes besides; but still, how much ought we wish to contribute to the fulfilment, by earth, of her part! Though the truth of these conjectures is, I know, far from proved, yet, if they have the appearance of some degree of probability, 'tis enough, I think, to warm the noble, aspiring mind, with the resolution to improve in virtue, and engage the world to do so; that, if it be indeed called upon to fill such an important station in the universe, it may not be found wanting.

However, though it be reasonable to suppose that the abstract principles of moral government are, for those higher worlds the same as for our globe, only much more fully developed, yet would it be absurd to think that they there require the same positive forms, as those that are suitable to our state, to be given to the social system. It is to be presumed, on the contrary, that the forms of society must necessarily, in these worlds, vary much from ours; since, as we are to enter into them, possessed already of a vast store of knowledge and experience, the fabric of society must there be very different from what it is on earth. This is one reason added to many others for our cultivating, along with a steady resolution to maintain what our judgment tells us is right, a great docility in being guided by those whose wisdom can enlighten us; so that no undue prepossession in favour of hastily conceived opinions, may militate against our acquiring, in another world, a

knowledge of the nature of the practical duties imposed on us by our new condition.

When, owing greatly to the perfecting of moral order upon earth, higher worlds shall also arrive at their highest moral perfection, good men will probably, after death, often taste the ineffable delight of meeting in their new habitation with their dearest friends: similar virtues will be practised by many, and will, we may hope, frequently occasion persons united by tender affections to reap, in the same happy place, the same glorious reward.

Good men will often too enjoy meeting with countrymen; for, to mortals translated into another world, we may well presume that every fellow-creature who had equally revived there, after a departure from earth, will appear like a countryman.

If any remains of an impure motive animate their virtues, they will also feel proud, should they perceive earth to contribute her full share in peopling those worlds with inhabitants, capable, on account of their expanded, orderly sentiments and extensive views, of lending an efficacious aid to raise to its full perfection their social system.

§ 2.—Analogy cannot, I think, assist us to form rational conjectures respecting a future life, nay we entirely disclaim its aid, if we do not suppose that we are to retain, in a future, happy state, the primitive affections which bind us here to beloved objects. Revelation, it is true, leaves us in the dark on this deeply interesting matter. But revelation, we should recollect, does not open to our understanding any of those views that reason teaches us to take of the world, from observing the plan which prevails through the composition of the human mind.

As that plan appears majestic and consistent, when we consider it as part of an universal one, while it is impossible to account for it satisfactorily on the supposition that it exhibits in this life, its perfect construction, we are led, by reflections on our nature and destiny in this world, to reason analogically on what we are to be in another; and to suppose that, as our fundamental business here below is to develope, purify, and regulate by natural means, our natural qualities,* so in the

* This assertion, as I understand it, does not imply that we can perform this task, without the assistance of the grace of God.

worlds in which we judge, from reflections on ourselves and on our present condition, that we are to make further advances towards perfection, our improvement is to take place by the further developement and strengthening of our natural good qualities.

Arguing from these premises, we must conclude that we shall, in a happier life, still be sensible to the affections which united us on earth to particular fellow-creatures; for such affections have not, in the least, a character that denotes that they ought to be numbered among those gross inclinations to which, when we have a more glorified frame, we shall rise superior. The best, the most refined mortals, and those the most detached from the world, are among the persons in whose hearts tender, social affections, are the most deeply rooted. Even the truly pious person, whose blameless life, and fervent trust in the promises of his God, lead him to look forward to an ineffably joyous resurrection, feels, in spite of his boundless confidence in the goodness of his heavenly Father, that his hopes would be still brighter and more consoling than they are, did they assure him of a re-union with those whom he dearly loves.

When we are conscious of being extremely sensible to tender, social affections, we are pleased with ourselves, even where we are not inclined to pride or vain glory, for we feel that a sensibility of this sort, though it be not a virtue, is an element which essentially enters into the composition of true happiness, and which virtue delights both to observe and regulate.

In addition to these reasons for believing in the re-union of friends after death, I shall add the following:

In the chapter, wherein I treat of social affections, I have mentioned that a capacity to feel a warm tide of universal love, which would lead to our identifying our own happiness with that of every living being, appears necessary towards the perfection of our virtues; and I have remarked that the more our character is improved, the more we approximate towards a disposition to cherish this full, unbounded benevolence.

I have also, in fixing the attention of the reader on the variety of sympathies which endear to us private affections, observed, that these affections appear particularly calculated,

with judicious management, to open our hearts to warm feelings of universal benevolence. But it is not when we are inconstant in them, that they produce that effect; we then become capricious and selfish. It is when we remain so faithful in all our attachments, that those that we form last, do not shake the steadiness with which we adhere to the former ones, that every new tie of particular affection in which we engage, helps to increase within us the power of universal love.

Proceeding on these principles, I conclude that, in the state of blessedness immediately above the present life, the happy beings removed thither from this world, shall have occasion to conceive many new and profound particular, social affections, but that those which warmed their hearts in this life, shall then pervade them with redoubled ardour.

If this be the case, it follows, since bliss is to go on increasing in those abodes, that mortals judged worthy of a removal into regions of felicity, shall at last be reunited in them to the friends who were dear to them in their terrestrial abode.

Whether among the beings immediately transferred from earth to a happier clime, that reunion shall always immediately take place, or be sometimes deferred till their admission into a still more glorious world; this is a question for a probable solution of which, I find no data to guide me.

I cannot either conjecture, in case happy beings, dear to each other, are sometimes totally separated in the life following this, whether the dissevered friends shall enjoy the unspeakable consolation of an assurance, conveyed to each of them, that like himself, the other reaps the reward of well doing, or whether each shall not feel alarmed least some perversity of the heart, which had escaped his knowledge, may not have caused his friend to be condemned to a place of punishment.

I think myself however warranted to conclude, that the longer friends are separated, the more extatic will be the joy which their reunion shall at last cause them. The greater the alarm which they may have felt, from their uncertainty respecting the lot of each other, where they had both been received into distinct, blissful worlds, the more exquisite will be the delight, with which they shall at last learn, that their alarm had been groundless.

Where a mortal raised to a second life in a happier world, shall have too good reason to believe, that a guilty object, who had particularly interested him on earth, is undergoing the dreadful punishment of his evil ways, I own that I believe that a pitying Providence, will allow him blamelessly to indulge in grief, though he be crowned with its favour, and though circumstances around invite him to felicity, till the beloved offender, purified from the stains of guilt, shall at last be restored to him: and joyous, ineffably joyous will, I fondly hope, be their reunion in mansions of bliss, where gratitude to a merciful God, and pleasure in the tried fidelity of a commiserating friend, shall sweetly, in the restored sinner, succeed to a sense of suffering.

§ 3.—As to the sacred ties of family, I do not believe that nature has instituted them solely for the commodity of this life. According to my manner of interpreting her designs, she has determined that they shall be immortal, indissoluble bonds. No doubt, we must presume, that on our arrival at our full perfection, universal love will burn so strongly within us, that particular attachments shall have no room to distinguish themselves in our mind, by the production of more vivid affections. Yet, even in that state—from which, I judge, that we are at present at an immense distance—we shall have, it is to be supposed, images in our mind of all past events, and those which shall exhibit us as having been particularly united, at the out-set of our existence, with a few individuals of our family, will probably be ever contemplated by us with peculiar pleasure, even though our affection for those beloved relations, should no longer transcend what we bear to all living beings.

Whatever our feelings may be on our arrival at that mysterious term, where our march towards perfection shall be accomplished, we shall long, as I humbly hope, continue particularly to cherish, in future and happier worlds, the beings to whom nature had closely united us in this. Her sacred ties are, I know, very galling to some ill-fated or wayward mortals, so that they take pleasure in imagining that they shall be for ever dissolved by death. But such a pleasure as this, is foreign to a well-set heart. Whatever it may suffer from the

unkindness of near relations, it feels that the completion of its bliss would consist, not in the dissolution of the bands uniting it to them, but in the conversion of them into ties unspeakably delightful, owing to the reform of those relations, and to their learning to feel for the friend, who anxiously expects their adoption of kinder sentiments, all the tenderness and affection claimed by his desert and connexion with them.

§ 4.—Were the belief generally received, that friends and near relations can never be thoroughly happy in another life, till their minds warm towards each other with sentiments of tender affection, whatever antipathy may have introduced itself between them in this world, it would perhaps contribute to make a deep sense of what we owe to friends and relations, predominate in our minds over our attachment to the perishable gifts of fortune. More rarely perhaps would we see the revolting spectacle, of an heir rejoicing in the death of a near and loving relation, for the sake of entering into possession of wealth, which he in his turn must leave behind him, and which, even before his final hour, may make to itself wings, and flee away. Children in particular would oftener, it is probable, start with horror from the idea of wishing to lose a father, in hopes of gaining by his death, riches and independence.

Not uncommonly, as it appears, are sons at present taught to look upon filial duty, as a temporary obligation, that necessity imposes on them for a time, but from which it is a blessing for them to be set free by nature, as soon as they are come o the age at which the law abandons them to their own discretion. Yet who does not feel, that, in order to promote both the happiness and virtue of the nation, it would be above all things desirable, that youths, in general, should learn sincerely to consider, as a truly happy man, the son to whom a kind father, whatever might be the quantity of riches possessed by him, had long been spared, and not him from whom such a father had been early snatched away, leaving great possessions behind him?

When we reflect on the nature of parental and filial affections, and on the circumstances in which they are unfolded, we are peculiarly struck with the idea, that the opinion which

supposes, that our sentiments of love and tenderness are to revive with us in a future life, presents a great probability of its truth. Parental and filial love, when they are such as they ought to be, and such as our heart can readily conceive them, are in their nature so sacred, so divine, as to show nothing of an earthly character, announcing them to be only meant to cheer us during our passage through this vale of tears.

The circumstances too in which they are displayed, teach us to regard them as imperishable bonds.

These circumstances do not allow of their softening, for one of the parties, in the course of nature, the most rugged part of his course through this world. When a child has enjoyed, during the most brilliant years of his life, the ineffable delight of seeing beloved parents, rendered happy by the proofs of his affection, and anxiously lavishing on him marks of theirs, he is suddenly deprived of these comforts, at a time perhaps, when he has become sensible of the nothingness of all human joys, excepting those which are derived from tender, pure affections; and when it is in consequence more necessary than ever to his satisfaction, to see near him those revered objects, for whom principally he had wished to live.

In his affliction, he is almost tempted—let me be allowed the expression—to accuse Providence of cruelty, in planting within him such a profound affection, in making him feel that it was his duty to cherish it, and then depriving him of all its sweets, after they had become so necessary to him, that they alone served to console him under every disappointment.

The law by which nature in her regular course, destines parents and children to part, long before the latter have drawn towards the end of their career, would indeed, I think, be a most inexorable one, were this world an isolated scene, whose duties and joys were denied the power of expanding into a future state. But when we look upon it as being associated in this respect with a better world, so that our duties, and the joys attached to them, regard our future as well as our present condition, we behold the parental and filial relations, under a more consoling aspect. We see, on both sides, awful and rigorous duties, which our heart indeed tells us, ought to be the source of exquisite delight; but seldom do we find this expec-

tation anything like fulfilled, even when the two parties acquit themselves religiously of their mutual obligations.

Long are the parents overwhelmed with cares and anxieties, for the sake of their children, before they have the satisfaction to see them capable to guide themselves with discretion, and, when at last they enjoy this pleasure, it usually happens, that their children have duties to fulfil, which deprive them of the satisfaction of seeing them around them, and which often too occasion them to be in continual alarms, on account of the ills which may befal them.

Our reflections on the facts which I have just enumerated, lead us then to conclude, that, to render the parental and filial relations, in their natural results, sources of happiness to those engaged in them; it is necessary, that the parties believe that they shall in another world meet again, full of an undiminished, reciprocal affection.

Children impressed with such a belief, would, it is to be presumed, look up to virtuous parents, with a veneration that would incline them, even after they had lost them, to govern themselves agreeably to the counsels which they had once received from them.

I do not mean, that they would do well, to regulate on those counsels, all the details of their conduct, since the living can alone judge of what is best to be done in all circumstances: but should they be induced to determine so to act, as that their conduct, or at least their intentions, should be approved of by their parents, whenever, in a happier state, they might become acquainted with the affairs, which, after their death, were transacted in this world, such a pious mode of honouring the memory, of the justly revered guides of their youth, could not fail of adding to the steadiness and respectability of their character.

Parents, when they hope that their relations with their children, shall contribute to their happiness after their resurrection, provided both parties act so as not to forfeit this privilege, have great inducements to do all that depends on them to secure it. If they are tempted to treat their infants as playthings, only destined to amuse them, they cannot be restrained by a more powerful motive, than the belief, that they are

not only beings intended for a future existence, but also, that they may, by rearing them according to the precepts of wisdom, enjoy after death in their society, the sweets of an immortal, sacred friendship.

This same belief would also engage them to merit their children's affection, by their tenderness and goodness; for they would reflect, that though, by making a tyrannic use of their parental power, they might see them constantly devoted to them in this life, from necessity or from duty; 'tis affection alone, a deeply rooted, well merited affection, that is to renew after death, among the just, the ties which that event had severed.

They would further perhaps be determined to beware of spoiling their children, either by misplaced indulgence or unwarrantable harshness, by the reflection that, should they be the cause of their being condemned after death to a place of punishment, they would probably be made acquainted with the unutterable misery which they had entailed on them, and be thrown by the thought of it into unceasing agonies.

I do not wish, by this description of the joys which the righteous shall derive after death, from the particular attachments that bound them on earth, to incite those who may adopt my sentiments, to act well by wrong motives. I know that our principal hope, in aspiring to the joys of a future state, should be that of becoming entirely acceptable to the Divinity, and enjoying the satisfaction of feeling our mind in perfect harmony with his laws. But if we find this hope too vague to animate us sufficiently, we cannot do wrong to inspirit ourselves by other considerations, which we certainly ought to keep in strict subordination to this principal one, but which nevertheless come more home to our heart. In regarding our particular affections as emanations of an eternal fount of love, we are excited to keep them, and in consequence, our whole character, as far as it is influenced by them, in harmony with the pure affections which raise our mind towards our Creator, and which make it overflow in love towards all his creatures. As a burning lens adds to the impression made on us by the rays of the sun, while it presents another focus by which we are cheared and warmed; so do our particular affections, when

they reflect faithfully, that heavenly fountain of love, which ought to shine in our heart, increase its power over us.

§ 5.—If the ties of blood be the basis of friendships, that are partially to unite individuals in a happier state of existence, undoubtedly we cannot suppose that that bond, namely, the conjugal one, which occupies the place of the fountain head among family relations, has no other bearings than what are relative to this life. Among all the private attachments that bind the human heart, there is not one which, more than conjugal love, whispers to the parties fondly conjoined by it, that they shall meet again in a future state, and love each other throughout eternity; nor is there a partial attachment that so much requires to be thus animated by a religious hope of reunion, in order that it may learn to invest itself with all its dignity and purity.

The conjugal bond is founded on a sensual desire, respecting which, we are warned by nature—in more distinct terms than she makes use of in specifying those of our other desires that are earthly and transitory;—that we shall rise superior to it when we enter on a higher state. The countless feelings of modesty, which, from the first dawn of civilization, throw a thick veil over this desire; the disgust inspired by women, who are supposed to indulge it more than suits with fidelity to one wedded lord; nay, that which men of a lascivious character make us feel, when they are advanced in years, especially if they fill a station in which it would be incumbent on them to appear peculiarly respectable; all these facts in our moral constitution give us notice that, while subject to the desire in question, we have not yet shaken off the nature of brutes, though we have begun to share that of beings blest in a spiritual mode of existence.

They also make us perceive that we are capable of a kind of mysterious longing to partake it fully, which, in spite of the solicitations of passion, engages us to look with a degree of loathing and disdain on the appetite, that has most power to pull us down to the level of inferior animals.

However, though our natural feelings be in accordance with the revealed word of God, which tells us that, in better worlds, they neither marry nor are given in marriage, it is nevertheless

certain that, what is gross in that connexion may give rise to virtues and pleasures, which appear to us very deserving to flourish in a higher state. Thus, how truly adorned with the purest charms, as though she were virtue or true happiness personified, does a lovely woman appear in the eyes of an affectionate, delicate-minded husband, when he perceives that her chaste mind, unable to like for its own sake the grosser part of her connexion with him, has found out the means of making her enjoy it, without wounding her modesty, by prompting her to devote herself entirely to him, and to be pleased in promoting his pleasure. When the husband thinks, while he finds his chaste consort all tenderness and soft compliance, that she would be equally, unalterably devoted to him, though he should be stretched for long years on the bed of pining sickness; when he fondly hopes that were she early to lose him, her unsullied and faithful mind could never consent to take to her bosom another lord, does not every heart acknowledge, that he is attributing to his wife such lovely, virtuous qualities as, if she really possess them, merit to be, even in blest abodes, a brilliant, conspicuous ornament of her character?

When a husband finds himself on the bed of death, leaving a beloved wife, still in her prime, behind him, the last lingering wish which binds his heart to earthly blessings usually is, that she may continue faithful to his memory. Yet, whatever confidence he may have reason to place in her affection and principles of fidelity, he dare not, from his knowledge of human frailty, trust implicitly in the hope, to which he fondly leans, that her constancy will correspond to his wishes. Supposing an angel from heaven to assure him in that moment that she would thoroughly accomplish them, his words would be such a consoling balsam to his anxious spirit, that this proof of his solicitude about what seemed to him to concern his future destiny, in a world from which he was immediately to depart for ever, might well afford the thoughtful observer of his emotions matter of wonder and reflection. On the principle then on which I proceed in this work—namely that every good or orderly sentiment of the human heart shall revive with it in a better life, more particularly where such a revival is necessary towards crowning it with satisfaction—we must conclude that

the deceased husband is at length to become acquainted, in a happier state, with the sentiments which had reigned through life in his widow's bosom, and that, should they be indicative of a pure, unspotted faith constantly holding her heart wedded to his memory, he will exult, whenever he shall be reunited to her, from being disposed to love her with an affection still more sacred and more fervid than that which, mingled with her answering tenderness, had on earth bound their hearts in one.

When we revert our attention from the feelings of the loving husband to those of the chaste, affectionate widow, whom we suppose him to leave behind him, we still find equally strong motives for believing, that they shall be re-united in a more blissful world, and that the remembrance of her tried fidelity shall greatly enhance their mutual felicity. The chaste widow, while she fondly contemplates in memory's glass the image of him who, though he is severed from her by death, is still the object of her plighted, conjugal vows, is constantly urged by her heart to console herself for her loss, with the hope that a merciful God will gloriously re-unite them after death, and that they shall then both rejoice in the thoughts of the proofs that she had afforded of her un-shaken constancy in loving him.

Even where an amiable woman, from having been unfortunate in marriage, is forced to acknowledge that the death of her husband has been a release to her, yet, if the purity of her mind be such as to engage her for ever to refuse to sully her memory with a second image of a wedded lord, she will be disposed to reflect with so much tenderness on him who had been the sole possessor of her, that she would gladly indulge the hope of being at last united to him in a world where, purified from his defects, he should appreciate her worth, and successfully endeavour to contribute to her happiness.

§ 6.—If wedded partners are to be re-united in another life, and that the memory of the nature of the engagement which, while they were on earth, rendered fidelity in the wife an unspeakably precious virtue in the husband's eyes, shall continue to make the thoughts of that past fidelity, greatly augment the mutual bliss of the once virtuous wife and happy husband,

it follows, that the relations between this life and the one immediately above it, are very close indeed. The happiness of the latter, however much it may transcend that of the former, still, in part, shoots from it, as being all of one piece, in a manner somewhat analogous to that of the higher portion of the tree, which, though it wave its branches in the pure regions of the air, still is nourished by a root hidden in the earth. And, if the happiness of the next higher state of existence, flows partly from earthly ideas still present to the mind, though it rises above them, as that state influences, in its turn, on the happiness of still superior globes, we may infer, that, throughout all the gradations through which we are to pass towards perfection, we shall mediately or immediately derive a part of our bliss from earthly considerations, if, while we are directly occupied by them, we keep them subordinate to virtuous principles.

Here is, I think, a proper opportunity to observe that, while I forbear hazarding any very definite conjectures concerning the nature of created beings arrived at the full perfection of a rational happiness founded on free will, I think myself warranted, by reflections on the kind of higher destiny towards which are pointed the legitimate wishes conceived by us here below, to draw some tolerably precise inferences, relatively to the conditions of our existence in the state immediately above ours. I further suppose that, in every world into which we are gradually to ascend, we shall feel such distinct and well ordered yearnings towards the felicity of a still higher one, as shall greatly serve to enlighten us on the means rightly to model our dispositions, and give us a sufficiently clear insight into the mode of existence which shall be assigned to us, in the world whither we shall next mount.

By the bearings of our present individual character, and of the terrestrial order of things, on the destiny of the worlds which shall, after death, receive the righteous amongst us, and by the analogy of higher worlds to ours, I conclude that a regular connexion shall be sustained between what we are now and what we shall be on our arrival at perfection, so that we shall ever have the same mind, only more and more deve-

loped, and shining with incomparably greater brilliancy, still as it becomes invested with a more spiritualized form.

Whether, at last, all intelligent creatures, however they may have travelled by divergent lines, shall arrive at the same central station of perfection, so that, possessed of faculties equally distinguished by strength and fineness, none of them shall bear a superiority to the rest, this is a point which I shall not attempt to investigate. But I think I may say that, if the conjectures on a future state, which I have ventured to unfold, seem warranted by reflection and reason, we must, to pursue them consistently, conclude, that many of the mental distinctions, by which it is ordained that the relative perfection to which one mortal can arrive, shall, in some respects, be different from that to which another can attain, or even inferior to it, shall still, in a great measure, subsist in those higher worlds that are but one degree removed from this. Those holy longings which we feel to meet with our friends in a better life, tell us, that, though we hope that every spirit shall then be purified from the corruption which infected it in this world, yet that it would not accord with our wishes to see the main fund of those characters changed, whose harmonious difference from ours, had been efficient in the cementation between us of a tender friendship.

This reflection will probably appear a just one to those who consider the sentiments, according to the description that I have given of them, with which a loving husband and wife hope to be restored to each other in another world. These sentiments evidently require that a mental distinction, analogous to that which subsisted between their moral qualities and intellectual endowments in this life, shall still be found between them, and render more intimate and sweet their mutual affection. They shall be attracted towards each other's society, from finding that by means of it, any deficiencies in their individual character may be greatly supplied, because the one endowed with the more vigorous capacity, can habituate his companion to take steady and enlarged views of the order of things which it will be their duty to support, while the other, more fit to exhibit virtue in all her loveliness, will

better know how to strew over their path, every sweet flower by which it can be rendered more delightful.

§ 7.—I shall now explain another train of inferences, which I have drawn from the principle that our pure, social affections shall revive with us in a future life, and that the parties united by them, shall preserve a difference of character, analogical to what distinguished them on earth.

In considering the conduct and dispositions of mankind, I am far from presuming to judge, precisely, who are the individuals whose mode of living is so acceptable to God, as to secure their admittance, after death, into a better world, for he who formed the heart, can alone determine the degree of allowance which his fatherly compassion will make for each of us: at the same time we, who fearfully reflect on a future state of rewards and punishments, must, for our own sakes, have fixed principles, respecting the qualities which we ought to cultivate in order to propitiate the Almighty, which will naturally influence the judgments that we form, in respect to the application of his promises to the mass of mankind. If, therefore, we see many more persons of the one sex than of the other, who, to the best of their judgment, live so as to secure to themselves the benefit of these promises, imbuing their hearts with a holy faith and every christian virtue, we cannot avoid surmising, that the better world to which they are apparently hastening, receives, for the present, a greater accession of new inhabitants from their sex, than from the one which more generally abandons itself to its passions.

When, on the other hand, the analogical inductions that sustain sentiments of natural religion, lead us to infer that a system of social order, securing to each individual world its relative degree of perfection in virtue and happiness, is, at last, by the intellectual and moral exertions of their inhabitants, to be worked out for them all; when we further see grounds to conclude that the perfection of this world is to precede that of higher ones; when we finally find reason for supposing that a difference of mental powers analogous to that which prevails between persons of opposite sexes, shall still distinguish them in a better world, we naturally arrive at the conclusion, that the system of social order, in that glorious

world, cannot be perfected, till the one established here below shall be equally favourable to the improvement of both sexes: since the aid of both, in such proportions, in respect to numbers, as they are usually found, is evidently wanted to support the reign of good order.

§ 8.—To prevent any misconstruction of my meaning, I think it advisable to inform the reader that, though my reasonings on the subject lead me to suppose, that the fund of the individual character of the righteous is, after their resurrection to a better life, to bear a particular stamp, analogous to its present peculiar distinctions, yet, I do not in the least suppose that they will then still have to regret any accidental defects, which may at present force them to contract the sphere of their useful exertions, debar them from the acquisition of some valuable species of knowledge, or lessen their enjoyments. I even think it probable that the intellectual tastes of the good may often undergo a total change, particularly where they are the result of organical impressions not faithfully corresponding to the truth of nature.

§ 9.—Whether traces of national distinctions of character shall still be observable among the spirits of the just, or whether such distinctions have no further bearings than that of facilitating the improvement of this world, I do not take upon me to pronounce: I do not find that the wishes which our heart fondly cherishes, and which it hopes to be able to satisfy in a better life, whisper to us aught touching this matter. I conclude, however, if the modifications of national character are still to be distinguishable among the good after their resurrection, that they will be no obstacle to their dearly loving each other, notwithstanding that they may have proceeded from different terrestrial countries; nor will they hinder the beings who may have been thus disjoined on earth, from uniting together to sustain the same local system of order. I perceive that even here, persons who are foreigners to each other, are capable of contracting together the closest engagements of love and friendship.

Though men can rarely be safely entrusted with the administration of the public affairs of a foreign land, this proceeds from their having early formed attachments which predominate

over their affection to their new country: their consequent lukewarmness in serving it, does not therefore denote that when, with their mind more opened to universal love, they shall, after their revival to a new life, be received into blest abodes, they will not co-operate ardently with beings who were once foreigners to them, in doing good to the country to which both parties shall then appertain.

§ 10.—If memory is to revive with us, and that we are to retain, in another life, dispositions analogous to our present ones, we must suppose that the soul is not, by death, entirely disengaged from the corporeal frame, which serves to develope its faculties and to stamp a character on it.

Some persons might, therefore, be led to infer, that it does not set out on its immense journey entirely light and unencumbered.

However we have, as far as I am informed, reason to believe that the soul is united to the body by a matter extremely subtle,—probably as fine as any element floating amidst the fixed stars,—and that this matter, should it remain conjoined with it, would suffice to give such a durable consistency to its present organization, that its future being, whenever it should revive, clothed with a more glorious frame, should be identified, both by memory and moral feelings, with its present one.

When we observe the physiognomy so completely moulded, as it often is, on the character of the mind, that, on looking at it, we cannot refrain from imagining that we have an immediate knowledge of the soul which it represents, we may very well suppose that if the gross part of matter, visible to the eye, can thus receive such a strong impression of its spiritual inmate, the finer particles, those, by the medium of which the expression of the feelings of the mind is thus stamped on the face, may be so entirely blended into the soul, that they never separate from it, and that, when it quits the body, they can accompany it through the most ethereal regions whither it may direct its flight.

The supposition that the distinctions of character observable in this world, are not obliterated in a higher, render it easy to conceive that friends united here below, must there recog-

nize each other without difficulty: supposing them to have no internal illumination on this subject, they must, doubtless, quickly acquire an unerring tact in deciphering, amidst a multitude of heavenly physiognomies, the peculiar expression which had formerly characterized a person dear to them.

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## NOTE TO THE SECOND CHAPTER.

*(See page 318.)*

(*a*) The sentiments,—namely, those of natural religion,—which I endeavour to unfold, to the utmost extent to which reason sanctions their being stretched, tend, if kept in meek subordination to the doctrines of christianity, to elevate the mind, and place it in a right frame. Serious meditations on the magnificent structure of the universe, usually excite in us feelings of holy satisfaction, which seem to us like a faint antepast of the ineffable joys, reserved in heaven for blessed spirits entirely free from the pollutions of sin. But when we sink, overwhelmed with the consciousness of how much these pollutions are engrained into our nature, we can only, I think, be preserved from the despair of ever becoming fit subjects of celestial felicity, by a firm faith in our Divine Saviour, and a trust, that his unspeakable goodness, in dying to redeem us, shall at length cleanse us from all our native corruptions.

Here let me be permitted explicitly to avow a principle, which is, indeed, implied in all the sentiments that I unfold, concerning natural religion.

It is, that I do not conceive that the first elements of our duties arise, from our obligation to acknowledge our infinite debt to our Divine Saviour. They are, as I believe, derived from a requisition, issued to us through the voice of nature,—though ill understood till christianity exalts our sentiments,—to put, ourselves individually, and, as far as lies in our power, our entire world, in a condition, harmonizing with the moral order destined to reign throughout globes, whose inhabitants have never sinned.

It appears to me very improbable,—let me, with an humble sense of my own utter incapacity, to pronounce positively on the mode of unravelling these awful mysteries, be permitted to make this observation,—it appears to me very improbable, that it was solely from purposing to unite us to his Divine Son, as the members to the head, that our Almighty Father allowed our race to fall. Meditations on the actual condition of humanity, are favourable, I think, to the supposition, that he did so to the end, that, seconded by our merciful Redeemer's oblation of himself, he might at length restore us to our original purity, after having made us acquire, in our sinful state, much more extensive and complicated principles of duty, than we should have had an opportunity to learn in a state of innocence.

The history of mankind—as I endeavour to explain in the text—satisfies me that a mysterious Power is over-ruling all important events, to lead us, by degrees, on to the consummation of some great natural and national design; while analogy, and the sentiments agreeable to my reason, lead me to infer that, that design is the one by the attribution of which to the Creator, I have ventured to account, for sin having been suffered to make such terrible inroads, in the constitution of human nature.

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## CHAPTER III.

### FUTURE PUNISHMENTS.

§ 1.—If, instead of traversing victoriously this dangerous world, to enter on a higher one, we sink overpowered by the temptations which we meet with in it, and fall the victims of vice, what is to become of us after death? Some dreadful punishment, we may expect, will overtake us, but of what nature will it be?

These are awfully important questions, and, in order to give the most satisfactory answer to them that I can, I shall begin with an inquiry into the kind of belief, relative to future punishments, which would be most likely to have, in this life, a salutary effect on our sentiments and conduct.

Two principal causes naturally suggest to men the idea of future punishments:

First—The consciousness of having committed crimes which they would have wished to punish in another, but which, profitting of favourable circumstances, they commit with impunity.

Though their self-love engages them thus to weigh their own offences in a different scale from those of their neighbour, their conscience tells them that they merit the same retribution, and that, if there be an invisible master, who watches over our deeds and loves to dispense justice, he will, perhaps, deal with them more severely in the end, for their having eluded the penalties with which righteous judges here below would have recompensed their guilt.

This fear is salutary, but if we endeavour to heighten it beyond the degree to which the suggestions of nature second, in the human breast, our denunciations to the sinner of punishment after death, instead of strengthening we enfeeble it. The

suggestions of nature, however they may appal the sinner by threatenings of the sufferings prepared for him by eternal justice, almost constantly leave hope at the bottom of his heart. His feelings so completely recoil from the thought of his maker being angry with him for ever, that, when he is told that the pains of the guilty are to endure throughout eternity, his heart refuses to believe that he shall ever incur them. It is prone, on the contrary, to assure him that he may find a certain method of avoiding them, even without renouncing his evil ways. The angry, vindictive power, who punishes because he is offended—and it is thus that God must always be represented when he is described as dooming his creatures to never ending misery—is one that lets himself be appeased by submission and homages. The sinner, therefore, thinks that, to provide for his security, he has only to consult those who pretend to be initiated in the divine mysteries, in order to know by what ceremonies and sacrifices he can be reconciled to the Omnipotent.

Having once embraced an opinion teaching him to believe that salvation may be effected on easy terms, he walks fearlessly on, and, though he be firmly persuaded that the reproved are condemned to everlasting torments, he takes no thought for himself, imagining that those only who differ from him in belief, or neglect those superstitious practices on which himself relies, are obnoxious to this terrible sentence; while he, as from a secure port, may calmly view them tossing on the tempestuous ocean of error, in danger, every moment, of being hurried into a gulph of ruin without end.

Owing to the propensity of each individual never to suppose that he can become himself the patient condemned eternally to suffer, while he readily acquiesces in the belief that such a horrible sentence may be put in execution against his neighbour, the christian world exhibits the strange spectacle of almost every person living free from alarm on his own account, notwithstanding his being persuaded that a great and indefinite portion of the race to which he appertains shall be condemned to woes so immense, that the thought of the bare possibility of being included among the sufferers, would seem enough to agonize even to madness the strongest mind. What renders

the security of each individual the more remarkable is, that he is constantly aware of how much his salvation appears in peril to a great number of persons, whose religious opinions differ from his.

Instead of trembling lest they judge aright of his condition, he usually, filled with an unconquerable sentiment of his safety, hurls back on their heads the sentence of damnation, as though mortals had been rendered liable to it, not to excite each individual to give heed to his ways, but to afford mankind a pretext for waging with each other deadly feuds.

The second cause, which leads men to think of future punishments, is their indignation on account of great injuries, real or imagined, which they are unable to punish. When they are worked up in this manner, to the utmost fury, they enjoy the idea, that, in a future life, they will be gratified with the spectacle of the agonies which their enemy will have to endure.

This motive for fixing our thoughts on a future state cannot be too much discouraged, since it tends to exciting in men an atrociously vindictive spirit. Yet the pictures commonly drawn of everlasting torments and of hell fire, exactly fill up the measure of the wishes of those infuriate spirits, who rejoice in imagining the utter ruin after death of a detested enemy.

Nor is this all, agreeably to a principle which I have already laid down, namely, that any proposition, relative to the effects produced by certain moral dispositions, if it be true, still continues so in a great measure, though the order of it be inverted—since an utterly enraged, implacable spirit rejoices in consigning in imagination an enemy to everlasting torments, the belief in such torments, where it prevails, will serve to make men the enraged, implacable enemies of the neighbour whom they believe devoted to them.

'Tis then of the utmost importance that a people's belief in the punishments of the wicked in another world, should be sufficiently lively and awful, and at the same time limited, to harmonize with the dictates of conscience.

Individuals, by learning to apply constantly to themselves the threats of these punishments, would be engaged to walk through life with a wise vigilance and circumspection, and to

feel a benevolent compassion for the errors of a neighbour. Where they were impressed with a sense of their own danger, they would be inclined to view, with fellow-feeling, the beings in a similar predicament.

§ 2.—I shall now lay before the reader a view of this matter of which he will judge, whether it does not enter very regularly into the system of natural religion, unfolded in the foregoing part of this work, and whether, if it attained in the minds of most of the members of the nation, the consistency of a probable conjecture, it would not be likely to keep them sufficiently alarmed, by the dread of incurring future punishment, to induce them wisely to take heed to their ways, allowing to hope, at the same time, due space in their bosoms, and disposing them to a benevolent feeling for every being exposed to the trials of this life.

Since I proceed on the supposition that the glorious abodes in which just men are to receive their reward, are sufficiently exposed to our view to make a deep, salutary impression on our feelings and imagination, I must also conclude that our sight can get a glimpse of those dreadful regions where the wicked are to be punished, otherwise the system of natural religion, which I here undertake to unfold, would leave us too much grounds to presume on the mercy of God, from imagining it so much fraught with indulgence as to assign no suitable retribution to our evil doings.

But if the worlds where retributive justice is to execute a dreadful sentence against guilty mortals, are not entirely hidden from our gaze, by what signs are we to know them? Have we reason to believe that any of the planets, whose situation respecting the Sun is analogous to that of earth, are peopled by beings who were once inhabitants of this globe, and are now receiving the punishment of sin?

The train of reflections, whence I have formed my opinion, leads, from the following reasons, to a different conclusion.

First—From having been taught to look on the other planets as equally material with our own, and equally subject to regular vicissitudes of seasons, as well as of day and night, I cannot suppose that their principal inhabitants are much more distinguished than those of our globe, by the strength of their

intellectual and vital powers. The course of nature would therefore, I conclude, be arrested, or even perhaps inverted, in those individuals who, after furnishing a sufficiently long career in this life, to become accountable agents, should be sent into a sister planet, to suffer for having misused the time allotted them here.

That the progress of nature should thus be checked, by the denial to sinners of stronger vital and intellectual faculties, in a future state of existence than in the present one, is, I think, very unlikely.

Were I to consider their punishment dictated by a spirit of vengeance, then might I, very consistently with such a belief, suppose that their mental faculties would be stationary, or even brutified to such a degree, as to leave them incapable of any sensations except those excited in them by cruel, corporeal inflictions. But since I believe that their sufferings, however prolonged and terrible they may be, will lead them to repentance, and finally to a reconciliation with God, I judge that the vigour of their understanding and of their moral nature, will be proportionate to their sufferings; so that they may at last obey the dictates of their reason and better feelings. It is not to be presumed that they would ever learn to exert these attributes, were they not to possess them to a very powerful degree. Were they only endued with them to the same extent that mortals are, they would let them lie for ever overwhelmed by a hopeless sense of their unutterable misery.

I am further confirmed, by the following considerations, in the belief that the wicked, when they are recalled to a life of unspeakable anguish, are to be endued, in every respect, with vital powers far transcending those of the most highly gifted mortals.

Our inducements to act well from religious motives, would be, in this world, sufficiently powerful to determine us to lead a holy and virtuous life, were our reason for ever untroubled and our bosoms serene. 'Tis the passions which cloud and agitate them, that induce us to lose sight of those motives, and it is also, by exerting a firm resolution to take them steadily for our guide through life, in spite of the seductive solicita-

tions of these passions, that we learn nobly to display all our native energy, and to become, at length, far superior to what we should have been, had those dangerous passions never been given to us.

The wicked, we may suppose, are ultimately to be led back to virtue by an analogous process.

They are to have passions, whose disorderly tumults will long blind them to the force of those religious motives, which would engage them to look for peace in the only quarter where it is to be found. Yet those motives will shine more brightly in their sight than they do in the eyes of mortals, and solicit their attention, with greater cogency, than that with which they address us: for those who have risen to a second state of existence,—particularly if they be acquainted with the conjectures made by human beings touching the moral scheme of the universe, and that their experience shall then depose in favour of their truth,—will see so great a portion of God's plan respecting the destiny of his creatures, as must carry the conviction home to their hearts that he has issued, for their government, laws, on their implicit obedience to which their welfare entirely depends.

Such a conviction impressed on the minds of men, would, I believe, determine most of them to endeavour to please their maker from servile motives of interest, and without exerting that free, independent spirit which, when it is rightly employed, teaches us to be deeply sensible of the intrinsic worth of virtue.

I judge then that the wicked, in a state of future misery, must have passions far stronger than those of men, in order to prevent their sense of their Creator's power and justice, from pressing so closely on their understanding as to engage them to try to conciliate his favour by implicit submission, ere yet their experience and mental agitations have taught them to appreciate justly every kind of happiness, and sincerely to feel that a life, spent in the practice of virtue, and irradiated by the smile of our Creator, is essentially one of true, unspeakable bliss.

If these reasons lead us to conclude that the passions of the wicked, after a fearful resurrection, are to be greatly stronger

than those of mankind, we must suppose that all their other forces and faculties will be proportionate to them, in order to render those passions active and efficient, and to enable those who possess them, at last to acquire, from a dreadful discipline, wisdom and fortitude to reign over them.

Secondly—I cannot look on the planets as the places where evil doers, after their departure from earth, are plunged into torments, because I see nothing in their aspect that warrants such a supposition. If our Maker afford us a glimpse of the dreadful worlds into which sinners are precipitated, with an intention that their aspect shall inspire to us a dread of incurring his displeasure, it is to be supposed that something menacing in their appearance shall lead us to surmise the terrible design of their creation. But we look at the planets with pleasure, for they contribute their share towards heightening the glorious spectacle, presented to us at night, by the vault of heaven. That they are the abodes of much misery appears to us highly probable, since we know that this earth, which figures among them, is, to numbers of its inhabitants, a land of sorrow. But we must conclude that, like it, they only contain that portion of misery which, in the scheme of nature, may affect creatures not yet arrived at a second state of accountable existence, nor yet become the objects of either rewards or punishments referring to a past life.

Agreeably to these principles, a world, specially set apart for the punishment of the wicked, should announce itself to us by a strange appearance, which should strike even men, unsuspicious of its nature, as lurid and portentous. The better to dispose us to view it with shuddering awe it should appear but rarely, since familiarity, with a terrific spectacle, destroys our dread of it. So incongruous should be its aspect with that of the stars of heaven, that it should disfigure, instead of beautifying, a widely illuminated, nightly sky.

It would the better answer to the signs by which its nature could be revealed to us, if the human intellect were empowered to trace the laws regulating its revolutions, and to see good grounds for presuming both that its inhabitants, on account of the immense changes in the temperature of their climate, must be incomparably more strongly constituted than those of earth;

and also that the orb of day, though it belonged to this sphere, did not diffuse over its surface that mellowed beauty and lovely harmony, with which his rays cover our more favoured world.

The drift of this argument may now be clearly understood: worlds, such as I have described, belong, it is well known, to our system, and I freely avow that their appearance, as well as what information I have gleaned respecting them, leads me to think that they possess all the marks by which we could expect worlds, prepared for the punishment of the wicked, to be distinguished, supposing them to be at all laid open to our view; and, agreeably to my conceptions of the moral plan of the universe, analogy leads me to conclude that a glimpse of them is disclosed to us.

But if observation and reflection teach us, conformably with the dictates of reason, to view the comets in the lugubrious light in which I have represented them, well may we, it would appear, exclaim with the apostles: "Who then can be saved?" since these bodies are described to us as so numerous that, supposing them to be attached in like proportion to every sphere, there is too much reason to apprehend that almost every accountable inhabitant, of every planet, is doomed to undergo a chastisement in them.

This is indeed a fearful thought. We may however, I think, look on our future prospects in a more cheerful light, when we reflect that, if there be an analogy between those dismal worlds and most of the countries on earth, whose natives are either in miserable slavery, or a prey to a ferocious anarchy, they are all of them but thinly inhabited, particularly those whose appearance is the most ominous; beings continually persecuting and tormenting each other, as we must presume to be the case with the inhabitants of those infernal regions, would seem to us to require to occupy a wide, dreary space.

Another reason for hoping that these worlds do not receive such vast, continual accessions of inhabitants, as the thought of their number might at first make us apprehend, is that, judging from the immense period of their eccentric revolutions, and the presumed strength of their inhabitants, we may infer that they usually are, for a much longer date than what earth is, peopled by the same beings. This is evidently under one point

of view an awful consideration, but still it cheers us, by leaving room to suppose that each of these dreaded abodes is, when compared with earth, but sparingly replenished with new inhabitants.

However, we should be careful not to lull ourselves with dangerous hopes. Reason points clearly out to us that the design of our being placed here is, that we may learn vigilantly to unfold all the mental energy, requisite for keeping our thoughts continually subdued to principles of virtue and good order. Nor is there any point on which revelation is more explicit, than it is on the duty of diligently examining and watching ourselves. If then we see many persons who make their happiness in this world too exclusively their object; who, indolently trusting to the mercies of God, arrange themselves so, as to commit indeed no flagrant crime, but still in such a manner, that they go on indulging the round of returning inclinations in the gratification of which their worldly happiness consists, without seeking to keep their hearts so detached from them, as that a determination to fulfil the laws of duty may press on them more closely, have we not sufficient inducement to recal to mind the exhortation of our Saviour, to strive to enter in at the strait gate which leadeth unto life, avoiding the broad way which leadeth unto destruction, and have we not reason to tremble for many whom we see passing their days in thoughtless security?

Yet, in starting this conjecture respecting the situation of those tremendous regions, where there is wailing and gnashing of teeth, I do not wish to add to the force of the temptation, that so much assails us, to occupy ourselves, with arrogance, about our neighbour's salvation, from believing it in danger, while we fondly deem our own in a secure state. I rather flatter myself, were the opinion generally received, that reason sanctions us in supposing that our Saviour made allusion to the menacing looking worlds, which skirt our sphere, when he depicted a place of utter woe, whither the wicked should be precipitated, that such a belief would greatly tend to make every individual apply sincerely to himself these awful denunciations, and work out his own salvation, with fear and trembling.

The idea of those worlds of limited, though tremendous punishment, would, I think, sufficiently correspond to the alarms of conscience, for each individual to dread lest he might become, without incessant care, one of the victims ingulfed by them; and the impression made on his mind, by their gloomy aspect, joined to the thought of their number, would tend to confirm him in this salutary fear. As nothing but a well founded conjecture would be offered him on this subject, while his imagination would probably be deeply impressed with the conviction, that such a belief harmonized with all he felt and saw, it would, I think, neither inspire him with an overwhelming, servile fear, nor yet allow of his freeing himself, to such a degree, from the dread of future judgments, as not to leave him ample motives to determine, unceasingly, to do his best to please his Maker. Conscious, however, of the imperfection of his utmost efforts, he would still humbly trust in the assistance of God's grace, and in his Fatherly goodness.

The thought that the worlds in question may be the abodes in which sinners are to undergo the penalty due to their transgressions, leaves the conscience of the individuals prepossessed by it, free to figure to them punishments analogous to their faults. For instance, the hard-hearted master may justly apprehend, that he shall there be a miserable slave, forced to submit to a ruthless tyrant. The rebellious servant may also learn to dread that he shall be thrown into a servitude incomparably more severe, than the one against which he revolted here below.

§ 3.—The supposition that future punishments may be adapted to present faults, would, I think, be much more efficacious to convert men's consciences into vigilant sentinels guarding them from temptation, than is the belief that the wrath of God is hurled, in general, against the wicked, without any sort of analogy being established between the mode in which it manifests itself, and the sins that it punishes.

When we look into the nature of the workings of conscience, we shall find it,—as it appears to me,—inclined to be moved by the apprehension that future punishments shall dreadfully correspond to present misdeeds; so that if the fear

of such a correspondence be removed by the religious belief taught us, conscience is too liable to be set at rest. Then are we prone to flatter ourselves that, without forsaking the sin which easily besets us, we can atone for it in various ways.(a)

The notion concerning the nature of future punishments suggested here, would, I believe, as much as any religious dogma on the subject could do, wrap the mind round with a garment fitting it in such a manner, that, without preventing its growth, it would be frequently present to its recollection. When we walked abroad of a lovely day, in the enjoyment of a delight so calm and exquisite, that it would seem to us as if we were already imbibing some foretaste of heavenly joys, how naturally would the fearful thought present itself to us that, unless we took good heed to our ways, we might, perhaps, one day exchange a residence in this fair world on which the sun smiles so sweetly, and where he calls on the seasons to follow each other in joyful succession, for an abode in dreary regions, either excluded from his sight, or else plunged in his tormenting flames. How readily, when we were indulging morose impatience, from experiencing some of the contrarieties of life, would we be recalled to better sentiments, by the thought that our present sufferings are far less than what they shall be, if, by a deficiency in the piety and firmness with which we should support our actual trials, we should cause ourselves to be banished into one of those ominous looking worlds, which, at intervals far removed from each other, glare with such a menacing aspect on our horizon. When we would reflect on the unspeakable misery with which tyranny and bigotry sometimes afflict this earth, careering, notwithstanding, in beauty and majesty through the heavens, and then imagine what must be, if there be any analogy between physical and moral nature, the terrible lot of the inhabitants of those worlds, whose aspects, instead of being grateful to our sight, cause us to shudder, I think that we could not avoid being struck with such an awful notion of the punishments that await guilt, as would make us feel,

"E'en yet while pardon may be found,
"And mercy may be sought,
"Our hearts with inward horror shrink,
"And tremble at the thought."

It is not extravagant to suppose, that the wretched inhabitants of these direful regions, while yet hardened in guilt, may, on approaching the sun, be horribly cheered by the hope that their dismal world will mark its passage by a dreadful calamity, from coming in contact with, and utterly destroying this earth which is viewed by them, as we may well conjecture, with boundless fury and bitter regret: perhaps, too, on finding themselves receding from its orbit, without having effected the ruin which they contemplated, they are overcome by transports of frantic rage and despair.

If all this be probable, it also appears likely that the beings among this unhappy race, who may at last be reduced to sincere penitence, though they be still suffering for the sins of a past life, gaze with unutterable tenderness and anxiety on this world, from the time that, after a long absence, it is first presented to their gaze, till it is again withdrawn from it. How fondly do they conceive, that the calmness of its movements and appearance is a faithful symbol of the joyous existence of its inhabitants: to them it doubtless appears, that none but halcyon days rise on the happy mortals sojourning on this globe, so light and easily to be borne do their worst troubles seem to them. While deploring that they perversely trod, when on earth, the paths leading to destruction, they think, with profound astonishment, of the mental blindness that induced them to neglect the care of their salvation, while it could yet be secured, without costing them any dreadfully painful efforts, and that engaged them to rush headlong on, heedless of the chance, to which they were exposing themselves, of arriving at a place of inconceivable misery. With the deepest commiseration do they revert their thoughts to those rash mortals who, as careless respecting their true interests as they themselves once were, misuse the invaluable time allotted them on earth; eagerly seek after worldly prosperity, in contempt of the precepts of virtue and religion; and thus prepare for themselves an entrance into those mournful worlds, into which the hapless beings, to whom the aspect of the earth suggests these sad reflections, are already plunged.

## NOTE TO THE THIRD CHAPTER.

*(See page 348.)*

(a) A belief in a great variety of future punishments—such as would follow an assent to the system exposed in the foregoing chapter—would serve to guard christians against the two dangerous extremes into one or other of which they frequently fall: namely, either that of believing that the slighter kinds of transgression, such as yielding to an impatient temper, must, though habitually committed, be venial; or else that of considering those transgressions on a par, in the sight of God, with atrocious crimes, since they lead to the same damnation.

The first of these doctrines encourages in men an indolent indulgence of passion, incompatible with the duty of vigilantly watching over themselves: the second tends to erase from their minds all natural principles of virtue.

A belief, such as I have explained, concerning the nature of future punishments, would also hinder mortals from laying to their souls—as many of them seem to me to do—the flattering unction of a persuasion that there are no positive torments in reserve for the wicked, nor no actual locality set apart, in a future state, for their habitation.

The persons to whom I allude believe, that a condemnation to the sufferings of hell only means that he, on whom such a sentence is past, shall be eternally denied any part in the love of God, and that, in consequence, wherever he goes—they suppose him free to wander where he likes—he shall pine in misery, from finding himself a forlorn outcast.

That to be forsaken by God, though no positive infliction accompanied such a demonstration of his displeasure, would be, to the hapless souls whom he abandoned, an unspeakably grievous calamity, I am thoroughly convinced: but I do not believe that even the most pious mortals sufficiently love the Almighty, to be able to comprehend the anguish to which they would be a prey, were the light of his countenance withdrawn from them; and I am persuaded that the wicked are too much sunk in sensual pursuits and the gratification of selfish passions, to be much affected simply by the fear of being cut off from the spiritual delights, which the sense of being ineffably dear to the God, whom they adore, affords his blessed saints.

The belief then, that there are laid by, in store for the wicked, positive tremendous punishments, of a nature to come home to the feelings of the beings the most sunk in selfishness, would probably have the salutary effect of dreadfully alarming many a sinner, and determining him effectively to set about the work of his reformation.

## CHAPTER IV.

### THE FUTURE LOT OF THE BRUTE CREATION.

§ 1.—If the opinions which I have here hazarded, relatively to the future destiny of mankind, were become a subject of familiar discussion, and generally allowed to have a right to draw attention, from their conformity to the visible order of nature, those who took pleasure in examining them, would probably soon finish by asserting that, if we are to consider them true, in regard to human nature, there is no reason why we should put the brute creation beyond their range; since our ideas respecting the plan of universal order become more vast, more magnificent, and more conformable to our sentiments of justice, when we believe it to descend still lower than mankind, and to comprise, in its immense operations, every entity capable of receiving the breath of life. They would not fail to remark, that the great differences observable in the intellectual faculties of the diverse species of animals, and which are always accompanied by an analogous difference in their physical organization, give ample reason to suppose, that the vital spark to which all their sensations refer, might be developed so as to shine forth a reasoning mind, like that by which human nature is animated, were the structure of the frame that encloses it equally noble.

Our confidence in the goodness of God must also—might it be said—lead us to believe, that, if he can make brutes mount into a higher kind of being, he will do so, and that he has not afflicted them with some of the ills of life, without having the intention to conduct them at last to an elevated state of blessedness, in which they will be indemnified for all their sufferings.

The belief that every entity capable of being awakened into life, will, in due course, receive it, and eventually be raised to a lofty rank among intelligent creatures, exhibits, I am well aware, the plan of the creation as extending, in all directions, into such infinite bearings, that probably beings far superior in understanding to the wisest man, would be totally

inadequate to comprehending what is the form which will be given to the creation, when its plan is universally accomplished.

Leaving aside all attempts to dive into this mystery; I still avow, that to me it appears probable, that it is involved in the design of the creation.

The opinions which I entertain, respecting the high destinies reserved for inferior animals, are, like all those which I have formed on points beyond the bounds of this life, suggested in the first place by my feelings, and afterwards sanctioned by my reason, on its perceiving that they are not inconsistent with what knowledge I have of the order of nature.

When I look at creatures of the brute creation, I fondly cherish the idea, that they, as well as mankind, are under the care of a wise and good Creator: this thought seems to me necessary, towards embellishing the world, by shedding over it, glorious rays of order and harmony.

However, I could not view the Creator, as thus extending his mercies over the brute creation, did I believe it to fulfil its entire destiny, in the space of one short, and often miserable existence. How often do not unfeeling men, render the domestic animals who serve them, the deplorable victims of their fury? The animals who preserve their independence, are frequently equally unhappy. The weaker live in continual terror of falling into the fangs of the stronger, who seek to prey on them; and the stronger, in spite of their continually prowling in search of their destined food, are generally tormented by an insatiable hunger, which they can find no means of appeasing. I cannot suppose that the Creator has no further designs for creatures, whom he thus dooms to a life of suffering.

Another thing which induces me to think it probable, that brutes have also another career to run after this life is ended, is, that I observe, that though their intelligence be so bounded, they seem to have nearly the same passions as those which distinguish human nature. Their passions, indeed, show themselves with much more simplicity and sameness, because mankind are continually varying and multiplying theirs, by the exercise of their reason and free will: but it seems to me cer-

tain, that brutes, and even insects, have the rudiments of those evil passions, which I consider allowed to take possession of mankind, that they may, by learning to vanquish them, grow strong and vigilant in the government of themselves.

This observation leads me to conclude, that all the living creatures on the earth, are launched into life for the same purpose, namely, that of rising in the end to a state of perfect virtue and immortal felicity; but that some are much further advanced than others, through the different states which they must first traverse. (*a*)

Impressed with this notion, I infer, from considering the immense number of brutes which exist on earth,—and probably in other worlds,—that several different globes contain beings, who, after being stupid animals, have just risen to be reasonable creatures.

It also appears to me likely, that some other worlds have humbler offices assigned to them, than that of nourishing a race of rational, perfectible beings like mankind, and that they only contain diverse tribes of creatures in various states of mere animal existence.

It may be perceived, that I do not suppose this to be the time that the beings, who now belong to human nature, have received the breath of life. I do indeed think it probable that, sometimes in this world, sometimes in others, they have been clad successively with an infinite variety of forms, so that, after having been invested with one, which scarcely distinguished them from inert matter, they rose by degrees to have as noble a frame, as could belong to creatures, not sufficiently endowed with reason, to be under the obligation of forming their own characters.

I judge in general, that no memory of a past state of existence, remains with those who, when they were in it, had not been charged with the duty of governing themselves by the fixed principles of right reason. Such a memory could for mankind answer no end but to confound them, and increase their propensity, already too strong, to try to dive into the mysteries of things beyond this life, as if the proofs of the dignity of their nature, consisted in the power to transport

themselves, by their imagination, out of the bounds of their present existence, instead of resulting from the exertions that they make to ennoble that existence, to the utmost of their power. The recollection of a former life, during which, they had belonged to the brute creation, would lead them to believe in the transmigration of souls, but it would not inform them of its being constantly an ascending one. They would therefore fear, that after death, they might return to vivify a brutal form, which idea would be so disheartening, as to offer little encouragement to virtue.

§ 2.—Though mankind seem as low in the scale of existence as any creatures could be, who had a capability of ever learning wisely to guide themselves, they are yet far above any species of mere animals, existing in this world, or probably in any other: it is to be supposed, that there is a very great interval left between any species of beings, entrusted with the care of improving themselves, and the highest order of those, whom Providence governs, solely by means of an instinct adapted to their nature, which it teaches them blindly to follow.

Any gleams of a faculty, tempting them to the use of free volition, would be prejudicial to the latter, whilst in the former, such a faculty would require to be considerably developed, otherwise it would inevitably mislead them.

Supposing then, that there be in other worlds, animals of a kind superior to the highest species existing on earth, I still presume, that there are none who can in any degree cope with man, in point of intellectual endowments. But between one species of animals and another, there seems to be no reason for any great interval being placed. I therefore do not wonder, that each race is only separated by an almost imperceptible distinction, from the tribes immediately above and below it, while mankind appear to be divided by a great space, from the kinds of animals approaching most nearly to them.

Perhaps that, after the departure of the righteous from this world, their progress through successive states, in different globes, will not be marked by near so great a superiority in natural gifts, as that which distinguishes a well organized man, from the highest class of the brute creation.

Man, however remote he may be, from the fountain of holiness and true happiness, still ranks in the order of those beings, who should endeavour to approach it, while the brutes do not. There is, therefore, a kind of distinction established between him and them, which is not again to prevail between him and the most elevated created beings. On that account, no parity of reasoning, drawn from the consideration of the distance separating him from the brutes, can lead us to infer any thing positive, concerning the space which parts him from the glorious order of creatures next above us. We must, I think, confine our belief in this respect, to faith in the promises of scripture. It assures us, that the righteous shall rise again, to a felicity so superior to the highest joys of earth, that then only may they be accounted to enter on the blessings of life. This promise suffices to guide our faith, as to the unspeakable happiness reserved for the righteous, in the first state, on which they shall enter, on rising from the sleep of death. But after promising that they shall at once be inundated with the joys of a truly happy existence, scripture is silent in regard to their future admittance into still more glorious worlds. Where we think then, as I do, that such a destiny is probably reserved for them, we cannot infer, from the words of scripture, that every successive world will as much transcend the one immediately preceding it, in the bliss with which its inhabitants shall be crowned, as the first joys which good men shall taste, after their resurrection, transcend the highest known on earth. In this world we are labouring with violence to get the gates of life opened to us, and to subdue our gross, animal inclinations, in order to prepare ourselves for the full developement in us of those which suit beatified spirits. But before we can enter through the gates of immortal life, and get rid of our carnal nature, we must first be dissolved in death. After the resurrection of the good, scripture assures us that they shall die no more.

If then progressive states of bliss are not separated from each other by the gulf of death, it follows that our belief in the resurrection of the just to a state of existence infinitely more glorious than their terrestrial one, does not regularly lead us to conclude, that each succeeding blissful world shall equally

excel the one which preceded it. The translation of their inhabitants from the one to the other will probably be an exhilarating, instead of a lugubrious spectacle. The glorified bodies of the beings thus translated, instead of being totally renewed, like those of mortals after death, will probably only be subject to some partial, imperceptible change; whence I am induced to conclude that these worlds, when compared with our earthly condition and that of the good immediately after death, rise by very gradual steps one above the other.

§ 3.—This view of the order of nature engages me to look on this life as a dangerous and difficult defile, through which, in our voyage from a state of non-existence to one of a glorious immortality, we are doomed to pass.

Before we arrive at it, we go on our way without having any thing to apprehend. We are blind, but Providence leads us by the hand, giving us an unerring instinct to conduct us.

After we shall have quit this life and entered on another, we shall be left to our own direction, but we shall then have a clear vision, and the path which will lie before us being gilt by a bright day light, we can walk in it with assurance. The memory which we shall preserve of this life, compared with the one in which we shall then find ourselves, will be sufficient to give us ample insight into the designs of the Creator, so that no doubts shall perplex us.

'Tis only in this life that we look about us bewildered and amazed. Our Maker has accorded us the faculty of vision, and in consequence no longer guides our steps: but alas! his gift is of little use, for dark night encompasses us.

We are in want of the flambeau of revealed religion, to enable us to distinguish the course in which we are bound to move; the Creator has mercifully granted it to us, but this precious gift is often employed to such perverted ends, that we are far from reaping from it the advantages which it ought to bestow on us. Those who take upon them to hold it up before our eyes are frequently deceitful guides, more intent on rendering their own aid necessary to us, than on pointing faithfully out the way which we ought to follow. They artfully fill with threatening and terrific phantoms the regions through which we pass; so that the light which they spread around

only serves to show the horrid forms of these ghastly figures. When we are in consequence unnerved by consternation, they easily persuade us that we have no other chance of safety than in an implicit submission to their commands.

Those who have courage to take this tutelary torch into their own hands, and to approach it steadily towards every object which they encounter, soon perceive that their road is much smoother and freeer from dangers than their false conductors had wished them to think it; and still as they advance they discover, with pleasure, increasing signs of their being about to enter on a rich and flourishing country.

However, though it would be weakness to become too fearful to trust to our own judgment, while we are exposed to the temptations of this life, it appears to me that we ought to look upon it as the most trying part of the passage of the righteous through diverse states of existence. If we get through it well, we may hope that afterwards we shall go on our way rejoicing, from having left behind us the greatest difficulties. Perhaps, after we shall have issued triumphantly from the combats which we may have had to sustain against the temptations assailing us in this life, that we may, in a future world, be hailed by glorious spirits with a joy analogous, though greatly superior, to that with which armies welcome those of their divisions who rejoin them, after having triumphed over formidable foes, in a perilous and important pass.

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## NOTE TO THE FOURTH CHAPTER.

(*See page* 353.)

(a) The conjecture, founded on a participation by brutes of our evil passions and misery, that the inferior animals are one day to rise to be accountable beings, destined to future rewards or punishments, does not in the least involve the assumption of their being at present sinful beings.

The words of scripture gives us to understand that, when human nature fell, an evil element broke loose and diffused itself over the whole of both the living and inanimate world; but this evil element only becomes a principle of sin when it enters into the composition of mankind; the sole accountable species existing upon earth.

However, if brutes as, I think, share the evil nature of men and that it is one day to become in them also a sinful one, from their rising into the condition of free agents; if besides—as agreeably to my mode of arguing appears probable—there is a great interchange between the earth and various other opaque planets, of the rudiments of animal life, then is it to be presumed that the melancholy consequences of the fall of man have extended into these planets, so that those of their inhabitants who are in a capacity to adore and serve their Creator—supposing them to contain any such—are sharers in our sinful nature: if so, we may humbly hope that they are sharers also, in the benefits arising from the sacrifice on earth of our blessed Redeemer.

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## CHAPTER V.

### CONCLUSION.

§ 1. The opinions which I have explained relatively to our future lot, do they offer us a perspective so consoling that it rouses us to bear with courage all the ills of life? When, for instance, we are bending in anguish over the grave of some beloved object, are the hopes here held out, of a future reunion with it, such as to be likely to pour a soothing balm into our afflicted mind?

I answer that it is impossible for a person who has adopted these opinions in solitude, after that her feelings and imagination had been, in a great measure, worn out by time joined to the habit of constant reflection, to judge whether they be adapted to inspire joy and confidence to the mind, that would have been taught them while still possessing the first glow of a youthful fancy, and to whom they would have been recommended, not by wearisome meditations, but by agreeable lessons easily comprehended, and by the example of parents and friends all imbued with the same doctrines.

Without attempting then to say what is the degree of consolation which, if they were generally received, these opinions might be expected to convey to the mourner, I shall merely describe the effect which, from experience, I know them to produce on myself, at the moments when I have most need of being strengthened and encouraged.

Never, I believe, do we in general so much feel the wish, to find consolation for the evils of this life, in the hope of their being compensated to us in another, as when we reflect on the eternal separation which, as far as this world is concerned, must inevitably take place between us and the persons whom we most dearly love.

When we are thus overwhelmed by the idea that we must part apparently for ever, is it a consolation to gaze on the brilliant vault of heaven, to think of the innumerable multitude of worlds which there roll in the immensity of trackless space, and to imagine that ourselves, as well as the persons whom we love, are all to be launched forth among those orbs, to run a great career, surrounded perhaps by a new circle of friends?

These thoughts, I avow, instead of being consolatory, are extremely depressing. At such moments, we shudder, in some sort, at the aspect of the starry firmament, and feel a kind of terror in reflecting on the inconceivable distance which separates its globes one from another. Our tender affections lead us to wish to isolate, if it were possible, our existence from that of the creatures in general, and to live confined to the small circle of our friends, on the narrow portion of this globe where we are accustomed to see them assembled. Nor is this all: they would not only bound our existence, in respect to the society which we see, and the place which we inhabit, they would also willingly enclose it all within a very small portion of time. Not that they would like to shorten our days; on the contrary, they would be glad that they were to last for ever, could we be for ever surrounded by the same cherished objects. But they would fain recal certain periods of our life, when we were rendered particularly happy by the society of dearly loved friends; they would wish those periods to be always present, and yet not to bear the impress of eternal duration; for, notwithstanding the warmth with which our affections attach us to the objects on whom they are fixed, they do not hinder us from feeling that, even the joys which they offer us would become insipid and tiresome, did we expect to be for ever called on to taste them, as they are presented to us in this world. The periods, then, of our life, which they

wish to make return and last for ever, should not, on that account, appear to us never to end. No,—though they were to be eternal, they must still seem as if they were a fleeting moment of pleasure, rendered more precious by the idea that we are shortly to be deprived of it.

When we are in this disposition, it is natural that we recoil from the idea of an existence spread out through infinite time, unbounded space, and during which we shall, perhaps, have to undergo long separations from the objects for whose sake we wish to live.

But it is not desirable that our way of thinking, respecting futurity, should encourage in us feelings that must terminate in regret, since they demand contradictions and impossibilities. Nor could we contrive to teach a belief that were satisfactory to such feelings: it is evident, that we must separate from the persons whom we fondly cherish, and quit those scenes which their presence had rendered dear to us. The awful spectacle of the grave, and of the decline of life, strikes us with a conviction of the perishable nature of the intercourse of love and friendship, as it can be enjoyed in this world; and also with the persuasion that, if it is to revive for us beyond the tomb, it will, in many respects, be renewed under other conditions, perhaps, too, after a long delay.

We must then have recourse to other views of the subject, to calm our bosom, agitated by the thought of our final separation from those whom we love: instead of gratifying our affection by keeping the persons dear to us constantly by our side, we must learn to form the noble resolution to suppress all the suggestions of our tenderness, rather than not do our duty, and encourage them to do theirs; so that, though a long and cruel separation in this world should be the consequence of our decision, we may comfort ourselves with the hope, that a friendship capable of such generous sacrifices, will be indulged with the means of perpetuating itself in a better state.

The consciousness of acting nobly, joined with the pleasure of respecting those whom we love, and of being respected by them, compensates for us, in a great measure, the sacrifices which may be the result of a conduct ensuring to us such a

consciousness. Whereas, if our tenderness engage us to prevail on a friend to neglect noble duties, rather than forsake us or compromise his safety, motives of dissatisfaction with ourselves and each other, rise between us, and prevent our connexion, even though we be together, from having half the charms for us which it would have, did oceans roll between us, and our esteem for each other's lofty qualities remain unimpaired.

The system of opinions which I have exposed is, I think, singularly proper to impress us with the conviction, that the only way to make our tender affections speak peace and comfort to our heart is, to ennoble them, by a steady wish to see the friends to whom they attach us, render themselves worthy that we should love and honour them for ever, by a strict obedience to the most rigorous laws of duty, even when they force them to deprive us long of their society.

This system is, I think, also adapted to keep lively in our mind the idea, that we must ever advance from one state of things to another, and to make us aware that, dismissing all vain regrets for past joys which can no more return, we should constantly endeavour so to employ the present moment, as that our use of it shall contribute to improve us in virtue and to prepare us for the enjoyment of true felicity.

This system of opinions is sometimes, in moments of langour, depressing and overwhelming, on account of the close relation with the entire order of the universe, which it attributes to our mortal state, apparently so bounded and transitory. At those moments the thought of eternity which it causes, as I may say, to press us on every side, puts us into a frame of mind analogous to the one which we probably should be in, if we became sensible of this world being, as we are taught to think that it is, hurried incessantly forward, with an inconceivable rapidity, in the regions of infinite space. In that case, it is to be presumed, we should feel so bewildered and amazed, from the contemplation of the boundless tract through which we should be precipitated, that we should hardly know how to believe in the existence of such diminutive beings as ourselves. It would seem to us every instant that we were on the point of falling away from this world, where our footing

would appear so precarious, to be drifted about in an ocean to which we could never find a shore.

The frame of mind which causes the idea of our intimate connexion with the eternal order of the universe, to produce on us effects, not greatly differing from these, is one which ought to be discouraged. It disposes our moral feelings and forces to shrink up in a manner favourable to indolence, and to the habit of fretfully repining at all the real or imagined ills of life. When we take pleasure, on the contrary, in reflecting on the close ties which bind us to the entire universe, we find our hearts expanded by a cheerful, exhilarating sentiment. All our moral forces open into vigorous expansion, so that we wrestle courageously against the evils of our destiny, preserving our minds serene, and vigilant to watch over themselves, in the midst of every trial, whether light or heavy.

I believe that the opinions under consideration are well adapted thus wisely to render our minds strong and active, by keeping ever present to them the thought of the bearings of our situation and character on the moral order of the universe.

§ 2.—The most radical difference between these conjectures on a future state, and any opinions on the subject which, as far as my knowledge goes, have as yet been published, seems to me to consist in the principle that a state of blessedness is one characterized by an extreme energy of mind; so that, if we are in it to be less exposed to temptations than we are here, it is because we shall have acquired such vigour, and such power to display a steady activity in doing right, that we shall have no need of being proved by trials, since we could easily surmount any that might be presented to us.

This doctrine seems to me much better to account for the ills which afflict us at present, and also to be, in every respect, more salutary to us, than the notion generally received, of the just being destined to enjoy, after death, a repose which demands from them no exertion.

I have already remarked, that any state of mind or things which naturally results from the exercise of certain passions, if it exist previous to those passions, will give rise to them. I conclude from this observation, that the belief of its being

necessary to make, for a time, prodigious and painful efforts, which are to be followed by the enjoyment of that perfect peace that is agreeable to indolence, is a notion too liable to inflame with the fever of a proud, selfish ambition, the breast that entertains it; for it is the nature of such ambition to suggest the hope, first to accomplish the most prodigious labours, and then to see them followed by calm, undisturbed enjoyment.

The idea that the labours are to last throughout this mortal life, and the sweets of unruffled peace only to be tasted in another, requires us to keep our eye steadily fixed on a longer tract of the course that lies before us, than we should find it necessary to do, if we determined to encounter great hardships in our youth, in order to enjoy afterwards, in the midst of ease and luxury, the glory which should crown our toils; but this difference does not seem to me to make any in the disposition of the heart. Whether we expect our labours to last for the whole, or only a part of this life; whether the peaceful delights which are to follow them, are to be enjoyed in this world or another, it appears to me equally true that a strong contrast, presenting itself to the imagination, between the perilous task which is first to be fulfilled, and the calm pleasures which are afterwards to be tasted, is adapted to awaken, with ardour, the passion of selfish ambition, that is, the desire to do great actions from a proud wish to show ourselves capable of them, rather than from a virtuous zeal to fulfil the task allotted us, in a manner acceptable to God and beneficial to man.

I believe too that the ambition highly to distinguish themselves, by a conduct which shall hereafter ensure them distinctions and rewards, frequently animates those who profess an extraordinary zeal for religion. It is well known, that such persons often betray their ambitious sentiments, by the love of domination which they manifest.

Virtue agrees with selfish ambition in telling us to hold ourselves ready to make great and painful efforts; but she does not, like the latter, force us to burn for the opportunity to show ourselves capable of them.

If she bid us seek for it, it is because she teaches us to consider it as a duty to exercise, for a good end, what faculties we possess. She does not look forward to the time when it will be no longer necessary for us to exert them with energy, for she requires our hearts to be always prepared for a state of vigorous action. As there is to be no term to the obligation which she imposes upon us to put forth all the activity of our mind, she requires no exaggerated effort from us, and she allows us to mingle through the duties that she prescribes to us, all the pleasures that are compatible with the fulfilment of them. The object at which she particularly aims is, to teach us to blend the highest and most exquisite degree of happiness into a life consecrated to noble and unceasing exertions in her cause.

Such being my notion of virtue, I need not repeat that the doctrines in regard to a future life consigned in this work, appear to me singularly proper to awaken in the bosom her firm and decisive, yet peaceful sentiments.

§ 3.—These doctrines are not, however, such as are most effectual to console the desponding mind at those times when, worn down with the tumults and contrarieties of this life, it flies for comfort to the hope of a future one. At such moments, images of unruffled, indolent tranquillity would be far more soothing to it.

Persons cast down by the evils of this life, have doubtless great need of being cheered by the prospect of a future, and more satisfactory one. But they do not stand in need of having such a prospect opened to them, merely to give them consolation; it ought also to strengthen them in the determination zealously to fulfil their duties.

In no respect does virtue promise every kind of happiness that the heart feels itself disposed to relish, for all the passions which tempt us so readily to err, have each a particular good that they make us sigh to attain, and none more than indolence. This passion is for ever trying to persuade us, that the kind of happiness which it becomes us to look for, is one that may be enjoyed by beings sunk in a languid supineness.

Indolence differs from more lively passions in this, that the

images of felicity which the former holds up to us are often only to be realized in another world, while the latter demand a present gratification. But the illusions frequently produced by indolence are, on that account, more dangerous, since she represents them to us as our true happiness. She does so the more easily because, though they be very pernicious, in engaging us not to arm ourselves sufficiently with firm activity and calm perseverance, to advance the work of our improvement, they offer nothing in their aspect which warns our conscience not to yield to them. They represent to us scenes of peace and love, which virtue's self engages us to contemplate with interest, that we may realize them as far as we can without quitting the path of duty. The error—and it is one that leads far—of indolence is, that she tempts us to make them the first object of our consideration.

These remarks explain to us why our inquiries respecting the condition of the just in a future life, should have for object, not to find out which is the doctrine that would prove most consoling to us at the hour when we were paralyzed by deep affliction, but to ascertain which is the one that would, at such a time, give us the most consolation that it were possible to reconcile with a good discharge of the principal service that our religious hopes ought to render us, namely: that of inciting us to go through, with unabating ardour, all the tasks and trials allotted to us.

It appears to me that the opinions, which I have here developed, are very fit to answer this end.

§ 4.—The hope that a system of natural religion, which appears agreeable to the laws of order, is true, together with a conviction, that, in the obscurity in which we are in this life, we cannot attain full certainty on the subject, puts the mind, I think, exactly into the state in which it best learns to know its own strength, and the noble purposes for which it should exhibit it. If it cannot be fully sure of what exists beyond this world, it at least studies to be well acquainted with the principles of justice, which must preside over a creation that is the work of a good God; and, by a steady concentration in the resolution to do right, and to abide the consequences;

it learns to appreciate its own forces, and to make up by the strength of its decisions, for the degree of uncertainty in which it finds itself.

When we have strictly interrogated the sentiments of order stirring in our breast, and that we have compared their answers, with all the phenomena offered by the moral and physical world, we arrive at a result that sanctions, I think, the opinions that I have explained. The images, relative to the destiny of mankind, and to a future life, which those opinions present to our imagination, appear to me as filling up the point, at which the views of our reason and of all our orderly feelings concentrate, when none of them are rendered obscure and confused, by ignorance, passion, or prejudice. That point may not be the one of absolute truth, which perhaps lies far beyond the reach of our vision, but I think it is respecting us, the one of relative truth, as being so perfectly in harmony with our virtuous wishes and sentiments, that, by contemplating it, we are excited to become such, as we feel that we ought to be, to correspond to any plan of happiness and order that may have been established, by an all-merciful and all-wise God. Therefore, if this system be not the one which regulates the creation, we may at least, I believe, conclude, that it invites us to follow the same course, which the real one would prescribe to us, were it unfolded to our comprehension: we may also conclude, that the latter would be to the full as satisfactory to us, and equally calculated to make us adore the goodness and wisdom of God.

Whether, then, these opinions be indeed some faint glimmering of Eternal truth, shining through an opening in the subterraneous passage in which I am doomed to tread, or only a visionary light, kindled among my own intellectual and moral faculties, they equally serve to guide me on my way.

They do not, by any means, undertake to set before us the whole course of our existence; but the view which they profess to open to us of a part of it is, agreeably to my conceptions, so grand, that it may very well give their highest degree of energy to all our noblest sentiments, and determine

us to wait with patience, though with lively hope, for the time when a wider and still more majestic scene shall be unfolded to us.

§ 5.—In the space which we can at present contemplate, I only see one circumstance which does not exactly tally with my notions of moral harmony. It is, that my speculative ideas, respecting the order of things which would manifest the world to be the work of an all-wise and all-good God, do not precisely agree with the sentiments which, in practice, are awakened in me.

In speculation, it seems to me that it would become him to admit no evil into his creation. In practice, I find not only that it does exist, but that its existence is necessary to make us, by the trials it obliges us to undergo, fit for the highest kind of happiness. Since, then, my practical sentiments find nothing that shocks them in the sight of the evil that appears in the world, I do not embarrass myself with conjecturing whether my speculative thoughts, which are so tenacious in insinuating to me, that the world would have been more perfect, could the advantages that result from our combats with evil, have been ensured to us, without our having any knowledge of it; will, throughout all eternity, continue to hold the same language, or whether, as indeed seems to me more probable, they will at last confirm the dictates of my practical sentiments, and perceive that the actual order of things is not only necessary, because of the elements of which we are composed, but that in every respect it satisfies all the theoretic principles that our reason can form, relatively to the operations that mark perfect goodness and unbounded power.

As to the pictures of undisturbed felicity in which my imagination and moral feelings prompt me to take pleasure, I consider them as deserving great attention from me, though I should counteract the order of nature did I literally try to realize them. They serve to show me what happiness would be were it given to us in a state of innocence, in which we had no opportunity to exercise virtue: they offer me land-marks to which, in promoting my own happiness or that of the world, I must try to approach as nearly as I can, without quitting the

demesne of virtue; and they enable me fully to appreciate the worth of the latter; for the comparison which they induce me to establish between a state of social order regulated by her laws, and one of innocence and peace, renders more striking and admirable my idea of the noble task which virtue commands us to perform.

# APPENDIX.

*This system can be reconciled with our Saviour's prophecies, relatively to the last judgment.*

The belief that our Saviour died to redeem fallen man, naturally induces us to suppose, that a time will come, when the creatures redeemed by his blood, shall be allowed gratefully to assemble round him, and humbly to glorify him, for the accomplishment of their redemption. Nor are we left trusting, on these momentous points, to the suggestions of natural feeling, since scripture confirms its dictates, explicitly declaring, that our Saviour, surrounded by multitudes of his Saints, shall appear triumphantly on the last day: that day, it further adds, shall be one, in which both the quick and the reviving dead, shall be judged by him according to their works.

The belief, that the day in which the present system of the universe shall be dissolved, shall be also one of retribution to the quick and the dead, does not, I think, any otherwise affect the foregoing opinions, than that it leads to the conclusion, that our passage from this world into another, is not in general to take place immediately on the separation of the soul and body. We shall most of us, I infer from scripture, without being able to form, from analogical reasoning, any conjecture on the subject, lie, for a longer or shorter interval, insensible in the grave.

Our Saviour's intention, in speaking to his disciples of a day of judgment, appears to me evidently to have been to impress them with a conviction, of its being necessary for them ever to hold themselves in readiness to depart this life, when their hour should come.

The obligation to do so was equally incumbent on them, whether they were to be among the quick, who would be suddenly surprised by the total overthrow of the visible creation, or whether they were to be withdrawn from the world,—as

many generations had been before them—while the natural order of things was still flourishing. A description therefore of the consternation with which they would be seized, should the last day arrive and find them unprepared, was just as applicable to their case, and as well adapted to impress on their minds, salutary counsels, as it would have been, had the last day been close at hand.

By this description, does our Saviour think proper to excite in them, a just terror of neglecting for a moment, the work of their salvation: in doing so, he makes use of such mysterious language, that, did a reconcilement of it with what appears to be the order of nature, require it to be loosely understood, we should perhaps be fairly entitled to give to it a lax interpretation.

But we need not have recourse to such an expedient; for all that could hinder the doctrines laid down by our Saviour, respecting the last judgment, from according with the system of order here exposed, would be, his representing it to be instituted to try all generations of men.

The descriptions which he gives of it, seem to me to have no such universal bearings. On the contrary, the continual references which he makes to it in common with the destruction of Jerusalem, as if these two events were in the same category, appear to announce, that it shall only affect the generations destined to figure in the world shortly before its destruction.*

* St. Paul in his description of the last judgment, (1st. Thessalonians, 4th, chap., beginning at 15th verse,) speaks as if he and the persons whom he was addressing, should be among the quick; so that in representing them and himself, as being included among those who should stand before his Redeemer's tribunal, he does not assert, the last judgment to be instituted for the trial of all generations of men, and not simply for those who live near or at the time of its occurrence.

Were it to be proved,—which it never will be in this world—that there shall have been, prior to the final judgment, many previous ones, to try mortals of various generations, our knowledge of such a dispensation would not, I think, in the least entitle us to impeach the veracity of scripture, since it could be perfectly reconciled with its assertions. I therefore conceive, if an investigation of the moral design of nature, sanctions me in the establishment of the hypothesis which I have exposed, touching our future destination, that the profound veneration which I feel for the revelations of scripture, does not bind me to reject it.

I may further add, that almost all christians seem to expect, that our fu-

Our Saviour too, in speaking of the ancient patriarchs, further sanctions the belief, that persons who had lived in ages remote from the day of judgment, shall not be amenable to it; for he mentions them in a manner, which gives reason to think, that they were already reaping the reward of a holy life on earth. Thus, in repeating and commenting on his heavenly father's words, he says: "I am the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob. God is not the God of the dead but of the living." This passage seems to me obviously to imply, not only, that these three holy men were living, but that they were enjoying the favour of God. Yet is there nothing recorded, relatively to their mode of departure from this life, which gives reason to believe, that the usual course of nature was changed in their favour,—as it was in that of Moses and Elias,—that they might be speedily received into life everlasting.

Again, our Saviour, in the parable of the rich man and Lazarus, appears plainly to intimate, that men shall arise from the sleep of death, to receive the recompense awarded to them for their doings in this world, shortly after their departure from it, and while it proceeds undisturbed in its usual track.

Besides, the declaration often made in the new testament, that innumerable hosts of saints, shall attend our Saviour, on his coming to judge the earth, denotes that multitudes of good men shall receive their reward before the arrival of that day.

I therefore conclude, that what is signified by a final judgment is, the separation which, when the present system of nature is dissolved, shall take place between those of the righteous and the wicked, to whom no reward or punishment had yet been awarded, on their being sent to receive the retribution, of which our Saviour shall find them deserving, under the new system of nature, that shall arise from the ruins of the former one.

I do not make any conjecture respecting the mode in which, in the latter days of our present system, the functions of re-

ture lot will be decided before the last day, for, after the loss of a pious friend, they constantly indulge the hope of his having already been received into heaven.

warding and punishing, will be distributed between it and the system that is to follow it.

'Tis enough for me to remark, that the idea of such a distribution, naturally connects itself with the opinions that I have advanced, concerning the local circumstances of future rewards and punishments; and to show that it removes any contrariety, which might at first sight appear to exist, between those opinions and the scripture doctrine of a last judgment.

END OF FIRST PART.

# PART II.

# PREFATORY DISCOURSE

TO

## THE SECOND PART.

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My principles, relatively to the design which seems to pervade the various modifications of national characters, being entirely drawn from my observations on the peculiar features, moral and physical, of individuals, I have not been induced to pay that attention to the comparative extent and natural advantages of their different countries, that such an important consideration would claim from an author, who would undertake fully to trace the relations in which—conformably to the will of nature—the nations of this globe should stand in regard to each other. My only intention is to offer on the subject, the few hints which my observations suggested to me. Such is their detached, circumscribed nature, that, had I had an opportunity to see some natives of the island of Elba, and also of the great empire of China, I should have compared the distinctive features of their character just as freely, as though the countries to which they belonged were entitled to figure on an equality, in a statistical survey of the globe.

The same cause, namely, the confinement of my observations to individuals, occasions me often to speak of the English, Scotch and Irish, as though they composed distinct nations, since they offer distinct traits of physiognomy and disposition. I wish it, however, to be clearly understood, that I adhere to the connexion, that binds together the different parts of the British empire, with all the respect and attachment which

it becomes a female to feel, who has ever enjoyed, in security, the main advantages attendant on her place in society, beneath the protection of the British government.

The countries which I have had opportunity to remark are not all equally in a state of prosperity and freedom. It may, therefore, justly be concluded, that many of the differences of national character, which engaged my attention, were merely the results of circumstances. Aware that such might be the case, I have scrupulously endeavoured, to the best of my power, to avoid confounding differences of this kind with the immutable distinctions established by nature.

But, notwithstanding all my precautions, I avow that my strictures on the peculiar character of the people whom I have observed, may often refer to the impression which accidental circumstances, rather than nature, had stamped on it. For instance, the part of this work, which treats of the character of the French, was written some time before the deposition of Charles X., at a period when they had not as yet gained the esteem of Europe, by that steady, constitutional resistance to his tyrannical encroachments, which at last, on his open violation of his compact with his people, ended in a revolution, that they achieved with heroic bravery, and have hitherto conducted with praiseworthy moderation.

I coldly describe them, such as they appeared to me, at a period when their national character was not much calculated to engage strangers to view them with respect and warm approbation. They submitted discontentedly to a monarch in whose intentions to observe the charter they had no confidence; and many of them consoled themselves for the mortification of being forced to acknowledge for their chief a detested Bourbon, by glorying in recalling to memory the splendid slavery to which Napoleon had reduced them, and the ruinous conquests that they achieved under him.

It is probable that, had I delayed writing my observations and reflections on their character, such as it appeared to me, till after their accomplishment of their late revolution, the high respect for them with which, on account of it, they have inspired me, would have caused me to dwell on the eulogiums they appear to merit more than I have done: particularly as

in praising them I should certainly have gratified my own private feelings, since I must ever remember with gratitude the amiable proofs of attention that I received from many of them, and the unvarying demonstrations of regard that I experienced from a few with whom I contracted an intimate friendship. I have not, however, since my esteem for their national character has been much increased, made the slightest change in what I had already written concerning them, conceiving that, while my opinion of them continued precisely the same, as it had been during my residence in France, I was best qualified faithfully to represent that which my intercourse with them led me to form.

I cannot conclude the preface to this part of my work, without mentioning that the strong patriotic affection that I naturally bear to one of the countries which I pass in review, renders my situation somewhat embarrassing.

The native of some other country comprehended within the range of these strictures, who may read this work, will, perhaps, readily take offence, if at any time his native land should appear unkindly criticised in it; he may think my censure owing to a spirit of hostility, that has been kindled in me by an illiberal and exclusive prepossession, in favour of the country where I first drew breath. On the other hand, in those descriptions which I make of what appear to me the natural failings against which the Irish should particularly guard, some of my countrymen will, perhaps, say that I have exaggerated them. They will, at least, perhaps assert, that it did not become me thus to lay their defects before the public; and they may further add, that I speak with a less censorious tone of every other country than I do of Ireland. I own that I think, that I have a greater right to dwell minutely on the faults to which my countrymen are naturally liable,—when I do so, that they may the better understand how to form their character,—than I have to point out, with equal minuteness, the defects of those strangers who received me with kindness and hospitality.

Reflecting, then, on the displeasure which may be conceived against this part of my work, on the score either of illiberal prejudice, or of want of due attachment to my country, I must

beg the candid, reflecting reader to consider, whether the mode, in which I sometimes point out national defects, is not one, that I am fully justified in making use of, actuated, as I hope I evidently am, by the wish to engage those who may hearken to me, to observe the various shades of national character, with a view to follow the bias of nature, in labouring to improve mankind. I request him, also, to judge coolly, whether it would be possible truly to describe the moral features of our own country, or draw a luminous comparison between it and other nations, if authors were not allowed as much liberty as I have taken, in marking the faults and defects of either their countrymen or persons differing from them by their national character.

# BOOK I.

## PART II.—CHAPTER I.

CONTENTS.

DESCRIPTION OF SOME OF THE EFFECTS OF IMAGINATION, INTENDED TO EXPLAIN HER MODE OF ACTING IN DIFFERENT NATIONS RELATIVELY TO SENSIBLE AND METAPHYSICAL OBJECTS.

BEFORE I enter on the principal matter treated in this part, I think it advisable to give some definition of two terms of which I make great use in it, and which I oppose to each other. They are: an imagination directed on sensible objects, and one directed on metaphysical ones. These terms are, in fact, only comparative, signifying *more* and *less*. By the constitution of all human nature, every one's imagination must be directed in the main on sensible objects, since it is only by attention to outward and visible signs that any person can penetrate into what passes in another's mind.

To make the reader perfectly aware of the very qualified sense, in which I affirm of the imagination of some nations that it is directed on metaphysical objects, I shall begin by pointing out some of the operations of that faculty which are common to all countries, and which prove that every where it pays great attention to sensible objects.

The wisest philosophers, those whose love for their fellow-creatures is the most founded on abstract principles of justice and equity, drawn from a conviction that they know the heart of others by a comparison with their own; when they wish, in the positive details of life, to excite in themselves a warm interest for particular objects, by an accurate establishment of such a comparison, can rarely feel for them exactly as for themselves; that is, they can rarely enter into their heart, and represent to themselves all its feelings, without adverting to their manner of expressing them, or their outward appear-

ance. Let them know their character ever so well, if they wish minutely to conceive how they would act and speak in such given circumstances, they will not often succeed in their purpose by just taking in imagination possession of their mind, observing where it differs from their own, and then describing a conduct and a discourse agreeable to what they find that they would have held, had they been changed so as to become like them. Imagination, instead of engaging us to enter into the mind which we wish to describe with all its nicest shades, urges us to keep entirely outside of it. She makes us see the gestures of the person whom it animates and hear his voice; nay, if he be unknown to us, she still represents to us a figure which she calls his. These sensible objects, instead of dissipating our attention from his character, serve to guide us in our description of it, so that we succeed, perhaps very well, in painting it as expressed in his outward appearance, though, if we did not survey it in its connexion with it, we should not know how to represent faithfully a series of actions or discourses entirely correspondant to it. In like manner, if we wish to give descriptions of an ideal world perfectly representing the real one, our task would be endless and too difficult, did we just enter into our own heart, and try, enlightened by our experience of the world, to form an idea of all the variety of modifications of which nature and circumstances might have rendered it susceptible; and did we postpone clothing our personages with an exterior form, until we had thus thoroughly developed the character which we intended them to have. Every inventor of fictitious histories, pursues, I believe, a shorter method, as well as a much surer one, for remaining true to nature. He gives at once an outward figure to his personages. Thus, if he have to describe an old man or a young girl, he never thinks of them otherwise than as having a suitable figure, animated by the character which he is to represent. He is perhaps young, and would probably be greatly embarrassed, if he were required to give an abstract description of all the feelings of an old man's or young girl's mind. His is so different that, the utmost notions which he can form of the modifications that it is susceptible of undergoing, cannot extend to supposing it one

suited to either of them. But when, without embarrassing himself with such a philosophical analysis, he represents to his imagination an old man such as he has been accustomed to see—whether respectable or otherwise—and when he gives to his young girl all the charms and graces which his youthful fancy can lavish on her person—supposing him to have genius—he is never liable to go astray. His old man has as exactly the feelings and manner of acting usual at his age, as if the author were old himself, and knew by experience how the heart of the aged is formed; and in his young girl he gives such a faithful description of the passions and sentiments common in youth to the fair sex, that it seems as if he were endowed with a tact, capable to penetrate much further into the folds of women's heart than they can themselves.

So far all nations agree in having an imagination directed on sensible objects. But the people among whom that faculty seems to me peculiarly to have such a bias, are remarkable for their inability to let their feelings plunge, instinctively, into another's mind, unless their imagination be also occupied in contemplating the external signs of his inward emotions. In respect to their manner of viewing him, his mind is so essentially united with his outward appearance, that both claim equally and indivisibly, their attention.

The people whose imagination is directed on metaphysical objects, dive at first into another's mind, by means of exterior appearances, but having once done so, they fix their attention principally on the former, and often even forget the outward signs by which they had penetrated into it.

These few explanations, relatively to the meaning that I attach to the two terms, by which I intend to mark the distinctions subsisting between the operations of imagination in different countries, may, I think, suffice for the present, as, in making positive applications of my notions on this subject, I shall have ample occasion to treat of them more largely. I shall just add, that the two distinctions of national, imaginative powers, which I think that I have perceived, readily escape the observer's notice, because every people, as far as I have had an opportunity to remark, unknowingly endeavour to unite in themselves the advantages of both. Those whose

imagination is the most inclined to a metaphysical direction, take incessant pains to arrest its attention on sensible objects, that it may enliven and embellish their minds with a great variety of images. On the other hand, the people in whom this faculty is principally struck with sensible objects, labour incessantly to make it take hold of metaphysical ones. Willingly would they enter, by means of it, immediately into the knowledge of what passes in the mind of the persons whom they observe, without being obliged to distinguish it only through the medium of external signs. But, unable to give their imagination the bent which they wish it to take, they endeavour to supply its deficiency by the use of their reasoning powers. To that end, they closely observe the conduct of others, as well as every sensible symptom by which the constitution and purposes of their mind can be made manifest, and then, by means of the various processes of reason, they try to ascertain the nature of the mental operations which had been the cause of those sensible effects. They also, I make no doubt, where they have a particular interest in becoming acquainted with a neighbour's disposition, succeed, frequently, in forming of it, to themselves, a just idea, that they carefully retain, though they may have entirely forgot the outward signs, by which he first gave them an opportunity to penetrate into the workings of his mind.

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## CHAPTER II.

### METHOD WHICH I PURSUE IN UNFOLDING MY VIEWS ON THE SUBJECT OF NATIONAL DIFFERENCES OF CHARACTER.

My notions respecting the relations in which, on account of the varieties in their moral and intellectual constitution, nations are placed by nature in regard to each other, have been suggested to me by incessant reflections on the observations which I had opportunity to make, on individuals of different countries. But as the reader would find it tedious and weari-

some to follow me through an explanation of the long course which I pursued, in passing, from a countless variety of minute details of practical life, to some general speculative principles, I shall, in making him acquainted with those principles, pursue a method inverse to the one by which I collected them, and, after laying before him the most comprehensive distinctions in mankind on which I was led to reflect, shall descend to the most circumscribed ones that fell within the compass of my observations.

I believe, that when all the nations on earth shall have attained the degree of perfection which they are destined to reach, there will reign, even among the most distant ones, a sympathy that shall greatly enlarge, for each of them, the field wherein their intellectual and moral powers will display themselves, for they will all learn greatly to identify with their own character, the peculiar mental distinctions possessed by each of them.

I am led to conclude that such a valuable sympathy will prevail among them, not only because I perceive that nature has rendered nations very prone to imitate each other, but also on account of her having established such an affinity between their dispositions that, notwithstanding the remarkable differences of character which distinguish them, they can all appreciate each other's literature as well as if it had originated among themselves; and they can, where it faithfully represents human nature in the country whence it sprung, relish it with as genuine a feeling, as though they were conscious of their character being formed capable of uniting in it every peculiarity, belonging to the human mind in any part of the globe.

I therefore infer, that well ordered sentiments, flowing from one nation to another, will, in the end, render every people respectable and their government stable. I do not, however, on that account, suppose that every national character will eventually be cast exactly in the same form. So far from thinking so, I am persuaded that there will ever exist, among the nations, differences of character analogous to those at present subsisting among the civilized states of Europe. Thus one will have a more commercial spirit, another a more lively and

refined taste for the enjoyments of society, with innumerable other shades of distinction. All I mean is, that each nation will imbibe the good qualities peculiar to its neighbours, so far as to give efficacy to its own, and to add to its mental treasures.

It will also be necessary for each nation to cultivate with care its own particular talent, otherwise it will not have a decided character, and its promptitude to imitate the brilliant points shining in a foreign one, will be more likely to mislead than improve it. Besides, by neglecting to cultivate the talent peculiarly entrusted to it, it would be guilty of not contributing its share to increase the common mass of the moral and intellectual riches of mankind. Such an omission might sometimes have very serious consequences; for the sentiments and tastes of which the men of other countries would thus be debarred the culture, might perhaps have quickened their love of virtue, by teaching them to admire her dignity or rendering them sensible to her charms.

Before I proceed further, I wish to give the reader notice, that the system of the moral order of nature to which I am attached, does not oblige me to adopt the opinion, that the inhabitants of every country on the globe shall at last mount so in the scale of moral improvement, as to harmonize with the great mass of mankind. One of my principles being, that this earth is to fulfil the office of raising the human mind to a high degree of excellence very imperfectly in comparison with what it would do, were not other worlds conjoined with it which are to repair her deficiencies, I conclude that the imperfection of the branch of the plan of moral order that immediately concerns this world, may be such as to leave the inhabitants of some spots on its surface for ever in a totally unimproved state.

## CHAPTER III.

### DIFFERENCES OF CHARACTER BETWEEN THE WESTERN EUROPEANS AND THE CHINESE.

In considering the diversities of national character, I am particularly struck with the contrast exhibited, between those of the Chinese and of the western countries of Europe; of which, speaking of them thus generally, I shall consider the French character as the nucleus. These characters appear as opposed by their constitution, as are the countries to which they belong, by their geographical position.

The European character is distinguished by a vigilant and haughty sentiment of honour, which occasions men jealously to threaten with condign punishment, the person who shall dare to offer them, individually, the slightest insult.

It is also remarkable for being in a state of continual combustion, which leads it constantly to undergo some change.

The fermentation carried on in it is still further increased by its national varieties, which, though they do not prevent it from being, throughout, distinguished by a restless vivacity, are such as to provoke it to endless wars and rivalities.

The Chinese character appears singularly a stranger to that sentiment of honour, which induces individuals to repel from their persons unworthy treatment: since it is well known, that the highest mandarins commonly bow with submission, and even with thanks, to their monarch's sentence, when he condemns them to disgraceful chastisements. I venture to say, that it would be utterly impossible so to mould the spirit of the Europeans, as that they should generally consent, to the introduction among them, of such humiliating punishments.

The Chinese character is also calm and constant to so extraordinary a degree that, were it not ascertained that it has existed some thousand years without undergoing any considerable change or revolution, we should, judging human nature to be every where much the same, suppose it incapable of such stability. There are, perhaps, greater varieties among the people who compose that vast empire, than what are to be

found among the nations of the west of Europe, but, if there be, it does not appear that they disturb its tranquillity.

Those remarkable differences, between the Chinese and Europeans*, lead me to suppose that nature, in establishing a plan of harmonious influences between national characters, has gone round the globe, so that the basis and crown of her plan incline greatly to a longitudinal direction. Struck with this idea, I remark with curiosity the variety of characters interposed between these two terminations, and am inclined to form of them some general notion, which I shall now communicate to the reader.

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## CHAPTER IV.

### EUROPEAN CHARACTER CONTRASTED WITH THAT OF THE ASIATICS.†

I shall now pass in review the Asiatic character, and, in order the better to discriminate it from the European, I shall first notice more particularly the peculiarities of the latter.

The mind of Europeans is prone to feel the stimulus of an ardent enthusiasm, which excites it to conceive lofty notions of its destination. But it is not a rich, towering imagination that speaks to it of the grand part assigned to it, and that spurs it on nobly to fulfil it, so much as a proud consciousness of its force and activity. Its imagination indeed helps to warm it, by exhibiting to it views of the noble ends which it should strive to attain; however, a very impoverished imagination will suffice to hold out grand and irresistibly captivating views to the mind, which is spurred on, by a sense of stupendous inward powers, to undertake great exploits.

The imagination of the Europeans does seem to me, in regard to the affairs of active life, to be an impoverished one. Where they apply in a calm, sedentary manner to imaginative

* For brevity sake I drop the epithet *western*, though I mean it to be understood.

† Who live west of China.

arts, they may indeed, by studiously diving into their mind, draw forth their imagination, and prove it to be strong, fertile and creative. But this faculty, when they are not attending to its culture, seldom rises with exuberance within them: rarely does it dazzle them in active life with brilliant lights which they implicitly, and, as it were by enchantment, follow.

Reason, and those mental faculties which serve reason in her operations, are much more developed in them than imagination. Their vigorous and ever-stirring mind peculiarly revels in the consciousness of its force. It loves to employ its activity to marshal all its reasoning powers, that by their means it may widen the bounds and fix the bases of the physical sciences: or else learn clearly to discriminate between true and false principles in metaphysics and morals.

The countenance of the Europeans indicates that they are less formed to shine by a rich, glowing imagination, than by ingenious thoughts, and reasoning faculties able quickly to detect the slightest flaw in the most complex system of argument.

The Asiatics have also a great, elastic spring of energy in their mind, prompting them to aspire with enthusiasm to the fulfilment of a lofty destination. They have not, however, enough of this mental vigour to render them enterprising and restless, and inspire them with a steady pride in the consciousness of their own inherent forces. What they possess of it throws itself principally into their imagination, impelling it to such lofty flights that it is capable of hurrying them on to deeds which, did they coolly reflect like the Europeans, would be far above their courage.*

The European constitution tends more to make us sensible of self-love being the central feeling of our mind, by rendering us conscious, even when we are most devoted to the service of

* In like manner, as the Europeans can sometimes display a great fund of imagination, when they studiously cultivate this faculty, so I suppose that the Asiatics have sufficient ability to exhibit great powers of reasoning, when, in their sedentary avocations, they assiduously apply to calling them forth: but, where their interests are actively engaged, they are greatly, I believe, guided by imagination, and they think but little of establishing rational principles of conduct, by a just train of arguments.

others, of our principal aim being to raise ourselves, by a noble conduct, as high as possible on the scale of existence.

An Asiatic enthusiasm more leaves self-love confounded in our breast with the love of our neighbour, or of universal nature. We are less conscious of having an isolated existence, than of being a portion of some greater combination of beings with whom we long to be intimately united.

When I think of the proportion in which reason and imagination, hold a divided empire over the natives of different countries, it appears to me, that the latter faculty preponderates as much in the mind of the Asiatics, as the former does in that of the Europeans.

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## CHAPTER V.

THE ASIATICS, HAVE A SENSIBLY DIRECTED IMAGINATION. VARIOUS PECULIARITIES IN THEIR CHARACTER, NOTICED WITH A DESIGN TO THROW LIGHT ON MY NOTIONS, CONCERNING THE OPERATIONS OF THAT KIND OF IMAGINATION.

The imagination of the Asiatics, is directed on sensible objects. To specify more clearly my meaning, I shall say that I consider the act of the Asiatic conqueror, who dined upon planks laid over his dying enemies, that he might have the pleasure of hearing their groans, to be one that would be much more likely to be suggested by an imagination exclusively struck by sensible objects, than by one directed on metaphysical ones. The latter would be more apt to glut itself with the idea, that hated foes were miserably expiring, without desiring that the auditory organ should, by the impressions which it received, render that idea, more lively, and add to its enjoyments.

A sensibly inclined imagination, from not being thwarted in the Asiatics by any other peculiarity in their mental constitution, operates, I believe, in them more freely, than in the natives of any other portion of the globe. I shall therefore, to give an idea of the influence which this kind of imagination naturally tends to exercise on the character of its possessor,

enlarge upon that of the Asiatics, to which, if I be not mistaken, it imparts its entire form and colouring.

The imagination of the Asiatics, on account of its never surveying the human mind, otherwise than through the medium of the senses, and of the glowing impression made on it by the beauties of nature, is very apt to confound the inanimate world with its principal inhabitant, just as if both belonged to the same class, and were companions to each other. Often it compares human beings with trees, with gardens, towers, or the luminaries of the heavens, with as much easy simplicity, as though they were all living creatures, appertaining to the same species. This peculiar structure of their imagination, makes the style of the Asiatic authors florid and redundant.

An imagination directed on sensible objects, inclines the person who possesses it, greatly to study the method of filling to advantage, his own place in the social order. But it appears, that it leaves him rather deficient in that penetration into the minds of the individuals whom he observes, which would greatly serve to enlighten him on the wisest mode of managing them. To repair this defect, he studies in his own breast the usual propensities of mankind, and his feelings represent to him with such fidelity, the manner in which their general character should be acted on, in order to mould it at will, that the Asiatics, in their transactions with Europeans, are generally, as I hear, found to discover a great knowledge of the human mind, and of the mode of winding it to their purpose; though I do not believe that they have much insight into the peculiar traits of character of the individuals whom they meet with. They have, at least, little sagacity to discern in a fellow creature's mind, those latent germs of virtue and wisdom, on the right developement of which, depends the practicability of improving mankind, and fitting them to live happily beneath the reign of a noble system of national government.

The Asiatics, are much less predisposed to form just conceptions of what constitutes a virtuous conduct, than the Europeans are. The latter, on account of their being reminded of their own greatness, rather by the force of their mind, than by

the brilliant visions of their imagination, are more generous; they much oftener spurn the thought of committing some ferocious or treacherous crime, to accomplish a glorious end.

Many Asiatic writings evidently prove, that their authors consider the accomplishment of a glorious object, amply to justify the means, however barbarous or dishonourable, that may have been employed to arrive at it.

The European authors of real and fictitious histories of all ages, have, as far as I am informed, almost constantly shown, that both themselves and the personages figuring in their writings, were perfectly aware of the limits separating crimes from good actions. They never attribute the former to any one, otherwise than in casting a suitable stigma on him: nor do they represent their heros dazzled to such a degree, by the end that they propose, that they look on a base action, leading to it, as a laudable one.*

Though the imagination of the Asiatics be very deficient, in opening to them views of that virtuous system of order, which should infuse its spirit through their political and social forms of government, it still impregnates their minds with the love of submission to the rule of order.

When this passion is nourished, as it constantly is, by the art of designing men, the Asiatic people are easily led to betray their duty to themselves, by an entire renunciation of their own rights: taught by their crafty, or perhaps fanatic guides, to be absorbed in the contemplation of something indescribably sublime and excellent, towards which they must elevate themselves by an entire abnegation of self, they readily learn to glory, in supporting patiently the most cruel tortures. For instance, the miserable sufferings and the horrible deaths to which the East Indians expose themselves, to please their divinities, are well known, as is also the calm intrepidity with which widows cast themselves on a husband's funeral pile, that they may rejoin him in a better world.

It is the more easy, thus terribly to abuse the propensity of

* This assertion does not hold good, in regard to military exploits; for, in all countries, they may be dictated by a selfish, unjust spirit, and yet the achiever of them, as well as mankind in general overlook, in the admiration excited by them, their blameable origin.

the East Indians to brave every evil at the call of a very exalted imagination, because one directed on sensible objects, if it be not counteracted by other peculiarities in our mental constitution, engages us, while it makes us adhere closely to the reign of order in active life, deeply to reverence those superiors who appear to us as the heads and supports of order. It disposes us to look on the world with a sort of respect; and ever to feel a vague sentiment of awe, which causes us to attach ourselves principally to those who give to that sentiment a precise direction, by rendering themselves the objects of it.

An imagination thus constituted to make the people whom it governs sink into slavery, holds out further inducements to them abjectly to submit to those whom they look on as their superiors, from its being prone to communicate, to each individual ruled by it, an extraordinary inclination to associate himself, by sympathy, to some of his fellow creatures.

The East Indians are thus prepared, by a predisposition to sentiments of awe and sympathy, to look up to their spiritual guides with humble deference, and to bend their necks to any yoke which they command them to bear.

However, I do not mean that the religious instructors of the East Indians could, now that their faith has been long fixed, readily induce them to change it for another. They do not try the experiment, as the original inventors of it framed it in a manner to leave the people as implicitly obedient to their spiritual directors, as the latter could wish them to be. But it would be difficult to change the religion of the East Indians; for the love of order,—which appears to be in the usual course of nature the accompaniment of an imagination directed on sensible objects,—renders the mind imbued with it steady, and firmly attached to the principles and social forms to which it had been early accustomed to adhere. The love of order particularly produces this effect in an indolent mind, like that of the East Indians, in which the calm, regular impressions made on an exalted imagination, are not counteracted by the consciousness of great active forces, and the desire to exercise them.

Forces of such a nature seem to be the principal cause, which renders a portion of mankind restless and changeable.

The East Indians do not appear so much attached to the persons of their temporal rulers, as to the order of things to which they are accustomed, and more particularly to their religious institutions. It seems, indeed, natural, that an imagination so peaceable and exalted as theirs, should contemplate, with a warmer affection, the general form of their government, than the persons who administer it. For, a great attachment to the persons of their governors, supposes a promptitude to be inflamed with anger against their enemies, and to wage war with them; which irascible passion more accords with the active mind, revelling in the idea of a great internal force, than with the indolent one, prompted chiefly to action by a raised imagination. The reason why the East Indians show still more attachment to their religious superstitions than to the form of their temporal government is, it may be presumed, that the solemn mysteries which envelope the former, affect their imagination with that vague, indefinite awe, with which one of this kind, so highly exalted, always likes to be impressed.

These reflections on the principal Asiatic nations prevent its being a matter of surprise to me, that these nations, after having been among the first reduced under the yoke of a regularly combined government, should suddenly stop short in their progress in civilization, and during long ages advance no further. Their native love of order made them, in the beginning, readily submit to the introduction among them of a regular government; while their strong sympathy with the characters among them formed to take an ascendency over the rest of their countrymen, gave great opportunities to ambitious men to render slavish and oppressive the system of government to which they determined them to bend. In all countries will ambitious men undertake to rule their countrymen with a rod of iron, where the character of the latter renders such an enterprise feasible. The fetters of these eastern nations once rivetted, by the slavish, superstitious principles inspired to them, their attachment to received notions and customs deprived them of any wish to break loose from them, so that they have the

appearance hitherto of being destined to wear and cherish them for ever.

Some hordes of the Asiatics glory, it is true, in a state of savage independence and have remained in it since the early ages of the world.

I cannot form well founded conjectures, having never seen an Asiatic of this description, respecting the peculiarity of constitution, by which nature has made their character offer such a contrast to that of the Asiatics who live in peaceable submission to a despotic government. I am aware that her resources are, in this respect, inexhaustible; and that, by a very slight modification of a people's mental organization, she can make any native quality produce in them quite different effects from what it usually does. It is, I believe, by crossing in an endless variety of ways, a few mental qualities and faculties, that she exhibits in the world a countless diversity of shades of national character.

Led, however, by analogy with what my observations represent as her usual mode of proceeding in creating such distinctions, I think it likely that the hordes of Asiatics, who cling regularly to the lawless life of freebooters, have in their character the fund of indolence which usually distinguishes the inhabitants of their quarter of the globe, but that it is counterbalanced by a fund of energy that makes them scorn to yield to it. Once they were induced by circumstances to embrace a savage, warlike life, their sensibly directed imagination could quickly inspire them with an unconquerable attachment to it, by investing the kind of martial government and the modes of living to which they had been early accustomed, with as much charms as though they had been the result of a well combined system of social order.

## CHAPTER VI.

### THE AMERICAN CHARACTER.

I shall now consider the character interposed towards the west between Europe and China. This subject however, I al-

low, affords me very little solid ground on which to establish an argument. The aborigines of America are in too savage a state justly to allow of any conclusion being drawn, from the consideration of their character, respecting the one which would be exhibited by civilized nations inhabiting that quarter of the globe, were any to be found whose moral and intellectual physiognomy might reasonably be considered indigenous to the trans-atlantic continent. On the other hand, the descendants of the Europeans, of whom its numerous, well organized communities are composed, retain still too close a resemblance to the natives of the countries whence they originally sprung, for me to presume that the climate of America has already completed the work of remodelling the features of their character, in a manner analogous to its constitution.

However, as I am desirous to contrast the operations of the sensibly inclined imagination of the Asiatics, with those of a metaphysically disposed one equally exalted—to the developement of which latter kind of imagination, I believe the climate of America to be adapted—I shall venture to lay before the reader my notions, as I have gleaned them from books, oral information, and my own observations on some Americans of my acquaintance, concerning the character of the trans-atlantic nations, supposing it to be now such as I conclude that it will be, when it has completely received a modification congenial to the air of their country.

The Americans are, like the Asiatics, more indolent than the Europeans, but they are capable, when they are roused, of very steady and energetic conduct. They also seem exceedingly prone to delight in a life of savage independence. I do not believe, however, that they are moved to take pleasure in it, by exactly the same kind of mental excitement as the wild hordes of Asia. The latter have an orderly imagination, which makes them cling to the customs in which they have been trained, from believing them to emanate from a system of social order. Individuals among these hordes, hurried away by an exquisite sympathy with the companions of their toils, more look on themselves as portions of the entire company of depredators, than as isolated beings; and there-

fore, they are stimulated by their imagination, zealously to bear their part in rendering it triumphant in its warlike undertakings.

The wild Americans have less attachment to whatever government assembles them together. Their union is chiefly cemented by the obvious necessity of lending a mutual support; for each of them is more moved, by the consciousness of inborn dignity and individual greatness, to lead a hardy, adventurous life, than by a sentiment of devotion to a fraternity.

A metaphysically inclined imagination, disposes its possessor to look on his fellow men in a familiar, and, as I may say, a vulgar light; for, while it impels him curiously to scrutinize their inmost feelings, it does not give them any dignity in his eyes, by diffusing over his transactions with them, an air of order.

He seems, indeed, nearly a stranger, when he is occupied with the details of active life, to that sentiment of order, which, for those who are penetrated with it, can shed over the most familiar scenes, an ennobling lustre.

A metaphysically directed imagination, is also liable to stir up irascible passions in the breast of men, making them inclined keenly to resent any provocation which they think that they receive: it also urges the violent, untaught mind, to delight in acts of cruelty, and in the invention of refined tortures. As for the patient on whom his enemies inflict such dreadful torments, it excites him to bear them with heroic fortitude, because it keeps the idea of his own individual greatness predominant in his mind, and that it bids him scorn to grant his enemies such a triumph as to acknowledge, that their power to doom him to cruel sufferings, excels his courage patiently to support them.

When the civilized Americans apply to some great enterprise, they do it with ardour and steadiness; because the sense of its being an occupation worthy him, is present to every individual's mind, and that their raised imagination, as well as the determination to vanquish their native indolence, render them, where furious passions are not roused in them, more calmly energetic than the general run of Europeans.

Their imagination does not expand, continually, in near so exuberant a tide, over the daily occurrences of life, as that of the Asiatics, for a metaphysically directed imagination, though it gives some aid to our feelings in conceiving what passes within another's breast, lends them, notwithstanding, a very meagre assistance, in comparison to what they receive from imagination, when this faculty stirs in them, perpetually, vivid emotions, by the brilliant glow which she casts over all the sensible objects that make impressions on them. Supposing then, an equal quantity of imagination to warm two minds, in the one of which it is directed on metaphysical objects, and in the other on sensible ones, a much larger portion of it lies idle and unemployed, in the daily business of life, in the former, than in the latter.

As the part of a metaphysically directed imagination which is called into use in active affairs, speaks little to the mind of the charms of social and moral order—which, however, all human beings, in as far at least as they are civilized, love to contemplate—the portion of it which, relatively to those affairs, lies unoccupied, is apt to find employment for itself in sketching, abstractedly from the concerns of the world, sweet images of social order, which it takes pleasure in combining together in one harmonious system. The American imagination, therefore, as I conceive of it, is much more prone, than the Asiatic one, to take speculative excursions through an entire plan of social order adapted to assure the happiness of a people. Nor is it so easy to deceive it, in engaging it to contemplate with affection a slavish and degrading system of social order: for the mind of the Americans, rendered proud and strong by a sense of their individual rights and grandeur, constantly urges their imagination to soar in those regions, in which freedom and independence appear as the greatest worldly blessings that it becomes men to prize. The austere majesty of their imagination, combined with those violent passions which prompt them to breathe defiance against any one who would presume to encroach on their rights, is what inclines the Americans so much to a life of savage independence. All the intervening states of civilization, between what is called a state of nature and one of the highest degree of national perfection

which mankind can reach, tend usually, more or less, to exhibit the human mind as enfeebled or even dwindled; on that account they are very unsatisfactory to a haughty, exalted, American imagination; nor do they impress, with sufficient reverence, the mind under its control, to induce it to abandon its own overweening, individual pretensions, for the sake of becoming one of the members subjected to an impartial system of national government. I doubt, therefore, that if the trans-atlantic continent had not been in the end mainly peopled with Europeans, it ever would have been possible widely to plant in it civilized nations: and I am inclined to think that, whenever the American imagination shall be fully developed in the intellectual constitution of their descendants, that it will be extremely difficult to hold them firmly together as members of one organized national community, otherwise, than by forcing them to bend under such an iron yoke as shall completely crush their spirit.*

Yet the Americans, when they learn to calm their violent, arrogant passions, and to take views of national order lofty enough to be congenial to the wants of their imagination, are, I believe, very well disposed to attach themselves, with calm constancy and steady affection, to a whole system of government, embracing a great variety of parts, majestically and happily counterbalanced.

A metaphysically directed imagination, appears to me much more adequate than one intent on sensible objects, to discovering, in the depth's of another's mind, those germs of virtue and good order, by the judicious nourishment of which, their possessor might be taught to become a firm support to the institutions of a nation, which had reached the perfection of virtue and happiness.

* I beg the reader to remember that the contrast that I mark between the American and Asiatic characters is only comparative, and that it relates solely to an innate sense of dignity in individuals, arising exclusively from the consciousness of their own isolated worth. Such a sense I take to be very energetic in the Americans, and to be very feeble among the Asiatics. But no people appear to be prouder than the latter of any social distinctions which raise them above their fellows, nor more jealous to maintain them. As to the Americans, should the haughtiest nations among them be once forced to submit to the curb of a severe system of government, they will, perhaps, produce proportionably as many cringing time servers as any country.

As a metaphysically directed imagination inclines the Americans to be implacable, remorseless enemies, so, I believe, does it determine them to be warm and steady in their friendships: with this difference however,—as I suppose,—in their friendly and unfriendly passions, that an offence received from a person warmly beloved by them, might suddenly convert them into his bitter enemies, while no atonement could engage them to relent towards the object of their hatred.

As American authors hitherto closely study European literature, and take it for their model, their writings are not characterized by national peculiarities of thought and style. But, if the impress of their national constitution of mind, should ever be stamped on their works, they will not, I conjecture, be found to mingle themselves, like the Asiatics, so much, in imagination, throughout universal nature, as in some measure to overlook the fact of mankind forming to themselves a distinct and complete species of beings. The exalted American imagination would, no doubt, compel all nature to furnish it with images adequate to the expression of the ardent thoughts inflaming it. But it would never forget the specific distinctions, and high prerogatives of man. It would press into its service the phenomena of inanimate nature; not to confound it with mankind, but to make it furnish figurative language, competent to fixing, in the hearer's mind, a striking impression of the worth and dignity of the human beings whom it would seek to extol. Whenever the Americans were betrayed into a prodigal use of imagery, the cause leading them into this error, would probably be the conception of gigantic thoughts, and the adoption of an inflated style.*

* Some of the native Americans appear very well disposed to range themselves under a civilized, well organized government. Supposing the nations of this description to resemble their untameable brethren in a metaphysically directed imagination, nature may have many ways of nullifying the haughty, unbending qualities, which such an imagination is apt to stir up in the mind. I believe, however, it will be generally found that the peaceably inclined Americans are of a soft, enervate disposition. Perhaps too many of them are good and amiable, for the kind of imagination which I attribute to them, usually, where it does not excite hostile passions, gives greater vivacity to benevolent ones.

## CHAPTER VII.

### THE CHINESE CHARACTER.

Having now taken a cursory survey of the countries lying both east and west between Europe and China, I shall add some further remarks to what I have already said concerning the inhabitants of that great empire. Among the Chinese the energetic, vital flame, that prompts to a high ambition and to daring deeds, which has been subsiding gradually since our departure from Europe, appears to be appeased to the very utmost that suits the plan of human nature. In consequence, the Chinese have neither the fiery European enthusiasm proceeding from a lively consciousness of our internal force; nor much of the enthusiasm, whether of an Asiatic or American kind, that is inspired by an imagination capable of lofty flights. Yet the Chinese are very active-minded and industrious, but it is an activity of a mechanical sort, to which they are roused by considering the necessities of their condition, and they have no higher wish than amply to supply them.

I have mentioned their insensibility to that haughty sentiment of honour which watches jealously, to prevent the individual ruled by it from suffering indignity. They are also strangers to that more refined principle of honour which is oftentimes a safeguard for the integrity of Europeans, by teaching them to scorn, as unworthy them, dishonest and fraudulent dealing. However, as nature seems to grant compensations to national characters for the good qualities in which she leaves them defective, I think it probable that the Chinese—in return for their want of those sentiments of self-respect which would engage them to act justly, because a contrary conduct would be unworthy them—are naturally more disposed, than most other people, to be deeply impressed with the idea of the intrinsic worth of a fair, good conduct.

Different circumstances may easily prevent this native attachment to honesty,—if it be a feature of their character,—from being recognised by strangers. Their morals appear to be, at present, very corrupted, and the most upright dispositions

can be warped by self-interest, when they are not fortified by the early inculcation of inflexible principles of morality. Besides, if ignorant people, in general, when they see rich strangers come among them, think that they have a greater right to defraud them than their own countrymen, it is natural that such a notion should more particularly influence the Chinese, who are prejudiced against strangers, and who see few arrive in their country, except such as appear to them rich and fond of gain.

Notwithstanding, then, that strangers resident among them, do not depose in favour of their honesty, I cannot help being persuaded that nature must have planted in them, in a remarkable manner, the inclination to conduct themselves with candour and uprightness, since I find that, though they do not seem in the least moved by a chivalrous, adventurous spirit, mandarins have sometimes gone, with the conviction that they were offering themselves to a cruel death, to expose, to a tyrannical sovereign, the grievances with which he was overwhelming his people; and since it appears that, when men of the lower classes afford proofs that they possess the requisite mental endowments, they can commonly obtain high public offices. I do not, indeed, conceive it to be possible, that an immense and thickly peopled empire, like China, could continue some thousand years in an unchangeable and flourishing state, unless its members were, in general, inclined to act with probity, for this good quality seems to me to be the principal nerve that gives strength and stability to a nation.

Assuming, then, as a fact, that the Chinese are endued with an extraordinary sensibility to the worth of an honest, upright conduct, I shall add that it causes them, as I believe, to make a juster, more philosophical estimate of the blessings of life, when they are considering them in detail, than any other people do.

If mankind would do well to leave their faculties unexercised and subdue their ambition, so as to draw themselves as closely to a state of innocence as is practicable with their corrupt nature, the Chinese would be the wisest nation upon earth.

They seem to have modelled their whole plan of govern-

ment and of social life, on the state of mankind in the golden age, as far as it was possible to realize such a mode of existence.

The feelings, which speak to us of such an age, tell us that mankind would always remain in it, such as they came out of nature's hands, without ever seeking either to improve the society or cast it into disorder; and the Chinese legislators have certainly shown a wonderful sagacity, in contriving to keep the people stationary at the point, at which they appeared as peaceably and innocently happy as they could be. They found this task easier than it would have been elsewhere, on account of the Chinese being little acquainted with those high sentiments which speak to man of his dignity, and persuade him that he ought to be hurried on by a proud ambition. Their legislators, however, perceived that their minds had so much activity as that it would be advisable to consume part of it in employments unknown to the golden age; and they chose, for this purpose, literary studies, because they knew that they could give to a taste for them such a direction as would make it perfectly suit minds that it was good to render laborious, but which were, in other respects, calm and innocent. That the literature of the Chinese might attain the proposed end, without inspiring them with the ambition to enlighten or improve the society, their legislators beset it so with difficulties, that a long life might be past in the study of it, without the student's having had time to add much to the stock of his ideas.

The people had still passions which often sowed enmity between individuals, who were further forced by necessity to be each other's rivals—owing to the scantiness of the means of subsistence compared with the immense population—but these sources of discord did not cause much disturbance in a country, in which pride and ambition were at a low ebb. The Chinese recognised that the goods of this life fairly belong to the industrious: they, therefore, became indefatigable in the discharge of business, impelled, both by the pleasure which they took in the accomplishment of what they considered a duty, and by the hope to reap from it substantial advantages. Though they had little expectation of obtaining, by their arid studies, fame or glorious distinctions, they toiled at them with satis-

faction, on account of their wish to hold a respectable place in a society which they respected.

It appears, that their monarch but rarely greatly abuses his power; for he, also, has his share of the national good sense, and wishes to do his duty by his subjects. His flatterers, too, are less inclined than such persons usually are, to inculcate to him pernicious ideas. He is particularly induced to take a friendly concern in his people, because, from the want of ambition, they submit so peaceably to his government, that he is rarely roused to jealousy of them.

The love of sensual pleasures has a great ascendant over the Chinese, as indeed our imagination tells us that it has over men in a state of innocence; with this difference, that the desires of the latter are so well regulated by nature, that they never tempt them into any excess; while the mind of the Chinese, though it is far from being vast and irregular, when it is compared with that of the Europeans, is still sufficiently so always to carry them too far in the indulgence of any taste to which they yield without control. However, though they are too much addicted to sensual delights, the accounts which I have read of them lead me to think that, from knowing better how to appreciate true happiness, than do the Mahometans of the west of Asia, they are less sunk than they in those abject enjoyments.

Like the mortals of the golden age, the Chinese are exceedingly attached to flowers, to beautiful rural scenes, and, in general, to all the charms of universal nature. But they take infinitely more pains to surround their habitations with a profusion of such charms; because, they cannot keep the comparatively ungrateful earth, decked, continually, in a lovely dress, without having recourse to severe and incessant toil: And also, because their sensibility, less exquisite than that of the men of the golden age, does not allow of their receiving, from the contemplation of the charms of nature, the full satisfaction which would correspond to the cravings of their heart and imagination.

Ignorant that the defect which prevents their tasting, in the midst of fine rural scenes, a delight commensurate to their wishes, lies in themselves, they adorn them more and more

And they would be wise in doing so, were they even aware of their sensibility to them being a little blunted: for, it is by rendering them a constant motive to the exertion of some mental activity, that they can keep their enjoyment of them ever fresh, and prevent themselves from feeling that ennui with which the constant contemplation of them would be apt to inspire them, did they only seek to derive from it an indolent gratification.

That elastic vivacity of mind which, in the Europeans, urges, principally, the reasoning powers into a lively, incessant action, and in the Asiatics, particularly exalts the imagination, having subsided in the Chinese, the consequence of their being less subject to feeling its forcible impulsion, seems to be, that in them reason and imagination are more evenly counterbalanced, than in those natives of other parts of the globe with whom I have compared them. Their dispassionate, philosophical views of the world, as well as their general freedom from degrading superstitions, prove, sufficiently, that their reason is clear; while the accounts which we have received, relatively to the various arts that they have invented to shed charms on their existence, abundantly testify the luxuriance of their imagination.

This latter faculty appears to be directed in them on sensible objects: however, I am greatly mistaken if, in at least many of their provinces, it do not incline more to a metaphysical direction than it does in the western part of Asia. They pay—to judge from their writings—a close attention, compared with other Asiatics, to looks and gestures, in order to dive by them into the inmost mind. This they might certainly be urged to do merely by their reason, since that faculty, where it is much exerted, pushes us to endeavour to contemplate the moral and intellectual portion of human nature, without arresting our attention on the sensible signs that are indicative of its operations.

However, the Chinese writings, which I have seen, impress me with the idea that their authors were moved, not solely by reason, but also by imagination and feeling, to study the heart of man as distinct from his outward appearance.

## CHAPTER VIII.

### REFLECTIONS SUGGESTED BY THE CONSIDERATION OF THE ABOVE MENTIONED DISTINCTIONS OF NATIONAL CHARACTER.

As I judge the Europeans to be distinguished, from the Asiatics and Americans, by a mental constitution fitting them to make a varied and incessant use of their reason, or, in other words, of that faculty which, in a well-ordered mind, exercises supreme authority: and as I consider them to be distinguished from the Chinese by an ardent and vigorous internal principle of motion, which shall push them rapidly onward through various stages of civilization, till their arrival at a fully developed, energetic state of virtue, I conclude that Europe is the portion of the world where the true system of moral order is first to be established: its inhabitants, I infer, are charged with continually watching over that system in its rise, progress and perfection, so as first, by their wise exertions, to enlighten the rest of mankind on its advantages, and then, after having prevailed on them to receive it, to guard them against letting it deteriorate.

The reader may, perhaps, smile at my folly in allowing myself to have been led, by chimerical speculations, to conclude that Asia, China and America will one day combine with Europe to support an august and peaceable system of social order, flourishing around the globe. He will probably be more particularly tempted to deride my indulgence of the fond persuasion, that the natives of those distant quarters of the world will then take a very beneficial influence over the character of the Europeans. I know well that the Chinese seem at present so unalterably attached to the actual organization of their political and social institutions, as to offer in their practice no opening to think that they may ever be induced to frame them differently: while the Asiatics and Americans—leaving aside those northerns among the latter whose character is as yet greatly moulded on that of their European ancestors—appear only destined to warn the Europeans, by their sad example, of the fatal consequences which ensue, when men either attach

themselves so exclusively to a national system of order, that, forgetting their individual dignity, they occupy in it, without a murmur, the place of despised parias; or else are so extremely jealous of any encroachment on their individual rights, that they prefer a ferocious, savage life, to those sacrifices of them which they must make, ere they can unite in considerable numbers, to form a flourishing, well governed nation.

But, though both the natives of Asia and America seem to be, as yet, nearly stationary in dispositions which consign them to slavery, or barbarity and anarchy; though slow is their progress,—if, indeed, they be making any,—in the acquisition of that instruction, and that frame of mind, which would fit them to enjoy a good government; I cannot help imagining, since their natural characters,—as I conceive of them,—are the inverse of each other; and since both seem endued with moral and intellectual advantages wanting to the Europeans, that the national characteristics of the inhabitants of the various parts of the world, are diversified agreeably to an harmonious scale, rendering them all proper to combine, in the end, to form one admirable system of social order, variously modified, no doubt, but which shall occasion all the nations of the world to appear like wheels of a great machine, acting concordantly one upon another.

Whenever the time,—still far distant,—comes, which, in imagination, I love to contemplate, when the nations of the world shall have arrived at their last perfection, or, at least, be on the sure route conducting to it, then will Europe appear as an intermedial power, occupied in infusing, mutually, through the Asiatics and Americans, a due portion of those opposite kinds of spirits which naturally animate each of them: and it will, in its turn, become more distinguished than it is, by the lofty steadiness of its inhabitants, because the influence which the Asiatics and Americans will have over them, will tune their minds to the same high pitch, to which an exalted imagination will naturally tend to raise the sentiments of their eastern and western neighbours.

It may be thought by the reader, that the Europeans would be far from gainers, were they placed under the influence of a more powerful imagination: for it may appear to him, that

they are already too much governed by that faculty, and that it is it which usually causes them to wander from the path of wisdom. But, if imagination be often the ostensible cause of their errors, I own that it appears to me that, what occasions her to act so pernicious a part is her being too much the slave of reason. She governs her, it is true, as flatterers often do a despotic monarch, but she is robbed of all her dignity and energy. Instead of being kindled by profound, genuine feelings, she is constantly in the train of disputatious, reasoning powers; each antagonist is excited by her to endeavour to triumph in an argument, and is little taught by her magical powers to contemplate, with enthusiastic affection, the object for which he contends; she does not fix his attention on it, nor give herself the trouble of investing it with brilliant attractions. Where the warmth of imagination is communicated to her by a sincere feeling of affection for the object which she seeks, she is constant, and capable of pursuing it with devoted disinterestedness; where, on the contrary, she is inflamed merely by the mind's consciousness of its force, or its pride in exhibiting the strength and acuteness of its reasoning faculty, she is liable to render it fickle and irresolute.

She is the more tempted to lead us astray, when a too active reasoning faculty confines her movements, on account of her constantly asserting the privilege of warmly interesting us, by presenting to us some attractive object. If, therefore, she be not allowed to exhibit one to us of so sublime a nature, as that our pursuit of it shall give full employment to our mind, she will engage us to occupy ourselves in the chase of others of a more groveling description, but more adapted to allure persons unmoved by noble aspirations. When imagination thus leads us into temptations which she would teach us to soar above, were not her flight too much controled, then, indeed, we naturally look upon reason as our best friend, should she guard us from falling into the snare laid for us.

I own that, in the European nations, an injudicious and too constant use of reason, often seems to me to have for imagination such injurious consequences as I have described. Reason, I think, acts more or less in them like a well minded, though imperious monarch of contracted views, who harasses his sub-

jects by taking on himself the administration of the most minute details of government. She seems to think it necessary not to allow imagination, or the feelings correspondent with her, to labour in the mind otherwise than under her direction, and within the bounds which she may prescribe to them. Yet would its internal government be conducted, as I believe, with much greater simplicity and harmony, did she allow all its springs to be in full activity, for then they would, by their mutual influence, greatly contribute to regulate each other.

Were China arrived at the moral perfection which I consider to be the consummation of its destiny, it would combine with Asia and America, in placing the Europeans more under the power of imagination, and it would particularly teach them always to make that faculty minister to the nourishment of simple, sincere feelings. Europeans would then have to set the example to the rest of the world, of moderate desires kept in subordination to virtuous principles; but they would learn from the Chinese, always to point their desires towards substantial blessings. Thus, if the rich among them indulge in a pompous equipage and splendid establishment, it will only be in as far as those distinctions offer enjoyment to a cultivated taste, and they will not be moved to take pride in them, by the thought of outshining a competitor. The greater part of the pleasure which the Europeans take, at present, in wealth, and many fortunate circumstances, seems to me far less directly to proceed from their native relish for the goods of which, thereby, they become possessors, than from the thought of being able to cope with or eclipse a rival. To this wandering away of their desires from their direct objects, is greatly to be attributed the complicated, artificial forms, in which they manifest themselves, as well as their insatiable avidity. When we seek the goods of fortune, simply for the pleasures which they are obviously calculated to procure us, we can, without much philosophy, act on the principle that, as nature has narrowly bounded our powers of enjoyment, so it becomes us to content ourselves with very limited means of indulgence.

But do the Chinese never, by allowing the ambition to excite admiration or envy, to mingle with their wish to gratify

their senses, encourage the latter to make exorbitant demands which it is not in their power to turn to their profit or pleasure?

I believe that the Chinese are sensible to the joys of ambition and vanity; but not at all to the same degree as the Europeans. And as I think I can perceive that, where one nation imitates a good point in another's character it likes to carry it to greater perfection, because, what in its model was only an instinctive, desirable quality, is adopted by it from a steady, vigilant principle, so I judge that the Europeans, if once they determined to imitate the Chinese in the cultivation of genuine artless tastes, would, much more than their prototypes, teach their wishes for the enjoyments of the senses to flow with a truth and moderation agreeable to virtue.

Till, however, they make it visible to the world, that their attachment to the rudest precepts of virtue excels what they bear to the most genuine kind of pleasure dependent on fortune, they will never engage the Chinese to follow the lights which they hold out to them; for it is only by forcing them to admire the order of virtue, on perceiving the Europeans to exemplify what glory and happiness attend the people who are subject to it, that they will induce them to acknowledge their superiority, and to take them for their guides.

Whilever the conduct of the Europeans is not evidently such as to compel the Chinese to acknowledge, that their resolution to fulfil their duty outweighs their intention to seek for personal enjoyments; whilever they do not prove to them that the principles of duty which they follow are such very wise ones, that the observance of them is what tends best to ensure happiness to the universality of the members of the nation, as well as stability to their general form of government—whilever, in short, they are not strikingly arranged under national systems of order, fashioned obediently to virtue's laws, the Chinese may be expected to look down on them with a scornful pity, from believing them much less happily constituted than themselves, for relishing the blessings which are within the reach of the men, who are placed in prosperous circumstances in the bosom of a peaceable, flourishing country.

## CHAPTER IX.

### THE NATIONS OF EUROPE WHOM I HAVE OBSERVED.

I shall now begin to unfold, to the best of my ability, the observations that were made by me on some different national European characters, my reflections on which led me gradually to form, by analogy, those conjectures that I have already exposed, touching the distinctions of character that prevail in the human race in various quarters of the globe.

I must first, however, specify to the reader the countries of Europe in which the observations in question were made.

They are principally Ireland, Scotland, France and Italy. These four countries being the only ones in which I have ever resided.

I have, however, from early youth, been habituated to the society of natives of the southern part of the sister island; and have, therefore, made some remarks on the character of the English, and their style of physiognomy. Not, however, near so many as I think it probable that it would have occurred to me to make, had I ever enjoyed the opportunity of living among them, and of being surrounded by them in considerable numbers. I have also seen a few Germans, Poles, Russians, North Americans, and, more particularly, Spaniards, whose appearance offered me inducements to establish between it, and the people whom I knew, some comparisons, serving to strengthen or extend my conclusions, in regard to the mode in which national characters are diversified. Never have I, to my knowledge, been in company with a native of Sweden, Norway, or Denmark. There exists, therefore, in the little knowledge that I have gleaned of European aspects, a chasm which causes me considerable regret. Very inadequate grounds can I have, for the formation of any theory, relative to the plan by which nature stamps on those aspects, various national expressions of character, since I am in total ignorance of the kinds of physiognomy which distinguish the inhabitants of the great northern portion of the west of Europe. I should be

particularly glad, if I had it in my power to compare the aspect of the Scotch, with that of their nearest neighbours, born in an equally cold climate.

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## CHAPTER X.

### DISTRIBUTION AMONG THE PEOPLE WHOM I HAVE OBSERVED, OF THE TWO SPECIES OF IMAGINATION. —THE SCOTCH, IN REFERENCE TO THEIR SENSIBLY DIRECTED IMAGINATION.

Among the various people whom I know best, the Scotch and the Italians* seem to me, the only ones distinguished by a sensibly directed imagination.

The Spaniards have a metaphysically directed one.

The Irish have in the main the same, though a portion of their imagination, has a sensible inclination. However, its metaphysical direction is still such, that it is it which has originally and principally suggested to me, the opinions that I have formed, respecting the bias, that an imagination of that nature, tends to give to the character of a nation.

The imagination of the English and French, is of a middle kind. That of the former, is more inclined however, to direct itself on sensible objects, and that of the latter, on metaphysical.

I shall confine myself in this chapter, to remarks on the sensibly directed imagination of the Scotch.

Of all the people whom I have seen, the Scotch unite in the most remarkable manner, an imagination of this kind, with a haughty consciousness of a great internal spring of force and activity, as well as with the will and ability, to make a vigorous keen use of their reasoning faculties. It may therefore, justly be inferred, that the kind of imagination in question, operates very differently on their character, from what it does on that of the Asiatics. But though it certainly does do so, it

* I have only resided among the Romans, and my remarks on the Italian physiognomy and character, principally refer to them.

also produces between them and the eastern nations, some points of resemblance.

Like theirs, their moral feelings rise in an orderly form, attaching them greatly to a regular system of government and social manners, notwithstanding that they have not much penetration to discern, in the breast of the persons of their society, those latent feelings, the unfolding of which, might both enable them to discover the plan of moral order, adapted to the constitution of the human mind; and also to give to national societies, a form and spirit suitable to it.

Like the East Indians, the Scotch are inclined to attach themselves tenaciously to the system of institutions and customs under which they live, as though they were faithful transcripts of the scheme of moral order, by which nature intended that the nation, when arrived at its perfection, should be governed.

Like the East Indians, the Scotch, from being secretly conscious of their not possessing sufficient tact, to lay hold on those springs in the human mind, by which it could at once be improved and easily governed, are much disposed to call in to their aid, a rigorous, unbending form of religion, that it may keep the people implicitly submissive to the social regulations sanctioned by it. I am greatly mistaken, at least, if the attachment of the Scotch, to grave, orderly forms in society, be not the principal cause of their clinging, with great pertinacity, to religious rules, that trace with considerable exactness and inflexibility, the outlines of such forms.

The national character of the Scotch resembles also that of the East Indians, by the closeness with which the different parts of it cement together, in consequence of the sympathy that unites individuals. This affection, is even more remarkable,—though I doubt if it have more real influence—among the former than among the latter, on account of the vivacity and activity of the Scotch character, compared with the passiveness and the torpor of the East Indian. 'Tis, I may say, at all moments, necessary to the Scotch, to find companions whose feelings have exactly a similar flow with theirs. So nice is their tact in this respect, that they quickly are aware of the smallest discrepance, by which the mental organisation of

their companions may jar with their own. As it is solely in the company of their countrymen, that they can have the pleasure of finding a full tide of sympathy flow from heart to heart, I believe that their wish to enjoy it, is partly the cause of that great partiality which they are known to bear to persons of their own country. In the society of strangers—such as the English and Irish—they quickly find, that that current of universal sympathy, in which they delight, does not freely abound. Their perception of this fact withers, as by a blighting wind, their feelings and imagination.

The Scotch, like, I believe, most of the people whose imagination directs itself, unchecked, on sensible objects, have, in consequence of the orderly flow of their feelings, an admirable native grace. Their taste in every fine art is also—compared with that of most nations,—singularly correct.

Any person indeed desirous to become a model of elegance and politeness, should be, I think, ambitious to obtain, for his external mode of behaviour, the suffrage of the Scotch: no people are more happily organized, for detecting and disliking in manners, the slightest tincture of vulgarity.

In other respects they are—as it seems to me,—but little gifted with the faculty of divining, from looking at a human countenance, the nature of the mind expressed in it. They cannot in this manner form a sound conjecture, either as to the kind and extent of its virtues, or the strength of its intellectual powers. I have heard several sensible, well informed Scotch persons avow, that their countrymen were not good physiognomists.

The great difficulty which the Scotch,—in common with other people, endued with a similar kind of imagination—have, in getting acquainted, by observation, with the characters of individuals, seems to me, to be one great reason, that determines them to remain shut up in themselves, and to treat mankind with coldness and distrust.

The tendency of their imagination, appears also to incline individuals among the Scotch,—as a similarly directed one, does those of some other nations,—to study the world, particularly with a view, exactly to mark the place which they ought to fill in it, and with a wish to occupy it becomingly. I shall not

expatiate on the advantages which they derive from studying the world, in order the better to regulate themselves in their relations with it. As I principally alluded to the Scotch, when, in the first part of this work, I described the wise conduct of many men, who are deficient in a tact, for divining the characters of the persons with whom they meet, but who have ample skill and discernment, for perceiving how they can judiciously make room in the world, for the display of their own; I shall refer the reader to what I there state on the subject. However, I think it incumbent on me further to add, that—as far as my information goes,—the remarkable success which attends the efforts of the Scotch, to distinguish themselves, and improve their worldly condition, does not usually result from any unjustifiable wiles, nor from an intriguing spirit. Disclaiming all attempts to find an unduly short road to preferment, they endeavour, by indefatigable exertions, to acquire a perfect knowledge of the profession to which they apply, and the ability with which they exercise it, as well as a generally irreproachable conduct, are what they trust to, for enabling them to render it productive to them, of honours and emoluments. A Scotchman is often remarkable for every talent, which can best supply the want of a quick insight, into the characters of the individuals with whom he has to deal. He has strong powers of reasoning, which he loves to employ, in getting acquainted with human nature: nor is it difficult for him to acquire a clear abstract knowledge of it, on account of the sagacity which enables him to make judicious reflections, on the movements of his own heart, and the operations of his understanding. He also shows great skill in resolving many important universal problems, relative to the government of man: more particularly he knows how to calculate, with great precision, the means of furnishing the people with an abundance of the things necessary to the material part of their existence.

He steadily scrutinizes the results of men's actions, following them unerringly throughout all their bearings, however complicated they may be.

The ability of the Scotch to penetrate, by reason and reflection, into many of the folds of the human heart, and to ascer-

tain in a great degree, the legitimate wants of man, leads them however into some errors, since it frequently engages them to establish a cold system, respecting what is right or wrong, and to praise or condemn actions agreeaby to what they consider a correct mode of reasoning, in cases where it would be better not to pronounce a judgment, without also consulting the feelings of the heart. Conscious of their talent to trace, with great accuracy, the general principles which reign through the constitution of human nature; they cannot believe that reason, observation, and reflection, may not still further increase their knowledge of mankind, by teaching them to have a juster insight, into the latent qualities of the mind of the individual, whose mental structure they wish to scrutinise, than persons with an imagination, such as theirs, usually have. They thence are sometimes tempted to imagine, that they can by a train of reasonings, and, as I may say, a rule and compass, infallibly ascertain the motives that determined a neighbour to a certain line of conduct. It is needless to enlarge on the injustice and fallacy of such a pretension.

The great recourse which the Scotch have to their reason, when they seek to make any discovery into the human mind, whether abstract or concrete, appears to me to have the inconvenience of rendering their feelings and imagination less lively than they ought to be, according to the intention of nature. Yet would they do much better to keep them as animated as possible, and then to trust to the lights which they might receive from them, for exploring the recesses of a neighbour's mind, rather than to employ those afforded them by their reason: for they are much more likely to acquire a talent of this nature, by treating themselves as poets than as philosophers. The fineness of their taste, and the habit which, as persons poetically inclined, they would acquire of taking part, in what appeared to them, to be the feelings which would pervade the countenance and manners of the persons of their society, would soon make them acquire so nice a tact, that they would very seldom be wrong in interpreting the most equivocal, or faintly expressed language of a by-stander's outward appearance, relatively to the impression made on him by passing occurrences. They would be imprudent to imagine, that

they could know any thing more of him, otherwise than by inquiries into his general conduct and character. It is certain, that the knave and the honest man, the person with firm, good principles, and another without any, may be affected much in the same manner, by passing events, when they do not concern their interest. I believe, indeed, that a man's general character, as it is respectable or otherwise, is almost always more or less imprinted in his countenance and deportment, even when he is occupied about amusements, that no wise put his principles to the test. The upright mind, at peace with itself and all human nature, has generally, in its aspect and air, a serene benevolence, a native dignity, which the most expert hypocrite tries in vain to imitate, for he cannot comprehend the noble feelings by which they are inspired. However, I doubt much that, even were the penetration of the Scotch sharpened to the utmost, it would often enable them to decypher justly those nice characteristics of the look and manner, which depend more on the general mode of thinking than on passing sensations.

What appears to me to be the cause of a calm, equable flow of orderly feelings which I have remarked in the Scotch, and of the goodness of their taste, is, that their feelings are commonly excited before their imagination—as I believe is usually the case among the people whose imagination has perfectly a sensible direction—there is not, indeed, the interval of a moment between the former being first affected and the latter being roused at their call. But, short as it may be, it is sufficient, since all that is desirable is, that the feelings shall take the lead. As soon as they are awakened in the Scotch, they instantly fly to take possession of their imagination, and thenceforth this faculty appears completely one with them.* You perceive it in the looks, the discourses, the writings, the dia-

I must remind the reader that, in establishing this distinction between feeling and imagination, I only allude to that portion of the latter which appears unveiled and visible to the observer of our mental emotions, for there is always an imperceptible portion of imagination, absorbed in the affections of our mind, from their first origin; and this infusion of it into them appears necessary towards quickening them into life.

We cannot, I shall further remark, engage in imaginative compositions with any success, unless this faculty greatly warm us. Yet even then, it should appear at first quite lost in the feelings of our heart, from just excit-

lect of the Scotch. 'Tis constantly by sensible signs that they represent to you the causes that affect them, even though these causes be really some moral revolution among the persons with whom they are connected. Guided by true feelings and an imagination extremely lively, though subordinate to them, they choose these signs so artlessly, and yet with such discernment, that they make the hearer fully partake the emotions which they thus respresent, and display a talent that is,—I believe,—unequalled by any other people.]

Every where else,—as far as I know,—those who wish to excite in another's breast sympathy with their feelings, are more obliged, if the cause of their emotion be a moral one, to fix his attention precisely on itself, without adverting to the sensible signs by which it had been manifested. This intimate union between the feelings and imagination of the Scotch, which is as strong as if they were,—as I may say,—closely rivetted together, keeps them firmly attached to every object that has once engaged their affections, and tends also,—if great care be not taken in their education, to counteract its effects,—to contract their minds.

The Scotch have an imagination which can embrace the entire world, as well as each particular nation in it. They have also feelings that loudly call on them to act with generosity, in all the relations in which they may be placed. But these feelings, and this portion of their imagination, if they be not fixed and fortified by each other, at an age when it is practicable to cement them closely together, rest always vague, indeterminate, and powerless to resist the encroachments of those affections which, by an early union with their imagination, have become invincibly strong. Thus, Scotchmen frequently wish,—and in a very restless, anxious manner,—to show themselves just and kind towards every nation, but particularly towards the two kingdoms which compose, along with Scotland, the British empire. They do sometimes, I well know, fully accomplish this laudable wish, but oftener,

ing them to take an intense interest in our theme, and, where it is practicable, to identify themselves with it. Afterwards, as we make progress in creating it, imagination must show itself more openly, but it should ever appear subordinate to our feelings, merely following them to second and increase their emotions.

when a Scotchman has to decide on a competition, arisen between some of the inhabitants of these countries and natives of Scotland, his first affections are too powerful for him not to yield to them, whether or no justice speak in their favour.

I am satisfied that I do not impose on myself, by subtle, metaphysical arguments, in imagining that education might greatly do away a defect, apparently so inherent to the Scotch character, as that of a very contracted spirit of patriotism. Their sensibly directed imagination offers evidently no impediment to their conceiving a warm attachment for a sublime ideal object, that does not take in their mind any definite form. Such an object they find in Scotland, on the idea of which they all, from very early years, reflect with the warmest affection, yet does it not, to most of them, present any clear, distinct image, beyond that of the local scenery, with which they are acquainted. I am, therefore, persuaded, particularly as I have had sufficient opportunity to remark the powerful effects of education in forming the minds of children in Scotland, that it would not be difficult to attach them sincerely to the whole British empire, and to engrave in them deeply such principles, as that they should ever afterwards be determined to treat, with becoming friendliness and liberality, the native of other parts of it.

I do not affirm that they ought to be taught to love the whole of the British empire equally with Scotland: for if they had not some pride in displaying a partial national character, exactly suited to their organization, their lofty, concentrated energy, and with it their sense of native dignity, would be dissipated. But it appears to me, that nature has been sufficiently liberal to them of noble feelings, for an enlightened education readily to succeed in training their youth ever to deal magnanimously by their rivals, and to suppress every feeling which would oppose itself to their manifesting a full sense of justice, in their manner of acting by them.

The Scotch deserve to be classed with the natives of the north-west of Europe, relatively to that generous, delicate sentiment of right and wrong, which makes those natives be much more scrupulous than,—as I believe,—the Asiatics are, in using unjustifiable means to attain a desirable end. The

writings of the Scotch of all ages,—as far as I am acquainted with them,—joined with their conversation and conduct at the present day, evince that they are naturally disposed to approve or condemn men's conduct, from a just consideration of the means that they employ, as well as of the ends that they seek. However, I have already remarked, that the people the most inclined to respect just and equitable principles of conduct, are liable to forget their dictates, in their admiration of hardy and intrepid qualities, so that they will often praise a man for unjustifiable acts, when in doing them he has displayed a remarkably determined, courageous, or energetic mind. Now, I think, that the disposition to permit qualities, commanding in themselves respect or admiration, to conduct their possessor to unwarrantable actions, has, in the Scotch, a wider range than in other northern people. Let a Scotchman obtain splendid results from a conduct deserving blame, but evidently proceeding from an adventurous, undaunted, resolute spirit, and his countrymen, completely dazzled by the lustre of the ends that he has accomplished, will be proud of his successes. They will even praise, with enthusiasm, the spirited or determined measures by which he obtained them, and, if they hear mention made of the circumstances that rendered them condemnable, they will not attempt to deny that they deserve censure, but they will still endeavour to turn their attention away from this mortifying fact, in order to fix it entirely on those points which prove the theme of their eulogiums, to be endued with great talents, or with a daring and admirable force of mind.

I have in general remarked, that the Scotch, when they live in a sociable manner that gives vivacity to their imagination, have a singular talent for composing aphorisms to guide the conduct of life, and which manifest a great knowledge of men's usual mode of dealing, in their relations with each other; but this talent seems to desert them entirely when, by assiduous study, they seek to strengthen their reasoning faculties.*

* The Asiatics, endued with a sensibly bent imagination, though they seem not to have the slightest aptitude for studying the heart of man, for the sake of getting acquainted with those native seeds of order, which, when rightly expanded in it, can fit all the members of a nation for firmly coalescing together under a wise and free system of government, discover great shrewd-

## CHAPTER XI.

### CHARACTER OF THE MODERN ROMANS AND COMPARISON OF IT WITH THAT OF THE SCOTCH.

The imagination of the Romans resembles that of the Scotch, being fully directed on sensible objects. In both people I think that this faculty has the same essential characteristics, notwithstanding that their minds, in other respects, appear very differently modified.

Like the Scotch, the Romans study, as I may say, at a distance the persons whom they contemplate, for they view them in reference to the appearance which they make in the place that they occupy in the social system. Like those of the Scotch, their thoughts revert principally on themselves; so that their chief object, in considering mankind, is to learn carefully to carry to a successful issue, the projects that they form for advancing their own interest. Like the Scotch too, the Romans conform themselves, in general, to the tone of the society of which they are members; so that rarely, if they have been tolerably educated, do they do or say any thing which appears at all misplaced. Like them they are also guided by a deep and steady sentiment of order. This sentiment, however, in the Romans, spreads itself through a much greater variety of feelings, and more fits them than it does the Scotch, to shine by a taste and genius for the fine arts.

The Romans are less fitted than the Scotch to study, in the hearts of the persons whom they observe, the laws of moral order, or to combine the social system into a judicious form. An individual in Scotland, by studying his own nature, and gleaning from it a general knowledge of the mental organization of mankind; also, by close observations on the consequences of men's actions, and by calculations on the proportions subsisting between the earth's productive powers, and those wants of human nature which earth's productions can

ness and discernment, in inventing maxims and apophthegms, for the benefit of the individuals who wish, according to their station, to improve to the utmost, their own personal character, in a country submitted to arbitrary rulers.

supply, puts himself in possession of many important points of the plan of order, according to which nature has decreed that human societies ought to be arranged. But a Roman, less inclined coldly to observe and calculate, and more confident in his ability to divine the mode of establishing within a nation, a wise system of social order, is prone merely to consult his own heart, as though unerring principles were written in it, for distinguishing, and consolidating in a nation, all kinds of salutary authority, so as to raise it, by these means, to the summit of moral perfection.

The Romans are certainly singularly well constituted for eliciting, from attention to the impressions made on their own feelings, the principles of the fine arts; and they the more easily persuade themselves that they can, in like manner, discover the principles which should pervade human governments, and make of nations admirably well organized communities, because they really do find written within them, lofty sentiments, the display of which would invest them with an imposing majesty.

Having to a great degree—though not as much as the Scotch—the haughty consciousness of their force which distinguishes the Europeans, they resemble the Scotch in contemplating a system of order commensurate to their dignity: 'tis such an one as gives, when favourable circumstances fully unfold their character, a solemn gravity to their manner, and an elevated tone to their feelings, which dispose the unadvised spectator to think that they are born for command.

To illustrate my meaning:—

The ancient senators of Rome, when they, instead of upbraiding their discomfited general at a time that all the people were panic-struck, in consequence of the defeat of their armies, sent to thank him for not despairing of the republic, apparently showed great knowledge of human nature; for nothing could be more proper than this sublime trait, to revive the drooping courage of the people, and to dispose them implicitly to adopt the same resolute sentiments that animated their chiefs. Yet my reflections on the history of the ancient Romans, as well as on the character of their modern descendants, have convinced me that the Roman senators, in behav-

ing, at that critical moment, in the manner best calculated to rouse the courage of the people, and save their country, were not directly moved by a nice discernment of the mode to guide, at their will, the minds of their fellow-citizens. They were prompted by a lively sense of what constitutes the sublime in conduct; they preserved the grandeur of their own character; and they expected, by maintaining it, to take as they did, dominion over the surrounding multitude, because they had reason to think, that they were constituted like them, and that they would infallibly associate themselves to their noble sentiments.

However, the Roman republic, though in some respects, well adapted to a nation of warlike conquerors, does not in the main vouch, that the people who formed it, had either inclination or skill to study the constitution of mankind, and to determine the laws, best adapted to the government of a flourishing nation. The deadly feuds which they allowed to subsist between the patricians and plebeians, the institution of domestic slavery, and the absolute authority over the families comprised within their territories, which they committed to their chiefs, are proofs, I think, that the leading persons among them, embarrassed themselves no further with the theory of government, than just what was necessary to secure to themselves the predominant rank, which they conceived to be due to them, and to assure, in the most compendious manner possible, ample leisure to all the chiefs of families, to devote themselves entirely to martial affairs.

I know that it may be thought, that the ignorant barbarity of the ancient Romans, and the circumstances wherein they were placed, amply account for their studying so little, the art of regularly combining a good form of national government, without supposing them to have been peculiarly deficient, in the talent of investigating in mankind, those principles which, when fully developed, fit individuals for being closely cemented together, in numerous, orderly, and flourishing national communities.

However, if the ancient Romans, in the zenith of their greatness, when they had both the pretension and the power to legislate for the whole known world, paid but little atten-

tion to the science of government, I judge, that this neglect was partly owing to their natural inaptitude, to acquire by observation such a knowledge of human nature, as would greatly assist them justly to determine the principles of this science; for their modern descendants appear to me, to resemble them in a disposition to entertain a few dominant sentiments respecting the method of subjecting men to a wise, orderly government, so that, had they it in their power to regulate, to their liking, their social laws and institutions, they would, unless the influence and example of more northern nations determined them to do otherwise, exactly frame them on those of their celebrated ancestors. For instance, because their hearts assure them, that it is impossible for a father to abuse his power over his children, notwithstanding that experience holds a different language, they would, I think, again give to the chiefs of families, all that fearful authority with which the ancient Romans invested them; and they would rest confident that, in obliging a son to look up to his father with the same implicit awe with which pious mortals adore their Creator, they would take the most effectual method of giving to their system of government, a solid and majestic basis.

It may, perhaps, occur to the reader, to attribute the wish of the modern Romans to govern themselves precisely by the same code of laws which ruled the ancient republic, entirely to their ambition to tread in the steps of ancestors to whom they look up with pride and admiration. But though such an ambition has, no doubt, considerable influence over them, I believe their partiality to the laws of the ancient Romans, greatly to proceed from sentiments which, independently of accidental circumstances, flow, naturally, from their disposition.

Whether the continually augmenting deleterious qualities of the climate of Rome have considerably weakened the constitution of its inhabitants, as compared with that of their great ancestors, I cannot say, but of this I am convinced, that, in other respects, they have in their minds the germs of the same character, so that the natural feelings which prompted the ancient republicans, to think their mode of government suited to

their dispositions, would produce the same effect on their descendants.

I think then that the Romans, if they were free, would have need to be enlightened by the study of the principles of legislation approved of in the north-west of Europe, or they would not know how to devise a system of government that might render them flourishing and respectable, without inspiring them with the wish to proceed, as their ancestors did, from conquest to conquest, till the whole world should bow beneath their yoke. As there is ample reason to think that they would never now be suffered to encroach on the rights of nations who might choose to remain independent of them, and, as I believe, that the hope to lord it in the world as haughty conquerors is almost the only one that, in the present state of their minds, could animate them to emerge from the sloth and apathy in which they are sunk, I conclude that governments breathing the true spirit of order, must have raised various countries of Europe to an admirable pitch of perfection, before the Romans shall be roused out of their present inglorious habits and induced to imitate them, from perceiving that they may, without yielding to the suggestions of an insatiable ambition, realize the most sublime conceptions which they can form, of the conduct and qualities that do honour to man.

It appears to me however probable, once the Romans shall have become universally sensible to a noble enthusiasm, and shall be impelled by it to advance in the track of those nations who shall have already perfected their social system, that they will, in copying their institutions, breathe through them a still more majestic spirit, because they will be determined to adhere to them by a simple, irresistible sentiment: whereas, the people who shall have first adopted them, will have more the air of being guided by cold, reflecting reason, which is a quality that is, no doubt, absolutely necessary towards rendering solid and good the foundations of the universal social system, but which must, nevertheless, be liable to fail of investing the particular ones branching from it, with all the dignity and charms that their nature would admit of their displaying.

Supposing that the Romans, with their present way of thinking, were to rise to be a great people, all but the very enlight-

ened among them must, I think, infallibly look down with contempt on every nation distinguished by a diversity of character. An exquisite sympathy reigns among them, which would, in that case, cause fine, patriotic sentiments to spread rapidly from breast to breast, in the same identical form: and as they would not appear similarly modified in foreigners differently constituted, most of the Romans, little aware of the possibility of those sentiments flourishing in any other form but the one in which they entertained them, would be tempted to despise foreigners, from assuming that they had not sufficient magnanimity to be sensible to them.

In the present state, however, of the Romans, in which they have no great temptation to allow themselves to be blinded by pride, they know, I think, much better than do the Scotch, how to prevent persons endued with a different national character, from perceiving, that their craving to find in companions a full tide of sympathetic feelings, keeps them cold and constrained in any society, excepting in that of their countrymen. Their disposition is more flexible than that of the Scotch, and a much greater variety of social feelings than usually stir in the bosoms of this northern people, are ever lively in theirs: in consequence, it is easier for them sociably to accord their minds with those of the foreigner to whom they wish to prove companionable.

A Roman is, indeed, I believe, remarkable for his skill in conforming, with facility, his tone to that of the society around him: however, if he be in a sociable humour, and cannot succeed in establishing, between himself and a stranger next to him, a companionable spirit, it is not uncommon with him, I understand, even though he be in a public assembly, to change his place, so irksome is it to him to be sensible of being next a person, whom he cannot induce to sympathize with him, in regard to the emotions which the occasion may have excited in him.

Nature, it is well known, has lavished on the Romans a remarkable variety of graces. The difference, however, of their character from that of the Scotch, occasions a great diversity in the mode by which the orderly, harmonious feeling that overflows the minds of both people, manifests itself, grace-

fully, in their external figure. 'Tis soft, yet joyous emotions, that are principally pervaded by it in the Scotch. Their movements in the simple, artless dance, are singularly beautiful; their gestures and expressions, when they are conversing joyously with one another, are greatly admired, as I believe, by most strangers of a cultivated taste, so that few of them get wearied of observing them, even though they can take no share in their conversation. The Scotch, too, know how to captivate beholders, by the graceful expressions or gestures with which they give vent to tender emotions.

They make, also, a very fine appearance as warriors.

When their countenance and air indicate that a martial spirit is aroused within them, they also denote that, though they be haughty, and inclined to breathe defiance against their enemies, they are disposed to treat, with generosity, those who submit to them.

The physiognomy and gestures of the Romans,—at the time when their elegance and grace are such that strangers view them with surprise and admiration,—are expressive of a very different class of passions. They are graver ones, which give less activity to the frame of the person whom they animate, and more make him appear to have a great talent for pantomime. Passing along the streets of Rome, you constantly see men standing buried in thought, who have spontaneously thrown themselves into as graceful attitudes as though they were exhibiting, on a public stage, to admiring spectators.

As far as I have remarked, throughout all Italy, but particularly in the Roman states, a concourse of people assembled at a fair, or from any other motive, form a most admirable spectacle, on account of the vast variety of picturesque attitudes and expressions of physiognomy, which characterize the persons standing unoccupied.

I must own, however, that their general appearance,—though well deserving of being studied by the painter or sculptor,—seems to me far from a pleasing one. There is generally something extremely menacing in their look and air, which announces, I think, a mind so proudly immersed in the ferocious thought of its having power miserably to destroy

its enemies, that, benevolent sentiments being quite extinct in it, it is animated with a hostile spirit towards all mankind.

The threatening air of the Romans seemed to me also to betray that they find more difficulty, than do the members of the other nations whom I have seen, in keeping their mind continually braced by a sentiment of courage. In those nations the men are calm and inclined to survey, with benevolence, all the individuals who cross their path, from having such an instinctive consciousness of their force and courage, that they do not feel a constant, internal incitement to manifest them, and that they are less disposed to look upon themselves as the hateful foes of the persons with whom they accidentally find themselves in relation, than as the protectors of the weak, and the companions, or at least honourable rivals, of the strong.

The Romans looked to me, as if the feeling which a first instinct made prominent in their mind was one acquainting them with their weakness and timidity: but they seemed also to have a contrary one—more deeply buried in their heart—which called on them to resist such an unworthy sensation. This courageous feeling, therefore, they determined—still led by instinct—to arouse with effort, and to fortify it in their breast, that it might enable them to vanquish every temptation to act as weak, enervated beings.* On this account they kept their imagination constantly inflamed, by the thoughts of their own greatness, heroic resolution, and tremendous power.

Reflections, on the one hand, on the temptation to listen to the suggestions of fear and an inglorious love of ease, that the constitution of the Romans seems to present to them, and on the other, on the exalted imagination that engages them to stifle fear, by giving them proud, stupendous ideas of their

* I judge that I am right in inferring, from the appearance of the Romans, that a greater conflict takes place in their breast between cowardly and courageous feelings, than there does in that of the men of those other nations whom I have observed, because I have repeatedly heard Romans say, that the question, whether it is better for a man to be brave from instinct, or only so from principle, is often debated among them: in the other nations to which I allude, I never heard such a question started, for, though most enlightened persons in them agree that a courage, founded on principle, is the only kind of meritorious one, yet would almost all the men, natives of them, scorn the supposition that themselves and their countrymen did not possess an instinctive, blind, constitutional courage.

own greatness, made me cease to wonder, as I had done formerly, at the fact that a people who had long persisted in a conduct which, though ferocious, was still awfully sublime, had afterwards suddenly sunk to a very low, and apparently hopeless state of corruption and effeminacy. I believe it will be very difficult for the Romans to become respectable, without their imagination receiving such an impulsion as shall determine them to shine by a majestic, heroic conduct. I think it probable too that the predilection for the life of banditti, which so many of them evince, is, in some measure, owing to the pleasure that they take in revolving thoughts in their mind, and performing actions, which prove them to be endued with a strength and courage that render them dreadfully formidable.*

Many of the Romans whom I met with in society, furnished, as I thought, striking examples of the truth of the observation, that imagination appears most captivating and lovely when she moves in strict subordination to the feelings. Those of the Romans seemed, in a colloquial discussion touching any of the fine arts, to be awakened before any sensible impulse was given to their imagination. Often, as, for instance, when they described the sensations which they had experienced on listening to a certain musical composition, their feelings seemed first to have been excited by an organical impression. But immediately, on their attempting to communicate them to the hearer, their imagination warmed. It gave fire to their whole countenance, while it eagerly sought incontestible proofs of the impressions made on them having been exactly agreeable to the immutable laws of harmony. Their feelings, excited by their imagination, and still taking the lead of it, acquired, at every moment a fresh vivacity, which enabled them to give birth to a train of sentiments wonderfully varied and regularly combined, yet simple and spontaneous.

Though frequently unable to form any judgment on the topic

* From the above observations I conclude, that the rise of a great nation, which drew its origin from a horde of banditti, was more illustrative of the natural disposition of the Romans than it would be of that of any other people: because among them high sentiments have a singular tendency to unfold themselves and take a practical consistency, beneath the shelter of a determination to commit acts of lawless violence against a neighbour and the established order of society.

which, on these occasions, I heard discussed by natives of Rome, I never failed to listen to them with surprise and pleasure. But, while I admired the extreme fertility of their mind in forming an abundance of well connected sentiments, concerning works of genius and taste, I learned to consider that same fertility as a great obstacle to their ever becoming adepts, in the art of conducting the character of a nation to its highest perfection. Their mind is just as rich in an abundance of regularly combined sentiments, respecting the method of dealing with men, in order to improve them and render them fit for a good social system, as it is in those which teach them to explain the various merits that the fine arts are capable of exhibiting. Accordingly, when they talk of the art of directing the human mind so as to give it the form, the most suitable to a virtuous and happy nation, they go on with as much rapidity ingeniously linking sentiment to sentiment, as if they thought that the principles that ought to direct a good social system may, like those which pervade the noblest compositions of the fine arts, be discovered by a well organized person, if he closely analyse appropriate sentiments that spontaneously rise in his bosom.

Sometimes, the principle from which they start, respecting the nature of the moral discipline suited to the constitution of mankind, has been suggested by remarks presented to them in the course of conversation, and appears to me a just one; but, eager to illustrate it, they instantly press, for that purpose, into their service, their ingenious, imaginative powers, and, led astray by them, though they preserve a very logical connexion in the positions that they deduce from the principle in question, they quickly wander far from the line in which, under the guidance of observation and experience, they could discern the real bearings that it ought to have in its practical applications.

Though the Romans are, I think, little adapted to determining the principles, by the wise observation of which, the improvement either of individuals, or of societies could be effected, yet, I believe, that, when they have an opportunity to be thoroughly acquainted with fine characters, they are exquisitely alive to all the admiration with which they deserve to be contemplated. No doubt that if they were not themselves—

as they unhappily are,—in a very corrupted state, they would gaze, with a much more intense satisfaction, on the august beauties of virtue, whenever they perceive that, in all her power and majesty, she animates the mind of some particular individual. But, notwithstanding their being too depraved to do full justice to her worth, most of them, I believe,—when they are not deficient in that sensibility to the fine arts for which they are in general distinguished,—contemplate persons, whose character they judge to be highly praiseworthy, with as much delight, as though they exhibited the most grateful of those spectacles, in the contemplation of which, a fine, delicate taste, is naturally disposed to take an interest.

The Romans have,—it appears to me,—a very true and quick tact for appreciating, from observations on the gestures and countenance of a human being, the nature of the moral qualities of the mind whose impress they bear, provided it be a fine one: where their imagination is not warmed by the belief that the human figure observed by them, is inhabited by a truly virtuous mind, I doubt if it gives them much insight into characters. Should they endeavour, by observation, and the use of their reasoning powers, without being aided by a brilliant imagination attuned to a love of the fine arts, to dive into all the folds of the heart of the person with whose character they wish to be acquainted, I do not believe that they could commonly conduct such an undertaking with any great skill or success. As they usually, when they thus coldly scrutinize a neighbour's disposition, do it with suspicion and malevolence, they rarely, I imagine, fail of conducting themselves, in regard to him, with a sufficiency of prudent caution, for they impute to him, and with great exaggerations, all the vices that really stain his character, but he may have in him the rudiments of many virtues, without their giving him credit for the possession of a single good quality.

In regard to the visible characteristics that an extraordinarily virtuous soul may stamp on the figure containing it, those which are most quickly decyphered by the Romans, are such as indicate a pure, unspotted mind. In all countries, men lay claim to a very quick tact in discovering an unsullied mind,

where it exists in women. In most of them, however, they do not seem to me, so rapidly to discriminate it, even in the fair sex, as the Romans do. The latter are remarkable for their confidence in their ability to distinguish, almost at a glance, a mind of this description, and they even profess, quickly to recognise the men who have preserved the purity of theirs, however they may wish to cast the veil of secresy over this portion of their character.

Whenever I heard the Romans—in the course of their remarks on particular individuals—advance, in an indirect manner, the pretension to distinguish with ease a virtuous, and especially a chaste mind, through its corporeal envelope, I always became impressed with the conviction, not only that they had that nice tact to which they laid claim, but also that they had capabilities of rising to be a very admirable people, since, though nature exposed them to great temptations to fall into a state of moral corruption, she enabled them to resist them, by bestowing on them such sensibilies to the charms of virtue as, if duly unfolded, could inspire them with an unconquerable resolution to keep their mental constitution sound and healthful.

Both the literature and the conversation of the Romans prove, that they have so far an eastern character as to employ, without scruple, vicious means to compass their ends. As, in their present fallen state, the ends too which they seek, are often endeared to them by criminal passions, they are far more tempted, than the northern Europeans, to act with perfidy and baseness. Nor do I believe that they will ever be generally determined to choose an open, honourable conduct, till they are taught to cherish such high sentiments, as shall engage them to spurn an action to which the slightest shadow of duplicity can be attached.

The Romans seem to me—where depraved habits do not stifle their natural disposition—to have a great instinctive wish that the persons whom they respect shall entertain for them corresponding sentiments.

Where they are not either sunk in vice, nor yet confirmed in virtue, they may appear quite different characters, according as they think highly or otherwise, of those with whom

they have to deal. Their respect for themselves is so much determined by what they bear their companions, that the Roman who would pride himself on dexterously over-reaching an individual of whom he had no peculiarly good opinion, would sometimes act with the most scrupulous probity towards the person whose character he believed deserving of veneration. It is not, therefore, mere observation and discretion that induce a Roman to suit himself thoroughly to the society wherein he is placed, his natural feelings also prompt him to rise or fall to its level.

The flexibility with which the Romans assimilate their minds to those of their companions, might, if the character of the northern Europeans were so improved as to offer them a model well worthy of imitation, induce them to feel, in contemplating it, a virtuous and noble emulation. I have, in particular, repeatedly seen them exhibit signs of an instinctive longing to find, in the example displayed to them by the English, an incitement to ennoble and purify their morals. Where the English, in public affairs, acted with an imposing magnanimity, the Romans seemed to me to be deeply sensible of the grandeur of their conduct, and involuntarily to look on it as an admonition to them to do likewise, whenever they should have an opportunity. When English travellers conducted themselves irreproachably among them, they spoke of them with great satisfaction, and seemed to think that all was not lost for themselves yet, since the example set them by these strangers, would one day warm them with an emulation, powerful enough, to determine them to emerge from the abyss of wretchedness and vice into which they were fallen. But did an Englishman act with depravity; did he in particular tempt an Italian to do the same, not only was their indignation great, but their regret was so also. To hear their comments on this affair, you would conclude that they considered it an imperative duty on the English to set the Italians a good example.

## CHAPTER XII.

### CONCLUSIONS DRAWN FROM THE TWO FOREGOING CHAPTERS.

I have now given some description of two countries whose natives, after I had resided among them a sufficient time to make a considerable series of observations on them, appeared to me, notwithstanding the great differences observable in their mental constitution, perfectly to agree in the exhibition of a national character, whose peculiar physiognomy was greatly determined by an imagination fully directed on sensible objects. I believe, indeed, that the imagination of the Scotch and of the Romans, is more purely one of this description, than is that of any other people of the western parts of Europe, excepting the Tuscans. The eyes of the latter, as far as I have noticed them, are filled, like those of the Romans, with a remarkable beautiful, delicate lustre; from which I infer, that the two people are gifted with a similar kind of imagination. But, as to all the rest of the Italians, as well as the natives, whom I have seen, of other countries, it appears to me that I can discern in their countenance something which announces, that their imagination is not strictly and simply of the same kind with that of the Scotch and Romans. If I do not mistake, it has always some mixture of a metaphysical tendency, though, perhaps, sometimes a scarcely perceptible one.* If this be the case, and should the remarks which I have exposed, touching the two different directions of imagination, be found worthy of further investigation, I am well aware, that the persons who will undertake to prosecute an inquiry into the various phenomena presented by this faculty, in many

* When I was at Naples I saw a few Sicilians, whose imagination appeared to me evidently to have somewhat a more metaphysical tendency than that of the Italians. I drew such a conclusion from observing more of a concentrated fire in their eyes than is perceivable in those of the latter. This observation led me to suppose that, in the islands of the Mediterranean, lying between Italy and Spain, the imagination of the natives is more metaphysically inclined, still as they more approximate the Spanish coast. Many intelligent persons, among the Scotch and Romans, dart from their eyes a keen, concentrated ray; but it is one, as I think, that emanates from their intellect, not from their feelings. It denotes them to be—to use a French term—*tres spirituelles.*

different countries where it appears to operate in both directions, will engage in a far more difficult and complicated task than the one which I have tried to accomplish. I have only sought to discriminate between these two propensities of imagination, in the countries where the line separating them, was most visible, and where I could easily seize it, once I had fixed my attention on it. While those, who undertake to analyze and trace to their respective sources, the clashing operations of imagination, in both tendencies, in those different countries, wherein she variously and subtilely combines them together, will, I make no doubt, require a far nicer eye and more acute penetration, than I can flatter myself with possessing. I should, however, from reluctance to leave my ideas respecting the different national characteristics of imagination, in the unsatisfactory state in which I now offer them to the public, have gladly gone to dwell some time in one of those countries,—as, for instance, in Germany,—wherein I conjectured her to be of a very subtly mixed kind, in order to mark the various phases which she presents there. But I found such an enterprise impracticable, for various reasons, more particularly on account of my increasing infirmities, which disabled me from travelling without great inconvenience, and which warned me that, if ever I hoped to lay before the public the work that I was meditating, it was time for me to content myself with the stock of ideas that I had already acquired, and to fix in one sequestered spot, where I might, undisturbed, devote myself to the care of writing and arranging the matter of my intended publication.

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## CHAPTER XIII.

### THE METAPHYSICALLY DIRECTED IMAGINATION OF THE IRISH AND SPANIARDS.

I shall at present add but few remarks, to those which I have already made, in treating of the Americans, on this kind of imagination.

I have mentioned, that it is not near so much employed, as a sensibly directed imagination, in diffusing charms over the daily occurrences and scenes of life.

In fact, it is more occupied in increasing the number of our sensations, by setting before us those of our neighbour, than in furnishing our minds with a great variety of interesting images.

By thus putting sensations in the place of images, it leaves a void in the mind, which is liable to cause a depression of spirits; for we require to be animated by an imagination, that presents to us, in the daily train of life, a constant succession of striking images. When our intercourse with society offers little to enliven us but sensations, they require to be very tumultuous and boisterous, in order to prevent our existence from appearing wearisome. To this circumstance, I attribute the passion of the Irish and Spaniards, for engaging in violent combats, or witnessing terrible conflicts; for, whatever difference of taste may subsist between these two people, I believe that the same instinctive wish to experience very turbulent emotions, and witness the expression of them, pushes the one on to convert fairs and other places of public assembly, into scenes of furious strife, and engages the other to delight in those sanguinary spectacles, wherein cavaliers combat enraged bulls, and equally gratify the spectators, whether they succeed in destroying the furious animals, or are gored to death by them.*

The Irish and Spaniards, are also prone to form into bands, for the sake of robbery and pillage. Individuals too, among them, of the lower orders, though they may conduct themselves peacefully, are remarkable for the pleasure with which they study the lives of heroic chiefs of banditti.

* The lower Romans, like the lower Irish, used till of late years—when these combats were prohibited to them—to divide into bands or parties, two of which, without any anger, frequently gave each other rendezvous, that they might try their superiority in battle. These meetings were more murderous too than similar ones in Ireland, as the combatants were armed with knives and such like weapons. I believe, however, that the close observer may distinguish a shade of difference in the motives, which determine the Romans and Irish, to take pleasure in these barbarous amusements. The Romans, as I conceive, look on them as exercises becoming lofty minded men: the Irish delight in finding their vital spirits rendered by them wildly, tumultuously, and fiercely active.

I venture, however, to affirm, that the interest which they take in those highwaymen, who conduct themselves, as they consider, gallantly, does not exactly arise from similar feelings with those, which prompt the Romans and Neapolitans to admire such characters.

The two latter are betrayed, by the sentiment of order itself, into a partiality for acts of lawless violence. 'Tis in braving the dangers to which banditti are exposed, and in undergoing the hardships which they must support, that—as it appears to them—men unfold all their dignity. Being disposed to a love of order, whatever reminds them of their dignity, reminds them also that they ought to be ranged under an orderly system of government. On that account they are inclined to give, if they could, to the life of banditti, a majestic, regular form; so that, did circumstances favour them, it would not be at all surprising to see one of their troops of robbers gradually increase and give loftier bearings to the laws regulating it, till it became a respectable nation.

The Irish and Spaniards, when they go about as violent spoilers, reject from their bosoms every fine sentiment of order: they know that they are warring with the system established for the peace of society, and this thought pleases them; it renders the feelings of their mind more tumultuous.

They may indeed, from necessity, lay down regulations for the government of their depredating bands; nay, from their propensity to study the inward feelings of men—which propensity constantly engages them to try to mould them to their will—they may apply to enacting a whole code of laws, to control the individuals whom they judge proper to make submit to them. They may even have, in many respects, honourable sentiments; for, a disposition to dive into the hearts of men, and to be as much agitated as they, communicates, very commonly, a great vivacity to the sense of honour, by leading us to study, within our minds, those laws by which individuals ought to govern themselves in their relations with each other. But the sentiment of order, that sentiment which distinguishes, from a riotous rabble, men willing to live under the shelter of, and lend their support to, a regular government, is, among them, in a very groveling state. Scarcely

could any fortuitous circumstances engage them, willingly, to form for themselves a permanent, well organized government, unless some resolute chief were to acquire over them such an ascendency, as to induce them to submit to his absolute sway.*

## CHAPTER XIV.

### EXAMPLES, ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE DISTINCTIONS, WHICH I HAVE POINTED OUT, BETWEEN A SENSIBLY AND METAPHYSICALLY DIRECTED IMAGINATION.

I shall now adduce some examples to illustrate the meaning which I attach to the two expressions, of an imagination directed on sensible objects, and one directed on metaphysical.

It is recorded of a young Spanish officer, employed at Peru, at a time when his government was committing great atrocities there, that, having received an order to dispatch some unhappy prisoners, who were undergoing a sentence which condemned them to be consumed by a slow fire, but whose cries, overheard by the governor, importuned him too much; to comply with the spirit of the order, yet not sacrifice the pleasure of torturing the patients, he placed gags in their mouths, and then sat down near the burning pile on which they were extended, to savour deliciously the idea of their sufferings. This abominable trait did not exceed in cruelty some acts, which are related, of persons possessed of an imagination directed on sensible objects; but it differs from them in general, I believe, in being modified so, that no external signs, as we may well suppose, of the victims' anguish reached either in imagination

* The above application of my principles concerning the kind of influence which a metaphysically directed imagination has a tendency to take, over the character of a nation, includes both the Irish and Spaniards: yet did I form those principles entirely from observations on the former, as I have never visited Spain. However, though I have reason to infer, from my remarks on the natives of that country whom I have seen, that the Spaniards are, in some respects, different from my countrymen, yet all the information, that I have been able to glean respecting them, leads me to conclude, that the above description of the effects of an imagination, such as I attribute to them, is, in a great measure, applicable to their character.

or in reality, the eyes or ears of him who prolonged it. It therefore seems to me to mark a horribly depraved imagination directed on metaphysical objects.

I shall next mention an Irish gentleman of no particular profession, who was noted for liking to indulge in solitary reveries, and who was known to affirm that he would gladly give a considerable sum, to obtain permission to feel the hand of a malefactor dying on the gallows. I never heard him accused of cruelty: but, to judge from this declaration, the pleasures of his imagination were such as that they might readily have conducted him to it. I believe also that a person, susceptible to the impression of metaphysical objects, was more likely to indulge in them, than one with an imagination directed on sensible objects; as, I presume, that the motive of his conceiving so strange a wish was the idea that, the pulse or other vital movements perceptible in the patient's hand, might enable him to apprehend, more distinctly, the nature and extent of his sufferings.

The ancient Romans gave proof of their being under the influence of a sensibly directed imagination when, in the spectacles of the combats of gladiators, they attached so much importance to the circumstance of their dying in a graceful attitude. The Spaniards indeed are said to require the same thing from the cavaliers, who fall by the horns of bulls excited to madness. But the accounts published of those combats attest, I think, that the attitude of the dying cavalier can be but a secondary consideration for the spectators, and that their principle pleasure must result from the fire and tumult of the battle. During the fearful, revolutionary times which closed the last and ushered in this century, both the Spanish and the Florentine populace crucified, I have been told, many unhappy victims, particularly Jews; but the former populace contented themselves with enjoying the thoughts of their anguish, while they were undergoing this cruel death, and did not take any pains to heighten the effects of it. The Florentines, as I have heard, did. They crucified the miserable objects of their wrath at the corners of the streets and in other places, wherein it seemed to them that the spectacle of their agonized forms was peculiarly calculated to strike, and glut with pleasure, the ima-

gination of their enemies. From all that I have said, the reader will easily infer, that I look upon the different modes in which the Spaniards and Tuscans performed the same cruel act, as characteristic of the different kinds of imagination which I ascribe to them.

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## CHAPTER XV.

REASONS FOR BELIEVING THAT A METAPHYSICALLY DISPOSED IMAGINATION DOES NOT GIVE TO THE EUROPEANS IN WHOM IT OPERATES, SUCH AN UNBENDING ATTACHMENT TO AN INDEPENDENT LIFE, AS IT DOES TO MOST AMERICANS.

I do not consider that a metaphysically directed imagination presents, in the European countries where it prevails, near such great obstacles to the permament reduction of their inhabitants to the control of a liberal, wise system of government, as it does in many of the nations of America. My reason for judging that this distinction subsists between the cis- and trans-atlantic countries is, that the physiognomy of the natives of the former, seems to me, to indicate a mental constitution that empowers and disposes them to make a fine, and incessant use, of their reasoning faculties; while the countenance of many Americans whom I have seen, does not denote those faculties to be in their mind so active and ingenious. I am well aware, that a great restlessness in the use of their reasoning powers, causes men to be disputatious, and is liable to inflame their passions in a manner pernicious to the ends of good government. However, on the other hand, these powers tend to communicate to the individuals in whom they are acute and lively, polished and polite tastes, by engaging them nicely to determine the laws by which they ought to conduct every matter wherein they take interest, whether it be one of business or amusement.

They also dispose their intellect to studying, in all their varieties and details, the principles of order, as well relatively

to the affairs of civil government and social life, as in business and speculations of a more solitary kind.

The individuals in question are attached, therefore, by means of their reasoning faculties, to the blessings of a good social system. Even where a practical love of order does not rise spontaneously within them, their feelings are still modified so, as to dispose them to prize the advantages of a good social government, once they are so fortunate as to see it established among them.

All the western Europeans are the more inclined to hearken to the voice of their reason, when it recommends peaceable, civilized habits to them, because their passions and imagination are not usually endowed with sufficient strength to reduce it to silence.

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## CHAPTER XVI.

### REASONS FOR PLACING THE IMAGINATION OF THE IRISH IN A DIFFERENT CLASS FROM THAT OF THE ENGLISH AND FRENCH.

I have mentioned, in a former chapter, that the imagination of the English and French is of a mixed kind.* I have also mentioned that a portion of the imagination of the Irish—though it is in the main a metaphysically directed one—flows towards sensible objects.

I shall now briefly notice my reason for classing the imagination of the Irish, though it is, in some degree, compound, among the metaphysically directed ones, while I consider that of the English and French as one of a mixed kind.

The imagination of the two latter people is constrained, so that it cannot completely flow in either direction, while that of the Irish has a free course in both, but the metaphysical direction preponderates and principally stamps their character.

* This intermixture does not take place in any such subtle or complicated manner as might render the analysis of it peculiarly difficult, which, I imagine, a similar operation would be in other countries, where imagination is not quite simple in her tendency.

It is, however, greatly modified by the portion of their imagination that is directed on sensible objects.

To explain these assertions, as well as what I have advanced concerning the English and French, I must now enter on a very intricate subject. I call it intricate, not because the views which I shall endeavour to expose, relatively to the mode in which national physiognomies are diversified, are not perfectly clear to my own apprehension; but because, not having the aid of a pencil exercised in taking striking likenesses of individuals, I fear it will be extremely difficult for me to make the reader perfectly comprehend my meaning.

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## CHAPTER XVII.

SOME DETAILS, RESPECTING THE OBSERVATIONS WHICH LED ME TO CONCLUDE, THAT THE HUMAN MIND IS PUT INTO ACTIVITY BY AN ELEMENT WHICH PASSES FROM THE ATMOSPHERE INTO THE HUMAN FRAME.

Immediately on quitting my country, and while the fact of being surrounded by human countenances, different from those to which I had been always accustomed, was both new and surprising to me, I gazed with peculiar interest and wonder, on the eyes of the persons who composed the societies into which I was received.

Never, while I was in Ireland, had any incident taught me that the natives of other countries had eyes different from those of the Irish. In consequence, when I discovered, by my own observations, that the organ of sight had different expressions analogous to the varieties of national character, I felt, I may say, as lively impressions while I gazed on eyes unlike those that I had hitherto seen, as though I had never beheld any before.

As great a stream of expression certainly flows abroad from the eyes of the Irish, on a surrounding society, as there does from those of the strangers with whom I first compared them: however, early and long habit had totally prevented my attention being drawn to the fact, of the emission of rays from their

visual orb; but, as soon as that orb appeared to me, among strangers, to have another kind of national expression, I then observed the constant emanation of rays from it, and they seemed to me to produce a very curious phenomenon.

I was struck with the idea of their being composed of some element distinct from the soul, though, by acting on it, the soul kept its vital flame awake; and as they appeared constantly to issue from the human frame into the air, I concluded that the element forming them was as constantly imbibed into it, from some component ingredient of the atmosphere.

Let not the reader think that, in starting this hypothesis, I have the least pretension to having made any real discovery, touching the manner in which the human soul is vivified. I merely mention it, because, from the time that it first occurred to me, it took, through the medium of the sense of seeing, strong possession of my imagination, and I have allowed myself to adopt it, because the supposition that the human soul is set in activity by an element which varies, in different countries—as, on comparing together diverse national physiognomies, I had reason to think that it does—its mode of rising to the head and eyes, though, in the natives of each country, whose ancestors have been long settled there, its course is uniform—this supposition has frequently afforded me so unerring a rule for determining the country to which a stranger belonged, that, were a person endowed with a quick, scrutinizing glance, to enter into my views respecting this element, and to begin early in life to make appropriate observations, with ample opportunities to vary them sufficiently, so that he would acquire greater facility than I have ever had, in applying to the aspect of strangers the principles resulting from these views; I am convinced that he would in the end be able to name, promptly and infallibly, the country whence they drew their origin, particularly if, by their extraction, they belonged entirely to it. This conviction must plead my excuse for laying before the reader my conjectures and observations, relatively to the element in question.

After the persuasion had taken possession of my mind, that this element was continually issuing through the eyes, from the human frame into the air, I thought that the play of the

physiognomy was such as to denote that it also, in some degree, escaped from every part of the face to which that play gave movement. Not that I imagined that I actually saw this element passing from the human countenance into the open air. In regard to the eyes, I knew that I only beheld what every one did, for every one perceives that this feature, when it is animated, is illumined by a fine expression, which appears emitted from it, so that I considered that my peculiar manner of contemplating it, merely engaged me to call element, what is usually termed rays. Nor did I imagine, that I could see that portion of the element which I believed to be emitted from all the parts of the human face, on which the play of the physiognomy depends. It is not easy for me, no doubt, to convey to the reader an idea of the impression by which my imagination was affected, and which made such a notion occur to me. I shall, therefore, briefly say, that when I saw an animated human countenance, the escape of some element from it, seemed to me indicated by its movements, somewhat in a similar manner as that in which I am taught to conclude, that a piece of water is issuing forth beyond its apparent bound, when, standing near the brow of a cascade, and unable to see it, I discover, by the peculiar rippling of the current, that it is forming one.

## CHAPTER XVIII.

### DESCRIPTION OF THE APPEARANCES PRODUCED BY THIS ELEMENT, IN THE NATIVES OF SCOTLAND, GERMANY AND POLAND.

This element produces, in the natives of different countries, various appearances, some of which I shall now try to describe.

Owing to the nerves,* with which a portion of it is involved, and which do not advance equally forward in the heads of all people, it seems, in the natives of some countries,

* I say nerves, from being ignorant of a more proper term.

to be divided into two parts, of which the one, fine and pure, overflows the whole of the eye, and penetrates to the surface of the entire face; the other, thicker and more turbid,—on account of the nerves with which it is mingled,—lies deep in the head, and by so doing, commonly gives a great concentrated force to the character.

Sometimes, it shows itself in rather an agitated form, in the back part of the eye, and seems to denote that the angry passions of the mind which it acts upon, are slowly roused, but that, if once they were excited, they would have great strength, and not be readily appeased.

The people, in whom such a division of the element takes place, are the Scotch, the Germans and the Poles.

The principal observations that I have made, however, on the effects which this kind of organization takes on the national character, regarded the first of these people.

I must here notice a principle of the mental constitution of the human species.

It is, that the imagination of every individual belonging to it is subject to two impulses, whereof, in different nations, sometimes the one, sometimes the other, predominates.

By the one, it is made to delight in thinking, that the mind which it animates, blends, to a certain degree, with those of its fellow-creatures.

By the other, it is taught to love the idea that it mingles, in a similar manner, with universal nature.

The finer looking part of the element, in the people whom I have described, or that which comes more forward in the head than those nerves wherein the rest of it is engaged, appears, principally, to awaken, in imagination, the idea of an union with universal nature, so that a feeling which leads them to imagine that they mingle with it, prevails, in these people, over the sentiment which makes them long to have mind sociably blend with mind.

This fine, unmixed part of the element, by stirring up the sentiment of an union with universal nature, seems to be capable of giving great exaltation to imagination; the passions, however, which principally induce men to act, that is, those which put them in relation with their fellow-creatures, appear

to owe their birth to the second, thick looking part of the element, or, to speak more accurately, to the nerves on which it operates.

The people then, in whom they are drawn far back in the head are not remarkable for social tastes, nor usually for lively, irrascible passions.

However, there appears to be, in those respects, great differences in them. In some those nerves are in a more quiescent state than in others, and, in proportion to the degree of restless activity imprest on them, is the vivacity which they communicate to the passions and social tastes. Thus, if I do not mistake, they are more restlessly in motion among the Scotch than among the Germans. I believe also, that the former are a more lively people than the latter, and that individuals among them feel usually a more jealous wish, to penetrate into the nature of the opinion entertained of them in society.*

The nerves which awaken the passions seem, in the Poles, to be still more restless than in the Scotch. They, in consequence, render them more quarrelsome, and, perhaps, more inclined to the enjoyments of society. I believe, however, that, where the Poles do not frequent nations who better know how to perfect and vary, to the utmost, refined, social pleasures, they are very ignorant of the art of cultivating their social tastes, and procuring to themselves, by their means, elegant recreations. They are reckoned violent and fickle. Different modifications of the mental constitution of men, may, no doubt, equally incline them to those defects. A near examination, however, of the particular organization of mind which gives rise to them in the Poles, would, perhaps, lead us to conclude them to proceed from a peculiar restlessness of

* The Scotch are considered exceedingly susceptible of resentment for any slight or offence which they think offered to them. If I conjecture right, the cause of this disposition lies in the number of social feelings that obscurely stir within them, and to which they do not know how to give vent: the consequence is, that, in the company of persons better organized than themselves for heightening and varying the pleasures of society, they feel uneasy and dissatisfied, from the consciousness of not sustaining their part as well as they could wish.

The thought that their companions may note their deficiency, makes them inclined angrily to suspect them of an intention to treat them with contempt, or turn them into ridicule.

disposition, owing to their not having sufficient stay in their own mind; on account of having a very sociable disposition, while, at the same time, they want the tact and the instinctive feelings, which would lead them to give to the fabric of society some consistency, by engaging them nicely to unfold and maintain a set of principles for regulating its tone and usages.

To return to the Scotch.

Being rendered sensible of their force, by their vigorous conformation, as well as by the concentration of the strong passions which are acted on by the second part of the element, whose effects and appearances I am endeavouring to explain, they feel themselves inclined to form enterprises adapted to their powers; while their imagination, prodigiously exalted by the fine etherial part of the element, does not fail to reply to the sentiment of their force, in opening to them views of glory or utility, to realise which must require their utmost exertions.

Thus do the two divisions of the element, contribute both, towards rendering them an enterprising, adventurous people.

The Scotch, when they follow the natural bent of their disposition, so much prefer feeling themselves in relation with universal nature to the pleasure of cultivating social joys, that their mountaineers are never happier than when leading a a hardy, active life, entirely cut off from any other society but that of their own family.

It is well known also that their adventurous spirit leads them to delight in exploring solitary regions, wherein they are perfectly satisfied not to find any traces of inhabitants, provided that they have an opportunity to contemplate universal nature in all her sublimity.*

They are, nevertheless, very fond of social pleasures, where they can keep them in subordination to their passionate desire to feel themselves in relation with the great scenes of na-

* It is generally said among the Scotch, that there is no part of the world, however remote it be from any inhabited country, in which Scotchmen are not to be found. I heard of one Scotch gentleman who declared that he had travelled among the mountains of Jamaica, and that, when he was arrived at barren, nearly inaccessible heights, he found two of his countrymen living, separated from one another, as well as from all their fellow-creatures.

ture. To that end those pleasures must be simple and unstudied.

Where society heightens the delight which they taste amidst their mountain scenery, by the diffusion of sympathy from breast to breast, it sometimes augments to such a degree their enthusiastic pleasure, as to make it appear like an exquisitely joyous and fine delirium.

## CHAPTER XIX.

### TWO DIFFERENT MODES IN WHICH THE NERVES THAT ARREST PART OF THE ELEMENT ADVANCE TOWARDS THE FOREHEAD.

§ 1.—The nerves which arrest the apparently thicker part of the element, when they come quite or nearly as forward in the eyes as the finer, more fluid looking part of it, advance in two different modes towards the forehead.

First—They appear to rise into the head and to spread entirely throughout it, quite simply along with the finer part of the element, so that, had I never seen any other people but those in whom they flow in this manner, the idea that this element ever appeared divided into two distinct parts, would not have occured to me. The people, in whom this element thus seems simple and uniform, are the Italians, and all the more remote nations, lying to the south-east, between us and China, of which I have seen any natives.

Secondly—In other countries the element seems, at the lower part of the head, to be divided into two parts, as in Scotland and Germany; but, on rising towards the top of the head, the thick looking part of it, including the nerves which give it this appearance, comes abruptly forward to the eyes and forehead, in a manner, as though they were forced to do so by a violent compression.

The people in whom the element follows this direction, are the French, the Spanish, some, at least, of the Russians, and all the nations of America, of whom I have seen any na-

tives, that were descended from ancestors long established on that continent.

The English and Irish, also, enter into this category, though they, particularly the former, do so imperfectly. I must mention, that this conformation of the head, seems to take place, in a more firm, decided manner, among the western Europeans, than the Americans, which distinction appears to me to arise from that peculiar bracing in the cephalic nerves of the former, that gives to their intellect a singular acuteness and vivacity.

The greater relaxation of those nerves among the Americans, takes on their aspect an effect which I think signifies that, in some respects, imagination is less keen among them, in following a metaphysical direction, than it is in the nations of Europe in which it has such a bias, because it is less stimulated by quick, vivacious, reasoning powers: but, on the other hand, the inertness of those powers, seems, in them, to leave a freer scope to imagination and the passions, than they usually have in the Europeans, so that they may be expected to be impelled with more violence than they, to such acts as a metaphysically inclined imagination is liable to suggest.

§ 2.—The complicated configuration of the head now under consideration, appears to keep up, in the mind of the western Europeans among whom it prevails, more restless and clashing movements, than those that kindle thoughts and sentiments in the brain of the individuals,—whether Scotch or Italians,—in whom the animating element flows in a more simple manner towards the eyes and forehead. These two latter people, when they discuss any subject addressed immediately to the moral feelings, can unfold all the sentiments and images which regularly flow from what they first advanced, with fineness, ingenuity, and abundance, so that the whole stream of their thoughts is rich, simple, and consistent. They can also, occasionally, express very humorous ideas, as far as they naturally arise from a methodical survey of their topic.

The people with the configuration of head which I have just described,—as the French and Spaniards,—do not seem to me, in treating a subject immediately interesting to the heart, inclined to keep to a fixed position. They view it on all sides,

without attending to one, regular method; and their restless, unsettled manner of surveying it, often inspires them with an incalculable number of desultory thoughts and sentiments, from the clash of which,—not from a first native feeling,—they often elicit those of which they at last make use. 'Tis this chaos, as I may say, of various sentiments, and the operations of a quick intellect, extracting from them their essence, that principally give birth to lively, comical conceptions: so that these people are remarkable for their wit, or humour. They also draw our attention to many important and useful views of things, which would have escaped the notice of minds, accustomed to more regular trains of thought.

But, generally speaking, they have not so sure a taste as the Scotch and Italians, nor do they express their sentiments with the same unstudied *naiveté*.

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## CHAPTER XX.

### THE ANIMATING ELEMENT EXISTS IN THE FRAMES OF THE NATIVES OF DIFFERENT COUNTRIES IN TWO DIFFERENT QUANTITIES.

In respect to the quantity of the animating element which is contained in the frames of individuals, the different nations appear to be divided into two classes.

The countries indeed, in whose natives it flows in rather less abundance than in the members of some nations, cover by far the greater part of the globe: so that those who are supplied with it to an extraordinary degree seem to be placed by nature—as I think that I can perceive for very wise purposes—in a case of exception to her general rule.

The people who stand in this case are the English* and

* The head of the English is not, in general, so full and round as that of the French, so that the latter appears to offer a greater space than the former for the element to collect in. Without discussing this point, I shall merely observe, that all the English and French appear to me equally filled with the animating element, in proportion to the room which their persons and particularly their heads—where it seems principally to accumulate—may, from their size, afford it.

French, also the Russians, supposing that all the natives of the vast Russian empire, agree, in their national physiognomy, with the few whom I have beheld.

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## CHAPTER XXI.

A COMPARATIVE SURVEY OF THE CHARACTER OF THE PEOPLE IN WHOM THE ELEMENT IS NOT MORE THAN USUALLY ABUNDANT. THEY ARE INDOLENT. CAUSE OF THEIR BEING SO.

The numerous people to whom nature has not been peculiarly liberal of the animating element, contain full sufficient of it in their frames, to have strength and energy adequate to the most arduous undertakings. Imaginàtion, too, acting more freely in them than in the persons in whom the element more abounds, more readily excites them to embark in a favourite enterprize with an ardent enthusiasm, tending to rouse in them the energy necessary to their success.

They are, however, when their imagination is not heated, more inclined to an indolent inertness, than the English and French.

The following reason, seems to me, to account, partly, for their being, more than they, thus prone to indolence.

I have mentioned that mankind are universally subject to two mental impulses; the one, making all individuals take pleasure in feeling themselves in relation with their fellow-creatures, the other, with universal nature. The people in whose frame the animating element does not flow in a greater quantity than what is common, are usually, comparatively speaking, at ease, as though the two feelings above mentioned, constantly obtained full fruition. The element escapes freely from the nerves on which their soul immediately acts, and in so doing, makes them imagine their minds in as close relation with those of their fellow-creatures, and with universal nature, as they wish them to be. They are, therefore, little impelled

to invent arts for heightening their satisfaction. They enjoy a feeling of ease which causes them too readily to remain contented in a dull state of listlessness.

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## CHAPTER XXII.

### THE PLEASURE WHICH WE TAKE IN OUR RELATIONS WITH UNIVERSAL NATURE CAN BE RESOLVED INTO TWO SPECIES OF ENJOYMENT.

In regard to the pleasure which we take in feeling our minds in harmony or relation with universal nature—a pleasure to which every one is at times sensible—my subject now leads me to remark that it consists of two enjoyments, of which, according to the country, the one or the other is subordinate. These enjoyments are :—

First—A sweet consciousness of our existence.

Secondly—An imagination of being mingled throughout nature as part of her elements.

These two enjoyments, when carried to their utmost pitch, appear rather incompatible, for, a consciousness of our individual existence separates us from universal nature, while an imagination of our being mingled throughout her elements, tends to make us lose the sense of an individual existence.

However, in the degree in which these two enjoyments are commonly tasted, a sweet consciousness of our existence, where it is the prevailing one, is rendered exquisitely delicious, by an imagination that tells us, that we are perfectly in harmony with that balmy atmosphere, or those pleasing country scenes, by which we are usually surrounded, at the times when we yield ourselves up to these calm enjoyments.

In like manner, the imagination that we are mingling with the elements of nature, when it forms our predominant pleasure, would not cause us, as it does, a delicious one, were it not that it allows the consciousness of our individual existence to stir within us, and to make us feel how much our passion for the charms of universal nature can render it joyful.

I thought it necessary, in order to convey to the reader a clear notion of my meaning, to premise this disquisition, concerning the nature of the general pleasures which we derive from an instinctive sense of our relation with universal nature, to my next observation on the people from whose frame the animating element escapes too readily to remain there in an extraordinary quantity.

The observation to which I allude is, that, in these people, the imagination of being a portion of the elements of nature is more lively than the consciousness of an individual existence.*

Connected with the feelings of being sufficiently at ease, in our relations with our fellow-creatures and with universal nature, is the one which makes it seem to us as if our minds had an indefinite expansion; and which prompts us to aspire towards infinity: where this last mentioned feeling has not that degree of liberty within us that human nature craves, we are also too much constrained in the two former ones.

My object in establishing these principles is, to apply them to the English and French. In them, the feeling that puts our mind in relation with our fellow-creatures, as well as with universal nature, and the aspiration towards infinity, are less at ease than they are in that numerous class of mortals in whose frames the animating element does not remain in extraordinary quantity.

But they are, in return, more proudly conscious of an individual existence.

The uneasiness which the English and French experience, from the causes which I have just stated, appears to me to render their dispositions more unceasingly active, than the human mind usually is in other countries; while the superabundance which they contain of the animating element prevents this constant activity from being fatiguing to them.

The imagination of the English, French, and Russians,—

* According to some of those views which I have already exposed, the imagination of the aborigines of America gives them a much haughtier consciousness of their existence than the Asiatics are sensible to. If I be not, however mistaken, a joyous sense of their being a part of universal nature predominates in both people, and I imagine that this sense strengthens the attachment of the American savage to his wild, independent life.

owing, I believe, principally to the quantity of the element which pervades their frames—is more subject to be impressed by gloomy and melancholy ideas, than that of any other people whom I have observed.

This assertion, in regard to the Russians, is founded, I own, on no better grounds than the expression of their eyes.

As to the English, I am led to believe it applicable to them, partly by similar remarks on this expressive feature, partly from finding that they are generally considered to be liable to an extreme depression of spirits.

Those who are well acquainted with the French will not, I believe, be surprised at my having placed them, relatively to a gloomily disposed imagination, in the same catagory with the English; but the persons whose whole knowledge of them is bounded to having heard, from popular rumour, that they are the people in the world the most intent on amusement, will probably think that, in attributing to them an imagination of such a kind, I have suffered myself to be led away by the love of advancing paradoxes. Yet do I rather like to avoid uttering one, where I find that the just exhibition of my ideas, on the subject which I seek to unfold, does not require me to clash with received notions.

Where the mental constitution of a people is framed with perfect harmony, their imagination and the feelings of their heart exactly correspond to each other.

But in the French, there seems to me to be a considerable discrepance between them: for their social feelings are multitudinous, lively and gay, while their imagination is, comparatively speaking, of a sombre hue. On account of the restlessness with which their feelings demand gratification, they do not, like other people in whom imagination has a tendency to melancholy, love to yield to its propensity. They therefore fly from solitude as from their worst enemy; they dissipate their attention amidst scenes that strike their imagination with cheerful images, and, if they still cannot get it to reply faithfully to their joyous feelings, they endeavour to forget the uneasiness which this internal discord occasions them, in the restless tumult of ever varied and agitated social pleasures.

## CHAPTER XXIII.

### NATURAL DISTINCTION IN THE MENTAL CONSTITUTION OF THE ENGLISH, FRENCH, IRISH, AND SPANIARDS.

The natural distinction in the mental constitution of the English and French, seems to arise from the greater concentration in the former, of those nerves, which give to a portion of the animating element, a thick appearance. In the French, they come quite, or nearly as forward in the eyes, as the fine clear part of the element. In the English,* they are not only drawn back,—though not as much so as in the Scotch,—but they are also condensed to an extremely narrow compass, so that they seem to fill a very small spot in the depth of the eye.

In the Irish, the second portion of the element, seems, as in the English, to be condensed into a small compass, but that little central spot which it occupies, comes forward to the front of the eyes,—as the second portion of the element does in the French,—while the rest of the eye is filled up—as the whole of it is in the Scotch,—with the fine ethereal portion of the element.

'Tis by having this divided expression of countenance,—partly French, and partly Scotch,—that the Irish, as I apprehend, differ from the Spaniards. I believe, that in the latter, the entire element flows, similarly to what it does in the

* When I first compared the Scotch, with the English and French, it appeared to me, as if nature, after making the English differ from the French, by the concentration and drawing backward, of the second or thick portion of the element, had, in going to North Britain, still tryed, without diminishing the quantity of the element, to increase this concentration, and to make the second portion of it sink yet deeper in the head; but it seemed as if she had attempted, what it was impossible to effect, for that the element, unable to support being thus pent up, had indeed, as far as it was involved with the nerves in question, retired as deep in the head as she wished it; but that it had still, breaking through constraint, rushed forth in a rapid, concentrated stream, and thus, set itself at ease, by effecting a free passage, and by only remaining within the frame, in the quantity in which it can subsist there, without causing any uneasiness.

The element, by thus escaping in a straight line, renders the character of the Scotch, very different in many respects, from that of the English.

French, with this distinction, that it escapes from them with more freedom, and remains within them in a smaller quantity.*

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## CHAPTER XXIV.

### A METAPHYSICALLY DIRECTED IMAGINATION, AS IT APPEARS IN SOME COUNTRIES.—REMARKS ON THE RUSSIANS.

The Irish, as far as the thicker looking part of the element, or that portion of it which is involved with nerves, comes forward in their eyes, have a metaphysically directed imagination, but the fine, pure part of it, that overflows a great portion of them, gives it also a tendency to attach itself to sensible objects.

* I cannot point out to my reader's attention, objects that could better serve to convey to him, an idea of how my sight and imagination were affected, when they first taught me to think, that the animating element did not flow in all persons in equal quantity, than would the Gascons and Spaniards, should he have an opportunity to compare them together. I have seen intelligent persons of each country, warmly engaged in debate with one another. There seemed to be little difference of national expression in their eyes, except what proceeded from the greater or lesser quantity of the element animating them, but their national expression was, notwithstanding, by no means the same. Those of the Gascons had in them an extraordinary quantity of rays, which seemed unwilling to quit them. Instead of darting straight abroad, they meandered about in them, and lent to them a very fine arch look. The rays emitted by the eyes of the Spaniard, seemed immediately to forsake them, with the rapidity of lightening, and they made him look like one who sincerely spoke his sentiments. They did not however flow from them as simply and easily as in the Italians. They appeared on the contrary, as if the Spanish constitution, partly like the French one, presented some obstacles to their free emission, but that they had broken through them with violence, like a rushing river, that forces itself a passage among rocks.

But, without going so far in search of sensible appearances, proper to convey to another's mind, a conception of the impressions which my imagination received from visible objects, and which suggested to me, a notion of the existence of this element, in two different quantities in the human frame, the reader may derive some satisfaction on this point, from the comparison of the eyes of the English, with those of the Irish. The former contain in the front part of their globe, a somewhat greater quantity of fixed immutable lustre, than the latter do. This distinction, wherever I have had an opportunity to note it, has long served me as a rule, to determine whether a stranger were of English or Irish extraction. I suppose the reason for its being generally overlooked is, that the Irish vivacity, except to a person versed by long practise in the art of decyphering the distinctions which I

I must here observe, that I believe a metaphysically directed imagination, to be generally the result of that complicated conformation of the head, which I have described as characterizing the French, Spaniards, &c. However, particular modifications of a people's mental organization, may prevent their imagination taking that tendency, though they may have what appears to be the requisite conformation of head.

Thus, the imagination of the French, has not a thoroughly metaphysical direction,—though it labours much to have it,—because the element which should bear it,—if I may be allowed the expression—into the inward mind of the persons observed by it, has not sufficient freedom.

The heads of the Russians, as far as relates to the course and quantity of the element, are made, I think, exactly like those of the French, but they certainly present a very different expression of countenance. Imagination in the former people, neither appears to have, nor to endeavour to acquire, any metaphysical direction. Their look denotes, that this faculty in them, prompted by a calm, and often gloomy affection, likes silently to mount to an immense height in ideal regions, rather than to contemplate the scenes of real life.

The Russians look as if they had a wonderful power to offer a steady calm resistance, to any one who might attack them, or who might seek to give them a direction contrary to the one which they were disposed to take.

In company with Russians, I think the English as much look agitated, by a restless vivacity, as the French do, when they are compared with them.

have described, presents an obstacle to the discovery of it, owing to the fire that it commonly communicates to their eyes. I shall further remark, that those of the English, are liable to have rather a strained look, as if the quantity of transparent matter, which they contain, were somewhat fatiguing to them. The same thing occurs in regard to the French, though, in other respects, their eyes have a very different expression, from those of the English.

## CHAPTER XXV.

### PRINCIPLES RESPECTING A METAPHYSICALLY DIRECTED IMAGINATION, AND THE APPLICATION OF THEM TO THE SPANIARDS, IRISH, AND GERMANS.

When Imagination acts in a metaphysical direction, she is in connexion with sensations stirring in our mind, which acquaint her—or pretend to do so—with what is passing in another's breast.

These sensations are many and various, but I shall not attempt a detailed specification of them. 'Tis sufficient for my purpose, to divide them into two classes.

Those of the one class, have in general an austere and stern character. They are—to mention them in a cursory manner—

Curiosity thoroughly to know the disposition and sentiments of another;

An imperious desire to fashion his ways of thinking to ours;

An alarmed watchfulness, lest he indulges a similar pretension in regard to us;

And a jealous wish to know whether he likes and respects us.

All these motives, for seeking to penetrate into his secret thoughts, incline us more or less to judge him severely.

The second class is composed of feelings of a softer description. They prompt the mind fondly to observe the person whom it loves, in order to warm him so, by its ardent glances, that it may induce him eagerly to reply to its tenderness.

Glances of this sort are particularly remarkable in a woman, under the influence of a tender feeling, when she fixes her penetrating eyes on a man whom she wishes to attract as a lover.

The expression of this latter class of feelings, is what is peculiarly piercing. 'Tis it, if I do not mistake, that renders remarkably brilliant and searching the visual ray, that denotes an imagination metaphysically inclined.

The austere class however, take a deeper, stronger hold of the mind, and are much more powerful in stamping it with a character, indicative of a metaphysically directed imagination.

If my observations on the few Spaniards I have seen, do not deceive me, the people of the country that gave them birth, are endowed,—to the highest degree in which they ever subsist,—with the two classes of feelings above mentioned. Those of the austere kind, determine their imagination strongly into a metaphysical direction, while the other, of a fond description, give full perfection to her power to advance in it, according to her wishes, by enabling her rays to dart, like lightening, into the mind of the person to whom she is fondly inclined, and to open to her gaze its secret recesses.

The feelings that impel the imagination of the Irish into a metaphysical direction, leave her shorn of her beams: for they seem to me, entirely to belong to the austere class; so that the eyes of my countrymen are not animated by the sparkling brilliancy and poignant flashes, which they would borrow from their imagination, were it under the influence of an amatory class of feelings metaphysically inclined.

I do not mean, however, that the eyes of the Irish do not often express an imagination very susceptible of giving full expansion both to joyous and tender affections. They do, indeed, and they are, in consequence, faithful interpreters of the emotions of their heart, which is usually soft and loving. But their fond, affectionate feelings, are in immediate connexion with that portion of their imagination which is directed on sensible objects. No doubt, the two divisions of their mental feelings, which are ranged under the two portions of their imagination, combine together, and have a great mutual influence.

To render more evident the notions that I am unfolding, I shall mention one peculiarity in the eyes of the Irish, that is, I believe, increased, by the metaphysical portion of their imagination being deprived of those rays of expression, which would belong to it, were it given to them in full perfection; and which would render its expression brilliant and piercing.

The Irish, like all the people of the north whom I have seen, are liable, when compared with the natives of the south, to have a cloudy appearance in their eyes. Whether the nebulous veil which seems to be inserted in that feature, is commonly thicker in them than in other inhabitants of the north;

or whether the vivacity of their look, makes the vapour which appears to obscure the rays emitted by their imagination, become more remarkable, I cannot say, but the cloud or fog which often, in the Irish, dulls the orb of sight, strikes me as being more conspicuous than is a similar one in any other people.

The consequence is, that the eyes of my countrymen are very apt to appear to me like the sun when he is covered with a mist, which blunts and confusedly scatters his beams.

Even when the eyes of the Irish are comparatively clear, their rays, instead of darting abroad bright and piercing—as the fund of their expression would lead you to expect—seem as if some mellowing touches had softly blunted and rubbed them down. The look which they, in consequence, have, is, I think agreeable, and it is one, I believe, peculiar to the Irish.*

But those vivid, pungent rays, which a metaphysically inclined imagination, when it subsists in perfection, emits through the eyes, and of which nature has deprived the Irish, animate, as I believe, the countenance of another people, that nevertheless, I think, may be classed among those who are chiefly under the influence of a sensibly directed imagination.

I mean the Germans, of whom I have seen a few, in the midst of whose eyes played a sparkling, penetrating ray which was not, as I thought, analogous to the rest of their expression, and it seemed to me as if it would have exactly completed, in a simple, uniform manner, the expression of the visual orb among the Irish.†

* The rays of the mind do not escape in a straight line from the eyes of the French any more than from those of the Irish, and, though the appearance of this phenomenon be different in the two people, since in the French it seems connected with the cause retaining within them an extraordinary quantity of the animating element, yet does it often communicate to their eyes an expression somewhat similar, notwithstanding the superior degree of fixed lustre constantly exhibited by those of the French.

† That is, supposing their style of features to be changed so as to suit this overplus of expression, for the Irish, like all other people, have an entire countenance correspondent to the language of their eyes.

In regard to the distribution, between them and the Germans, of an expression similar to that of the Spaniards—allowance made, however, for a greater or less ardour of expression according to the heat of the climate—the reader will probably smile at this fancy, as odd and whimsical. I think it advisable then to say, that I only mention it because I do not wish to omit any remark that may serve to give the reader a clear idea of the man-

## CHAPTER XXVI.

### SOME PECULIARITIES IN THE COUNTENANCE AND CHARACTER OF THE FRENCH.

There is still another peculiarity in the French national expression of countenance, which I shall try to explain.

All their social feelings flow with uncommon vivacity and abundance, on account of that part of the element which is mixed with nerves, coming completely forward to their eyes and forehead, without being at all concentrated, as it is in the English.

The nerves mingled with the second part of the element, when they come forward in the constrained, complicated manner which they do in the French, cause the feelings to act tumultuously, and do not permit the sense of order to reduce them to a regular, harmonious flow.

For these reasons,—and, on account of their extreme vivacity,—the feelings of the French would never desist from violent, unruly operations, if nature had not implanted in their constitution, a means of guarding them against the abuses whither their uncontroled feelings might lead them.

This she has done, by giving them a very extraordinary ability and disposition to exercise, incessantly, their reasoning powers. Their very look, whenever they appear grave and thoughtful, seems to me to announce that their mental constitution peculiarly fits them to pursue, with vigour, one pro-

ner in which my imagination was struck, when it engaged me to analyse the national expression of the human countenance. I believe the method that it suggested to me to be a good one, on account of the success with which it has been crowned, in giving me true information respecting a stranger's country, notwithstanding the very limited opportunities that I have had to compare together the natives of different countries, and the great disadvantage, which I have always laboured under, of being short sighted.

As to the ideas which I have expressed, concerning the analogy that appears to me to exist between the aspects of the Spaniards, Irish and Germans, I would be very presumptuous did I offer them with an air of confidence in their truth, where I have not had an opportunity to confirm myself in the belief of them, by being frequently, at the same time, in company with natives of the three countries, and directing an attentive glance from the one to the others. I never had even an opportunity of seeing natives of two of these countries in presence of each other, so as to be able to compare their countenances together.

found train of thought. The quantity of the animating element which is accumulated within them, appears to be only what is necessary for giving to their mind sufficient activity to follow, with intense earnestness, an abstruse chain of reasoning, through all its most hidden branches. If their feelings tend to dissipate and confound their ideas, their reason prompts them to concentrate and marshal them. Among most of them this faculty is principally occupied in giving laws to their feelings: and it displays such vigilance in doing so, that, however confusedly and impetuously their feelings may be tempted to break forth, it rarely fails of effectually checking them, and obliging them to march regularly, in succession, as it may prescribe.

That its constant interference, in order to discipline them, has very salutary effects on the character of the French, I am convinced; but as nature, however liberal she may be to us of well balanced faculties and inclinations, always leaves us liable to fall into some extreme, so in guarding the French, by giving strength and activity to their reason, against the danger of being blindly hurried by tumultuous and conflicting passions, she has not secured them against the temptation greatly to abuse the former attribute. They make a wrong use of it in two manners:

First—By allowing it to listen too much to the demands of frivolous, inconstant tastes and passions. It therefore settles society on a basis agreeable to them, and the code of laws which it digests for the regulation of it, is such as widely to spread the inclination to indulge them, and to sanction their caprices.

Secondly—By permitting it to subject society to such a minute, inflexible system of laws, as to give it a cold, artificial form. The finer feelings of the heart, which cannot expand where they are not allowed to exert themselves with some freedom, wither in consequence, and a conventional good breeding is too much substituted for the genuine expression of good nature and kindness.

The French find it the easier to prevent their social feelings from indignantly throwing off the chilling yoke of a code of polite usages, emanating from a critical intellect and not from

warm sentiments, because, such is their dread of the censure of society, that its chilling influence could blight their most ardent feelings, if they expected to incur its displeasure by letting them appear.

As the French are surrounded by various nations contiguous to them, it is to be supposed that their character offers many shades of distinction, according as it approximates, near their frontiers, to those of their various neighbours.

I believe, from many things which I have heard said by the French, that the principal variety exhibited by their character is the Gascon one, which subsists in a wide extent of country spreading from the foot of the Pyrenees. 'Tis the only variety of it that I have had the least opportunity to observe, and I took of it but a very cursory survey, which however suggested to me a few ideas that I shall disclose to the reader.

So far up as Bourdeaux, or the off side from Paris of the Garonne, I believe that the French character begins to incline towards the Spanish. The Gascons, compared with their more northern countrymen, are remarkable for eyes beaming joyously, and which announce that in them the softer feelings—connected with a metaphysically disposed imagination—act with as much freedom and vivacity as the more austere ones. This does not appear to me to be the case with the northern French, for what I have already said of the discordance, observable in that nation, between a gloomily inclined imagination and lively, sociable feelings, is peculiarly applicable to them.

Though the Gascon imagination resembles, I believe, the Spanish, in being equally favourable to the free expansion of all the feelings, whether they be of a joyous and sociable, or of a severe kind, the animating element exciting it remains, I think, in the Gascons, in the same quantity as in the French in general, but it seems, in them, more at ease, as though the fetters binding it were beginning to be loosened, preparatory to its obtaining liberty, among the Spaniards, to flow with a free current. It is still, however, in the Gascons, too much confined, to allow of their imagination moving completely in a metaphysical direction.

The moral feelings of the Gascons are, like those of the

French in general, lively, varied, and sociable. They are, therefore, as I presume, a much more joyously and sociably disposed race than the Spaniards: though, in the latter people, I judge, that imagination replies, faithfully, to all the feelings of the heart, whatever be their character, yet, I believe, that feelings of an exhilarating, sociable nature, rise in much greater abundance in the French than in the Spaniards.

The Gascons, I am told, are more susceptible of a deep and durable resentment for conceived injuries, than the rest of the French. If this be the case, it affords a proof of the approximation of their character to that of the Spaniards, since the latter are noted for an unforgiving temper.

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## CHAPTER XXVII.

### CERTAIN PHYSICAL SENSATIONS, CAUSED BY ANGUISH OF MIND, WHICH ARE PECULIAR TO THE FRENCH AND ENGLISH.

I believe, that the different quantities in which the animating element rests in the human frame, and the greater or less advance, towards the forehead and eyes, of the nerves involved with a part of it, cause a diversity in the physical sensations proceeding from distress of mind.

The French, in whom the nerves come very forward to the front of the head, and who are filled with a superabundance of the element, commonly, I am told, when they are excruciated by a poignant mental anguish, feel as if many fibres, spread over the surface of their forehead, were breaking. This affection is, I believe, not so much known in the countries where the fine part of the element unmixed with nerves, flows more forward to the front of the head, than the remaining portion: nor is it, I imagine, felt to the same degree by those natives of the south of Europe, who, though the whole of the element comes as forward in them as in the French, differ from them, by not containing in their frames so great a quantity of it.

I have sometimes perceived that English persons were a prey to unutterable mental anguish, though their countenances were calm. A strong quivering motion in their eyes, such as I have never remarked in those of the natives of any other country, betrayed their inward agonies. Considering the difference, which I have already pointed out, between their organization and that of the French, it seems to me probable, that, on those cruel occasions they experience, in some internal fibres of the brain, sensations analogous to those which the suffering Frenchman feels in the fibres of the forehead; the sensations of the English are probably connected with a more concentrated and oppressive, though less violent grief.

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## CHAPTER XXVIII.

### COMPARISON OF THE FRENCH, SCOTCH, AND IRISH, RELATIVELY TO THE ACTION IN THEIR HEAD OF THE ANIMATING ELEMENT.

Notwithstanding the different characteristics of the aspects of the French and of the Scotch, there is between them a striking point of resemblance, which I long perceived ere I was able to decipher the cause of it.

I came at last to the conclusion that it arises from the element, that escapes from their countenances and particularly from their eyes, flowing from them in a steady determined manner.

The precision which, in its passage, its movements seem to observe, proceeds, I think, in the French from their being constituted so as to keep the element in subordination to their intellectual faculties, though it serves to call them into action. It accordingly preserves, in issuing from their countenances, that regular, equable motion which those faculties impart to it.

In the Scotch the intellectual faculties act, no doubt, with vigour and fineness, but they do not seem, instinctively, to fill the place of watchful inspectors, regulating, minutely, the

march of the element which puts in motion all the faculties and qualities of the human mind.

What appears to me to cause it to part from their countenances in a firm, decided manner, is, that the portion of it which,—mingled with nerves—is drawn far back in their heads, acquires great force from its condensation, and that it bears, evenly, on all the finer part spread between it and the front of the head, so that this finer part, still as it escapes from the eyes and face, flows in a direction communicated to it by the force that from behind, urges it forward, and gains, from this pressure, a great elastic energy.

Though the Irish have, also, a fine, ingenious intellect, yet the conformation of head which gives it to them, does not seem, as it does in the French, to keep the motions of the animating element subordinate to its operations. Nor does the second portion form, as it does in the Scotch, a hinder rank, able to support and give energy to the finer portion before it. The second portion, or that mixed with nerves, by flowing forward, in a concentrated manner, to the front of the eyes, and escaping from them freely, takes a direction which prevents it from fully bearing on the finer portion, or communicating great strength to it. This peculiarity renders, I believe, the character of the Irish, in some respects, weaker and less decided than that of the Scotch.*

## CHAPTER XXIX.

### FURTHER REMARKS APPLIED TO THE CHARACTER OF THE IRISH, ON THE ANIMATING ELEMENT.

The finer portion of the element seems, in itself, to take no other effect on the mind than just to dispose it to tender senti-

* It also gives them a great propensity to indolence; to which defect, more than to the humidity of their climate may, I believe, be attributed the strong temptation, that by their constitution they are exposed to, to indulge, in the midst of their convivial meetings, in inebriating draughts. Their animal spirits seem to them to require this stimulant, from not being, in their natural state, adequate to the demands of their lively, social feelings. These feelings are the more restless within them, as I mean shortly to remark in the text, from being rather pent up, on account of not being sufficiently seconded, and encouraged to expand by their imagination.

ments and to exalt the imagination. But when it is mingled with the second portion, or that it is acted on by it, it offers no opposition to its stamping on the character the impress of every discordant passion congenial to the human mind.

The finer portion of the element, by being, in the Irish, exempted, from the influence of the remaining part, surrounds the central spot, in which that remaining part—as the expression of their eyes indicates—comes forward mingled with nerves, and gives to the portion of their imagination, on which it acts, a metaphysical direction; it surrounds that spot with a propensity to yield to tender emotions, and to be governed by a sensibly inclined imagination, pure and exalted. Such a propensity, influencing the metaphysically inclined portion of the imagination of the Irish, commonly teaches them tenderly to feel for the neighbour whose mind they scrutinize, and to treat him with indulgent humanity. It inclines them to generosity, by rendering them deeply sensible, that justice imposes on us the obligation to deal by others, as we should think, in their place, that we ought to be dealt by.

There is not, in the Irish, that correspondence and harmony between the mental feelings and imagination which usually, I believe, subsists in those countries, whose natives are exclusively under the influence of an imagination having one, unconstrained and uniform direction.

The Irish have many feelings, particularly such as give a propensity to invent humorous and comical jokes, that seem to proceed from that conformation of the head, which renders part of their imagination prone to take a metaphysical direction. Were their natural organization framed then, agreeably to the laws of strict harmony, the portion of their imagination metaphysically inclined, would willingly second all the effusions of wit and humour, in which their comic inclinations tempt them to indulge. Now this does not seem to me to be the case. Though imagination, in the Irish, appears, in general, of a less gloomy habit than in the French, the metaphysical portion of it, in the former, is, nevertheless, rather gloomily and, throughout, austerely inclined.

As to the sensibly directed portion of it, which, as I have already noticed, is, in them, remarkably soft and tender, it is

generally silent when their lively and comic feelings are in action, as finding itself to have no affinity with them. The consequence is, that when the Irish are in a merry mood, they seldom indulge in effusions of gaiety, which reflect the brilliant colours of an active imagination, or are agreeable to a refined taste.(a) The intellect too of the Irish, though I do not believe that it yields much to that of the French in either vivacity or acuteness, does not continually watch, like theirs, to regulate, finely and judiciously, their social pleasures. The Irish, when they indulge in merriment, too often seem merely to give the reins to wild animal spirits.

If the metaphysically inclined portion of their imagination seems, sometimes, at such moments awake in them, it only serves to render them more troublesome to the persons in company with them, for it engages them to watch them, imperiously, in order to discover whether they quite approve of their tumultuous behaviour, and to grow angry and quarrelsome, should they suspect them of secretly disliking it.*

I mean to return to this subject in a future chapter, when I shall be freer, than I am at present, minutely to treat of the character of the Irish.

* I think it probable that the Spaniards offer the most perfect model in existence, in Europe, of an organization completely adapted to a metaphysically directed imagination. But even in the Spaniards does every feeling of the mind, as soon as it is excited, communicate to the imagination a suitable impulsion, with that beautiful simplicity with which, in the Scotch and the Romans, the mental feelings act—though in different manners—on the imagination?

I think it probable that such is not the case.

In the few Spaniards whom I have seen, I have observed, particularly when their eyes were animated with an ardent fire, something rough in their expression, which led me to compare it, in a former note, to a rapid stream forcing itself a passage among rocks. I therefore judge it to be likely that, though every mental feeling of the Spaniards may have its due share of influence on their imagination, yet that they do not all unite with it so freely as to appear, from the moment that they begin to manifest themselves, identified with it.

## NOTE TO THE TWENTY-NINTH CHAPTER.

(*See page* 466.)

(*a*) Some activity of imagination seems essential to the excitement of every mental feeling, to whatever class it may belong. My observations then, on the inertness of this faculty in the Irish, at the times when they greatly indulge in certain social feelings, refer to a comparison of them with other nations. The Irish have, I think, to the full, as rich and delicate an imagination as their neighbours; they have also a lively intellect proper to suggest to them a great variety of agreeable and witty ideas. Yet, when their animal spirits are greatly excited, they seem to withdraw many of them, in a singular manner, from the influence, either of an intellect that could furnish them with an agreeable variety of conversation, or of an imagination that could, in the eyes of the spectator, give to their recreations a pleasing effect. The consequence is, that their social amusements are liable to have a vulgar tone. Often too do they conduct to broils and strife. Those who do not perceive how much the Irish are subject to be carried away by their animal spirits, beyond the bounds which either a lively intellect or a brilliant imagination would prescribe to them, have only to compare the appearance which they make when their spirits are highly raised by social pleasure, with that which the Scotch, on similar occasions, present. The latter, when they give a loose to mirth in joyous assemblies, are usually governed instinctively by an imagination so lively and correct, that it causes them to form a living picture worthy the admiration of beholders.

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